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Abstract 
Inside Youth Justice: Conflict and Contradiction in the 
Remand Management of Young Offenders 
by 
Rob Homsby 
A thesis based on research conducted at a Youth Offending Service in the North 
of England. As an essential part of the Youth Justice Board's central aim to 'reduce 
youth offending' bail supervision and support projects, integrated with Youth 
Offending Services are an intrinsic factor of this overall aim. Bail supervision and 
support is targeted at those young offenders perceived to be at risk of being remanded 
into custody or, local authority accommodation while awaiting trial for their suspected 
offences. 
The research presents an ethnographic case study of one such project in the 
north of England. For a significant minority of 'hardcore' persistent young offenders 
referred to and accepted onto the project, this thesis argues that this particular aspect 
of youth justice intervention offers little in its central aim to reduce re-offending by 
young people on bail. The study contends that bail supervision and support proposes 
pragmatic interventions for the majority of its target group for a significant sub- 
sample of its population the project offered little by way of intervention that were 
aimed at transforming the criminal lifestyles of this problematic group of young 
offenders. The study examines the role of inter-agency partnerships in dealing with 
young offenders and utilizes an ethnographic approach in which to examine this 
aspect of the new youth justice system. 
The thesis argues that although welfare approaches in dealing with young 
offenders appear, on the surface, to be child focused interventions, the entrenched 
organisational cultural disparities limit the potential of the youth justice system in 
addressing juvenile delinquency, whilst paradoxically attempting to deal with them as 
'children in need'. The strains, conflicts and contradictions involved with the delivery 
of multi-agency approaches within the contemporary milieu are examined and 
questioned. It is argued that the current system for dealing with this category of 
young offenders requires a far more welfare-orientated focus in order to deal with a 
heavily flawed youth justice system. 
Table of Contents 
List of 
Tables ...................................................................................................... vi 
List of Diagrams and 
Charts .................................................................................................... vii 
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................... ix 
Chapter One: 
Introduction .................................................................................................... I 
Chapter Two: 
Methods ...................................................................................................... 14 
Chapter Three: Locking Up or Bailing 
Chapter Four: An Appropriate 
Adult ................................................................................................................ 95 
Chapter Five: Conflict and 
Contradiction 
........................................................................................... 139 
Chapter Six: Between a Rock and a not as Hard 
Place .................................................................................................... 182 
Chapter Seven: Bail Supervision and Support in 
Practice 
.................................................................................................................... 229 
Chapter Eight: Overview and 
Bibliography 
.......................................................................................... 294 
Appendix A: A Dispossessed 
city ..................................................................................................... 320 
List of Tables 
Tables 
Table One: Police Bail Decisions: Detention/Release from Police Stations 1998- 
2001 ......................................................................................................... 63 
Table Two: Cases at Magistrate's Courts' 1998-2001: Types of 
Remands ................................................................................................... 69 
Table Three: Police and Magistrates Courts Opposition to Bail 1998- 
2001 ......................................................................................................... 69 
Table Four: Children and Young People Denied Police Bail: July-September 
2000 ....................................................................................................... 134 
Table 5: Funding of Project ........................................................................... 147 
Table 6: Local and Regional Magistrates' Courts' Custodial and Community Sentencing 
Rates of Young Offenders: 2000 .................................................................... . 202 
Table Seven: Remand Decisions by Age and Gender 
in Sunderland: 01/04/00-31/12/2000 ................................................................ . 203 
Table Eight: Remand Episodes Ordered by Courts' in Sunderland: 01/04/00- 
31/12/2000 ................................................................................................. . 205 
Table Nine: All England and Wales Remand Episodes 01/01/01 to 31/12/01 .................. 227 
Table Ten: Young People's Views of Specific Areas of BSS Focus ............................. 265 
Table Eleven: Sunderland Population Estimates and Projections 1961-2011 ................... 324 
Table Twelve: Housing Statistics: Number of Dwellings April 2000 ............................. 333 
Table Thirteen: Average House Prices November 2000 .......................................... 334 
Table Fourteen: Permanent Sickness Figures 1986 ................................................ . 336 
Table Fifteen: Increasing Incapacity Benefit Recipients (1986 & 2002) ........................ 337 
Table Sixteen: Working Aged Incapacity in the City of Sunderland: Number of 
vi 
Incapacity Benefits Claimants, August 2002 ......................................................... 
337 
Table Seventeen: Incapacity Rate ....................................................................... 
338 
Table Eighteen: Working Aged Population, Employment (EA), Incapacity in Sunderland 
1999-2000 ................................................................................................. 
338 
Table Nineteen: Employment Deprived Population of Sunderland 1998-1999 .................. 339 
Table Twenty: National, Regional and Local IB Figures ............................................. 
339 
vii 
List of Diagrams and Charts 
Diagrams 
Diagram One: The Bridge Police Station Charge Room .......................................... 88 
Diagram Two: The Flow of Youth Justice Bail and Remand Decisions ........................ 157 
Diagram Three: Multi-Agency Approach of the BSS Project ................................... 163 
Diagram Four: The Office: The Key Players ...................................................... 231 
Charts 
Chart One: Interventions and Level of Supervision and Support .............................. . 161 
Chart Two: Rates of Remands by category by the courts' in Sunderland: 01/04/00- 
31/12/2000 
............................................................................................... . 
206 
Chart Three: All Remand Decisions and BSS Decisions ....................................... . 
207 
Chart Four: Young People Charged Whilst Subject to BSS and 
RLAA Remand 01/04/00-31/12/00 .................................................................. 208 
Chart Five: Re-Offending & Breach Rates on BSS Nov. 1999 - Jan. 2002 .................. 268 
Chart Six: Aggregate BSS and Breach Re-Offending Data ..................................... . 
269 
Chart Seven: Remand Management of Target Group ............................................ . 270 
Chart Eight: BSS Target Group and Remand Decision Outcomes .............................. . 273 
Chart Nine: Remand Totals Nov. 1999 - Jan. 2002 ................................................ . 
274 
viii 
Acknowledgements 
My gratitude is expressed to the young people and youth justice workers who allowed 
me to share in their experiences within the mechanics of the youth justice system. A 
number of the young people permitted me to observe and discuss a range of other 
experiences that they encountered within their natural habitats and I am grateful to them 
for the views they allowed of the 'other-side'. 
Kate O'Brien has been solid and Phil Hadfield has been supportive, my thanks 
to them both. To Dick Hobbs I express my immense gratitude for his advice, support 
and humour. My thanks are also expressed to my friends and family, especially Mum 
and Ben, Dad and Jan, Joe and Rita Hunter, Tony and Liz, Ashleigh and Asa, Kris and 
Dave. 
I'm obliged to acknowledge that the greatest debt I owe is to Joanne, Ruby 
and Alexander. 
ix 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Setting the Scene: Context and Rationale 
Aims of the Study 
This study has two distinct aims. First, to present a study of the relationship of young 
offenders to the current youth justice system. The second aim is to provide empirically based 
insights into human relationships, the activities, the processes and experiences of delivering 
and receiving a distinct youth justice intervention, namely Bail Supervision and Support 
(BSS). This thesis discusses the policy rhetoric supplanted onto the new youth justice 
system and provides an empirically grounded understanding of the cacophony of 
relationships involved in the delivery of youthjustice within the contemporary milieu. 
The Research Context 
The research provides analysis of young offender's involvement with, and Youth Offending 
Service (YOS) worker's delivery, of the youthjustice system. The study is intent upon 
providing rich insights of the inner workings of that system. The research was based at a 
local YOS in the North East of England and access was gained by way of a Youth Justice 
Board evaluation into one of its newly sponsored interventions, Bail Supervision and 
Support. 
In 1998, the neW Labour Government implemented fundamental reforms to the 
youth justice system, the most significant of those reforms being the Crime and Disorder Act 
(Card and Ward, 1998; Goldson, 1999a, 2000b; Haines and Drakeford, 1998; Home Office, 
1997a; Leng et al., 1998; Muncie, 1999; Pitts, 2000a, 2001 a; Newburn, 2002; Smith 2003). 
During the mid-1990s there was growing anxiety amongst some politicians and sectors of 
the media that the youth justice system was failing (Sasson, 1995; Audit Commission, 1996, 
1997; Crime and Disorder Act, 1998; Garland, 2001; Reiner, 2002). The concerns focused 
upon a relatively small number of persistent young offenders (Hagell and Newburn, 1994) 
committing criminal offences, on a frequent basis, and then being dealt with by the youth 
justice system, only to be allowed back onto the streets and continuing to re-offend (Audit 
Commission, 1996; Home Office, 1997a; Crime and Disorder Act, 1998). 
The Crime and Disorder Act's aim and objectives were to undo much of what was 
perceived to have been wrong with the previous youth justice system (ibid. ). The Labour 
Government acted hastily upon its election pledge (Pitts, 2000) of 'being tough on crime' 
and 'tough on the causes of crime' by acting on the recommendations of the Audit 
Commission's report 'Misspent Youth'. This report observed that: 
The current system for dealing with youth crime is inefficient and 
expensive, while little is being done to deal effectively with juvenile 
nuisance. The present arrangements are failing young people-who are 
not being guided away from offending towards constructive activities. 
They are also failing victims-those who suffer from young people's 
inconsiderate behaviour and from vandalism and loss of property from 
thefts and burglaries. And they lead to waste in a variety of forms, 
including lost time, as public servants process the same young offenders 
through the courts time and time again; lost rents, as people refuse to 
live in high crime areas; lost business, as people steer clear of troubled 
areas; and a waste of young people's potential. 
(1996: 96) 
This thesis is an analysis of a number of the above statements. With the re- 
configuration of youth justice policy and practice, ovcr-scen by the newly implemented 
Youth Justice Board (YJB), and organised at the local level by Youth Offending 
Teams/Services (YOT/S), major changes were planned for those delivering and receiving 
youth justice. This study was based within a local YOS at its Bail Supervision and Support 
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(BSS) project'. The study deals with a range of disparate practices and conflicting cultures 
found within the youth justice system. The experiences and views from a sample of young 
people engaged within the system, its frontline workers delivering it and a range of other 
youth justice personnel who engaged with the project are considered. 
The research initially began as an evaluation of the BSS project. However as time 
progressed, my own interests involving the daily workings of BSS, from the views of those 
involved with it, began to develop in a way that transcended the scale and scope of the aims 
of the evaluation process. It became clear to me that during the initial implementation 
process of Crime and Disorder Act 1998, a range of conflicting actions were apparent within 
the new multi-agency approach in dealing with young offenders (see, Crawford, 1999; 
Burnett and Appleton, 2004; Souhami, forthcoming). 
Within the current agenda of youth justice research the majority of academic 
studies have focused upon policy orientated evaluations of Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) 
and their practices (see, for example, Bailey and Williams 2000; Holdaway et al. 200 1, 
Burnett and Appleton 2004) and other areas of YOTs specialist interventions (see Newburn 
et al. 2002; Crawford and Newburn, 2003). To date, there has been little sociological insight 
into the organizational culture and associated conflicts involved in the delivery of youth 
justice (Souhami, forthcoming, stands out as an exception) and there is even less recognition 
of young people's experiences within the current system. To date, the research emphasis 
has been policy focused in attempting to demonstrate 'what works' by way of 'evidence- 
based' criminal justice practice (Hester, 2000; Smith, 2003). However, this emphasis has 
largely produced limited insights, if at all, of the internal mechanisms and associated discord 
that is inherent within the delivery of that system (see, Goldson, 1999a; Worrall, 1999). 
Despite the emphasis upon evaluation research of youth justice interventions, it is 
rarely the case that the intricate details of interaction within such organisations are exposed 
(Crawford and Newburn, 2003). What is often representative of the current evaluation 
agenda is that the machine of criminal justice is examined, but rarely are those mechanisms 
Throughout this thesis Bail Supervision and Support will interchangeably be referred to as BSS, Bail Supervision and 
Support, bail support, and the project or project. For those who worked in and around BSS all of these terms were applied 
to Bail Supervision and Support. 
stripped down to expose many of the internal faults within the machine. Indeed, the current 
research emphasis, in the main, continues to be embedded within a 'science-for-govemment' 
agenda (Garland 1994: 60). These forms of 'establishment criminology' (Young 1997: 493) 
are developed and targeted at the management of risk (Feeley and Simon 1994; van 
Swaaningen 1997) and that: 
... of designing barriers, evaluating surveillance, and calculating the 
risk of disturbance ... [A] flourishing evaluation industry develops much 
of which is of little scientific validity, with few bothering to ask 
whether all the cost is worth it to maintain a system which is at basis 
fundamentally flawed. 
(Young: 1997: 494) 
This study seeks to go a little deeper than most that have been located within that 
'evaluation industry' of contemporary youth justice. It provides empirically detailed insights 
into many of the social-relational dynamics and the lived realities engaged within this 
system of social control. This study provides evidence of a range of organisational cultural 
disparities, conflicts and contradictions that occurred in working within, receiving and 
delivering youth justice. 
The study is interpretative, working within an interactionist paradigm. It aims to 
shed light on how those participants involved with the youth justice system experienced the 
situations they were involved with. As an interpretative sociological account of actor's 
experiences of the contemporary youth justice system, the study aims to reflect many of the 
profound contextual realities involved with delivering bail supervision and support. It 
argues that within the contemporary youth justice system, despite many areas of good 
practice which indeed assist young people away from offending and re-offending behaviour, 
the cultures that are imbedded within any organisation can contradict and can work against 
the policy rhetoric (Morgan, 1986). Within the grounded operational realities of the project 
the underlying values, workers beliefs and practical codes (i. e. the culture within the BSS 
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project) were in a state of flux to that of the YJB championing of the new system's 
managerialism strategy (see Newburn, 1998). Connected to other organisation's often non- 
complimentary ideological stances on 'how best' to deal with young offenders, the social 
interactions in and between the organisational cultures involved with BSS did not cultivate a 
harmonious state of affairs. 
And then there were the young offenders. Within this group who came onto BSS, 
many of them were from a different cultural mind-set to that of 'mainstream society'. They 
often broke the law and by way of their offending-related histories, they had attained a 
dubious status as some of Sunderland's most prolific young offenders. Few of the young 
people who came onto BSS went to school. Many had been without consistent mainstream 
education for years. Dealings with the police, the courts, the local YOS and its 
predecessor, the Sunderland Youth Justice Service, were common occurrences for many of 
the young people who came onto BSS. Via a range of inter-relating sub-cultural practices, 
their involvement with the youth justice system was an intrinsic aspect of their natural 
habitat. Their associations with the system had often gone on for years, sometimes 
consistently, with little to no respite. Their disassociation (Downes, 1966) from mainstream 
aims was often compensated by way of entrenched engagement in deviant action (ibid. ). 
Conscious of their place in society, they often accommodated the structural arrangements 
that aligned their status by rejecting both middle-class and respectable working-class norms 
(Gill, 1977). They were, what would have previously labelled as 'deprived',. 'poor' or 
'marginalized' youth and within the present-day context are termed as socially excluded 
young people. The majority came from the most run-down and economically depressed 
local authority housing estates that ringed the periphery of the city. 
Within the city, unemployment and long-term sickness (incapacity) of the adult 
population is high, school leavers educational attainment is low, the denizens health is poor, 
teenage pregnancy rates well-above the national average, wages below the national rate and 
a range of other key characteristics of social exclusion are embedded within the city's 
cultural composition (TWRI, 200 1; TWDR, 2001,2002; City of Sunderland, 2000,200 1). 
Despite a proud yet withering industrial heritage (House, 1969; Dennis, 1970; McCord, 
1977; Townsend, el al., 1986; Corfe, 1988; Milburn and Miller, 1988. ), the city now takes 
on the appearance of a"clapped-out industrial dump' (Byrne, 2001: 59. [See Appendix A for 
a discussion]). As the third, fourth and fifth generations of the city's economically 
dispossessed stratum, disassociation had become the norm for the young offenders who 
came onto BSS. 
To a range of the new youth justice system's 'stakeholders', Bail Supervision and 
Support seemed to offer a less austere 'remand management' strategy to that of remanding 
young people to prisons and local authority care homes. In dealing with the cultural 
disassociation of its 'target group' and in promoting its service to other agencies who were 
often in favour of following more punitive pathways in dealing with the more serious types 
of young offenders, a range of organisational and culturally embedded obstacles littered this 
particular youth justice trail. Despite government and YJB embellishment of the workings 
and effects of the contemporary youth justice system (Burnett and Appleton, 2004), this 
thesis argues that there are many divisions which impede its aims and objectives. 
Researching the New System 
Studies of the contemporary youth justice system have tended to focus upon the policy 
implications of the system (Haines and Drakeford, 1998; Goldson, 1999a, 2000b, 2001; 
Pickford, 2000; Newbum, 1999,2002; Pitts, 2000; Padfield, 2002; Smith, 2003); distinct 
theoretical 'models' of youth justice (Pratt, 1989; Newbum, 1997; Goldson, 1999b; Muncie, 
1999b); preventing youth crime (Hagell and Newburn, 1994; Audit Commission, 1996; 
Farrington, 1996; Rutter et aL, 1998) and delivering the new youth justice system through 
multi-agency partnerships (Chapman and Hough, 1998; Pitts and Hope, 1998; Crawford and 
Newburn, 2003; Burnett and Appleton, 2004; Smith, 2003). This thesis acknowledges that 
the above discussions and arguments relating to the contemporary youth justice system 
provide useful insights as to how the state views, and attempts to deal with troublesome 
young people. However, they do have a tendency to omit one intrinsic factor; this being the 
grounded experiences of a range of actors involved with this system. 
The current youth justice criminological predisposition has been dominated by the 
&government project' (Garland, 1997,2001; Morgan, 2000) and is guided by political 
objectives and indeed, dealing with youth offending is viewed as a potential vote-winner 
within the political agenda (Pitts, 2000a, Goldson, 2000c). The majority of the literature 
relating to youth crime and youth justice has become an element of the current 
'managerialism' (Newburn, 1998) strategy in dealing with deviant youth (Pitts, 2001a; 
Muncie, 2002). 
This thesis goes beyond, whist still maintaining sight of the policy implications of 
youth justice, and delves deeper into the arena of BSS by gaining understandings of 
participant's social lives and personal experiences. The participants in this study came from 
a cross-section of actors within the contemporary youth justice system. They include for 
example; young people (young offenders), their parents or guard ians/carers, Youth 
Offending Service (YOS) workers, police officers and magistrates. 
BSS: A Brief Overview 
The intervention of BSS is targeted at young offenders in at the deep-end of the youth 
justice system. It is aimed at those young people who are in danger of being remanded into 
custody (either a Young Offenders Institution [prison], local authority-secure 
accommodation or, a local authority care home). The intervention is managed by Youth 
Offending Teams/ Services (YOTsNOS) and attempts to step into the breach if magistrates 
consider applying a 'remand' decision to young people by taking away their right to bail. 
BSS central aim is to assist young people in not re-offending while they are on bail. The 
BSS 'target group' were the higher risk offenders within the city. 
As a 'remand management' intervention, BSS attempts to safeguard young 
suspects' rights to remain at I iberty during episodes of engagement with the youth justice 
system. Following arrest, charge and the court pre-trial process a range of different agencies 
become involved in making decisions that might affect a young suspect's right to bail. In 
such situations the danger is that young people can be 'remanded' into institutions (either 
secure or un-secure). This is recognised as a damaging consequence for such young people 
(Monaghan, 2000; Goldson, 2002), whilst at the same time re-assuring a number of criminal 
justice agencies and local communities that such remand decisions are required in order to 
protect the public. 
For the majority of young people who enter the youth justice system and appear at 
court, most will not require remand management services (Thomas, 2004). Following 
arrest, charge and bail by the police, the courts subsequently follow this course of action in 
87% of pre-trial hearings (ibid. 91). In the majority of cases young people will be placed on 
unconditional or conditional bail and will be at liberty to remain within their communities 
whilst their cases continue (YJB, 2003). 
However, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) may object to bail being granted 
for those young people. Such objections are raised when it is assumed that young suspects, 
if granted bail, might not appear at court at a later date or, the young person will continue to 
offend or, for those who might interfere with witnesses and obstruct the justice process or, 
because of the seriousness of the offence that they have been charged with (PACE, 1984; 
Cavadino and Gibson, 1993). For these types of young suspects the application of remand 
management services will become the focus of the youth justice system. The aim is to limit 
the potential that the refusal of bail might see young suspects being remanded into an 
institution. Bail Supervision and Support, as a remand management service, aims to rescue 
such young people from the clutches of far harsher remand management regimes (i. e. prison, 
secure local authority accommodation and un-secure local authority accommodation). As 
an integrated YOS intervention, BSS (implemented nationally by the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998), is an intrinsically welfare-orientated intervention. 
The central focus of BSS is to rescue its target group from the damage that 
institutional remands are known to have upon young people. Remand episodes are 
recognised as problematic to those who have a tendency to self-harm, and it also causes 
disruption to education and family-life, and impacts upon mental-health and is linked to 
intimidation and bullying (Liebling, 1996; HMIP, 2000; Moore and Smith, 2001; Goldson, 
2002). The BSS project would offer the courts bail related 'remedies' in to appease the 
concerns of the courts relating to young suspect's potential adherence to bail conditions. In 
such scenarios the BSS project offered to undertake the 'supervision and support' of young 
people given conditional bail (BSS being one of those conditions), by way of individually 
tailored interventions aimed at reducing the risks of re-offending whilst on bail. 
BSS links into a number of multi-agency perspectives within the 'new youth justice 
system' (Goldson, 2000b). This thesis will explore the extent of inter-connected dilemmas 
found within the system and in providing BSS. Throughout this thesis the guiding thread 
will be to unravel the policy and practice of delivering and receiving youth justice. 
The Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Each chapter's aim is intent in demonstrating the 
chronological flow of inter-related youth justice processes that are involved in the provision 
of BSS. The structure of the thesis aims to follow the narrative of youth justice decisions 
that are connected to the project at innate stages of procedures that occur at relevant stages 
of the youth justice process. 
In the following chapter there is a discussion of the methods that were undertaken 
in order to conduct the research. As an intervention, BSS crosses and overlaps with a 
number of other youth justice agencies within the system. It involves the police, 
magistrates, social workers, YOS workers, young people and a host of other individuals and 
agencies. This meant that in conducting a participant observation study my time in the field 
saw me engage with a range of actors, a variety of research-sites and also involved the 
'observer' participating in a number of research roles. Thus, the researcher engaged with 
this study as a 'worker and as a witness' (Smith, 2001: 229) of the youth justice system. 
Within this chapter I provide details relating to the trials and tribulations of conducting 
research from within the youth justice system. 
In Chapter Three there is a discussion of what happens once young suspects have 
been arrested and charged for committing criminal offences. This chapter provides a 
number of critical perspectives associated with bail decisions. A number of interrelated bail 
matters are considered. These vary from the legislation of bail from a legal perspective to 
the cultural practices of the police, Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), and magistrate's 
courts'. The discussion also reviews much of the theoretical implications relating to this 
facet of the criminal justice system. 
For a clear understanding of what bail is, how it operates, and as to how it fitted 
into the youth justice provision of bail supervision and support, the determining issue of bail 
decisions is required to be discussed. This chapter includes an analysis of bail law, policy 
and practice within a socio-legal framework of discussion in order to understand as to how 
the provision of BSS connected with a range of other determinant factors involved in the 
provision of youth justice. The analysis will be grounded in an understanding of what bail is, 
what constitutes a bail decision, and the ways this crucial component of the criminal justice 
process can affect individuals during the pre-trial stage and later involvement within the 
system. 
Chapter Four develops the previous chapter's examination of the right or, refusal 
of bail decisions made at police stations and subsequently at magistrate's courts. This chapter 
will extend this analysis at the level of practice from within the mechanisms of the youth 
justice system, by way of an ethnographic study of the role of the Appropriate Adult and of 
young suspects held at police stations. This is based upon fieldwork conducted as an 
Appropriate Adult at police stations in the North east of England. It offers an insight into 
police decision making processes as to who 'gets out', and who 'stays in' at police stations 
after charges to young suspects have been made by Custody Officers. The findings of this 
chapter demonstrate issues relating to a police sub-culture, and areas of malpractice relating to 
young suspects. From a theoretical perspective an examination of three models of the criminal 
justice system are reviewed and considered. 
Chapter Five deals with the central factor of this research, this being bail supervision 
and support. As a youthjustice intervention bail supervision and support was intent of 
rescuing the more troublesome of young offenders from the worst case scenarios that could be 
offered by the youth justice system, often involving remands into custody. This chapter details 
a case study of one such bail supervision and support project in the North of England. I 
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examine the organisational strains and pragmatic realities involved in delivering this aspect of 
the youthjustice system. A central tenet of this chapter focuses upon the aims of the YJB of 
overseeing Bail Supervision and Support as an intervention designed to reduce the institutional 
remands of young people. This chapter examines the organisational strains of the BSS project 
in its attainment of this and other objectives relating to the delivery of this service. 
In this chapter the relevant issues relating to the local BSS project's 'clients', these 
being the young people who went onto BSS, will add a further dimension in understanding the 
structure and function of this particular aspect of a youth justice/social work welfare orientated 
intervention. Paradoxically, this can also be viewed, as a system of social control, targeted 
towards some of the city's most serious and/or persistent young offenders. 
Chapter Six examines the inter-related issue of the state's inherent failure in 
providing 'alternative' accommodation, to that of remanding young people into custody. 
There is a discussion of a number of inter-related problems in providing an all-encompassing 
range of interventions that the youth justice system claims to provide in attempting to 
maintain the equilibrium between the welfare and punishment of young offenders. This 
chapter examines other alternative accommodation interventions, which were utilised by the 
project, in order to influence local magistrates that other welfare-orientated interventions 
were available for young people in danger of being remanded into custody. 
I examine the provision of local authority secure accommodation for young 
offenders which is intended to offer a 'better' and more welfare focused alternative to that of 
remanding young people into Young Offenders Institutions (YOI). It is argued that public 
and state apathy towards the treatment of young offenders within the youth justice system, 
encourages a continued denial of the damaging effects that remands into custody have upon 
young people. 
In Chapter Seven, there is a summary of findings relating to the intended aim of the 
bail supervision and support project. In this section a number problems, failures, and 
successes of the project's delivery are discussed. This will involve considering the tensions 
and weaknesses that are to be found within this aspect of youth justice delivery. In this 
chapter there is discussion of some of the unsanctioned and informal activities that were to 
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be found in the delivery of bail supervision and support. There is a discussion of the youth 
justice 'shop-floor' relations, which involved considerable conflicts and resistance to the 
new policy rhetoric imposed by new youth justice system. 
With the implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, major changes were 
planned for the delivery of youth justice within the conceptual isation of multi and inter- 
agency approaches in dealing with young offenders (Crawford, 1998; Anderson, 1999; 
Hester, 2000; Muncie, 2000; Newburn, 2002). The drive within the new policy rhetoric was 
one of a corporatist approach (Pratt, 1989) to youth justice. This approach placed a far 
greater emphasis upon managerialism (Newburn, 1998) in a system intent on reforming the 
'data-free zone' failings of the previous mode of youthjustice delivery (Allen, 2004: 27). 
The envisaged strategy of this 'systemic managerialism' (Newburn, 2002: 55 8) was one that 
fully endorsed the achievement of goals by way of 'inter-agency cooperation', 'overall 
criminaljustice strategic planning ofservices', 'the creation ofperformance indicators and 
their meeting of 'mission statements' and 'the active monitoring relating to thefunctioning 
of the system' (ibid. 558-559. Own emphasis added). This chapter discusses the-inter and 
infra-agency social relationships that often impeded the attainment of the project in meeting 
its aims and objectives in relation to the national strategy of the youth justice system (ibid. ). 
The concluding chapter provides the overall assessment relating to this study and 
its findings. It is argued that that the provision of 'youth justice' was locked within a 
protracted state of flux. The occupational cultures within the project revealed a somewhat 
disparate engagement with policy rhetoric. These internal tensions were further compounded 
by the resistance of other agencies involved in the attainment of the project's aims and 
objectives that subsequently created a multitude of dissonant factors that ultimately 
restricted the success of the project. 
The transformation of the youth justice system and its dynamic and conflicting 
organisational cultures and ideologies, often retaining competing approaches in how best to 
deal with young offenders, disrupted the potential of BSS from fully attaining its desired 
aims. The inconsistent organisational practices within the youth justice system created a far 
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less congenial approach within the practice of delivery than the policy rhetoric would have 
us believe. 
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Chapter Two: Methods 
Introduction 
The research for this thesis began as an YJB sponsored local evaluation of bail supervision 
and support. The evaluation commenced in November 1999 and ended in March 2002. The 
aim of the evaluation was to inform the YJB national strategy of the local YOS attainment 
of National Standards (YJB, 2001c) in the delivery and practice of BSS. 
The Bail Support Policy and Dissemination Unit - Nacro Cymru, were contracted by 
the YJB to act as national supporters and evaluators to 124 BSS projects, funded under 
development grants from the YJB. My role as evaluator was to examine one such project 
delivering BSS in Sunderland. As a statutory requirement of the 'remand management' 
policy within the national delivery of youth justice, the aim of the evaluation was to examine 
a range of key areas in the delivery of BSS (see Thomas and Goldman, 2001, Thomas and 
Huckelsby, 2002). 
The role of the BSS programme evaluation 2 undertook a systematic collection of 
information about the activities, characteristics, and outcomes of the project and made 
judgements about the project's effectiveness in meeting the aims and objectives of BSS. 
Those aims were: 
a) To prevent offending on bail 
b) To ensure the appearance of young people at court in order to reduce delays in the 
court process 
c) To ensure remands to custody and secure remands were kept to the essential 
minimum. The Sunderland project also aimed at keeping un-secure local authority 
remands to a minimum, as this remand factor had long been identified as a 'drain' upon 
social services resources. 
2 For a full overview of the areas of evaluation undertaken taken by this process see Tbomas and Goldman, 2001 and Ilomas and 
I lucklesby, 2002. 
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The local BSS project targeted its resources at four distinct groups of young people. 
The target groups identified as benefiting from the services the BSS offered were within the 
following criteria: 
" Those young people for who the CPS were objecting bail 
" Those at risk of a Remand in Custody (RIC) or a remand into local authority 
accommodation (RiLAA) 
" Those young people who were already RIC or RiLAA 
" PYOs and ISSPs and those who had committed a single very serious offence. 
The referral process of young people to the BSS project came via a number of 
distinct routes of access involved in the youth justice system with the referral processes and 
the project's intended 'target group' coming from a range of inter-locking areas involved in 
dealing with young offenders. These areas of entry to BSS will be discussed in more detail 
at later and overlapping areas of this thesis. 
The focal concern of the evaluation process involved a rigorous examination of the 
BSS project's core provisions of resources. These resources included: 
inputs (the financial and human resources) 
outputs (products utilised during the period of the project's implementation) 
impacts (the results gained from the project's outputs that aimed to intervene with the 
identified individual risks associated with re-offending on bail); 
outcomes (the consequences of BSS during its intervention which connected to its aims 
and objectives). 
As a quasi-experimental youth justice strategy (Farrington and Petrosino, 2000), the 
aim of the evaluation was to evidence the strengths and weaknesses of the aggregate data 
produced by local evaluations relating to the outcomes of BSS. The aggregated data from 
124 local BSS projects across England and Wales were instrumental in infon-ning future 
practice and standards in the delivery of this youth justice intervention. 
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The purpose of evaluations is perhaps best defined as a task ofjudging if a course 
of action is working or not. The evaluation was highly prescriptive with no scope to merit 
any deviation away from its focal concerns. There were also competing interest groups 
involved (YJB/Nacro/, the local YOS and the BSS project) often with distinct definitions of 
the situations encountered in the policy and practice of BSS. In a number of ways 
evaluation programmes and policies are inherently political (Weiss, 1993). In evaluating 
the BSS project, I was making decisions about its practice and reporting them through a 
four-way channel of stakeholders, these being Nacro, the YJB, the management of the local 
YOS and subsequently the BSS workers. This in turn had potential workplace implications 
for those involved at the practice level of BSS in attaining the project's core objectives and 
therefore altering the working practices of those involved within the system (Robson, 2002: 
Chp. 7). 
As Ncwbum terms it, this'systemic managerialism' (2002: 558) within the new 
youth justice system, constructed by the reforms legislated by the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998, are governed by some or all of the following procedures: 
1. An emphasis on inter-agency cooperation in order to fulfil the overall 
goals of the system. 
2. An emphasis on creating an overall strategic plan for criminal policy. 
3. The creation of key performance indicators, related to the overall 
cmission statement' of each agency. 
4. Active monitoring of aggregate information about the system and its 
functioning. 
(ibid: 558-559) 
All of the above were considered in the examination of the BSS project and the 
findings of each area have been reported elsewhere (Hornsby 2000a, 2000b, 2001 a, 200 1 b, 
2002). In attempting to improve the 'functioning of the system' (Newbum, 2002: 559) the 
evaluation reports I provided were expected to inform both local and national (at the 
aggregate level) management of BSS. This external evaluation of BSS was 'funded by the 
16 
Home Office which serves an elected government more or less carrying out manifesto 
commitments' (Morgan 2000: 72). Rarely are such evaluations 'critical' in their approaches 
in providing definitions and analysis of the mechanisms being evaluated (Jefferson and 
Shapland, 1994). The general contextual pattern of evaluations is to provide evidence that 
makes recommendations that are intended make the system work better. 
The BSS venture I was asked to study was '... neither of his choosing nor under his 
control' (MacDonald, 1993: 105). Essentially, the evaluation provided me with funding to 
undertake research with the aim of writing a thesis for a PhD. I had developed an interest 
within the field of deviant youth and had also completed an MA in the study of criminal 
justice. However, what knowledge I had of the youth justice system hardly made me an 
'expert' and this could also have been said about my knowledge of evaluation techniques in 
the field of criminal justice. My understanding of the debates and arguments about the 
policies involved with youth justice were barley competent and in accessing this area of 
study I had a lot to learn before I entered the field and as I progressed through it. I had no 
pre-conceptions of what I might find once I entered the youth justice arena and took with me 
no 'youth justice' problems or, theoretical perspectives which I believed required further 
scrutiny. The fact of this matter was that I was an innocuous novice. However, this allowed 
me to enter the youth justice arena with an untainted and potentially objective mind-set in 
which to conduct the research. The fact of the matter was that I had few, if any, 
preconceptions and value-laden judgements that 'required eradicating' (Durkheim, 1938: 
3 1) or, at least 'suppressing' (Denzin, 1970: 331-34 1) them on entering this area of research. 
Evaluating BSS 
The aim of the evaluation was to examine the delivery of BSS of its achievement of the 
aforementioned aims. The methods involved required that the assessment required both 
quantitative and qualitative data collection, of an on-going analysis into the following areas 
of the delivery and practice of BSS. As a somewhat simplistic overview of the evaluation 
focus, the following areas of referral to the project were assessed: 
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" The numbers of young people who were referred to BSS 
" Where the young people were referred to BSS from (e. g. courts (crown, magistrates 
or youth courts; police stations) 
" How many young people referred to BSS were detained overnight/weekend by the 
police prior to the referral 
" In what ways assessments by the BSS project for referral were undertaken 
" The remand situation (how many young people were remanded to local authority 
care; custody, secure accommodation). 
The next stage of evaluation examined a range of contextual processes involved in 
the delivery of BSS for young people referred to the project. For example: 
" Young people's previous highest bail/remand status 
" Previous most serious sentence 
" Previous most serious offence type 
" Total number of current offences 
" Number of outstanding court dates 
" Identified offending related issues 
The following stage of the evaluation examined the programme details for accepted 
referrals to specific interventions that dealt with 'risk factors' related to offending behaviour. 
For example: 
" Drugs 
" Education 
" Health care 
" Offence focused work 
" Advice with court proceedings 
" Monitoring bail conditions 
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From this point, the process involved the examination of young people's compliance and 
progress on the projects and looked at, for example: 
* If the young people had been reported for breach of BSS 
* Outcome of those breaches (was the programme terminated? ) 
* Attendance at court (did the young person attend all court hearings; number of BSS 
court hearings? ) 
9 Offending on bail (were young people arrested and charged for offences committed 
on BSS; what types of offences were committed; was the programme terminated 
because of those offences? ) 
The final stage of the evaluation process examined the outcome of BSS. This considered 
the following areas: 
* Start and end date of individual programmes 
* Number of days young people were on the programme 
* How BSS ended (for example, episode ended; episode was terminated; young person 
was sentenced) 
In essence, the evaluation role was to make assessment of the project implementation 
and to make appraisals of the impact that BSS had for its target group of young offenders. 
For examPle the evaluation methods involved: 
e Interviews with project managers, project workers and project participants and its 
intended young beneficiaries 
9 Assessment of project management, planning and implementation 
* Analysis of project documents 
0 Site surveys 
The data obtained were analysed and forwarded to Nacro for aggregation to assess how 
BSS was progressing at the national level. In turn, Nacro fed-back the results of the 
evaluation to the YJB, who then reported the aggregate findings to the Home Office. 
19 
Quantitative local data returns were sent to Nacro on a quarterly basis as where interim 
reports (Hornsby, 2000a, 2000b, 200 1 a, 200 1 b) and a final local evaluation report (Hornsby, 
2002) which presented a range of interim and final findings of the project's delivery of BSS. 
In a number of ways the monitoring and evaluation methodology did not differ from 
applied methods commonly used in qualitative research studies. There is also to be seen 
some characteristics that loosely resemble the ethnographic approach to conducting 
fieldwork (Robson, 2002). In order to obtain data I interviewed a range of participants or, in 
evaluation terminology, 'stakeholders' involved with BSS. These stakeholders included 
managers and workers at the project and within the larger organisation of the local YOS, 
young people placed onto BSS and police officers. The 'sites' included the local project and 
the courts. 
During the initial stages of the evaluation I began to become focused on range of 
inter-locking organisational disparities involved with BSS that required a far deeper level of 
observation and description. Other areas of connecting processes and decision-making 
relating to bail for young suspects began, in no specific order, to connect to the delivery of 
BSS which I believed were instrumental in restricting the granting of bail (with BSS as a 
condition of it) to those young people. Intrinsically, the evaluation had little scope of what 
magistrates thought about the young people they dealt with or, with BSS in general. It had 
no qualitative interest of the relationship of police officers' bail decision-making that could 
and often did impact upon future bail outcomes. It wanted brief and sterile insights of 
workers' views of the how they went about delivering BSS and some of the problems they 
encountered. 
Research and access into the youth justice system, due to the current political 
agenda and emphasis upon 'evidence-based practice' (see, for example, Baldwin, 2000; 
Hester, 2000; Mair, 2000; Monaghan, 2000; Morgan, 2000; Newbum, 2002) has a obvious 
tendency to come by way of the 'narrow, technical, evaluative studies that the Home Office 
will fund' (Morgan, 2000: 76). However, as Morgan also suggests, where there's a will, 
there is also a way. In being granted access to such a social setting this opens a number of 
potential channels in order to deploy other areas of vested research interests in order to 
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exploit potential sources of data. This offers opportunities for 'the budding critic or the 
seasoned campaigner from using the multiplicity of criminological data collected by these 
means' (ibid. 85) as a way to attempt to explain a range of inter-connected variables that 
constitute the delivery and receipt of the youth justice system. What Morgan is suggesting 
here is that within the current governmental evaluation agenda into areas of criminal justice, 
the opportunity is available for the researcher to exploit the access that the evaluation has 
granted and to use it as a tool to prise open other areas of research and subsequent data. In 
essence this was the strategy I adopted. 
My initial observations from within the system began to steer me, in a far more 
critical approach, to examining the often deeply-ingrained inter and infra agency 
discrepancies involved within the youth justice system and as to analyse how these issues 
impeded the delivery of BSS. Although this may initially sound as if the approach is of an 
'organisational study' (and in a number of ways it is) it also relies heavily upon individuals 
experiences of work (Smith, 2001) and of the receipt of such work. 
Into the WorId of Experience 
The evaluation, as a 'test and survey instrument' (MacDonald, 1993: 105) involving value 
free analysis of BSS, was intent on providing a de-personalised procedure of its 
administration and analysis (ibid. ). However, in conducting the evaluation it became clear 
to me at least, that the relationships within the youth justice system were much more 
complex and indeed, so highly personalised that these issues also required clarification. The 
sterilised and de-personalised context of the evaluation presented to me a major problem. 
Simply, the question that this raised for me was, 'How can the remanding of young people 
denied bail and sent to jail be de-personafiseO' Of course, it can't and I wanted to know 
how the system functioned, in that the remanding of young suspects continued and as to how 
the system intended to combat the harsher elements of that arrangement. In order to do this, 
a methodological approach developed and ensued (whilst still continuing the evaluation 
exercise) that looked at a range of personal perspectives of those involved in the delivery of 
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the youth justice system. My approach became one that was to observe and 'reconstruct the 
action' (Armstrong, 1993: 37) involved in delivering and receiving BSS. 
As I will briefly point out in this and in more detail in later chapters, the methods I 
employed in order to conduct this research discovered a range of organisational disparity 
that affected the delivery of BSS. These observations directed further areas of interest that 
developed from observing the day-to-day practices of BSS and then considered as to how 
the functioning of BSS integrated with other competing organisational outlooks in dealing 
with young offenders. 
When closely observed the social relationships of working with young offenders 
convey 'vivid, dynamic and processual portrayals of I ived experience' (Smith, 2001: 229). 
Ethnographies of the youth justice system within the UK are lacking 3. And this occurs 
despite the current criminological trend, which under the Crime Reduction Programme has 
seen a host of emergent potential research sites. The political climate in how best to deal 
with young offenders has opened up a range of potential funding and research sites for the 
budding or well-seasoned researcher to focus his or her gaze upon (Morgan, 2000) and 
produce knowledge that is 'well worth having' (Rock, 2001: 3 1). Whythisdearthof 
ethnography from within the system has occurred is unclear, but perhaps it may be that the 
problems in conducting fieldwork are notably difficult and time-consuming exercises (Bosk, 
1992; Zussman, 1992). Conducting ethnography often involves a state of temporary 
withdrawal of the observer from the academy (see, Hobbs, 1988,1993; also see 
Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983) whilst also removing themselves from the actual and 
sometimes deviant practices of the social group that attracted those researchers to such 
social worlds in the first instance (see, for example, Hobbs, 1988,1995; Wright and Decker, 
1994; Guilianotti, 1995; Armstrong, 1998). Ethnographies of the distinct organisational 
cultures at work within the British criminal justice system au natural have been undertaken 
in probation (e. g. Harris, 1977; May, 199 1); the police (e. g. Banton, 1964; Reiner, 1978; 
An exception to this situation will be Souhami's (Fordicon-dng) Transforrning Youth Justice: Occupational Identity and Cultural 
Change. 
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Holdaway, 1984; Hobbs, 1988; Fielding, 1994); magistrate's courts' (Baldwin, 1985; Bartle, 
1985; Parker et al. 1989; Brown, 1991); crown court (Rock, 1993) and social work 
(Redmond, 2004; Wade et al. 1998) but to date there has been a notable absence of studies 
adopting ethnographic principles in which to illuminate areas of the inner-functioning of 
youth justice (see, Souhami, forthcoming). 
My own divergence away from a purely evaluative account of BSS towards an 
ethnography of it, which offers a flavour of some of the contextual realities involved with it, 
rested upon providing understanding of the varying perspectives and grounded realities 
involved within the system. For example, as some of the chapters that follow will highlight, 
would the YJB have been interested in issues of police brutality upon young people? Would 
they have been interested in police intimidation and threats of violence to young suspects 
who had been placed onto BSS (see Chapter. 2)? Would they be interested in the lived 
experiences of young people being remanded into custody, due to the fact that there were 
too few local authority secure accommodation places available (see Chapter. 6)? Of young 
people self-harming, due to not being afforded the 'luxury' of BSS or, the opportunity to be 
remanded in a local care home, by way of the consistent lack of secure placements or, of a 
young man's terror at being 'remanded' causing him to attempt to strangle himself (see 
Chapter 4)? My suspicions were that the YJB would not or, could not have found the scope 
for such data and its analysis and a variety of other observations from within the system, 
which were directly or indirectly connected to young offenders and youth justice workers 
experiences of that system. 
The evaluation process had little to no scope in which to provide a range of less 
than savoury linkages that do occur within the youth justice system and its sterile emphasis 
upon the 'clarity of objectives, consistency of approach and targeting of resources' 
(Newburn, 2002: 559). In observing youth justice 'at work' and the interaction between the 
system, its workers, and the decisions they make within the organisational arrangements 
they are expected to fulfil, the strains between policy and practice, the petty individual 
gripes and systems failures. The scope of the evaluation exercise was restricted in which to 
highlight the hidden back room organisational arrangements and lived experiences of youth 
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justice. My aim is to use the ethnographic angle of the methods employed to conduct the 
evaluation to advance our knowledge about this type of work and to explain the inter and 
intra-organisational tensions that exist when agencies, groups, and individuals come together 
in order to fulfil a social function such as youth justice. 
During the initial stages of conducting the evaluation, it appeared that there were 
embedded organisational conflicts and contradictions that appeared, to me, to be inherently 
contradictory to the strategic development of the new youth justice system which impacted 
upon the successful implementation of interventions, such as BSS. My attention began to 
focus (whilst still adhering to the evaluation process) upon other dilemmas situated within 
the youth justice workplace, at the frontline delivery of it, which noted the '... ("artfal 
practices") through which people come to develop an understanding of each other and of 
social situations' (Silverman, 1993: 60). Within these practices the everyday shop-floor 
relations within the system revealed a range of disparate professional identities and non- 
complimentary occupational cultures, during a period of fundamental organisational change. 
The evaluation exercise had no scope to identify such distinctive inter-organisational 
contexts, which impacted upon the wider implications of such cultural obstacles (Morgan, 
1986, Smircich, 1983) embedded within the youth justice system. As access to a variety of 
inter-locking youth justice research sites had been granted, I exploited this good fortune 
which presented a multiplicity of data sources to attach onto and around the problems 
encountered by the BSS project, its workers, and young offenders. As Rock suggests, 
The social world is taken to be a place where little can be taken for granted ab 
initio, a place not of statistics but of process, where acts, objects, and people 
have evolving and intertwined local identities that may not be revealed at the 
onset to the outsider. 
(2001: 29) 
As I was observing the system, I wished to explore how the system dealt with young 
offenders and how the workers at the project viewed their experiences of delivering youth 
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justice. The methods for the data collection and its subsequent selection worked within the 
interactionist paradigm (Blumer, 1969) in which actors interpret the symbolic meanings of 
their environments and how social life is constructed in interaction with others (Rock, 2001). 
This approach; 
rests upon the premise that human action takes place always in a situation 
that confronts the actor and that the actor acts on the basis of dqfming this 
situation that confronts him. 
(Blumer, 1997: 4. Original emphasis) 
As I was in and around the system and the young people involved with it, it seemed the 
obvious choice in which to try to make more of the access that had been provided by way of 
the evaluation. This strategy involved a somewhat rambling journey on my part, through the 
many inter-connected aspects of youth justice that were involved with the delivery of BSS. 
In researching these social groups, for example of young offenders, magistrates, BSS 
workers and police officers it became clear that they all: 
Develop a life of their own that becomes meaningful, reasonable, and 
normal once you get close to it, and that a good way to learn about any of 
these worlds is to submit oneself in the company of the members to the daily 
round of petty contingencies to which they are subject. 
(Goffman, 1968: 7) 
And this was my approach. The world of youth justice involves an interlocking 
array of contingencies, of the police wishing for a young person to be denied bail and 
attempting to persuade magistrates of the likelihood that a young person if granted bail 
would re-offend; of magistrates frustration at seeing the usual suspects up in front of them 
again, and believing themselves to have run out of the youth justice welfare orientated 
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options in which to allow a particular young person to be supervised within his or her 
community; of the parents of young parents sick to their back teeth of their sons and 
daughters offending and throwing in the towel in refusing to allow the young person back 
home; of the local YOS attempts to offer alternatives in which to protect the best interests of 
the young person and keep them at home, or at least in the care of the local authority. 
If the Hat Fits... 
I observed and participated with a range of inter-connected youth justice experiences and the 
conflicts and contradictions that regularly occurred. At all times, I bore in my mind that I 
was observing how the State deals with troublesome young people. At times, within the 
machinery of youth justice the whecls would fall off and the welfare-orientated aspect of the 
machine would grind to a halt. Underpinning the 'spanners in the youth justice works' 
hypothesis, is the concern that despite a strategic focus upon counter-balancing the 
objectives of punishment (for the offence or, in the case of BSS, for the suspected offence), 
to that of welfare objectives (after all these were children and young people). The aim of 
BSS as a 'remand management' intervention was intent on rescuing such young people from 
the harsher elements (remand institutions) of the youth justice system. In conducting the 
research I found that: 
Life in the field involves the same emotions as life at home: elation, 
boredom, embarrassment, contentment, anger, joy, anxiety and so on. To 
these are added, however, the necessity of being continually on the alert 
(of not taking one's surroundings and relationships for granted), and the 
necessity of learning new routines and cues. 
(Gulick, 1977: 90) 
As discussed earlier, the current enterprise of evaluation studies such as the one I 
was conducting was neither one of my ideal choosing (however it did provide funding) or, 
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of my immediate contextual and content control. However, the access to it provided a 
wealth of potential data sources that counter-acted against the welfare-orientated aims of 
BSS. On my part, this involved the adaptation of a number of research roles that 
encountered inter-action with a diverse range of participants involved with bail decision 
processes for young offenders. These roles included one as an Appropriate Adult, one as the 
local evaluator and one as a post-graduate research student. In essence I was all of these 
things. The research also involved a host of mistaken identities, on the part of some of the 
participants about my roles, including mis-understandings of me as a 'spare pair of hands at 
the BSS project' (see a brief discussion later in this chapter) and of me as a 'social worker' 
(see Chapter 4). 
Shrouded Methods 
In conducting this research most, but by no means all, of the participants were aware that 'I 
was looking at bail support'. So, for the majority of participants involved they were aware 
that the functioning of BSS was being examined. However, my guess is that many of them 
would be surprised with much of the contextual analysis that informs this thesis. My reason 
for this suspicion is that none were aware that the evaluation process began to and continued 
to highlight a range of other areas of social interaction and the participant's contextualised 
understandings of working practices within the youth justice arena. From one viewpoint it is 
then argued that by way of the evaluation participatory consent was given. However, if not 
fully covert, the research methods applied for this research were somewhat hidden and at 
times disguised. And here is situated the deceptive approach involved with this study. I 
very much doubt that any of the 'participants' would have appreciated my undertaking of 
continued and shielded action in scribbling down field notes of loose workplace 
conversations. Such shameless approaches in deceitfully obtaining data have continued to 
be discussed, defended and criticised within the academy of social science. 
Defendants of covert observational research studies (for example Holdaway, 1982; 
Homan, 1980; Humphreys, 1970), have argued that the undeniable deceit involved on the 
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part of the researcher, in conducting research unbeknown to those being studied, are justified 
by way of the findings of such research and often outweigh the consequences of 
compromising participants rights. The normally upheld ethically correct sociological 
research methods quest of 'informed consent' by participants, and the full explanation of 
what the research is 'about' (British Sociological Association Statement on Ethics, 2002) 
are, as far as is possible, the 'correct way' in which to conduct any research project of social 
enquiry. In transgressing those norms, by way of conducting covert research, this method 
remains the black sheep of the qualitative research family in a field of pure white 
sociological fuzziness. If only life were as simple. 
Many of the settings in which the study was conducted were 'closed settings'. For 
example, I gained access via the evaluation into youth justice sites that are normally closed 
to or, in the least shielded from public gaze and are often difficult to gain access to by way 
of research (see for example, Denzin, 1970; Holdaway, 1983; Rock, 1993). These, for 
example, included Young Offenders Institutions, police stations, youth courts, local 
authority care homes and the local YOS itself. Few, if any, of these youth justice arenas 
could be viewed as 'open' or 'public settings'. Previous research within similar research 
sites have illuminated a range of potential difficulties in gaining access, and where and when 
successful in doing so, a number of them have illuminated the problems of conducting 
research in such social settings. 
Parker et aL (1989) study of magistrate's courts' have shown us that having access 
commissioned and granted by 'those from above' (in this case, the Home Office) allowed 
the research team access to juvenile courts usually uncomfortable in allowing access to 
academic gaze. Parker and his colleagues observational research provides detailed insights 
as to how the magistrate's culture in sentencing procedures for young offenders was often a 
law upon itself, in has to how magistrates conducted sentencing procedures which often 
went beyond the 'outside control' of the state. The research developed important discussions 
relating to the 'imperviousness' (ibid. 39) of the magistrate's culture to that of state 
legislation directed to the youth courts, in setting agendas and protocols relating to the 
sentencing of young convicted offenders. 
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Goldson (2002) provides detailed insights of 'remanded' young suspect's and prison 
officer's views of their situations by way of his interviews conducted from within the walls 
and barbed-fences of Young Offenders Institutions. The study provides a critical analysis 
of the contemporary youth justice system, and many of its policies that continue to rely upon 
inappropriate decisions and protocols, which lock up young male offenders who, at that 
stage of the youth justice process, had not been convicted. Again, the research to this study 
came by way of access being granted by the Prison Service, after Goldson had been 
conducting research into a number of other inter-rclated areas of state sponsored research 
(having previously evaluated BSS at its local delivery level) from within the youth justice 
system. 
It is a rare occurrence within the contemporary youth justice research milieu that 
it is the case that access to an 'associated agenda' will be brought forward to and accepted 
by those involved in delivering youth justice (see, Souhami, forthcoming). Indeed, in 
conducting the 'evaluation', I engaged with a number of what I believed to be important 
areas youth justice issues in explaining the conflict and resistance that are to be found within 
the study of any organisation (Smith, 200 1), than the formal evaluation process had 
prescribed. The evaluation of BSS had little scope for any contextual meandering away 
from the youth justice managerialism (Newburn, 1997; Goldson, 1999b; Muncie, 1999b) 
task at hand in which to produce a range of narrow research questions that examined the re- 
organisation of the system (Muncie, 2000). The rapid expansion in state sponsored youth 
justice research programmes (Morgan, 2000) has created an academic criminological culture 
which has led to the 'growth of "safe", narrowly-focused, policy-relevant research, and a 
decline in critical research' (Jefferson and Shapland, 1994: 268). 
Furthermore, being accredited with 'official authorisation' (ibid: 227) to gain 
access and to get amongst the organisational practice and its 'natives' (Jones, 1970) does 
not, and will not, guarantee a rooted in-depth organisational examination of the social 
phenomenon that they select or, in the case of the current youth justice activities of 'what 
works' (Chapman and Hough, 1998) evaluations and who gets 'selected' in order to carry- 
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out such evaluations (Morgan, 2000). As Smith suggests, the fact that a researcher has been 
granted official access to the site may also encompass that: 
... they also run the risk that they are being allowed contacts with and 
glimpses of people, situations and events carefully selected by company 
managers. 
(2001: 227) 
At the BSS office I had a desk and generally I was there for three to four days of the 
average working week (on Wednesdays I taught at my University). I made tea and coffee 
and paid into the 'kitty'. I collected sandwiches for workers lunches, laughed, joked and 
griped about the daily working practices and rituals from within youth justice. Iheard 
sexist, racist, localised and regionalist jokes and stereotypes and of intra-agency conflict, 
tension, bitterness and grudges which at some point had to, and indeed did, impact upon the 
youth justice system per se. However, I was still only an 'observer'. As others who have 
undertaken substantive ethnographic research have suggested that being 'in it' does not 
necessarily constitute as 'being a fully-fledged part of it' (see for example, Hobbs, 1988). 
In order to be considered as 'one of them' from within the system, I attempted to become as 
fully-fledged as was possible (albeit a part-time and sessional) member of the local YOS, by 
taking on a paid-role as an Appropriate Adult (see Chapter Four) and this in itself led to a 
range of research role conflicts (see for example, Adler and Adler, 1987; Gold, 1958; 
Hobbs, 1988) and a variety of ethical dilemmas. 
But a few studies conducted within the criminal justice system have openly revealed 
that they have rejected the role of willing and informed participants, and have instead 
decided to opt for the far more ethically dubious methods of covert observation. Holdaway 
(1982) as a police officer, conducted a covert ethnography which he argues was the only 
realistically viable method in which to research the characteristics of the institution, its 
organisational culture and the day-to-day realities of lower-ranked officers retaining 
substantial control in their working lives from inside of the British police. Quite simply he 
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argues that any other form of method would have been 'unrealistic' (1982: 63) in providing 
illuminating insights of routine police work and the organisational culture that officers were 
embedded within. 
Due to the nature of the various research sites I engaged with (for example, the YOS, 
BSS office, police stations, a variety of young people's residences and courts) in a 
continually shifting terrain of youth justice associated contextual experiences, there was 
little prior methodological knowledge at hand in which to offer research guidance within 
such a complex area. Substantive methodological insights have been provided for reviewing 
ways in which to conduct ethnographic research in a variety of criminal justice agency 
settings, for example, with the police (Hobbs 1988; Holdaway 1982; Punch 1979; Reiner 
1978,2000; Maanen 1978); of courts (Baldwin 1985,2000; Brown, 1991; Darbyshire 1984; 
1972; Rock 1993; Parker et al. 1989); of prisons (Cohen and Taylor 1972; Irwin 1970; King 
2000; Morris and Morris 1963): and of community penalties (Ditton and Ford 1994; 
Fielding 1986; May 1991). Of ethnographic research of deviant youth groups there are 
many studies, with far too many to provide a comprehensive overview here, of the methods 
and associated problems in conducting research with delinquent/criminal young people 
(however, for a British overview see for example, Campbell 1993; Corrigan 1979; Downes 
1966; Gill 1977; MacDonald 1997; Mayhew 1968; Mays 1954; Parker 1974; Patrick 1973; 
Willis 1977). 
The Sample(s) 
The clusters of individuals in this study came from, for example, the local YOS, its BSS 
Scheme, young offenders, the police, magistrates, local authority care homes, prisons and a 
range of non-statutory agencies whose collective aim, under the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998, was to prevent the offending of children and young people. It was a diverse sample of 
individuals with a focus in dealing with young offenders. In this thesis I aim to present 
empirically detailed slices of the trials and tribulations involved in delivering youth justice 
to a disassociated subculture of young offenders. 
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I interviewed all of the BSS staff, from managers to Welfare Assistants, often 
with these individuals being interviewed on two or three occasions over a twenty-two month 
period of time. In total I conducted twenty-two interviews with staff members involved in 
the delivery of this youth justice intervention. I took extensive field notes (often written 
covertly under the noses of those providing the data) throughout the period in the field. 
Other workers connected to the delivery of BSS were also interviewed and spoken to. These 
included local authority care home workers, prison and police officers and to a lesser degree 
magistrates. 
The sample of young offenders within this study totalled 188 young people all of 
whom had been placed onto BSS. Of the 188,172 were male and 16 were female. Their 
collective age range was from 10 to 17 years of age (this being the age group in BSS can be 
applied to). Access to the sample came from their involvement with the project between 
November 1999 and March 2002. All of these young people were representative of the BSS 
'target group'. This sample of 188 young people is to be viewed as the 'access sample' to 
this study. By this I mean that these were the young people placed onto BSS that I had 
potential access to. However, this does not mean that they had to, and indeed the majority 
did not engage in any substantive way with the qualitative aspect of the research. But, at the 
same point, I was able to obtain other forms of data, for example by studies of case records, 
Police National Computer records and other forms of primary and secondary data sources 
relating to all of that sample. 
In total 18 young men, and three females were interviewed 4. It was generally the 
case that the initial interview topic would be focused upon those young people's subjective 
experiences of BSS, for example, what they thought of it, had it helped them, how it could 
be bettered and what impact they believed it had had upon them re-offending (Hornsby, 
forthcoming). Of the twenty-one, eight young men agreed to engage with further interviews 
at a later time. However, due to my presence in and around the inter-connected youth 
justice observational field sites (the BSS office, courts, and care homes) my 'face' became 
4 Females constituted eight per cent (16) of the total nwnber of the 188 young people who came onto BSS between November 
1999 and March 2002. 
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known. Within this aspect of my participation between me and six of the (young male) 
participants I 'established respectful, on-going relationships with interviewees, including 
enough rapport for there to be a genuine exchange of views and openness in the interviews 
for the interviewees to explore purposefully with the researcher the meanings they place on 
the events in their worlds' (Sherman-Heyl, 2001: 369). On occasion I also spoke with young 
people's family members which assisted in gaining data for some wider-contextual relations 
involving the delivery of youth justice (see Hornsby, forthcoming). 
I attended eighteen magistrate's and youth court hearings which involved young 
people who were being referred to or, having been placed onto BSS. The vast majority of 
these visits were for observational purposes of the referral process of BSS to the courts. As 
a chain of criminal justice locations often encompasses BSS and its outcome access to such 
significant sites was of importance. The youth justice chain of remand management 
decisions at this stage, involved the police station following arrest, the initial pre-trial 
hearing at court, acceptance onto BSS or, the refusal of acceptance onto BSS which might 
often be followed by remands to custody or local authority accommodation. My aim was to 
incorporate as many of these events as possible as a way to inform understanding of cases 
through a grounded approach of inductive theory building (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This 
qualitative method was undertaken in order to make legitimate claims regarding knowledge 
from inside the system. Collins argues that in providing understanding of life experiences 
those conducting research should 'have lived or experienced their material in some fashion' 
(1990: 232). However, being around 'it' does not necessitate being part of 'it'. The 
Appropriate Adult role aside (where I was experiencing, by way of work, an aspect of the 
youth justice system), I was a visitor to that social world and knew when my 'time' with it 
would be done, and at the end of the research I was more than pleased to be leaving it. For 
the participants involved in this study they were stuck with it. For the 'shop-floor' workers 
at the front-end wedge involved in delivering or attempting to block BSS it was work, 
nothing more nothing less, and they had to turn up. For the young offenders involved with 
my study it was, by most accounts, a 'natural' and continuing aspect of their lives. Most had 
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had some form of continued youth justice involvement in their lives during my two-year 
period in the field. 
For many of them this involved three bail appointments per week with the project, 
often they might be involved with other areas of 'justice' interventions and in many ways 
the substance of their lives were co-ordinated by the bail process. They were banned from 
entering certain areas, they were restricted at what times they were allowed out (curfews), 
they had surveillance devices placed on them ('tags') or, in their homes (Voice Verification 
surveillance). They inter-acted with BSOs, Social Workers, Probation Officers, Police 
Officers, magistrates and a gamut of other agency professionals within or connected to 
youthjustice. This was a major slice of their lived-experience and I was now apart of it. 
Protecting the Participants 
Within this thesis all of the participants names have been changed, as have many times and 
date's of specific observations which might jeopardise participant's anonymity. Due to what 
are of course valid ethical concerns, a significant amount of data that were obtained, and 
have been used within this thesis, came by way of covert observations and subsequent note- 
taking the research, and indeed the researcher may be considered ethically questionable. 
However, the gradual adaptation of this covert role, which hid behind various other roles 
(the evaluator, the Appropriate Adult) I considered to be suitable as I was savvy enough to 
realise that had I made clear all of my research intentions, say for example, to the police 
while attending police stations as an Appropriate Adult, that in coming clean and informing 
the participants I may have altered the 'nature of interactions and behaviours taking place' 
(Wardhaugh, 2000; 325). Such ethically questionable methods are of issue and I have 
attempted to adhere to the British Sociological Association's ethical code of practice in 
protecting the study's participants from any form of harm. Ideally, I would like to have 
changed the name of the town. Yet, due to an Appendix (A) to be found in the thesis, which 
refers to city by name, it would not take any impressive investigative skills to find out where 
the research was based. Therefore, the town stays in, it is Sunderland. 
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Throughout the thesis all names have been changed, where possible place names 
have also been distorted. In some areas (mainly policing) dates and times have also been 
altered as to limit the potential for someone to back-track over records and identify any of 
the participants involved at that particular stage. I was and am conscious that some of the 
data used in this thesis could be considered as somewhat incriminatory. However, I have 
taken a number of safety orientated measures in which to reduce those possible negative 
outcomes. My aim was and continues to be to protect the participants of this study (Denzin, 
1970). If this entails having to bury and restrict access to this document then I consider that 
to be a price worth paying in order to protect the participant's safety and interests (ibid. ). 
Too Many Hats and Too Many People 
The multi-Participatory research approach raised numerous dilemmas. In researching youth 
justice this brought me to a range of participants within it. Some were youth justice workers, 
some were young people involved with it. Others were parents and often the participants were 
from other agencies involved with BSS, for example the police. On occasion young people 
would confess, brag or concoct crimes they'd been involved with which had not come to the 
attention of the authorities. What was I to do? Sometimes the level of offending went beyond 
the scale and scope that the current focus of the BSS project was dealing with and after all, it 
could only deal with what it knew. Tony, a prolific young offender from the town told me that 
he'd lost count of the crimes he'd committed and not been apprehended for. He had a 
weakness for other people's cars, to the extent that he'd already served a prison sentence for 
this type of offence. He came from a 'criminally known family' where other mates within that 
family group were known for 'chopping up' stolen vehicles and selling them on. Geoff, one 
of the social workers at the BSS office opinion of Tony and his car-crimes was that, 'He'sjust 
like the typical Twocker. Young, daft andjust outfor a laugh when he steals them. Tony's 
view was somewhat different. 'I've been 'moving' cars onto certain peopleforyears, What 
cars (stolen) I've been donefor or TlCdfor there's loads more that I haven't been donefor'. 
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Now sixteen, Tony's view of his criminal activities (whether true or not-it was how 
he viewed the situation) was somewhat removed from Geoffs professional knowledge and 
risk assessments made against Tony. Once I got to know the young people and a level of 
trust developed I would always ask them to give me an account, by way of a show of fingers 
(representing the crimes they had got away with), how many crimes they'd actually 
committed. Without fail the response was always of ten or more digits on display. 
Sometimes they got bored flashing their fingers up and down and in a similar vein to Tony's 
response retorted with 'afuckin'hundred more, at least'. His involvement with youth 
justice and data obtained from the Police National Computer (PNC) highlighted that Tony 
had been busy from an early age committing offences and his 'fuckin' hundred' may not 
have been a simple display of youthful bravado. But again, what was I to do with this 
information? As the project evaluator I was supposed to be there to measure whether the 
intervention was meeting the needs of its target group (Robson, 2002), with Tony being one 
of thcm. 
There are, of course, no easy and quick solutions to such dilemmas. I took the 
easiest available way out and kept my mouth shut. With this and other dilemmas that arose 
throughout the duration of the fieldwork, I adopted the approach that if in doubt, say nowt. I 
was advised by a senior academic with years of experience 'to sort it out by writing it all 
down'. These were my dilemmas, no one else's. Tony was busy thieving cars on an 
entrepreneurial not a hedonistic basis. Geoff was simply doing his job. Thefactthatthe 
targeting of the young offenders may have been somewhat skewed would be too difficult to 
resolve, as the chances of these types of young offenders performing some form of youth 
justice confessional for the crimes the system was unaware of, is an unlikely scenario. 
Gaining Access 
Access had been approved via the evaluation process and trust and relationships were being 
forged with many of the participants involved in the evaluation. However, I did not seek 
consent for the 'other' side of the research, which to a large degree informs much of the 
36 
content and context of this thesis, and I will talk about this in more detail later in this 
chapter. Rock adds some clarity to the murky theoretical conditions ethnographers can be 
expected to find themselves situated within by suggesting that ethnographic research; 
... is a process that does not start from fixed conditions and a clear vision but 
changes with each stage of enquiry so that many important questions emerge 
only in situ. It is virtually impossible to anticipate what will be 
encountered 
(Rock, 2001: 30) 
The research (not the evaluation, it is important to remember the distinction between 
the two) and my 'learning role' (Agar, 1986: 12) effectively determined how I responded to 
what I discovered at certain stages of the research. Perhaps the term learning roles might be 
a more precise definition. The research, and who and how I presented myself to a variety of 
social groups all associated with BSS, took on a metamorphic role throughout the time in the 
field 
The research sites included young people's homes, remand institutions, courts, the 
BSS Off ice, police stations, a local YMCA, and street comers. In particular situ I could be 
referred to and thought of as what I was expected to be by those actors within these distinct 
social settings. All of the settings had the key elements that guided, in a somewhat 
meandering fashion, the selection process for the research. 
It was not until the final stages of the field work that I became fully conscious that 
my research may have involved too many people in too broad field a of activity for the 
ethnography to be considered as such by my peers (see Fielding, 1993: 155). Classical 
ethnographies have generally focused their empirical gazes upon small social groups in 
order to obtain rich data, and 'thick descriptions' (Geertz, 1973) in rarely 'more than one or 
two settings' (Fielding, 1993: 156). My own study is based on young offender's 
interpretations of the youth justice system, of those delivering the system and of the 'social 
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factors' (Becker, 1963: 8) which had influenced these young people to continue committing 
deviant acts, despite the intentions of the youth justice system (Hornsby, forthcoming). 
The research involved participating with a range of actors involved with young 
people across a number of social settings that were often involved with youth offending. It 
would have been far easier a study to manage had I been able to pin down the field settings 
to one or two distinct sites, for example, the BSS Office and the residences of the young 
offenders. However, this would not have been a realistic picture or explanation of what 
young offender's realities within the system involved. Neither would it been an adequate 
explanation of much of went on in delivering BSS to young offenders in order to stem their 
offending behaviour. The delivery of BSS was not isolated to the office where the project 
was based. For example, the local courts, police stations, YOls, care homes and the YMCA 
all played significant roles in not only the delivery of BSS but also in the day-to-day 
experiences in lives of young people who came onto it. 
Despite a host of useful insights and potential ethnographic problem 'solutions' 
offered by all of the above works, none could offer any substantive advice as to how I could 
merge together the ethnographic methodology between a range of quite distinct, and 
culturally diverse organisations and individuals involved with the youthjustice system. To 
date, there has been little to no ethnography conducted into the distinct area of multi-agency 
youthjustice delivery. This of course may be due to the relatively new approach within the 
system of delivering the contemporary youth justice strategy by way of this policy directive. 
However, it may also be suggested that the current emphasis upon evaluation techniques in 
providing 'evidence based practice' (Chapman and Hough, 1998) has instigated a closure of 
opportunities into practising research into many other significant areas of sociological 
enquiry within this system of youth justice (Morgan, 2000). The aim of this thesis is to 
produce a detailed reflection of the real on-the-ground contexts of the experiences and 
meanings of the social-life from within the youth justice system. 
As a somewhat simplistic and brief example of the intcr-connecting roles of all of 
these agencies, a'typical' period of BSS for a young person might involve the following. 
The young person would be arrested for an alleged offence, sometimes they would be 
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released from police custody on bail, sometimes they would not and would detained by the 
police and then presented at court. Sometimes the parents of the young offenders would 
refuse to have their sons and daughters back home, which meant that the young people 
would often have no suitable bail address for the magistrates to release them on bail. In 
these situations BSS would attempt to apply a variety of alternatives in which to lessen the 
threat of the young person being remanded. 
Collecting the Data 
The methodological triangulation of data (Denzin, 1970; 1997) collection is, I believe an 
extremely useful approach to provide the corroboration of data and improve the validity of 
interpretations of them (King, 2000: 306). The 'Cross-method' (Webb et al. 1966) approach 
and use of data involves the use of different types of methods in the study of the same 
phenomenon (ibid. ) Throughout the duration of the evaluation I attempted to apply this data 
triangulation approach by way of the interviewing young offenders and where possible their 
parents or guardians, YOS workers, police officers, magistrates, defence solicitors, Crown 
Prosecution Service personnel, and other personnel involved with the multi agency 
partnership approach in dealing with young offenders. The methods in which to conduct the 
research involved observation, participation, semi-structured interviews, covert and overt 
note taking. 
The participants came from a range of organisations involved with delivering youth 
justice. They included for example, YOS workers, police officers, magistrates, health 
representatives, educational representatives, local authority care home workers, parents' and 
young people. I also observed, participated and undertook the examination of BSS and 
Youth Offending Information System (YOIS) databases as a way of understanding and 
interpreting the delivery and receipt of BSS for those involved with it. Four interim and 
one final reports were written for Nacro regarding the outcomes of BSS, which were 
expected to inform youthjustice policy in the practice of BSS (see Nacro/YJB, 2001b; 
Thomas and Hucklesby 2002). 
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To date, the closest the YJB have got to reporting the findings of this national 
evaluation of BSS are to be found in a report of 'Remand Management' written on behalf of 
the YJB by Thomas and Hucklesby (2002). This example may perhaps add a little more 
validity to the Midas touch of YJB self-congratulatory 'hyperbole' (Burnett and Appleton 
2003) in often claiming that every youth justice intervention it implements 'works' to the 
highest expected outcome. 
The evaluation I conducted at the project found that this was far from the reality of 
what actually occurred in the project's intended aims, objectives and intended outcomes (see 
Hornsby 2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002). A further criticism of the evaluation process 
was that it was atheoretical in its approach and analysis. The young offenders were taken as 
given that they committed crime and needed dealing with. There was little to no approach in 
understanding or interpreting their involvement in crime that went beyond the current 
managerialist trend in dealing with them (Newburn, 1998). 
As Morgan argues, criticisms directed at the 'criminological enterprise' of 
evaluations funded by the Home Office, Research Development and Statistics Development 
(HORSD) this type of Home Office funded research is almost entirely ' atheoretical fact 
gathering ... narrowlyfocused... and in its final product invariably is, policy-friendly' (2000: 
7 1). However, the New Labour commitment to 'what works' is also to be commended in 
turning around previous Conservative administration's pursuit and implementation of 
criminal justice policies, which went against and defied a substantial tide of research 
evidence in dealing with offenders (ibid: 85). 
The evaluation I conducted on the local BSS project has been reported elsewhere 
(see Hornsby, 2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) and the aim of this thesis is not to 
replicate the overall context of that evaluation research exercise. As Morgan has suggested, 
in his advice to post-graduate researcher's serving their apprenticeships, and also to 
seasoned practitioners involved in evaluation research of the criminal justice system, the 
issue of access does not need to be overcome because it is handed to us (2000: 85). This 
provides the opportunities in which to break through the narrow constraints of policy 
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focused evaluation exercises on crime, and in particular to my own study, on young 
offenders and youth justice by way of using: 
the multiplicity of criminological data collected by these means, and 
attaching them to the broader socio-economic data streams, in order to 
demonstrate, or suggest, that there is another interpretation or pathway. 
(ibid. ) 
Methodological Triangualtion 
As I have already mentioned I obtained data from the young people, YOS workers, police, 
solicitors and magistrates all engaged with, to varying degrees with BSS. I observed 
situations at courts, police stations, young people's homes and 'residences', on the streets 
and at the local BSS office. I employed a data triangulation approach in which to obtain and 
validate 'stories' told to me by the young offenders. They were, I would assume, unaware 
that I had access to their case files, detailed data-bases of a great deal of 'official' and 
classified information that had been recorded about their lives. 
I could use these secondary data sources to view their criminal histories, involvement 
with Social Services, case notes about their family situations, medical and psychological 
problems, education, housing and Pre-Sentence Reports. These data came in the format of 
individual case-files and statistics from within the YOS. These data contained information 
on crimes, victimisation, sexual and physical abuse, homelessness, poverty, pregnancy and 
abortion and drug and alcohol addiction. There were YOS workers views of young 
offender's improvements and success stories, worsening situations, denial, disrespect and 
non-compliance. For the apprentice academic scholar it was a data feast and I gorged 
myself upon it. 
At no point did I inform the participants that I was using and indeed plundering these 
resources. The local YOS and its BSS project were quite aware that I had access to its 
information systems. I had a password to enter the system and they would have expected 
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that at times, relating to the project's inputs, outputs and outcomes that there would be some 
requirement to view some areas of data. However, much of what I was to obtain from these 
information systems had little direct bearing upon the evaluation. These were some of the 
ingredients for my thesis and I was filling my pantry. 
At the BSS office, police stations, youth and magistrate's courts' and a variety of 
other youth justice settings I would often take field notes covertly. This was not always 
possible and in such cases I would scribble down field notes at the first opportune moment. 
For such situations I always had a small notebook and biro handy in my trouser pocket. On 
occasion, where the notes I intended to make I considered very important that I didn't want 
to forget any of the detail that had moments earlier had been divulged, I would leave the 
office and similar to Ditton (1977) the workplace toilet provided the most sheltered and 
secure area in which to scribble down the content and context of the earlier conversation. 
Unlike Ditton's (ibid: 5) 'Bronco paper', my notepaper was lined not shiny and I had little 
trouble later in remembering what had been said or, in writing up the field-notes in full. 
Other data, for example, quantitative data of the numbers of young people on BSS, 
their gender, ages, reasons for arrest, number of breaches of bail conditions, re-arrest while 
on bail and remands to local authority accommodation and custody were obtained without 
deceit as these were the data that informed substance of the evaluation. A questionnaire 
survey was also conducted in order to obtain data about the views of young people, who had 
recently finished their episodes of BSS, regarding their opinions of it. This methodological 
triangulation (Denzin, 1997), and is also referred to as 'multi-strategy research', (Bryman 
1988,1992) approach assisted the research in conjunction with the evaluation. I grabbed at 
everything that I considered to be useful data sources to validate the primary qualitative data 
I was continually obtaining. The aim, as Rock advises is to check '... everything, getting 
multiple documentation, getting multiple kinds of documentation, so that evidence does not 
rely on a single voice, so that data can be embedded in their contexts, so that data can be 
compared' (2001: 34). 
There existed a precarious balance between my undertaking of the evaluation and 
then conducting my own academic research. MY draft evaluation reports were requested by 
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the local YOS to be presented to it prior to being forwarded to the National Evaluators. On 
a number of occasions requests were made by the local YOS that certain compromising data 
be dropped from the reports. This placed my role as an 'independent' external evaluator in 
jeopardy, as some of these requests asked that highly significant weaknesses and evidence of 
the inappropriate use of funding in the provision of BSS were cut. Furthermore, the staff at 
the BSS office were far closer to me, in friendly terms, than most of the trainee academics 
and their time served supervisors at the university where I studied were. I spent far more 
time at the office than I did at the university. With the Appropriate Adult work which took 
over a significant amount of time in the field, I spent as many hours in and around youth 
justice as I did my friends, family and my own home, as I was often called out to attend 
police stations during nights, early mornings and weekends. I was asked of favours that, 
from both a youth justice professionalism and a sociological ethical position deserved to 
have been criticised. 
For example, four weeks into the research I was attending my second fieldtrip to 
the local courts. At this stage I was still an amateur, in terms of experience, of what went on 
in the courts and its maze of corridors. Dee, a senior social worker at the project had taken 
me to court with the intention that I was to observe the workings of a BSS application. The 
young man in the dock was given BSS. The magistrates set the conditions and the young 
man was free to leave the court accompanied by his mother (fathers or male partners rarely 
attended often because there were none and where there were it was not considered 
important enough an event to attend). Dee was in a rush and had been called to attend 
another BSS application that she was now running late for. With the pre-trial case that had 
just ended, there was still some preliminary youth justice paper work to get through and 
appointments for the young man to be available for his first bail supervision visit in the 
following twenty-four hours. 
Dee: Rob, do us afavour will ya? Grab the lad and his Mam and get theirfull 
names, address and a telephone number. Ask him ifhe has any other current court orders 
against him. Make sure he understands the bail conditions [I couldn't remember all of 
them, and hadn't had time to scribble them all down in my notebook]. Justfill in the details 
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on thisform [hands me a clipboard with form attached, thankfully Dee had written down the 
conditions], and tell them someone will be in contact with them later to arrange the bail visit 
tomorrow. 
The lad and his mother were walking past us. Dee called out, 'Michael, hang on a 
second. This is Rob [pause] he... umm ... [a coy sideways glance directed at me], works with 
me at bail support and needs some details offyou andyour Mam'. And with that, Dee 
sprinted up the corridor of Court No. 2 to the next hearing, in some far flung comer of the 
red-brick Edwardian magistrate's court. In turn, I took on the role of 'youth justice worker' 
by bumbling and stuttering my way through the relatively simple process of recording some 
basic details. I was unsure of what next to do, as it would be a further twenty-four hours 
before a bona fide youth justice worker made contact with Michael and explained his bail 
conditions to him. Flustered, I told him to 'Stay in doors until someonefrom the project 
comes to see you tomorrow. You're not at school are you? I thought not, thenjust stay in 
until the Bail Support Officer comes to see you tomorrow, OK? Good lad. ' Despite the 
ethical criticism that this situation obviously merits, it does provide insight and detail of my 
roles and other's perceptions of them while carrying out the research. I later had a quiet 
word with Dee and politely explained that such a situation should not occur again, due to the 
legal and ethical circumstances that could arise. 
As I was interested in the daily encounters of youth justice these could only be 
witnessed in situ (see, for example, Punch, 1979; Parker et al. 1989). 1 had been given a free 
reign as to where I could enter in terms of access for connected issues relating to BSS, and 
this provided countless opportunities to witness 'backstage' performances (Goffman, 1969) 
in places where aspects of youth justice 'action' occurred (Goffman, 197 1). Theessenceof 
this method of my extensive participation as a researcher was to study the daily lives and 
interaction of young offenders and youth justice workers. The ethnographic practice, with 
the researcher as the 'research instrument' (Coffey, 1999), and 'digging out' (Hobbs, 1988: 
14) the I ived experiences of youth justice from inside of the system incurred a sequential 
process of access, sampling, data collection and its interpretation and occurred as a 
concurrent procedure (Parker, 1974; Hobbs, 1988; Armstrong, 1993). As an 'appreciative' 
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(Matza, 1964) and descriptive study, the aim is to explore the 'complex social realities that 
are not always amenable to more formal methods' (Punch, 1994: 85). This approach 
compensated for the lack of any real concern of the BSS evaluation in explaining the nature 
of life within the group and its conduct (Blumer, 1969: vii). I attempted at all points to 
remain empathic, to all the participants, no-matter which side of the fence they were 
situated, and to the norms, values and behaviours to be found within those groups (Becker, 
1970). 
Key Informants 
The role of gate-keepers in conducting ethnography are vital resources in which to gain 
substantive insights into the phenomenon in which the social researcher focuses his or her 
attention upon (see for example, Armstrong, 1993; Bourgois, 1995; Campbell, 1984; 
Cromwell et al, 1991; Downes, 1966; Hobbs, 1988,1995; Patrick, 1973; Shaw, 1930; 
Whyte, 1955). 1 relied heavily upon informants at every corresponding stage of the 
fieldwork. These gatekeepers came from inside specific areas of the research where I placed 
my gaze upon and often adopted the role of 'reporters' with detailed and contextualised 
knowledge of specific areas within the youth justice system and active participants in youth 
offending. In searching out and observing as many as inter-related areas of BSS a number 
of key informants emerged and stayed the course of my time in the field. Throughout this 
thesis a number of consistent names and voices will appear. 
At the B SS office all of the staff were informants too lesser or greater degrees to 
this study. However, the likes of Geoff, George, Norm and Jack were relied upon heavily. 
To this day I'm still undecided as to how they emerged and remained as the key-informants 
at the office, as there were others in situ who were around as often, were usually willing to 
talk and appeared to accept my role as much as the aforementioned. My inclination is that it 
was 'personality' that drove our interaction to the extent that they became the 'keys' to 
unlocking some of the organizational mysteries from within BSS. 
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With this perspective I aimed to 'reflect the real on-the-ground contexts of the 
meanings of social life in a given milieu' (Bottoms, 2000: 22). As I have referred to earlier, 
Morgan (2000: 85) suggests that for academics involved in evaluation exercises there is 
scope to stretch the reams of available data in order to build upon sociological and 
criminological knowledge. However, there is also a danger involved, in using these 
evaluations for 'other' shrouded research interests, that we may be biting the hands that feed 
us. I am confident in my claim that few, if any, of the youth justice workers who 
participated in this research would have expected to see this thesis presented with the 
content and context that it now appears as. In substantial areas it is a long-way removed 
from the outcomes of the managerialism evaluation it was believed to be and in what the 
evaluation was intended to produce. The overall evaluation exercise was conducted for one 
audience, while this thesis is intended for another. 
Summary 
The evaluation provided access to a wide-range of participants involved with youth 
offending in the city. These individuals included young people [offenders], members of 
their families and friends, YOS workers, Social Services Department workers, the police and 
magistrates, all of whom participated to greater and lesser degrees in this study. My time 
researching the delivery of BSS was split, in no precisely formulated time-scales, between 
the local YOS, the YOS BSS office [which was on a separate site to the YOS], YOls, police 
stations, courts, streets and the young people's places of residence. It is fair to say that I 
covered much, if not all of the trodden pathways that involved the young people's 
interaction with youth justice at the level of delivery involving BSS. 
Other agencies and individuals were not informed and did not know that they were a 
part of the research. For example, six-months into the research I was recruited by the local 
YOS as an 'Appropriate Adult', whose role is to attend police stations for young people 
aged 10 - 17 whose parents or guardians cannot or will not attend police stations following 
their child's arrest. In attempting to 'show how things are' at particular stages of young 
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offenders involvement with the system, this is an interactionist venture into the day-to-day 
experiences of delivering and receiving youth justice. I used this opportunity, the access 
again provided by the evaluation, in order to examine the processes that occurred for young 
people entering into the criminal justice system. 
This aspect of the research provided an ideal opportunity to observe the beginning 
of the bail process for young offenders as it is at the police station that the bail process 
generally begins. This access and participation permitted me with the opportunity to grasp 
the meanings of situations and events of those studied while under arrest at police stations. 
This appreciation of the situation of some of the sample of young offenders allowed me, as 
described by Matza "to comprehend and illuminate the subject's view and to present the 
world as it appears to him" (1969: 25). This method was applied not only at police stations, 
where I had become a participant of the delivery of youth justice and to some degree had 
gone 'native', but also at a number of other 'closed settings' involved with youth justice. As 
I have pointed to earlier much of the research I conducted was covertly shrouded as 
something else, although the research I conducted in police stations was intrinsically covert. 
None of those under study at police stations where aware that my furious scribbling of 
observations, field-notes and verbatim conversations into my note-book which was shielded 
from view behind a large Sunderland YOS clip binder and could have been viewed as a 
diligent youth justice worker, duplicating the custody record details of the young people's 
alleged offences. 
At the BSS Office I observed the daily workings of delivering youth justice at its 
grounded practice level. Here, I was with the front-line youth justice troops aimed at 
providing a criminal justice intervention targeted for a distinct category of children and 
young people. I spent such a considerable amount of time at the BSS office that during the 
two and a half-year period in and around it I became one of its fixtures. 
Over time, I became more entrenched in the daily workings of BSS and observing, 
whilst participating, in studying the interactions of the work of the organisation and many of 
the contextual ized understandings from within youth justice. This was not goingto be 
'armchair academe' (Smith, 2001: 220) as I was now up-close and getting into 'it'. As time 
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progressed I would become fully immersed within the workings of BSS, and like previous 
studies involving ethnographies of the workplace this would provide the opportunity, which 
to date in the has been widely under-researched in the UK from within the contemporary 
model of youth justice, in illuminating the intemalised complexities of work. Studies of the 
work place, for example, have shed light upon paralegals (Pierce, 1995), night-club back- 
room bar staff (Silverston, forthcoming), food servers and cocktail waitresses (Spradley and 
Mann, 1975), phone sex operators (Flowers, 1998), police detectives attending dead bodies 
(Jackall, 1997) and the changing of elderly people's clothes, 'diapers' and the moisturising 
of their bodies (Diamond, 1992), all regarding insights into the contextual isation of workers 
experiences. 
First, is that the practice of non-maleficence (Beauchamp et al. 1982: 18) [that 
researchers should avoid harming participants] should be upheld. The danger in spilling the 
beans was that reprimands, or worse, might occur to some of those involved with this issue. 
These were data being fed back to the YJB in order to inform the Home Office of the 
successes and failures relating to BSS. Second, is that the practice of research in the field 
should adhere to the principles of autonomy or setf-determination (ibid. ) [meaning, that the 
values and decisions of research participants should be respected]. 
I witnessed miscarriages ofjustice, inappropriate police behaviour, incidents of 
young people harming themselves and evidence of good and practice in the delivery of 
youth justice. In conducting the research I dipped my head to magistrates as I entered and 
left courts. I provided money and cigarettes to young offenders, became knowledgeable of 
the fiddles that were undertaken by some of the YOS workers on petrol expenses claims 
forms and understood the processes that occurred in fraudulently claiming extra hours 
worked as an Appropriate Adult. On occasions I also had to consider particular incidents 
where my own ethical conduct could have been questioned. 
The contract for my role as the local evaluator from the YOS stated that I 'was an 
employee of the Sunderland Youth Offending Service and sub ect to the rules and j 
disciplinary procedures of this organisation'. I was uncomfortable with this as it had the 
emphasis that I had now become 'their man' and despite my discomfort I signed up. I 
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received a Youth Offending Service photo ID card which at times I used to get me into 
places, organisations and institutions which had previously refused me entrance when I had 
told them I was a researcher from the University of Durham. This offered a range of 
opportunities in which to broaden the potential scope of the degree of participation that I 
could undertake within a range of agencies involved in the delivery of youth justice. 
A common complaint of those working within the new youth justice system in 
these early stages of its development was that the YJB had rushed ahead in its dramatic 
overhaul of the system (Bailey and Williams 2000: 83). A senior manager from the Nacro 
national evaluation team told me: 
The YJB have thrown a bucketfull of money at BSS without much thought as to how 
we are going to use it to its best effect. At this stage it's a 'suck it and see' exercise. We'll 
have tofigure it out as we go along. Don't worry ... things will get better as time goes along. 
(Fieldnotes: December 1999) 
At specific stages of the research the process moved on from 'observing' youth 
justice to the actual 'full-participation' within it (see, for example, the Chapter as an 
'Appropriate Adult'). I soon discovered that in partaking and participating within the 
$system' I had to learn and engage with a host of simultaneous, shifting, emotionally 
draining, long-hours between a range of multi-agency sites and interact with a range of 
actors within the system who were often scared, angry, confused, depressed, jovial, sarcastic 
and nonchalant in their various experiences of being involved (from a variety of guises) with 
the youth justice system. 
This time in the youth justice field provided me, in the first instance, with the scope 
of conducting the evaluation. Second, it provided me with the time, contacts, acceptance of 
the participants to conduct, somewhat clandestinely, my own research which broke free of 
the constraints of the evaluation and its set managerialist agenda. This I argue offered a far- 
wider scope in which to explore a range of often sealed criminal justice back-spaces to offer 
some perspectives on the informal organisation of the youth justice system. Therefore this 
opportunity offered me the chance to find access to areas of youth justice 'dirty-work' 
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(Hughes 1984: 338-447) that operated beyond the lofty-ideals of much which is promoted 
from the 'official' agenda regarding young offenders and the youth justice system. I had 
little prior experience of conducting ethnography prior to this. It is rarely the case, often 
because of the 'uniqueness' of social settings and situations, that there was much research 
methods text in which to infonn my knowledge and offer advice of how best to go about the 
business. It was, quite simply, a case of sink or swim, occasionally stopping to tread water, 
and learning as I went along (Nader 1970: 98). 
To date, there has been a lack of ethnographic studies conducted into multi-agency 
youth justice delivery. This of course may be due to the relatively new approach within the 
system of delivering the contemporary youth justice strategy by way of this policy directive. 
However, it may also be suggested that the current emphasis upon evaluation techniques in 
providing 'evidence based practice' (Chapman and Hough, 1998) is instigating a closure of 
opportunities into practising research into many other significant areas of sociological 
enquiry within this system of youth justice. The aim of this thesis is to produce a detailed 
reflection of the real on-the-ground contexts of the experiences and meanings of the social- 
life from within the youth justice system. 
At specific stages of the research the process moved on from 'observing' youth 
justice to the actual 'full-participation' within it (see, for example, the Chapter as an 
'Appropriate Adult'). I soon discovered that in partaking and participating within the 
4systern' I had to learn and engage with a host of simultaneous, shifting, emotionally 
draining, long-hours between a range of multi-agency sites and interact with a range of 
actors within the system who were often scared, angry, confused, depressed, jovial, sarcastic 
and nonchalant in their various experiences of being involved (from a variety of guises) with 
the youth justice system. 
This thesis, through a process of first-hand experiences explores the social setting 
of one distinct area of the contemporary youth justice system, this being bail supervision and 
support. By means of participant observation, and a range of other research techniques 
including, complete participation as an Appropriate Adult where I became a fully 
functioning (Gold, 1958) member of the youth justice system in a role that aimed to protect 
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young suspect's rights at police stations. By way of the right of entry that was granted 
through the evaluation process, on-going access to a range of participants occurred 
throughout the twenty-two months I spent in the youth justice arena observing and 
participating with a range of actors at work within, and being worked on by, the youth 
justice system. In other areas of the youth justice field different roles were adopted and these 
roles normally took on the ethnographic role ofparticipant observer. In such situations, 
unlike the role adopted for complete participation as an Appropriate Adult, people were 
aware that I was evaluating the BSS scheme. However, as I have suggested earlier they 
were not generally aware of the double-edged aspect of my participation with and amongst 
them. The overall research strategy was neither fully overt nor fully covert, although the 
role adapted to research in police stations perhaps bordered the fully covert research 
technique 5. 
The following chapter begins by examining the issue of bail at police stations and 
courts. It is within this distinct area of the criminal justice system that suspects' come to the 
attention of the system and that the issue of bail becomes a paramount issue within the many 
pathways that can be taken by the youth justice system, in as to how a young person is dealt 
with following arrest. 
5 Staff at the BSS scheme were of course aware, indeed they offered me the role as an Appropriate Adult, that I was evaluating 
the system. However, none I am certain, would have known that I spent much of the time hanging about police stations 
throughout the North cast of England and that I was taking fieldnotes and observations of the interaction between young 
people and police officers and an intrinsic youthjustice perspective related to BSS. Many of the young people I attended police 
stations for in my role as an Appropriate Adult (AA) I would find, following their arrests, charge, and subsequent court hearing 
would be placed onto BSS. I'llis role was often the starting point of the BSS journey through a maze like system of 
interconnected youth justice protocols. Likewise, they were unaware of the verbatim transcripts I took of conversations within 
the BSS office. 
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Chapter Three 
Locking Up and Bailing Out: Bail at the Police 
Station and the Magistrate's Courts 
Introduction 
Bail is the conditional release of individuals who are suspected of or, charged with a 
criminal offence. The questions that arise within the criminal justice system in England 
and Wales as to 'what to do' with those accused of offending and are awaiting trial, 
hinge upon suspect's right to bail. In theory, bail is a condition that an individual who 
has not been convicted of an offence should not be imprisoned unless their liberty 
presents a significant risk to the safety of the public or, interferes with the due course of 
justice. However, in practice for criminal justice agencies this agreement to the right of 
bail often breaks down. The decision whether or not bail should be granted originates 
during a number of pivotal stages of the criminal justice process. 
This chapter discusses issues that arise once suspects have been arrested and 
charged for committing criminal offences. The chapter is divided into a number of 
critical perspectives associated with bail law. Here, interrelated bail matters are 
considered and range from the legislation of bail from a legal perspective, to the 
practical processes undertaken by the police, Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), and 
magistrates with regard to bail decisions. The discussion that follows reviews the 
theoretical implications of this facet of the criminal justice system. 
It should be noted that in this chapter bail as a legal and practical aspect of the 
criminal justice system is examined per se. In this chapter bail relating to the distinct 
delivery of youth justice is left aside until a later chapter (see, Chapter Five). The reason 
for this is that for the most part, bail-is-bail, and except for a few notable differences 
between 'adult' and 'youth' bail decisions, there are but few distinctions within the 
operation of bail decisions. 
The discussion that follows includes analysis of bail law and its policy and 
practice within a socio-legal perspective. In this way the study will offer an 
understanding of what bail is, what constitutes a bail decision, and the ways this crucial 
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component of the criminal justice process can affect individuals during the pre-trial 
stage of their involvement within the system. 
It is at the police station or, in most cases from the initial youth or magistrate's 
court hearings following arrest that young people arrived from for their episodes of Bail 
Supervision and Support (BSS). Their entrance into the criminal justice system was 
very much dependant upon what had occurred at the earlier decision making stages 
relating to police and court bail decisions. Bail decisions relating to young offenders 
were the basis of the Youth Offending Service's involvement in the provision of Bail 
Supervision and Support. For a significant minority of Sunderland's young offenders, 
the bail decisions made at court often encountered a scenario where the right to bail 
could be removed and that they might be 'remanded' to institutions. InsuchcasesBSS 
offered a remand management intervention which aimed at rescuing those young people 
from the threat of a remand. 
This area of the study discusses that in theory bail, be it in policy or in 
practice, remains an intrinsic right of those suspected of criminal offences. However, as 
will be discussed, this 'right' undergoes scrutiny at a number of critical stages of the 
criminal justice system which can deny that fundamental right to bail. The 'policy' in 
terms of securing the right to bail is often juxtaposed by policing methods. Aswillbe 
discussed the police targeting of known individuals, and of particular social groups, 
play a major role in the gate-keeping functions of entry into the criminal justice system 
(Choongh, 1997,1998). The police can, and often do, influence the decision-making 
processes of other agencies within the system who afford the right or denial of bail 
(Morgan, 1996; Hucklesby, 1997; Sanders and Young, 2000), and also influences 
which suspects come onto this platform of the youth justice process. 
Bail Law 
The purpose of bail is an intention, as a code of bail law, which affirms the presumption 
of innocence to allow for the release of suspects who have been arrested, and/or arrested 
and charged, with a suspected offence prior to trial or sentence (Sanders and Young, 
2000: 511). Paradoxically, the provision of bail also allows the arrest and detention of 
suspects in order to bring them before court and pern-dts pre-trial remands into custody. 
The concept of bail is therefore fraught with contradictions. On the one hand, it 
promotes the rights of those suspected of committing criminal offences with a 
presumption of innocence until guilt has been proven (Cavadino and Gibson, 1993). 
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Yet, on the other hand, bail can be refused when initial evidence is assumed to object to 
and refuse the right to bail (Sanders and Young, 521). 
The refusal of bail and an order to be remanded into custody can only be 
considered and implemented 'when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his 
committing an offence or fleeing after having done so' (Sanders and Young, 2000: 512). 
The law concerning the liberty of suspected individuals who may be charged with 
criminal offences, is governed by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) 
and the Bail Act 1976. PACE deals with the powers of the police to detain suspects and 
with magistrates' powers in extending the usual maximum amount of time a suspect can 
be detained by the police. PACE, as with the notion of bail as a legal concept, aim is to 
protect the welfare of suspects, albeit riding alongside a commensurate objective to 
protect the public from fiu-ther criminal offences by suspects' once a criminal charge 
has been made. 
T'he Bail Act 1976 preserves an individual right to bail and is a covenant once a 
suspect has been charged with a criminal offence and is brought before the court. The 
intended aim of both provisions is to accredit considerable safeguards concerning the 
liberty of the suspect (Cavadino and Gibson, 1993: 9). It does however; provide a 
number of areas relating to the suspect and the offences which are to be dealt with by 
the refusal of a suspect's right to bail. 
Bail or Jail? 
During the early 1990s, the issue of bail within the criminal justice system became a 
pron-dnent item within the political agenda. Many of the concerns regarding bail were 
raised from public, media and law enforcement perspectives directed toward a notion of 
the impotency of the criminal justice system in dealing with persistent offenders 
receiving bail and then continuing re-offend while on bail. During this period political 
involvement within the criminal justice system increased in order to appease the 
concerns of the electorate (Pitts, 2001 a; Muncie, 2000). The functions of bail and its 
associated 'failings' became a suitable target for those concerned with early action 
within the criminal justice system (Cavadino and Gibson, 1993: 11). 
In England and Wales the question as to whether bail should be granted originates 
during a number of key areas of the criminal justice process. When a suspect is arrested 
for a criminal offence the police must decide at some point, whether the suspect is to be 
released without charge, cautioned, or prosecuted (PACE 1984). 
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The refusal of bail at police stations and courts and subsequent remands into 
custody that will often occur contradicts a crucial element of the criminal justice 
rhetoric. This maintains that defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty 
(Hucklesby, 2002: 116). Therefore, it can be assumed that remands into custody 
following the denial of bail, are a criminal justice process that deals with legally 
'innocent' people (ibid. ). Lord Hailsham commenting on the refusal of bail, suggests 
that it 'is the only example, in peace time, where a man can be kept in confinement 
without a proper sentence following conviction after a proper trial. It is, therefore, the 
solitary exception to the Magna Carta' (quoted in Cavadino and Gibson, 1993: 69). 
Hucklesby argues that the right to bail has, since the 1980s, been eroded with a far 
greater emphasis placed on the importance of protecting the public and the rights of the 
victim (2002: 117). Hucklesby highlights a number of problems encountered by 
defendants when their right to liberty has been refused as "defendants remanded in 
custody are more likely to plead guilty, less likely to be acquitted, and more likely to 
have custodial sentences imposed" (2002: 116; also see; Bottomley 1970; King 1971). 
Research has also found that during the initial stages following arrest and court 
hearings, that the threat of being remanded in custody is used as coercive tactic to place 
pressure on suspects and defendants to confess, during detention at police stations or, to 
plead guilty to suspected offences at court (see, Bottoms and McClean, 1976; 
McConville, Sanders and Leng, 1991; and McConville, Hodgson, Bridges and 
Pavlovic, 1994). If remanded, such prisoners do have more additional basic rights to 
those of convicted prisoners. Yet, the potential damage that can occur to remand 
prisoners is immense. The significant effects on adult defendants and their families 
regarding the refusal of court bail include the loss of employment and/or future 
employment prospects, and a multitude of emotional and practical long-term problems 
encountered by defendants and their families (Hucklesby, 2002: 117). Lord Justice 
Woolf describes the effects of imprisonment as: 
Being imprisoned people lost their connections with the 
outside world. They lost their jobs, if they had them. They 
lost their homes, if they had them. Their families deserted 
them, if they had them. Their attachments to the outside 
world, were weakened and their attachments to the prison 
society, the illegal society were straightened. 
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(Woolf, 1991: Para. 1.196) 
For many remanded prisoners the problems highlighted by Woolf (ibid. ) are 
encountered during imprisonment despite in theory, of being presumed innocent. The 
premise of the law regarding bail is that all defendants have a right to unconditional 
bail. However, the decisions as to who gets bail and whether this is unconditional or 
conditional or, as in many instances refused bail and detained by the police and 
remanded into custody by the courts', is a decisive stage of the defendants' initial 
engagement within the criminal justice system. 
PACE (1984) fundamentally reformed the law relating to the investigation of 
crime by the police. Previous reforms had tackled issues on criminal procedures yet, 
the overall structure of those criminal procedures had not been comprehensively 
evaluated for nearly a hundred years. What reforms in criminal procedure that had 
occurred in those years, it has been noted, were generally of a 'piecemeal' nature and 
that an overall reform of the criminal procedures of police investigations including the 
arrest, charge and detention of suspects' was long over-due (RCCP, 1981: 2-3). 
A number of factors instigated the review of the existing criminal procedures 
occurring at that time. These included the general public's anxiety about rising crime 
and what were believed to be the lack of police powers in tackling escalating crime 
rates (Consortium of Penal Affairs, 1995). Equally, there were increasing concerns 
regarding police abuse of existing powers (Cavadino and Gibson, 1993). In this 
context the mistreatment and out-right abuse ofjuveniles and mentally handicapped 
suspects detained by the police, were pushed to the forefront of debate within the 
criminal justice system. The 'Confait Affair' raised specific concerns. In 1974, two 
boys and a young man of eighteen were arrested in South London. They were charged 
and detained at a police station and following the advice of the police the courts 
remanded the boys into prison on suspicion of murdering Maxwell Confait. All three 
suspects, under police interrogation, confessed to the murder and were later imprisoned 
fortheoffence. During the mid- I 970s, it came to light that the confessions to Maxwell 
Confait's murder were obtained from the three suspects under duress from the 
investigating officers involved in the case. What was also found was that the criminal 
justice process had serious flaws and operated with unregulated bias regarding the role 
of the police to that of suspects under interrogation for suspected criminal offences. 
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Easy Pickings 
The Fisher Inquiry (1977), examined the Tonfait Affair' and highlighted a number of 
very dubious practices involving the interrogation methods, and the overall prosecution 
processes that were governed, at that time, by the police involved with Maxwell 
Confait's death. The evidence that came to light during this inquiry found a number of 
extremely dubious police practices had occurred during the detention of the three 
juveniles, while the police conducted inquiries and interrogations. Fisher (1977) found 
that the allegedly 'voluntary' statements offered by way of the three suspects 
confessing to the murder, had in fact been constructed by interrogating officers, and 
that words had been 'put into the mouths' of the three juveniles by the interrogating 
officers. 
The inquiry also found that two of the juveniles were under the age of seventeen 
and the third, the oldest at eighteen years of age had the mental capacity of a thirteen- 
year old. At no stage during the arrest, charge and detention processes did the police 
consider the juveniles to be 'vulnerable'. Nor, did any of the investigating officers' of 
the case offer the young suspects the right to legal representation during their detention 
and interrogation. It was found that during the interrogations police officers' had 
deployed a technique of questioning which led to 'coerced compliant confessions' 
(Sanders and Young, 1994: 184). This form of interrogation involves unwarranted and 
undue pressure from police officers in order to coerce the suspect into making a 
confession that s/he knows is false but, agrees to the confession as a way to escape the 
intense pressure the suspect find themselves under (ibid. ). With children and young 
people it could be expected the police found this an extremely useful strategy in 
obtaining confessions. 
The issue of police interrogation tactics in dealing with suspects has raised 
specific concerns regarding the culture and implications of such police practices. A 
number of studies have argued that the 'informal processes', often hidden and/or 
masked by arresting and interrogating officers, have been common cultural practice 
within street policing and detective work (Evans, 1992; McConville, 1992). As 
Newburn and Hayman have argued in their thesis of policing and social control, the 
time experienced by suspects being detained at police station passes 'exceedingly 
slowly' (2002: 97). With these factors in mind, and with the added negative of the three 
suspects to the Confait murder, bearing in mind these were but children with no formal 
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legal representation present during their interviews and subsequent 'confessions', it is 
hardly surprising that the police 'got a result'. Perhaps even more startling was that 
police officers had persuaded the duty pathologist to alter his report regarding the 
originally recorded 'time of death' of the victim. This inter-agency deceit and 
collaboration removed one of the suspect's alibis that had initially separated him from 
the scene of the crime. The 'revised' and 'new' time of death of the victim had put the 
suspects back into the frame again for the murder. The convictions of all three 
wrongfully convicted and 'vulnerable' suspects' were eventually overturned. 
Fisher's report identified three major flaws in the investigation and prosecution of 
the case, which he claimed had led to the wrongful conviction of the boys. The most 
important criticism in terms of the eventual establishment of the CPS, was the failure of 
prosecution lawyers to subject the prosecution case and its discrepancies to careful 
scrutiny. The prosecution of the suspects was simply an exercise to prove the case 
against the three juveniles and neglected the fact that other alternative explanations 
may have existed. It was also an exercise that highlighted occasional police apathy to 
the notion ofjustice and of the rejection of fair play by some police officers. As 
Walker proposes: 
Criminal Justice should be judged, inter alia, by the 
number of injustices produced by them in the first 
place, and, secondly, by their willingness to 
recognise those mistakes. 
(2002: 522) 
The weaknesses and mistakes highlighted by the Confait Affair, as with a 
number of other high profile miscarriages ofjustice that occurred during the same 
era, were recognised and began to be dealt with. An-overhaul of police investigation 
methods and a number of other key areas within the criminal justice system were 
implemented. 
PACE 1984: Protecting the Suspects 
The Royal Commission (RCCP, 1981, also referred to as the Phillips Commission 
198 1) that followed the miscarriage ofjustice relating to the Confait Affair examined 
the powers and duties of the police, in relation to the criminal investigation of offences 
as well as the rights of suspects. The central tenets of the Commission (198 1) were to 
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balance the needs of the police's investigative processes, with those of suspect's rights. 
This newly imposed equilibrium was to "have regard both to the interests of the 
community in bringing offenders to justice and the rights and liberties of persons 
suspected or accused of crime... "(RCCP, 198 1: iv). PACE, which owed much to its 
legislation and implementation because of the findings of the RCCP (198 1), legislated 
for a greater regard to the balance of the investigative process of the police (Brown, 
1997: 1). PACE set three areas of reform regarding police investigation of criminal 
offences which the Commission (198 1) had been critical of, these being the, 'fairness', 
'openness', and 'workable system of practices' relating to suspects welfare (RCCP, 
198 1: Para 10.1). PACE was implemented as a direct outcome of the RCCP 
recommendations for systematic reforms of police investigative processes. The 
provisions of PACE were intended to be a balance of the public interest of solving 
crime and the rights and liberties of suspects (Brown, 1997). 
Under s. 38 (1) of PACE there is an assumption that once charged with an 
offence suspects should be released from the police station, with or without bail 
unless specific conditions apply. Police perceptions regarding the likelihood that a 
suspect will 'abscond', 're-offend' or 'interfere with a witness' are reasonable 
grounds for the refusal of police bail at the station. In such circumstances suspects 
will be detained at the police station and will be presented before a court at the first 
available court pre-trial hearing. 
The notion of bail as an individual right is surrounded by legal complexities 
which on one hand, attempts to uphold individual rights within the legal system with 
the reliance of a long-held presumption of innocence upheld over guilt until guilt is 
proven. On the other hand, the credibility of suspects to the police and courts plays a 
fundamental role as to who receives bail. 
Bail or Detention at the Police Station 
The importance of the right to bail cannot be under-estimated. The stage after arrest is 
a pivotal period of the criminal justice process in deciding as to whether or not suspects 
arrested by the police for committing criminal offences, enter the criminal justice 
process (Phillips and Brown, 1998). Until 1995, the police in England and Wales held 
no powers to attach variable police bail conditions to defendant's bail. The Criminal 
Justice Act and Public Order Act 1994 incorporated both police and court bail decision- 
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making processes, under a joint criminal justice policy, in order to tighten bail 
procedures during these initial stages of entry into the system. 
Research on Police Bail Decision-Making 
At the police station when a person has been charged with an offence it is the decision 
of the custody officer as to whether to release the suspect on bail or, to detain the 
suspect in police custody until the first available court hearing. With the 
implementation of the 1994 Act, the police have been awarded the power to apply 
whatever conditions they deem appropriate to defendant's bail. The only exception to 
those powers being the condition for a suspect to reside in a bail hostel which can only 
be ordered by a magistrate or judge. A central tenet of the 1994 Act was the 
expectation that with this increased power to apply conditions to suspects' police bail, 
the numbers of suspects detained in police custody would be reduced. A small pilot 
study in 1993 (Burrows et al. ), found that the police bailed approximately 60 per cent 
of defendants, whereas the remaining 40 per cent were detained in police custody. 
Home Office (2000) figures suggest that the police detain 15 per cent of those 
arrested and charged with a criminal offence. Other contemporary studies have found 
significantly higher rates of the refusal of bail by the police, with rates of between 20 
and 28 per cent (Burke and Brown, 1997; Phillips and Brown, 1998). For the rates of 
conditionally bailed defendants, Burke and Brown (ibid. ) found that 17 per cent of 
suspects were conditionally bailed, whereas Hucklesby (200 1) found that just under a 
third (32 per cent) of suspects were conditionally bailed. 
Brown's (1989) study of thirty-two police stations found remand rates at police 
stations ranging from 13 to 32 per cent. Considerable variations in the remand of 
suspects of comparable offences also occurred. For burglary charges, suspects detained 
by the police ranged between 21 per cent to 72 per cent. Brown argues that these 
variations can be accounted for by police opinions in differing geographic areas and the 
interpretations of the 'seriousness of offences' meriting the refusal of police bail and 
remands in police custody (ibid. ). 
To date, no official figures are available on the use of police conditional bail. 
Of a limited number of research studies conducted into the use of police bail, several 
points of interest have arisen. Phillip and Brown's (1998) study found distinct 
variations between the use of the granting of unconditional/conditional bail and 
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detention rates between police stations within the sarne force constabularies. However, 
it was also found that inconsistent rates within different police constabularies occurred. 
The decision to grant or refuse bail at the police station is the Custody 
Officer's decision (generally a police sergeant), and is a judgement that is governed 
under the legislation of PACE. It allows bail to be refused at the police station, if a 
custody officer has 'reasonable' grounds for believing that if given bail a suspect 'will' 
a) cause physical injury to any other person; b) cause loss or damage to property; c) 
that they will fail to appear in court to answer to bail; d) they will interfere with the 
administration ofjustice; and/or, e) they will interfere with the investigation of offences 
(PACE, 1984). These wide-ranging and often speculative 'reasonable' grounds equip 
the police with a variety of definitions in upholding the right to deny bail from the 
police station and may influence other bail decisions that are made at a later stage of 
the process. I 
The Crown 
The Prosecution of Offenders Act (POA) 1985, created the Crown Prosecution 
Service as an organisation to take over the function of prosecuting offenders from the 
police (Sanders and Young, 1994: 1). A consequence of the Confait Affair was to 
transfer the role of prosecution away from the police to lawyers, who would have the 
final say as to whether or not, and in what ways cases would be brought before the 
courts. The POA 1985 implies that the decision to prosecute should be made 
independently of the police. Although the CPS is designated to fulfil a number of 
functions and the CPS is commissioned to assume a number of roles, the most 
important function of the CPS is its ultimate control over the decision to prosecute 
(McConville, et al, 1991: 141). In exploring the function of the CPS the discussion 
will therefore focus on whether the current organisation of criminal prosecution 
permits the CPS to exercise an independent decision making-process. The question 
that is asked is how independent is the CPS? 
Once charged or summonsed the role of the CPS is to decide whether or not 
to pursue a prosecution for the related criminal offences. However, the 
'independence' of the CPS has been called into question. Political and institutional 
pressures, it has been argued, are located within its relationship with other criminal 
justice agencies (Sanders and Young, 2000: 332). McConville et al, (1991) research 
of three police-force areas, found that the CPS were not particularly independent of 
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the police regarding the decision-making process relating to prosecuting criminal 
suspects. The study found that in many areas regarding the approval of or, arguments 
against bail conditions, the CPS generally followed police recommendations. 
The structural weakness of the CPS regarding its level of independence has 
been found to lie in the practicalities situated within reviewing police cases on the 
basis of evidence provided solely by the police (Crisp, 1993; Sanders, 2002). For the 
CPS to become adequate at reviewing evidence, it is argued, that this can only occur 
if the agency is placed in an 'entirely different structural relationship with the police' 
(Sanders, 2002: 158). 
The earlier corresponding conditions of the Bail Act (1976), allowed custody 
at the police station to be justified, if grounds existed on the belief that a defendant 
would commit further offences if granted police bail (Brookes, 1992; Northumbria 
Police, 1992). During the period that followed this legislative change, a general 
consensus developed within police forces that PACE (1984) had restricted the powers 
of the police in detaining suspects and in denying them police bail (Morgan, 1996: 38). 
Police opinion regarding the arrival of PACE 1984, stressed investigating officers were 
excessively hampered by the new codes of practice within PACE and that suspects had 
been given too many rights, thus restricting long-held policing methods of investigation 
(Bottomley et al, 1991: 76). 
However, organisations and their cultures do adapt to enforced change and 
diversionary tactics can be applied in manipulating the 'rules' in order to achieve their 
own specific aims (Bottomley, 1991; Morgan, 1986). In my own research at police 
stations it was evident that for a particular group of young (often labelled as 'persistent' 
offenders) suspects, police officers could and would distend the use of PACE in order 
to deny these young defendants bail. 
In my observations as an 'Appropriate Adult' for young people arrested, 
questioned, charged and often detained by the police, instances occurred where the 
manipulation of the 'reasonable ground' rule permitted the denial of police bail. Rarely, 
if ever, were police detention decisions, which came about as a refusal of bail due to 
'reasonable grounds', questioned or criticised. An account of the granting and denial 
of bail at police stations are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
A central issue in the use of attached conditions of police bail has been to reduce 
the number of detained suspects held in police custody (Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice, 1993). However, there is also evidence to suggest that this has not 
been universally achieved. In some areas of police bail decisions a 'net-widening' 
62 
affect has occurred for defendants, who would have previously been granted 
unconditional bail prior to the introduction the 1994 Act, have instead received 
conditional bail (Burke and Brown, 1997-, Hucklesby, 2001 ). Hucklesby Suggests tlllt 
many of the associated problems regarding the police's interpretation ofthe legislation 
may be located in police officer's lack of training in dealing with the complex issue of 
bail. She argues that: 
Most custody officers receive a very brief introduction on bail 
decision-making as part of their custody officer training and no 
special training was undertaken when the 1994 legislative changes 
were introduced. 
(2002: 119) 
The decision-making processes regarding police bail are important as they can 
and do have implications regarding similar decisions in other stages ofthc criminal 
justice process. This should therefore be considered as a highly significant process and 
therefore requires skilled and competent professionals to carry out such a role. 'File 
following table provides an overview of police bail decisions that custody officers at 
police stations make the informed crucial decisions regarding suspect's rights to bail. 
Table One 
Police flail Decisions: Detention/Release from Police Stations 1998-2001 
Police Bail Decisions 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Numhcr Arrested, 
Charged & Released on Bail 950,000 953,000 916,000 931,000 
Number Dcnied 
Police Bail & Detained 
Percentage Denied 
Police Bail and Detained 
143,000 143,000 142,000 129,000 
15% 1 5/o 15% 14% 
(Sourcc: I lome Office, 2002: 136) 
63 
The above table demonstrates that police bail decisions during the last few 
years have remained consistent particularly when analysis is applied to the overall 
proportion of suspects who are refused bail by the police after arrest and charge. The 
data demonstrate that 14% to 15% of all arrested and charged suspects are refused bail 
and held in custody until the first available magistrate's court session. 
Despite the findings of previous research regarding bail decisions made at 
police stations, the police continue to play a crucial and often unaccounted role during 
this process. A number of the studies refeffed to in the above section demonstrate that 
police perceptions and 'inclinations' regarding affested suspects potential to re-offend, 
if bailed from police stations, continue despite the evidence that suggests that these 
decisions are often flawed. Police bail decisions also make an impact upon proceeding 
bail decisions that follow at court and it is to this area of the bail process that we shall 
now discuss. 
A Dual Process: Police and Court Bail and Remand Decisions 
Research has found a correlation between police bail/custody decisions and later court 
remand decisions (Hucklesby, 1997; Morgan and Henderson, 1998). Research has 
found that if the police released defendants on bail that in most cases they were also 
unlikely to be remanded into custody by the courts. Conversely, if the police had 
detained defendants, it was more likely the case that the courts would follow suit and 
remand the defendants to prison during initial pre-trial court hearing while awaiting 
trial. 
The power of the police to attach bail conditions has ambiguous definitions and 
purposes. On one hand, is an issue that bail/detention decisions of the police are now 
more visible with 'precise' details of those decisions available to the courts (Hucklesby 
2002: 120). On the other hand, it has been argued that the decisions made by the police 
or, requested for at court, strengthen the police influence in court regarding bail 
decisions and 'may partially account for the rise in the use of conditional bail by the 
courts' (Hucklesby, 1997: 274; Hucklesby, 2002: 120). 
A ftirther aspect of the bailing process at police stations is worthy of 
consideration. The police are able to bail suspects from the police station without 
charge of a criminal offence and as a condition of bail the suspect is required to return 
to the police station at a latter specified date to assist with enquiries (PACE 1984: s. 47 
[3]). If a suspect fails to attend the police station they are liable to arrest (PACE 1984: 
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s. 46A). Research has found that 17 per cent of suspects were bailed by the police, 
without charge at that point, and requested to return, as a condition of bail, while 
fin-ther enquiries were made (Phillips and Brown, 1998). 
Strong evidence exists to suggest that this use of bail has increased during the last 
few years. Phillips and Brown (1998) describe this trend as a police 'maximisation' 
process. As there is a limited time available to conduct enquiries the length of time 
available for the police to hold suspects has been overcome by way of the 
maximisation process. The police, it is argued, use this type of bail to 'stretch-out' the 
available options to conduct enquiries (ibid. ). 
If these policing methods in bail use are occurring, the measures to reduce the 
delays in the criminal justice system highlighted by Narey (1997) could be jeopardised. 
It has also been argued that this method of 'pre-charge' bail will continue to rise as the 
police utilise the resources available to them to its most sought-after outcome 
(Hucklesby 2002: 120). This raises a number of issues. First, that the police may abuse 
this option by arresting 'suspects' without initial evidence. Second, in knowing that the 
restrictions regarding the rights of the suspects and the time the police can detain them, 
can be by-passed (Hucklesby, 2002: 12 1). Phillips and Brown (1998: 84) state that a 
fundamental strategy in this use of 'pre-charge' bail by the police is that further 
evidence may be detected, and then used to strengthen the enquiry. Yet, as the study 
also found in the cases where pre-charge bail had been applied, over two-fifths of pre- 
charge bail cases were dropped with 'no further action' decisions (ibid. ). 
PACE, it has been suggested, has had little impact upon police practices in the 
arrest, and detention rather than the summonses of suspects (McConville et al, 1991). 
Yet, other studies have found little evidence to suggest that since the introduction of 
PACE that the police are using powers to arrest suspects unduly (Bottoms et al, 199 1; 
Irving and McKenzie, 1989). A number of studies have suggested that there may have 
been improvements in the standard of evidence on which arrests are made since PACE 
came into practice (Irving and McKenzie, 1989; Bottomley et al, 1991; and Brown, 
199 1). Bottomley et aL (1989) indicate that although PACE may have widened the 
scope for officers to make their own interpretations regarding the character of 
'reasonable suspicion', yet despite this, many police officers believed that they arrested 
less often on 'hunches' than they did prior to the introduction of PACE. This suggests 
that a more professional practice of policing may have developed since PACE issued a 
code of police practice. 
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After charging suspects, custody officers are required to examine the necessity of 
the refusal of police bail. It has been suggested that although custody officers at police 
stations are intended to operate independently of arresting officers and examine each 
charge, this is not always what occurs in practice (Bottomley et al, 1989). It has been 
found that due to workloads and pressure custody officers often find it impractical to 
carry out substantial enquiries regarding the arrests of suspects (ibid. ). 
McConville et al (199 1) argue that structural factors often influence custody 
officers' decisions regarding police bail. The concept of 'internal regulation', where 
custody officers take an independent stance on proceedings at the police station, often 
fail. The shared interests of police officers at the same station are can overwhelm the 
notion of custody officers operating independently from their colleagues (ibid. ). 
Morgan et al (199 1) have found that shared interests did occur, and that custody 
officers would often back up their colleague's claims but, do also employ tactics in 
order to deal with arrest decisions they disagreed with. For example, 'private words' 
with arresting officers away from earshot of other officers on the shift and a variety of 
criminal justice agency workers (for example, legal representatives and Appropriate 
Adults) often occurred. 
As with any close-knit occupational environment 'colleagues' are often 'friends' 
inside-and-outside of the workplace. Cultural practices restrict the independence and 
neutrality of the custody officers from fully disassociating themselves from the 
working practice and police culture that is embedded within the organisation. The 
reality of the shared perfunctory policing methods may well suggest the 
6 ... appearance of everything 
being 'done by the book', 
detention [by the custody officer], reviews of detention may 
be perfunctory and the suspect might remain in custody as 
long as investigating officers wish, subject to the time limits 
stated in PACE. ' 
(Sanders and Young, 2003: 238) 
As one of Bottomley's respondent's suggested the idea is 'to make PACE work 
for the police' (1991: 106). It is therefore of no surprise that an earlier report, to some 
extent, criticised the role and practices of custody officers. The Runciman Commission 
(1993) recognised a number of failures including, custody officers allowing colleagues 
to visit suspect's cells; failures in providing information to suspects about their rights; 
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denying the right to legal representation by adopting tactics that deny that right and, of 
much importance to this particular chapter, the 'rubber-stamping' of detention at police 
stations. The 'rubber stamping' of the detention of suspects at police stations plays an 
important aspect in the criminal justice processes that generally follow such decisions 
during subsequent bail decisions made at court. 
Locking-Up or Bailing Out at Court 
The present bail system in England and Wales is based on the Bail Act 1976. The Act 
provided a right to bail and also imposed the justifications for the removal of the right to 
bail (Hucklesby, 2002: 12 1). The Criminal Justice Act 1967 had initially preceded this 
process in the application of bail decisions to defendants, where the introduction of 
conditional bail and a relatively weak presumption of the 'right' to bail instructed a 
number of circumstances when bail should be granted (ibid. ). Both the 1967 and 1976 
Acts came about as results from Pressure from a number of sources which had criticised 
the way the process of bail was operating. 
During this time a concern emerged regarding the increase in numbers being 
sent to prison and the burdens that this placed upon the Prison Service. Other concerns 
were raised and attributed to a number of research studies which found high numbers of 
unnecessary remands in custody; striking variations in bail and custody rates in various 
courts; an unjustified system of bail (money) sureties, and a general lack of information 
available to magistrates regarding bail procedures to base their decisions upon 
(Botton-fley, 1970; King, 1971; also see Hucklesby, 2002). 
Throughout the 1970s a consensus developed within the crin-ýinal justice 
system that the number of defendants placed on bail should increase. A review of the 
bail decision-making process by the Working Party (1974) considered strategies to 
enable courts to release more defendants on bail (Hucklesby, 2002: 121). As a result of 
the Working Party's (1974) suggestions a Home Office Circular (1975) stated that 
courts should introduce a 'presumption of bail' in most applicable cases. The resulting 
reduction (of approximately 13%) of remanded custody rates during the mid-to-late 
1970s, were to a large degree as a consequence of the findings and recommendations of 
earlier research into this problem area of bail within the criminal justice system. 
However, the fall in the prison remand population during the late I 970s as a 
consequence of the Bail Act 1976 was not sustained during the 1980s. This period of 
time witnessed a return to rising custodial remands within the prison estate. 
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A major contributing element to these increases was that the delays being 
experienced within the criminal justice process during the 1980s increased the length of 
time defendants were spending in prison on remand awaiting trial (Hucklesby, 
2002: 122). During the 1980s amendments to the Bail Act 1976: 
... overturned the presumption of bail for some defendants charged Vrith 
serious offences. This trend to restrict the right to bail for certain 
defendants deemed as 'dangerous' continued in the 1990s. The 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 completely removed the 
right to bail for those accused of committing a second grave offence. 
(Hucklesby, 2002: 122) 
The 1994 Act created a shift in policy legislation restrictions regarding the 
right to bail, for those alleged of being persistent offenders and re-offending on bail. 
The nature of those re-offences did not have to be of a particularly serious 'nature', as it 
was the repetition of crime thatjustified the restrictions of defendants' liberty. 
In England and Wales the number of defendants denied bail and remanded in 
custody increased from 48,000 in 1990 to 84,000 in 2000. The increased use of 
custodial remands throughout the 1990s rendered a continual rise in the numbers of 
remanded defendants within the prison population. In 2000 the remand prison 
population in England and Wales was 11,270 (Home Office, 200 1 a: 40). 
In 1998,143,000 people were refused bail after arrest and were detained in police 
custody pending first court appearances for suspected offences (ibid. ). Of this total, 
magistrates' remanded 49,000 defendants to custody (ibid. ). Although the proportion of 
remand prisoners is comparatively small to the sentenced prisoner population, the 
remand population does make up approximately a fifth of the overall prison population. 
The following table provides an overview of magistrate's courts' bail and remand 
decisions in England and Wales from 1998 to 2001. 
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Table Two 
Cases at Magistrates' Courts 1998-2001: Types of Remands 
All Offences 1998 1999 2000 200 1 
Not Remanded 1,484,000 1,427,000 1,493,000 1.433 1,000 
(70%) (69%) (72%) (70%) 
Remanded on Bail 552,000 541,000 505,000 523,000 
(26%) (26%) (24%) (26%) 
Remanded in 98,000 98,000 84,000 78,000 
Custody (5%) (5%) (4%) (4%) 
(Source: Home Office, 2002b: 135) 
As with the data in the previous table, magistrates bail decisions during this 
period, in terms of a consistent dosage of numbers from the overall populations, 
corresponded closely to that of the police. The following table (below) provides an 
overview of police detention rates and the subsequent first available court hearings and 
outcomes of those cases. The figures presented also demonstrate the rate of 
magistrate's custodial remands. 
Table Three 
Police and Magistrates Courts Opposition to Bail 1998-2001 
Police/Court 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Opposition to Bail Rates 
Police Bail Declined 
(Suspect Detained) 
Court Bail Declined 
(Remanded in Custody) 
143,000 143,000 142,000 128,000 
(15%) (15%) 
98,000 98,000 
(5%) (5%) 
(I 5'Vo) 
84,000 78,000 
(4%) (4%) 
Court/Pollce Differences 45,000 45,000 59,000 50,000 
(Source: I lome Office, 2002) 
Tile above table demonstrates a consistent level of the refusal ofbail at both police 
stations and magistrate's courts. The figures dernonstrate that nationally dic policc will 
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refuse bail and detain 15% of arrested and charged suspects and then present them at the 
first available magistrate's court hearing. Once presented at the initial magistrates 
hearing between 4 and 5 per cent of defendants (nationally) are refused bail and are 
remanded into custody by the magistrates. A number of studies have provided some 
evidence that may well suggest that the CPS is heavily influenced by police opinions 
and perspectives relating to the objection of bail at court. It has been argued that the 
prosecution view: 
... is dominant in bail/custody 
decisions make it difficult to come 
to any conclusion other than that in the majority of cases the 
magistrates simply rubber stamp decisions made earlier in the 
process. 
(Hucklesby, 2002: 127). 
As the police provide the CPS with recommendations regarding the bail status of 
defendants, it is argued that the CPS is often influenced by the police of such matters 
(Burrows, Henderson and Morgan, 1994). Phillips and Brown found that during this 
initial entry stage into the criminal justice system, the police influenced the CPS to such 
a degree that 85 per cent of police recommendations were followed by the CPS 
(1998: 135). The study found that although the CPS was less likely to follow police 
recommendations to opposing bail yet, in these cases the recommendations were still 
followed in nearly three-quarters of those cases (71 per cent). Furthermore, in cases 
where the police recommended to the CPS that conditional bail should be applied, the 
CPS followed those recommendations in 89 per cent of cases. For recommendations of 
unconditional bail the CPS followed suit in 96 per cent of those cases (ibid: 135). 
The findings raise serious questions relating to the independence of the CPS with 
regard to the information they rely upon from the police and how the CPS uses such 
information relating to bail decisions at court. At this stage of the criminal justice 
process, the relationships between the CPS and the police as prosecutors are a 
fundamental factor in bail decisions. In basic terms it is these decisions which 
determine 'who gets what' in terms of bail decisions (i. e. unconditional, conditional or 
remand bail decisions at magistrates courts). It has been argued that despite 
appearances to the contrary, the CPS is a police-dependant organisation. 
CPS dependence on the police is partly by choice, in so far as the 
ethos of the two institutions is similar. It is partly a product of the 
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performance indicators-conviction rates, primarily established for it 
as criteria of success. Since both the police and the CPS are 
prosecuting agencies, it could not be expected that either of these 
conditions be otherwise. Finally, the CPS is almost entirely 
dependent on the police for its inforrnation about cases. Since cases 
are made up of nothing other than information, cases themselves are 
police products, and the CPS decisions are therefore driven by the 
police. 
(Sanders and Young, 2000: 345) 
The 'structural dependency' (ibid. ) of the police and CPS organisational order has 
the potential to undermine the 'due process' (Packer, 1968) ethos of the criminal justice 
system. Of course it would be wrong to suggest notions of 'conspiracy' at work here, 
as the CPS does discontinue cases and recommendations made by the police, who 
would much prefer to see prosecutions occur in such situations. In most cases the CPS 
does not oppose bail and the courts will usually follow suit in such cases (Burrows, 
Henderson and Morgan, 1994; Hucklesby, 1994,1997). However, for the police and 
CPS and courts, bail decisions are often 'follow-on' decisions where the former informs 
(and often influences) the later. 
Much of the research conducted into this area of the criminal justice system has 
found that gross variations in the use of custody rates occur between courts. Hucklesby 
(1997), for example, found in three courts that variations in custody rates ranged from 9 
per cent to 25 per cent. In all three courts in this study similar cases were treated 
dissimilarly. This therefore suggests, that these variations provide further evidence that 
'justice by geography' (Haines and Drakeford, 1998) similar to police making decisions 
leading to cautioning variations, are an intrinsic factor regarding bail as to 'who gets 
what' during these interconnected aspects of the criminal justice system (Sanders and 
Young, 2000). Pre-court discussions regarding bail conditions by all parties (including 
defence solicitors) carried out prior to magistrates hear cases, often set the tone 
regarding what the outcome regarding bail conditions will be (Hobbs, 1988). In many 
aspects it is before the magistrates' hear the actual cases that deals are done (Parker, 
Sumner and Jarvis, 1989) and as to 'who gets what' is often implemented at this stage 
of the court process. 
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Hucklesby's (1997) study examined 1,524 remand hearings at three magistrates' 
courts. In approximately 85 per cent of cases, the CPS did not object to bail conditions 
for defendants. The study found that in onlyjust over half of the cases where the CPS 
requested remands into custody, did defendant's solicitors oppose these requests. It was 
very rare for magistrates to question those CPS proposals (ibid. ). In her study it was 
also found that in 86 per cent of the cases where the CPS requested a custodial remand 
the courts granted the option. Similarly, both unconditional and conditional bail 
recommendations were granted at virtually every request (ibid. ). Hucklesby's 
hypothesis is that during this integral part of the criminal justice process, the 'real' 
decision-makers in order of merit are, the police (who make recommendations to the 
CPS), the CPS (who stake a claim upon the right to bail or its denial) and the defence 
Idwyers (who it has been found, argue against bail opposition in approximately 50 per 
cent of those opposing arguments). 
What is clear is that for those defendants who are in the position where the CPS is 
objecting to bail and proposals are made to remand defendants, there occurs an 'uphill 
struggle to overcome CPS objections to the 'right to bail" (Sanders and Young, 
2000: 521). A central area of concern regarding the objection to and refusal of bail at 
both the police station and the court, is the 'speculative' assessments regarding the 
short-range forecasting which the police, CPS and magistrates often make that 
defendants will 'abscond' or 'commit further offences' if granted bail. As one 
magistrate regarding the rhetoric of bail decisions, suggested: 
... the bail decision is a matter of guess work, of 
hunches, not 
capable of precise explanation. Will he turn up, will he do it 
again? Each magistrate will apply his own criteria and his own 
values to his decision. 
(Hayes, 1981: 22. Quoted in Sanders and Young, 2000: 522) 
The decision-making processes regarding the right to bail from the onset (custody 
officers' at police stations) to its end (magistrates' at court) are rarely drawn out 
deliberations (Sanders and Young, 2000: 522). Zander's (1979) study of London courts 
found that for the vast majority of cases (86%), the decisions regarding the right to bail 
and individual's liberty took five minutes or less, during the 261 court sessions she 
studied. In cases where remands into custody were sought the proceedings were swift. 
Approximately 60 per cent of cases being considered and then reached by a decision, 
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occurred within a period ofjust five minutes. Zander also found that the bail decisions 
made by courts were careless in the conviction of the non-existent offence of breaching 
bail conditions. 
The breaching of bail conditions is not a criminal offence although it often leads 
to a defendant being brought back in front of the court. With such cases, magistrates 
will assess recorded breaches of earlier bail conditions and reconsider the defendants 
remand status (for example to withdraw bail and remand the defendant or, to apply 
other conditions to the existing bail conditions). However, in Zander's (1979) study a 
number of magistrates were unaware of this legal issue and mistakenly believed that a 
'breach' was a criminal offence. 
As with the earlier discussion in this chapter regarding police influence upon bail 
decisions, the police continue to play a major arbitrary role in the withdrawal of 
previously set bail conditions. The police can arrest defendants if they have 'reasonable 
grounds' to believe that a defendant on bail has broken or is 'likely' to break any of 
their previously stated conditions (Bail Act, 1976: s. 7). Under any of these 
circumstances 'the defendant need not be granted bail' (Bail Act, 1976: s. 4). The 
influencing perspective of the police, who often inform the CPS regarding bail and 
remand decisions, who then in turn, are often successftil in persuading magistrates of 
the prosecution's preferred route ofjustice, is a useftil strategy deployed to tighten the 
bail rope around defendants in order to restrict their liberties. Sanders and Young 
provide a useful overview of how the arbitrary and discriminatory conditions of bail can 
operate as a form of social and legal control. 
Financial conditions weigh far more heavily on poor people 
than on others, and sometimes lead to remands in custody. 
Residence conditions lead to similarly operate unfairly on the 
homeless and rootless. Most other conditions are largely 
unenforceable. When curfews, for example, are breached, the 
only defendants at any risk at all of being caught are those who 
the police recognise, these will usually be defendants who are 
'known to the police' or who stand out-such as members of 
ethnic minorities in largely-white areas. 
(2000: 519) 
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This suggests that at all levels at this stage of the criminal justice proceedings the 
police maintain the upper hand of the bail/remand process with the majority of 
stakeholders. 
Up to Their Old Tricks Again: Re-Offending on Bail 
Contemporary concern regarding incidences of re-offending while on bail have 
continued to raise discussions as to 'what' is to be done with suspected offenders during 
these early stages of the criminal justice process. Debates regarding the rates of re- 
offending on bail have also added to the discussion. Since the late 1970s a number of 
studies have examined the incidence of offending on bail and most of these studies have 
attempted to answer either or, both of two key questions relating to offending on bail. 
First, regards the numbers of defendants who are given bail and then offend 
while they are on bail? Second, regards the proportion of recorded crime for which an 
offender is detected and were the offences committed by the individual who is on bail? 
Caution is required in the general interpretation of figures resulting from the studies 
(below), as the studies were often incompatible to each other. The reasons for these 
incompatibilities vary and include major differences in the methods of sampling of 
defendants on bail, definitions relating to 'offending' or 'convictions', differing types of 
bail i. e. 'Police', 'court' or both, and the methods that the police recorded and measured 
offending on bail. 
In 1978, a Home Office study examined the rates of offending during periods 
of bail. From a relatively large sample (7,400) of defendants who had all received bail 
by any magistrate's court, it was found that 9 per cent of the sample were later 
convicted of an offence that was committed while they were on bail. For the Greater 
London district this figure increased to 12 per cent (Home Office, 198 1). 
Other studies relating to offending rates while on bail were completed during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s and found varying re-offending rates while defendants 
were onbail of between 10to 29per cent. During the early 1990s the Metropolitan 
Police conducted its own study of offending while on bail. Examining the rates of re- 
offending of 1534 defendants study found that 12 percent where convicted of finiher 
offences whilst on bail (Ennis and Nichols, 199 1). 
A comparative study of re-offending rates by the Home Office during the late 
1980s, of 1225 defendants granted bail in three courts in Brighton, Bristol and 
Birmingham, found that 10 per cent were convicted of offences they had committed 
while on bail (Home Office, 1990). 
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In 1989, Northumbria Police conducted a study of 1806 defendants who were 
given police bail. Using methods that incorporated cautions (but not charges) for 
offences while on bail, offences on bail that had been 'taken into consideration' (TIC) 
but not presented in court as primary separate offences, or actual convictions for 
offence committed while on bail, it was found that in the use of these variable legal 
definitions vaguely relating to re-offending rates on bail that 17 per cent met these 
criteria. 
In the above Home Office (1990) and Metropolitan Police (Ennis and 
Nichols 1991) studies, the highest re-offending age group consisted of 17-20 year olds. 
Of this group 22 per cent re-offended while on bail. Morgan argues that the result of 
both studies 'illustrates the limitations of the present state of knowledge in targeting 
high-risk offenders' (1996: 41). With such 'high risk' groups where offending while on 
bail is persistent, it should also be noted that for the substantial majority of defendants 
on bail no re-offending occurs (ibid. ). In addressing the issue of suitable 'target' 
groups for bail Morgan suggests: 
It may be that, if more detail about the defendants had been 
available, it would have been possible to select the 22 per cent 
who did offend on bail. On the other hand, it may be that 
offending on bail is an event which contains an element of 
randomness, and it is therefore inherently difficult to predict. 
(1996: 41) 
Greater Manchester and Avon and Somerset police have conducted their own 
research into re-offending bail rates (Greater Manchester Police, 1987,1988; Brookes, 
1991). Both police forces employed a different measurement tool, this being the 
proportion of defendants who were arrested and charged (however, not convicted of 
those respective offences). Northumbria Police employed a similar measure that 
examined arrested but not charged defendants on bail (Northumbria Police, 1991). The 
'offending' (this term should be treated with caution as the defendants were only 
arrested or were arrested and charged not convicted) the re-offending rates of bailees 
from all three police forces ranged between 23 and 29 per cent. 
However, it should be considered that the methods of measurement adopted 
within all three of the above studies should be treated with caution. The lack of 
evidence in all three of the above studies regarding convictions of suspects questions 
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the validity of each of these studies. What is implied here is that even though suspects 
are arrested or arrested and charged for alleged offences this does not merit that the 
suspects were actually the offenders to those crimes. Arrests and charges of suspects 
are not findings of guilt. The studies failed to provide evidence of conviction rates for 
offences committed while on bail. In other words, the figures that are provided are 
nothing but police interpretations and should be considered as such. It is widely 
recognised by practitioners within the criminal justice system and academics who have 
studied policing that particular social group's face a disproportionate attention from the 
police and generally become the 'bread and butter' of daily routine policing activities. 
The official statistics measuring the granting and refusal of bail at police stations 
and courts are variable. However, what appears to clear is that although re-offending on 
bail ranges nationally from 7 to 40 per cent there does appear to be evidence that 
suggest that the younger age groups placed on bail are more likely to re-offend. Again, 
the figures vary. The Home Office (198 1) found that for males' aged 17-20 the rate 
was approximately 10 per cent. For males aged 30 or over the rate was 5 per cent, 
representing a 50 per cent higher incidence of re-offending on bail by the younger age 
groups. Similar findings occurred at two Scottish bail support schemes for adults where 
it was found that the most common occurrence of re-offending was amongst the under 
twenty age group. 
It is evident that the 'right to bail' varies between police stations and also between 
courts. At courts similar cases are treated dissimilarly and nationally this produces an 
effect of 'justice by geography' (Sanders and Young, 2000: 519). At police stations it is 
apparent that the police refuse bail and detain and this takes on a more personal 
perspective. It should be considered that in many instances it's the 'same old faces' that 
are denied bail (dependant upon the category of offence the person is suspected of, and 
for example, police officers' assessment in 'predicting' whether or not the suspect will 
commit ffirther offences). Furthermore, as has been discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
denial of police bail can often influence the next stage of the criminal justice process. 
What is evident is that the police do carry enough weight in order to influence 
many of the processes that occur in the administration ofjustice. 
Police Property 
The targeting of 'known' individuals by police officers has been a continued strategy 
within the police organisational. culture by way of a 'bureaucratic mode of suspicion' 
(Matza, 1969). Common practices by the police involving stop and searches of known 
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offenders, multiple forms of harassment and the 'tracking' of the 'usual suspects' are 
common policing practices known all too well by both the police and 'street' criminals 
(see, for example, McConville, et al., 1991; Choongh, 1997; Waddington, 1999). 
Arresting known offenders by the police does not always coincide with attempts to 
solve specific committed crimes for which the arrested suspect is seriously considered 
to be in the frame for. Police officers also arrest the 'known' as a matter-of-fact 
administration of social control as an apparatus to demonstrate power relations and 
authority (Cohen, 1985; Reiner, 1985). Inasmuch, having ones collar-felt is a less than 
subtle reminder that whether, or not, the 'suspect is at it', the relationship of power 
continues. As sixteen old Jimmy divulged: 
It's been well over a year since I've been in any real bother and been arrested but 
the police who knew me back when I was getting into trouble, still stop their cars and 
call me over and ask where I've been, what I'm up to, where am Igoing, Always 
suspicious are the polis [police]. It's usually, 'Here, Jimmy we haven't seen you in a 
while-how come we never hear ofor see you anymore? Haway son, what's the matter 
with you? ' One ofthem said to me last week that the [police] station's not the same 
without me. Cheeky bastard! You'd think they'djust let me get on now and leave me 
alone. But no, every now and again they let me know that they're still interested in me. 
(Interview: January 2002) 
Jimmy's experience was not an unusual or, isolated ritual of policing in order to 
reinforce the structural arrangements of power and 'informal' social control (Goffman 
1971: 402). 
Tony, a fifteen year-old offender had just been released from a Young Offenders 
Institution for car theft. From his first day of release he had encountered an intimidating 
heavy police surveillance exercise. At this point in time I also came to the 'surveying' 
officers' attention. After meeting Tony at his home to conduct an interview, a police 
car pulled up and parked outside of the house with the two officers looking directly at 
the living-room window where we were positioned. On leaving the house shortly 
afterwards the surveying officers gave me a long look over in order to 'clock' my 
demeanour and quickly assess my potential as another 'asshole' (van Mannen, 1978) 
and worthy of some intended 'detective' work regarding who I was, where I was from, 
and what I was 'up to'. I can assume that from the initial visual assessment by the police 
officers that fortunately I had fAed the 'test' and never quite made the 'asshole' grade 
as no other action followed this. Earlier during the interview, Tony had explained to me 
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that since his release from prison two weeks earlier, the police had pursued a continued 
course of designed harassment. 
From the second day Igot out they've been pulling up outside the house andjust 
sat there staringforfive or ten minutes and then theyfuck off. "en the next shift 
comes on they'll do the same. Drive up, park outside the house and stare in. Me Ma's 
been gannin'Jucking mental with them. Now when they see the door open and me 
Mam or Dave [mother's partner] come out, theyjustfuck off. IfI'm in the town Iget 
pulled IfFm waitingfor a bus Igetpulled IfI'm stood about with me mates I get 
pulled They'rejust doing it to let me know that they're on-it. I mean, like, letting me 
know that they're watching me and waiting and wanting me to slip up. 
(Interview: June 2001) 
Later that day I raised this matter with members of the BSS team who advised me 
that they were aware of the tactics the police were using against Tony. I was also told 
by an officer who worked closely with the YOS that that it was common practice 
within Beat Area Commands for the police to 'come on heavy' with young offenders 
who they believed 'needed reassuring'. Simply because of the fact that the young 
people had been punished for previous offences was evidence enough for the police 
that they would remain as members of the usual suspects and that the police would 
continually remind them of this. In such cases known young offenders become 'police 
property'. In general, as Holdaway makes clear, "Suspects are regarded as property 
which is under the control of the arresting officer and station officer" (1982: 87). 
Arresting officers' inasmuch become the 'owners' of such property (ibid: 8 8). 
For these types of offenders, as with other 'known' individuals or social groups the 
police are the gatekeepers of the criminal justice system (Reiss, 197 1; Choongh, 1997). 
However, in the pursuit of proactive policing by way of clampdowns upon known 
young offenders, which direct the 'targeting process' (Gill, 2000) of localised street 
policing methods, legal norms are suspended and/or deployed into other methods of 
intimidatory practice. In some instances, such as Jimmy and Tony's experiences, the 
offender becomes the property of the Beat Command Unit (BCU) and fair game for all 
and sundry within the BCU to assert their control upon young offenders (Choongh, 
1998). Both the young offenders and the police are concerned with the vital issue of 
'who rules around hereT (Robins and Cohen, 1978: 104). 
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Shite Always Runs Downhill 
In the area of the town known as 'Downhill' youth crime and disorder was 
recognised as a major public issue. The area has long been stigmatised as a rough 
working class neighbourhood. To combat the perceived problems of wanton youth 
running amok in Downhill the police sent in its 'Taskforce'. PC 'Golightly' is a 
central figure of the taskforce and in his words his role was in 'controlling the little 
bastards and showing them who runs Downhill'. PC Golightly has a reputation for 
firm action against the 'assholes' (Van Maanen, 1978: 22 1) from Downhill. Angie, a 
YOS 'Advocate' for young people placed onto the Intensive Supervision and Support 
Programme (a programme incorporated within BSS), and who lived at Downhill told 
me. 
Angie: Golightly! Oh, the man's a bastard. He's running around Downhill like 
amanpossessed, No wonder thefriggin'arrest rates ofyoung people have soared in 
Downhill over the last year. He's arresting themfor nowt. He garns [goes] out ofhis 
way to wind the lads up and then when the young uns'start to get lippy with him he 
lifts [arrests] them. He thinks he's a one-man litter campaign cleaning up what he 
feels is the rubbish and shite on the estate. Some of the kids don't get a minute from 
his harassment when he's on duty. He's a shite, that he is. 
(Interview:. February 2002) 
It will be argued in subsequent chapters that police 'targeting' of known young 
offenders at times played a major perspective in those young people's arrests and 
despite the best efforts of the local YOS there was little that could be done to assist 
those young people at risk of offending on bail. 
Young Man There's A Place You Can Go 
Mark, aged seventeen had encountered a number of major problems in attempts to 
find accommodation in the city. Mark had had to leave the family home after the 
local authority's housing department became involved in a legal wrangle with his 
mother regarding Mark's offending behaviour over a number of years. In short, 
Mark's mother and her partner were attempting to purchase the council house as a 
'right-to-buy' and the council were attempting to block this right due to Mark's 
previous offending. It was decided within the family that Mark would be a liability 
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to this potential property purchase, as one more offence and/or police presence at 
Mark's mother's home would certainly j eopardise the intention to buy the house. 
Over a two-week period of time Mark became homeless. The YOS were 
involved with Mark due to outstanding offences awaiting hearings at the local youth 
court, and they found him accommodation on the outskirts of the city in a bed and 
breakfast hotel. On his first night of residence mark invited a number of friends over, 
got pissed and stoned and created noise and some damage within the property. The 
next day the YOS were told that Mark would no longer be welcome there. 
Mark was forced to move intermittently between his mother's (covertly as there were 
neighbours willing to inform the local council that Mark was residing at his mother's 
address) and other relatives in and around the city. The YOS, after a great deal of 
negotiation and persuasion, finally secured Mark a place at the local YMCA. I later 
interviewed Stuart, a worker at the YMCA: 
nen Angie and Geofffrom the YOS came here to speak with Alice [YMCA 
manager] and askfor a roomfor Mark she didn't want to know. Let'sface it, Mark is 
known as a wrong un'. Ifind him canny, but let'sface it he's well knownfor his 
motoring skills [Mark is a renowned car thief in the city] and the last thing we needed 
here was more police attention. Let'sface it, they're here two or three times a day 
already and the last thing we needed was Sunderland's premier Twocker [car 
thief/joy-rider] staying here. Anyway, Angie and Geoffmanaged to win Alice round, 
like persuaded her that Mark was a reformed character [laughs]! So it was agreed 
that Mark could rent a room here. 
Then the police got to hear about it! Jesus, you should have heard thefuss they 
createdaboutit! We had two or three coppers round here going on at Angie and the 
rest of us about Mark moving inhere. Golightly was climbing the fucking wall! He's 
shouting the odds, 'Ifyou let him stay here we're going to have a one-man crime wave 
back in Downhill again. After all the work we've put in trying to get rid ofthe all the 
shite from Downhill and then you allow him to stay here. It's irresponsible and on 
your heads be it. 
I mean he's the local community bobbyforfuck's sake, and he's going on like 
that to us at the YMCA. We're saying to the police, 'We're a Christian organisation 
trying to help desperate people and believe that Mark should have a chance as he's 
young and homeless. Where do you propose he goes? Golightly's response was 
'We're trying to drive him out ofthe city and don't care where he goes as long as it's 
asfar awayfrom this city as is possible'. I mean, what thefuck is all that about? ' 
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(Interview: November 2001) 
The YMCA decided to reject the police's advice and instead allowed Mark to 
stay at this establishment. Maureen a senior member of the YMCA staff was less 
forthright than Stuart in her description of events but added: 
Let'sjust put it this way, the police are not very happy about the situation. 
They are always here checking up on Mark to make sure he isn't breaking his 
curfew and constantly reminding me that we'll regret taking him in. 
(Interview: November 2001) 
These 'remedial workings of social control' (Goffman, 1971: 13 8) are 
maintained by the agencies of the State in order to sustain longstanding relationships 
of order and the control of that affiliation Yet, in the drive to maintain social order it 
is evident that the police are prepared and willing to over-step the normal boundaries 
and attempt to administer governance and at times summary justice in order to retain 
control. As Goffman points out, 'there have always been groupings in society which 
feel considerable need for protection from the police, not merely protection by them' 
(1971: 3 84). The issue of crime control and as to who controls what, and where, and 
in the methods of which to do so is: 
-acceptable and efficient way to police society 
is to identify 
classes of people who in various ways reject prevailing norms 
because it is amongst these classes that the threat of crime is at 
its most intense ... the police are then 
justified in subjecting 
them to the surveillance and subjugation, regardless of whether 
the individuals selected for this treatment are violating the 
criminal law at any given moment" 
(Choongh, 1998: 627) 
Packer (1968: 178) has observed that police powers enable the surveillance and 
subordination of whole classes of people, and this form of social control where an 
individual can only be arrested when there is specific reason to suspect an 
individuals involvement in crime is rejected. Instead, 
81 
... people who are known to the police as previous offenders 
should be subject to arrest at any time for the limited 
purpose of determining whether they have been engaging in 
antisocial activities..... but more importantly, the very fact of 
stopping him for questioning, either on the street or at the 
station house may prevent the commission of a crime. 
(Packer, 1968: 177) 
Yet, in performing such aspects of their duties in maintaining the status quo of 
power relations and crime control, this particular policing strategy has the danger of 
driving young offenders towards further criminal activities. This it appears would be 
contrary to the original intention of the police officer's aims at 'reminders' that they are 
surveying individuals, in order to deter them from committing more crimes. June, a 
BSO at the project stated: 
It's disgusting what they are doing to Tony. He's never had a minute'speace 
from them [police] since he got releasedfrom the YOI They're on his case every time 
he steps out the door. I mean, I've been into the Town with him to take him to related 
services and I've seen police officers clocking him with stares. So God only knows 
what it must be likefor him when no adults are around him. See the thing is, he's now 
talking of thro w ing in th e to we I and go ing b ack to comm itting offe n ces. He fe e Is tha t 
even though he's determined to play the game now, You know like really challenge 
himselrand tackle those offending issues, hefeels he hasn't got a chance with the police 
onto him like they are at the moment. 
(July2001) 
The application of summary justice by the police reinforces the issue of social 
control upon those who have been marked as deviant well after the official 
punishment has been administered. In controlling the known and usual suspects, 
'The police sometimes use arrest powers to stamp their authority on challengers, 
often without any intention of prosecuting' (Sanders and Young, 2003: 237. Also see 
Choongh, 1997). Manning suggests that the implications of the degrees of controlling 
mechanisms provide those agencies with the rights to maintain power. 
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The more power and authority a profession has, the better able it is to 
gain and maintain control over the symbolic meanings which it is 
associated in the public mind 
(1978: 8) 
The maintained control of both 'perceived' and 'known' suspects can play a 
major role as to 'who gets what' regarding bail decisions during the early stages of 
entry into the criminal justice process. The role of street policing means that police 
officers: 
Routinely come into conflict with the most marginal groups in 
society, and like antagonists generally, they demean their 
opponents ... If the police can persuade themselves that against 
whom coercive authority is exercised are contemptible, no 
moral dilemmas are experienced-the policed section of the 
population 'deserved it' 
(Waddington 1999: 301) 
As will be discussed in later chapters regarding young offenders, the usual 
suspects, often faced up-hill struggles in obtaining bail after being arrested by the 
police. As we have seen within this chapter, there is considerable scope to argue that 
following arrest, the police influence upon the CPS and the magistrates may further 
increase the risk of young people being denied bail and placed under threat of being 
remanded. 
Summary 
This chapter has discussed the bail process at a number of interconnecting sites within 
the criminal justice system. Since the 1970s ambiguous concerns have arisen focusing 
upon the welfare of suspects and the control of crime particularly of individuals who are 
granted bail by the police and/or the courts. Yet, the remand of suspects at police 
stations, subsequently denied bail by the courts and then often remanded into prisons 
refutes a fundamental principle of the law that an individual is considered innocent until 
proven guilty. As a standard the provision of bail should not be controversial however, 
as we have seen in practice, the interpretation and agreement of the right to bail can 
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often break down resulting in innocent people being detained against their will in police 
stations and prisons. 
Legislative Acts such as the Bail Act 1976 and PACE 1984 have intended to 
provide a 'fairer for all' system of bail processes that balances the 'rights' of criminal 
suspects and the 'needs' of the police, in protecting the public from the risk of finther 
offending. In this chapter I have argued that the police continue to be the 'major 
players' at all levels of the bail processes that occur during the initial engagement of 
suspects within the criminal justice system. The influence of the police in providing 
evidence during the preliminary stages of system it has been argued, often out weigh the 
intended independent and objective stance of the CPS and also that of the magistrates 
during initial court hearings. The police continue to be largely exempt from scrutiny 
regarding their decisions regarding the denial of bail and detaining suspects at police 
stations. Furthermore policing protocols are largely except from scrutiny out on the 
street and amongst 'the dross' (Choongh, 1997) with a variety of heavy-handed 
approaches to reinforce the status quo are deployed. As this chapter has shown the role 
of policing, whether this be on the street or at the station and often the legitimate 
processes can be undermined by police action, which is often to be found 'in the 
informal, the situational and the subjective' (McBarnet, 1979: 25). Such street 
policing methods and decisions can impact upon suspect's routes of passage through the 
system at police stations and courts which the right to bail can, and often is, denied 
(Sanders and Young, 2002). The 'moral force of the law' exerts little pressure onto the 
police who often manipulate the 'gaps between rhetoric, rules and reality' (Sanders, 
1997: 1084). 
In the following chapter, I follow the youth justice staged action of 
sequential processes. Relating to bail decisions for young offenders, the issue of what 
happens to young people who have been arrested and whose parents or guardians can 
not or, will not attend police stations is discussed. In such situations a local YOS will 
have to provide an Appropriate Adult to attend the station in lieu of a parent or 
guardian. I often undertook this role during my time in the field and what follows are 
a number of my observations encountered as a participant within the youth justice 
system. 
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Chapter Four 
An Appropriate Adult: Dealing with Young People 
Held at Police Stations 
Introduction 
This chapter develops the earlier examination of the right or refusal of bail decisions 
made at police stations and subsequently at magistrate's courts'. The preceding chapter 
examined a number of areas of law, policy and practice relating to bail decisions for 
children and young people made at police stations and at courts. This chapter will 
extend the analysis at the level of practice. The analysis I propose in this section is 
based upon fieldwork conducted as an Appropriate Adult at police stations in the North 
east of England. In this section there are insights into police decision-making processes 
as to who 'gets out' and who 'stays in' at police stations after charges to young 
suspects have been made by custody officers. 
From a theoretical perspective the examination of three models of the criminal 
justice system are discussed. These models ofjustice are compared alongside the 
empirical data drawn from my own experiences and observations as an Appropriate 
Adult. I will argue that the isolated incidents upon which I have chosen to focus go 
beyond individual officer's 'malpractice' of the PACE Codes of Practice relating to 
young suspects at police stations. As was discussed in the previous chapter, despite 
an emphasis on releasing young suspects' from police stations, the fact is that the 
police often decide to detain them. 
A Back-Stage Pass 
In May 2000 1 was recruited as an Appropriate Adult by the local YOS. My taking of 
this important role within the youth justice system (see Hodgson, 1997) was based 
upon two deciding factors, each of which was of equal consequence. In the first 
instance, the opportunity to undertake research within police stations was an added 
bonus in my attempts to illuminate a number of key stages and youth justice 
processes, relating to bail for young people. As has been pointed to in earlier sections 
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of this thesis, the bail process often begins at the police station. It was here at police 
stations, that the maj ority of young people who came onto the BSS proj ect entered 
the youth justice system for their suspected offences. 
The second influencing factor in accepting this role was money. As a Post- 
Graduate student receiving a funding grant, albeit a far better level of funding in 
relation to that of my ESRC funded cohorts, money was too tight to mention. George 
and Geoff at the BSS scheme offered the j ob to me as I was working in the BSS 
office one morning. 
George: Rob, do you want to be an Appropriate Adult? 
R. H: "at now? I haven't had any training. I wouldn't know what to do. 
George: No, not right now! I know we're short [staffed] but even we wouldn't 
sendyou out without anyfucking training. 
Geoff: [Mocking] Oh dear, Oh dear, Oh dear! [Laughs] He'sjust the calibre 
ofperson we're lookingfor. Congratulations son, you got thejob! 
George: Ihe money's all right andyou can pick and choose when you're free 
to do it, so that you canfit it in with your study. 
Geoff., Aye andyou students are always complaining thatyou're skint. So 
here's a chancefor you to get offyour arse and do some proper work Youcanmake 
some decent money in claimsforpetrol expenses, kerching! [He makes the noise and 
motion of an old-fashioned cash register, operated by a pull-lever handle, opening]. 
The only problem with it is that you have to deal with the scumlies ['scum' young 
offenders] each time you go out. But, you'll get used to that. 
George: Ifyou want it-well thejobsyours-you'll have to do aformal interview, 
but that wilIjust be aformality. 
(Fieldnotes: February 2000) 
I passed the interview and attended shortly afterwards, a one and a half-day 
training session with other newly recruited AAs. I then attended police stations with 
more experienced AAs, in a 'shadowing' technique (five in total) as a basis to train 
me up as a fully-fledged AA. At this point I make an important interjection in 
explaining that this aspect of one of many inter-connected youth justice sites, in terms 
of well-planned methodological rigour, had gaping holes in the design framework of 
investigating this research site. The entry into a 'field experience' (Burgess, 1982: 
15), had no well-planned research design. Similar to Becker et al., (1961) description 
of an applied method in studying the culture of medical students: 
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In one sense, our study had no design. That is, we had no well 
worked-out set of hypotheses to be tested, no data gathering 
instruments purposely designed to secure information relevant 
to these hypotheses, no set of analytic procedures specified in 
advance. Insofar as the term 'design' implies these features of 
elaborate prior planning, our study had none. 
(ibid: 17) 
Likewise, in this field of the youthjustice system neither did mine. However, I 
was aware that in gaining access to police stations I could observe the youth justice 
protocols in dealing with suspected young offenders from arrest to charge. This point 
of access, connected with other key areas of remand management relating to young 
people, also included observations at pre-trial hearings at courts, of bail supervision 
and support, and a number of other inter-related aspects of the youth justice system 
intrinsically dealing with the issue of bail for young people. In short, I had been 
granted access to observe most of the youthjustice protocols involved in the bail 
processing of young offenders. At this particular stage of the research I basically 
turned up at police stations and took fieldnotes (or later wrote them up, when time 
permitted) of areas of police bail decision making and the interactions that occurred 
that were of interest. Over time the field research activities at police stations, began 
to shape a theoretical framework of decisive and influential police decision making 
processes, that could been seen as influencing other inter-locking youth justice 
practices further down the field of the bail and remand processes. 
In the section below is presented a diagram of the Charge Room at the Bridge 
police station. It was here that the majority of Appropriate Adult cases I conducted 
were held. Approximately 70 per cent of the 56 total cases were conducted at the 
Bridge Charge Room. 
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It would be an exaggerated claim to suggest that my Involvement in and around the 
back-stages of police custody suites (in practice terms 'the charge roorn') gave me full 
access to the 'truths' within those charge rooms that I was called to. I was not a police 
officer and I had little access to the overall organisational police culture. Here similar 
to solicitors, legal representatives, cleaners and doctors my role as an Appropriate 
Adult remained as a member of an invited and somewhat select member of the 
audience. It has been noted elsewhere that on occasion social workers 
Adult Cells: Off 
Limits to AA 
acting in the role of Appropriate Adults have been requested to leave police stations 
due to conflict occurring between AAs and police officers conducting investigations 
(see, for example, Jones, 1987; Gifford, 1989; Jones, 2004). 1 remained unaware that 
within the AA scheme I worked for such instances of conflict occurred. However, it 
should be noted that within this domain the police remain the controlling agents as to 
who gets in and stays in. As will made clear in this chapter the, interaction between 
AA and police officers, within the domain of the Charge Room, could at times ripple 
with conflict and tension between respective competing agency aims and objectives. 
In gaining a level of access I became a part of the process in dealing with young 
offenders held at police stations. As will be assessed, the 'fronts' employed in those 
performances often become blurred and the intended roles presented to specific 
audiences become confused. Much has been written about gaining entry into those 
'back-spaces' of police stations and the difficulties involved in conducting research 
(see, for example, Van Maanen, 1978; Holdaway, 1979; Punch, 1986). My official 
role for attending police stations in the region was to act as an Appropriate Adult for 
the local YOS. The more clandestine role in researching young people's experiences 
after arrest and being held at police stations was modified in order to investigate this 
initial staging post into the youth justice system. The process of bail often begins at 
the police station (Sanders, 1997). What happens at police stations often 
interconnects with other stages relating to bail decisions of young people, suspects 
and known offenders at later stages of the youth justice system (McConville et 
al. 1991). The local YOS were not aware of my clandestine reasons for attending 
police stations, despite acting as the 'go-between' (Goffman 1968; 148) for my 
entrance into this area of the research. 
The Official Role of the Appropriate Adult 
PACE 1984 and the accompanying Codes of Practice ensure that special arrangements 
are in place for the added protection of vulnerable suspects, including children and 
young people under the age of seventeen held at police stations. For children and 
young people detained and questioned by the police, it is a requirement that an adult is 
present at key stages of the process while held at police stations. This role is known as 
the 'Appropriate Adult'. The role of the Appropriate Adult is '... to safeguard the 
rights and civil liberties of a child who is detained and questioned by the police. The 
Appropriate Adult's main area of concern is not with the guilt or innocence of the 
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child, 'but his or her physical and emotional welfare' (Spencer, 1999: 1). Section38of 
the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 details that YOTs should co-ordinate the "provisions 
of persons to act as Appropriate Adults to safeguard the interests of children and young 
persons detained or questioned by police officers". 
Once a child or young person is arrested and detained, it is the role of the duty 
officer (also referred to as the custody officer or more commonly as the Custody 
Sergeant [Sgt. ]) at the police station as soon as is practicable, to identify and inform 
the young person's parent or guardian (which could be an individual or the local 
authority). The police are duty bound to contact this person and inform them that the 
child has been arrested, why he or she has been arrested and where the child is being 
detained. If a parent cannot or refuses to attend the station, in such situations the 
custody officer must request that an Appropriate Adult attends the police station to 
see and assist the child. In most cases local YOTs co-ordinate by way of paid or 
voluntary staff the provision of AAs within their local areas. 
In the majority of cases it will usually be a parent or guardian who attends the 
police station. However, this is not always the case. For example, if the young 
person is in care or, as was often the case in my role as an Appropriate Adult, the 
young person's parent refused to attend a duty a social worker could be requested to 
attend. As has been discussed, appropriate adults (AA) were introduced into the 
criminal justice system by PACE 1984. The role of the AA was implemented in 
order to safeguard vulnerable suspects (as well as children under the age of seventeen 
AAs can also act for vulnerable adults 6). In essence, the appropriate adult's role is to 
be 'present to support the suspect, assist with communication and ensure the police 
act fairly' (Jones, 2004: 72). 
The role of the AA is generally not intended as an 'expert' responsibility, as 
any other responsible adult aged 18 or over can take on the role (PACE, 1984). 
Exclusions to this role include police officers and a civilian employed by the police, a 
suspect of the same offence, a witness to the offence, a victim of the offence, or 
anyone involved in the investigation of the offence (ibid. ). Teams of AAs jointly 
organised by either/or Local Authorities and their YOTs, often carry out the role of 
the Appropriate Adult, when parents or guardians wont or can't attend police stations. 
6 This thesis chapter leaves aside the role of AAS acting for vulnerable adults (for example, those with suspected mcntal 
health problems of learning difficulties) but for a useful overview of literature relating to AAs dealing %Nith vulnerable 
adults, see Palmer and Ilart (1996). 
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Within the PACE Codes of Practice there are three definitions as to who can 
take on the role of an appropriate adult. The usual route that is taken by the police 
following arrest is that: 
1. The police will request that a parent or guardian of the young suspects attends the 
station and thus assumes the role of the AA. 
2. If the above option is not possible (due to a parent or guardian being unable to be 
contacted or refusing to attend) then the police must attempt to ensure that local 
statutory agency, such as the local Social Services Department or (as is now often 
the case) the local YOS, assumes responsibility and provides a member of staff to 
act as an AA. 
3. If both of the above options are unavailable an independent member of the public 
can assume the role of the AA (however this option should and would only occur 
in exceptional circumstances). 
Local YOTs under the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act s. 38 (4), have a statutory duty 
to co-ordinate AA services (and this co-ordination role can be for a 'volunteer' type 
AA service or, as was the case at the local YOS I worked as an AA for, as an integral 
(and paid) aspect of the overall YOT service provision). The AA is required to be 
present during key aspects of police procedures in investigating young suspects' 
involvement in criminal offences. Thus, the AA must be present: 
" When a young person is informed of his or her rights by the police 
" To witness the strip and intimate searches of young suspects; 
" During interviews; 
" When an identity parade for the offence is required; 
" During photographs, finger printing and DNA sample collection 
41 and at the stage where the case of the offence is disposed of by the police 
(Nacro, 2003a). 
Studies of Appropriate Adults 
Research into the capacity of AAs providing welfare orientated cover for young 
suspects held at police Stations, has generally been commissioned by the Home 
Office (Jones, 2004). Brown's (1989) study of 5,500 police custody records found 
that the role of AAs was undertaken by young suspects parents or relatives in 77% of 
all cases; by social workers in 17% of cases and by 'others' in the remaining 5% of 
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cases. As can been seen in most instances, parents will attend police stations in order 
to present during interviews of their children. However, and as will be discussed in 
brief a little later, parents may not be the most suitable adult to competently protect 
their children's rights while being interviewed at police stations. 
Irving and McKenzie's (1989) research raised concerns about AAs 
detracting from the suspects' right to remain silent during interrogation. This 'right to 
silence' has now been to some extent resolved by its partial abolition by the 
legislation of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994. The study found that 
within the AA role of 'facilitating communication' between the police and young 
suspects, many were unable to identify whether the interviews were being conducted 
fairly or not so (ibid. ). In advising untrained AAs, usually parents or other family 
members, but also often including social workers (Evans, 1993), the police only 
informed these types of AAs in very vague terms what was expected of the AA role 
(Evans and Rawstorne, 1994). The ambivalence which has been found to occur 
within the roles of AAs affects the course of the interviewing protocols conducted by 
the police (usually infavour for them and to the detriment of the young suspect). 
Evans and Rawstorne (ibid. ) argue that 'mute' and 'passive' appropriate adults 
protected the police from claims of excessive interviewing techniques and therefore 
assisted in tendering the admissibility of evidence gained in such a manner. It is also 
claimed that officers preferred the appropriate adult to misinterpret their role as to 
that of an interviewing officer (ibid. ). 
Parents and family members acting as AAs have been found to abuse (both 
verbally and physically) and threaten their children in front of police officers (Bucke 
and Brown, 1997: Dixon, et aL 1990). Research has also found that parents, due to 
the emotional distress of having to attend the police station to deal with their children, 
were as likely to be unsupportive of their children as they were supportive (Evans, 
1993). In the same study, Evans reveals that in 74% of interviews parents and 
'brought in' AAs (e. g. social workers) made no contribution during the interviewing 
processes. 
In most cases interviews will flow relatively smoothly with few welfare 
concerns relating the young suspect being raised (ibid. ). However, when more 
oppressive interviewing techniques in the 'haranguing, belittling and threatening' of 
young suspects occurs it is the duty of the AA to 'step in' and remind the young 
suspect and the interrogating officers of the correct way to conduct interviews with 
such vulnerable suspects (Evans, 1993: 46). 
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The demeanour of parents attending stations in order to deal with their arrested 
children may play a crucial role in assisting or hindering police investigations. 
Unsupportive parents have been found to place pressure onto their children to admit 
to offences (Evans, 1993: 40; Bucke and Brown, 1997: 11). Other parents view their 
role as 'assisting' the police and this sometimes witnessed the chastisement of the 
child by the parent in front of the police (Dixon et al., 1990: 119). Bean (1997) has 
suggested that two 'types' of parental appropriate adult were observable in his 
research of AAs. The first type being 'the wait until I get you home, you're for it' 
type, the second being the 'tell them [the police] nothing' type. The antagonistic type 
of parents 'who vehemently took sides against the police' (Brown et al. 1992: 73) and 
the 5% of parents that Bucke and Brown (1997: 11) found that took hostile, 
uncooperative and anti-police stands are viewed as hardly conducive in 'facilitating 
communication' during young suspect's interviews. 
Studies that have examined the role of social workers attending as AAs have 
found a number of deficiencies in the competency of such officials. Evans (1993: 40) 
highlights in his research that social workers made less contribution during interviews 
of young suspects than parents did. In 62% of cases where social workers attended, 
it was found that the police used influential techniques in order to obtain confessions 
during interviews without any form of utterance from social workers. It was found in 
this study that it remained unclear as to whether social workers were clear of their 
duties or, just failed to carry aspects of them out in order to fulfil the potential roles 
that were expected from them. Research has also questioned the suitability of social 
workers attending police stations as AAs, due to the widespread lack of training and 
experience of this role for such professionals (Thomas, 1995; Evans and Rawstorne, 
1997). Pierpoint (2001: 258) has suggested that due to the potential of inter-agency 
conflict occurring, social workers carrying out the duty of the AA, may be reluctant 
to question police practices in order to maintain good working relations with the 
police. Brown (1997) raised a general concern of the role of AAs, be these parents or 
social workers, and claims that neither played an overall significant role within this 
area of the youth justice system. 
Pierpoint's (2001) research aimed to test the hypothesis of volunteer 
appropriate adults' contributions during police interviews in comparison to parental 
and social worker appropriate adults. Pierpoint's survey employed a methodology of 
volunteer appropriate adult' s self-completion of questionnaires. The 'volunteer' 
appropriate adults differed from previous studies examining the contributions offered 
93 , 
by 'parent' and 'social worker' AAs in that they were trained and experienced, they 
lacked any emotional conflict or conflicts of interest (ibid: 263). The findings from 
Pierpoint's survey of volunteer appropriate adults found that these appropriate adults 
contributed in 3 6% of police interviews, compared to Brown's (1993) 26% in his 
study of parental and social worker appropriate adults. However, within Pierpoint's 
sample the fact remained that in 64% of the interviews the volunteer appropriate 
adults recognised that they did not interject during those interviews. In these cases it 
may have been the appropriate adults' silence occurred because they believed that the 
interviews were conducted fairly and without undue pressure being placed upon the 
suspects (ibid). It may also have been the case that the appropriate adults failed to 
recall or recognise their contributions within interviews (ibid. ). 
The one clear finding within Pierpoint's survey (amongst a multitude of often 
vague and speculative assessments) is that the level of contribution by trained 
volunteers acting as appropriate adults was significantly higher than Brown's (1993) 
assessment of parental and social worker appropriate adults. Therefore, Pierpoint's 
claim is that within such a role issues relating to the level and quality of training 
remain significant aspects of how well suspects are represented whilst held at police 
stations. 
Previous research of appropriate adults has focused upon the minimal amount 
of contribution they tend to make during interviews and such studies have tended to 
focus upon volunteers (Pierpoint, 2001), parents (Dixon et al. 1990; Brown, 1992; 
Evans, 1993; Bean, 1997; Bucke and Brown, 1997) and social workers (Evans, 1993; 
Thomas, 1995; Evans and Rawstome, 1997). These of course are important in 
informing both policy and academe of an intrinsic aspect of the criminal justice 
system that is usually sheltered and unobserved from prying eyes and ears. 
From a purely subjective standpoint relating to my own delivery of service in 
my role as an appropriate adult, I rarely contributed during the interview process with 
young suspects. In retrospect there may have been two possible reasons for this. The 
first being, that in general most of the interviews appeared to have been conducted 
fairly. The second point relates to the first. I did not know what constituted a 'fair' or 
an 'unfair' interviewing process. During all of the interviews I sat in on, at no point 
did I witness an interviewing officer act aggressively or pursue a line of questioning 
that I might have considered too fervent. Potentially, this could mean three things. 
First, that the police conducted themselves at this stage of the criminal justice process 
fairly and in accordance to the PACE Codes of Practice. Second, that I was poorly 
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trained as an AA as I had no detailed understanding of what constituted fair or 
otherwise of the interviewing etiquette. Third, perhaps it was the case that I believed 
that the young person's legal representation would interject during interview had the 
line of questioning turned hostile and unfair. My opinion is that it was connection of 
all three of the above factors which saw me act during interviews, as a passive 
observer for the most part. 
The role of legal representatives during interviews is widely neglected in much 
of the literature relating to Appropriate Adults. Indeed, in the majority of the 
literature the issue of legal representation is notable by its absence, despite the fact 
that young people should have legal representation during interrogation no matter 
how minor the offence. Even if the young suspect declines the right to a solicitor or 
legal assistant the AA can override the young person and request that a solicitor 
attends (this is evidenced in a little more detail at a later stage of this chapter). 
Perhaps the absence of legal representation within a number of the above studies was 
because no legal representation was requested and that the AAs involved believed 
this to be the best course of action. If this were the case then the issue of young 
people having no legal representation at police stations might be a common 
occurrence. I was aware during my time as an AA that similar situations also 
occurred in Sunderland, and this was with a 'trained' and paid YOS organised AA 
service. 
To date there has been no published research, of which I am aware, that has 
produced detailed empirical research of the appropriate adult from a front-line 
prospective of participation and observation. This in itself makes the following 
section of the thesis unique in this particular area of the youth justice system, as it 
emerged (in due course) from one enlisted to act as a paid appropriate adult of a local 
Youth offending Service. This entailed 'leaming the experimental world from within' 
(Rock, 2001: 32) and involved the concealment of my academic preoccupation of 
observation and analysis. 
Field Observations from a Practising Appropriate Adult 
My role as an Appropriate Adult was to attend police stations when requested while I 
was on call for the local YOS Appropriate Adult service. It was well known within 
this particular platform of the youth justice system that some parents simply refuse to 
attend police stations which their sons and daughters are being held at for alleged 
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offences. For the young suspects I acted in the role of appropriate adult the situation 
of parental non-attendance, was representative of the overwhelming majority of 
cases. The objective was to protect the welfare and personal rights of those young 
suspects held at police stations. I was required to sit in on interviews, arrange 
transport (where applicable if police bail was granted) for young suspects' to their 
places of residence and at times, question police practices relating to young suspects. 
The trained Appropriate Adult's role is not intended to be a 'passive' one (Home 
Office, 2002b). In essence the role constitutes that the AA aims to ensure that the 
detained person for whom they are acting understands what is happening to them and 
the reasons why those procedures that are occurring. The responsibilities are as 
follows: 
" Offer support, advice and assist the detained person, particularly while they are 
being questioned. 
" To observe whether the police are acting properly, fairly and with respect for the 
rights of the detained person. And to tell them if AA thinks they are not. 
" To assist with communication between the detained person and the police. 
" To ensure that the detained person understands their rights and that the AA has a 
role in protecting their rights. 
(ibid: 2) 
Young suspects being questioned at police stations are recognised as being 
prone to providing information which can be misleading, unreliable and at times self- 
incriminating (PACE, Code C: Note II B). Therefore the role of the Appropriate 
Adult is intrinsic in maintaining the rights of suspects and that a sense of 'fair play' is 
conducted by police officers in carrying out their interviewing duties. 
The research of this initial staging-post entrance of young people into the youth 
justice system and of police decision-making processes regarding bail decisions was 
conducted covertly. The police, young offenders and the local YOS were unaware 
that my role as an Appropriate Adult had an abstract and vested interest attached to 
the officially prescribed role. This of course raised ethical dilemmas. The British 
Society of Criminology, British Sociological Association and the Socio-Legal Studies 
Association all offer statements relating to ethical practice and propose sound 
guidance and advice on conducting research. Each of these three academic 
disciplines offer statements of guidance regarding research concerned with, for 
example, 'the protection of those in the study'; 'should be based upon the informed 
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consent of those studied'; and to 'explain as fully as possible what the research is 
about'. It is fair to say that during this particular stage of the research none of the 
previous ethical recommendations were comprehensively adhered to. The reasons 
why were two-fold. 
First, is that 'access' had been granted through my role as an Appropriate 
Adult and during the scores of call-outs to police stations, that was my principal role. 
I was an Appropriate Adult. The observation, field-notes and 'follow-up' research 
(in forging relationships with young offenders and following up arrest, at court and 
bail decisions at these stages of the criminal justice process) were always subordinate 
issues. My central aim and focus was always to attempt to carry out the role 
professionally and try to get the young people through interviews without 
unnecessary duress, inform parents/guardians of the outcome and to strive for the 
release of the young people from police stations. 
Research for research's sake would have altered my primary role as an 
Appropriate Adult. I am sure that 'stakeholders' with immediate concerns regarding 
these bail decisions (the police, young people, legal representatives and the YOS) 
would have felt the same way in believing that undertaking research the Appropriate 
Adult role may have been contradictory positions. Other's understanding of my role 
I was sure, would be for me to secure the release of young people following arrest, 
not to observe and eavesdrop on aspects of police organisational culture and the 
interaction between young offenders, police officers, legal representatives, social 
services and Appropriate Adults. 
I was first and foremost an Appropriate Adult. This was my 'prescribed' role 
of attendance at police stations in the region, that's what I was paid for, that's where 
the kerching came from. The sociological data I picked up as I went along and I kept 
my mouth shut regarding this aspect of my role(s) at police stations. This, in it self, 
will raise concerns regarding the 'validity' and 'methodological rigour' focusing 
upon the 'reliability' of my observations, questions, data recording methods, 
subsequent analysis and the overall ethical implications of this approach. I do and 
will accept those critiques of this 'applied' method for this particular aspect of the 
research. 
The second reason is that 'inside outsiders' researchers (Reiner, 2000a: 222) 
tend to be less critical of policing because of incorporation into the organisation 
(Sheptycki, 1994: 130). This style of research has a tendency to be conducted by 
4civilians' who have roles within police forces or govermnental organisations such as 
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the Home Office. But, inside-outsider research has produced highly critical findings 
of police practices in the areas of their effectiveness and police notions of 'justice' 
(see for example, Clarke and Hough 1980; Anderson et al 1993; Brown et al. 1992). 
Yet, this type of research role may have a tendency to be policy focused rather than 
developing a theoretical analysis of policing (Reiner 2000a: 222). 
Bad Science and Bad Lads 
Covert research is fraught with issues and tensions relating to the sociologist's 
responsibilities to the subjects of the research. Erikson has argued 'the practice of 
using masks in social research compromises both the people who wear them and the 
people for whom they are worn, and in doing so violates the terms of a contract 
which the sociologist should be ready to honour in his dealings with others' (Erikson 
1967: 367-8). The central tenet to this sociological and ethical stance is that: 
... the sociologist 
has responsibilities to the subjects of research. 
The method has potential to do (unforeseeable) harm. If the 
subjects know they are being studied, at least they have agreed to 
expose themselves to possible harm. To study them secretly is 
ethically comparable to a doctor who carries out medical 
experiments on human subjects without their agreement. 
(Bulmer 2001: 47) 
My research at police stations took on this 'masked' role. My covert 
position in the field certainly took on the role of something that more resembled 
Blumer's ethically depraved 'Quack' than a saintly Dr Kildaire. However ethically 
deceitful this was it has yielded a number of incidents of police 'malpractice' and 
perhaps abuses of children held in their custody. The potential 'damage' to the 
unknowing participants I would stress was far less harmful than young boys being 
strip searched unnecessarily as a police strategy to 'mortify' (Goffman, 1970) the 
suspect into police compliance. The use of 'verbals' by police officers to fifteen year 
old boys often with an underlying threat of violence were recorded by the 'masked' 
Appropriate Adult (see 'Tommy-Boy' in this chapter). The detention of young 
suspects by police officers as a 'pre-emptive criminal justice process' when the 
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PACE codes of conduct stated otherwise were observed and recorded (see 'John- 
Jon', this chapter). I have attempted to counter-balance this 'bad science' (Erikson, 
1967) with my own professional failings as a 'masked' Appropriate Adult as a way to 
demonstrate that this aspect of youth justice is a 'messy business' and those 
individuals, organizations and policies often revealed structural weaknesses within 
that system. 
The issues surrounding confidentiality and anonymity have been maintained. 
Names of all of the 'participants', albeit unknowing of my own hidden agenda, are 
changed. Precise dates and times of my attendance at police stations are omitted as 
interested parties wishing to verify and 'unmask' certain individuals could use these. 
On occasion (and where possible) 'place' names have been changed. My intention 
was and is, to strive to protect the identity of all of those in the study. My entrance 
into these back-stages for this particular field of the overall research project came 
through the rear door. Regarding the covert nature of this aspect of the research and 
the ethical implications surrounding it, I found comfort in Ditton's argument that: 
"Participant observation is inevitably by virtue of being interactionally deceitful. It 
does not become ethical because this deceit is openly practised. It only becomes 
inefficient" (1977: 10). The 'efficiency' of my own research was that it allowed me to 
be taken for granted at police stations. Although access had been granted my role(s) 
was double-edged and somewhat clandestine. My face over-time became known, I 
was generally treated in a hospitable manner, pleasantries and jokes were shared and 
'piss-taking' at my expense, occasionally occurred. 
My overriding argument which supports the conduct of this particular aspect 
of the research is that as Goffman (1970) has stated, to be outside the stage restricts 
(or indeed denies) the access to observe the performance that occur within these 
'back-spaces'. As a form of 'audience segregation' relating to participants 
performances I would argue that my 'mask' granted me a front-stage seat and at 
times, this in turn rewarded me with a back-stage pass, to observe some of the 
performances where the actors (participants) took off their masks. 
Yet, despite Goffman's (1970) claim that entrance to these back-stages 
provides a clearer picture of the organisation, its people and their culture, I am under 
no illusion that I saw the whole show or, got to see behind many of the different 
masks worn. by police officers in the charge rooms I attended. My access was 
limited to specific areas of the station and what went on in those areas that I could not 
see, it might have been a very different show to observe. What I am attempting to 
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suggest here is that from different and varying positions quite diverse and altered 
performances will occur. For example, I know that young offenders are rarely beaten 
in front of Custody Sgts. or, close to the front desk of the charge room. This would 
occur in the far reaches of cells beyond the audible and visual scope of an individual 
stood or seated near the front desk. 
They Shoot Horses Don't They? 
The following extract from my field notes regards a visit as an Appropriate Adult to 
the 'Bridge' police station 'charge room'. As I walked through the corridor to the 
charge room Sgt. Herriot, who I had known for sometime in my role as an 
Appropriate Adult met me. He had just handed over the charge room on completion 
of the out-going shift as we met each other in passing. 
Sgt Herriot: Aah, Mr Hornsby how are we? I take it you're here to see to one of 
the little tinkers and get them home again? 
R. H: Well, we do try our best to get them back homeftom the station Sgt. 
That's what we're paidfor. 
Sgt. Herriot: You know my view on the little buggers don'tyou? Idgive them 
all a lethal injection which would make my and my colleaguesjobs a lot easier. 
[Laughs] Seriously! Ifyou had dogs that run around creating the mischiefand 
damage those little buggers got up to you'dput them down wouldn't You? Thistown 
would be a betterplace without them. Not onlyfor us [police officers'] but, alsofor 
the trails of victims they leave behind them. Yeah, put them down that's the answer, 
How say you Mr Hornsby? 
R. H: We'lljust have to agree to differ on that one Sgt Herriot. 
Sgt. Herriot: I thought you might say something along those lines. Keepupthe 
good work [laughs sarcastically] and no doubt I'll be seeing you very soon. 
Although comments and views of the world such as Sgt Herriot's were often 
constructed with a humorous approach, an under-current of truth and meaning were 
evident. 'Wind-ups', such as I have described above act as and aim to, "retain a shadow 
ofjest in his voice so that should he be caught out he can disavow any claim to 
seriousness and say he was only joking" (Goffman, 1969: 228). For the most part, the 
tserious' and/or 'persistent' young offenders were often the 'same old faces' and police 
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officers remained frustrated in dealing with a hardcore group of young offenders. It was 
often the case that for this group of young offenders the welfare orientation of PACE 
1984 relating to children and young people arrested and held at police stations 
obstructed a 'natural' right to justice. Police officers often believed that suspected 
young offenders should be, due to the seriousness of the crimes that they often 
committed, dealt with in exactly the same manner as adult criminals. 
A Botched Job 
In July 2000,1 was called out as an Appropriate Adult to attend a police station at 
'Georgetown'. A young female Kelly, aged 14, had been arrested and held by the 
police. Kelly had absconded from the Tower local authority care home after being 
remanded there by the magistrates and had been arrested by the police in Georgetown 
on a shoplifting charge. Kelly had been missing from care for three days. When I 
arrived at the station and was taken to the charge room, escorted by a police constable 
who told me, 'You're not going to enjoy this one. She's absolutely lifting [stinking]. 
We'rejust waiting to get her out and awayfrom here so we canjumigate the cell. ' I 
did the preliminaries of viewing the detention/charge sheet and was informed about 
the case by the Custody Sgt. 'I'd advise you when you have your consultation to 
leave the door open. It must have been sometime since the lass had awash. Shewas 
caught leaving a shop with a multi-pack ofknickers and a can ofdeodorant by I 
security'. He, looked at me, I looked at him. Both parties silently acknowledged the 
desperation of this young girl's plight. Nothing was said. Nothing needed saying. 
Kelly had been roughing it for nearly three days now and the theft of the goods were 
her attempt at maintaining some dignity and a level of personal hygiene. I wondered 
for how long I could hold my breath. Ridiculous, as my role was to check on her 
welfare and to do this I would have to ask questions. Within the whole area an 
unpleasant odour was obvious. 
I was escorted towards the cell where she was held. By the look of things 
the Custody Sgt. had moved her as far away from the front desk as was possible. The 
smell got stronger with each step. As I entered the cell the stench was so over- 
powering I felt nauseous. I had to swallow the retch in my throat. I was confronted 
by a spotty fourteen year old girl with the grime of roughing it over the last few days 
ingrained upon her face, neck and hands. Her hands looked like they belonged to a 
mechanic and her clothes belonged in a dustbin. The once white tracksuit top was 
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now grey and intermittently patterned with black smudges. The blue tracksuit 
bottoms were still blue but with an oily sheen to them. Her hair was matted with 
grease and grime 7. The smell complemented the look. She was indeed in a sorry 
state. , 
The show had to go on. This, I hoped, would be a quick one. I ran through 
the usual schedule of preliminary questions. The duty solicitor arrived and we were 
ready to proceed. Thankfully the interview was remarkably short. All parties 
involved during the interview rushed uncomfortably through the formal proceedings. 
For the first time in my role as an AA the interview room door was left ajar. Kelly 
admitted the theft and fingerprints, photograph and DNA were taken. I tried to 
arrange a lift for Kelly from Georgetown to get her back to the Tower. 
The police refused to accept the responsibility of returning Kelly although 
officially, it is the duty of the police to transport young suspects back to their place of 
residence. I tried to argue the case and was told by the Custody Sgt. 'Sorry, but we 
just can't do it as we're three men down on this shift due to illness. Ifwe have to take 
her back she might not get back until much later today when the next shift begins 
[twelve-hour shifts are common at this level of policing]. 4nyway, you 71 be going 
back to Sunderland couldn'tyoujust drop her off? ' A logical question and request 
but, as I told him, male AAs were not supposed to transport female suspects. I rang 
the shift supervisor at the local authority Tower car home (where Kelly lived) and 
asked for someone to come and collect Kelly from Georgetown. I was told: 
Rob we've got major ruptions going on here. There's been a mini-riot 
with some ofthe kids. I'm the only one on duty who can drive and we're short 
staffed Please, please, willyou do me a massivejavour and bring her infor 
us? I know you're not supposed to, but I really can't leave here with what's 
goingon. Just this once can you do itfor us please? 
Now I was really concerned and this was not because I would be bending the 
rules in transporting a young female back to the local care home. My main concern 
was being stuck in my car for forty minutes, on hot summer's day, with smelly Kelly. 
The car had just been purchased and was a 'new', (second hand', but in terms of 
what I'd been driving during the last ten years-old bangers-this one was like new), car 
7 When I was informed the local care home that Kelly resided in that shed gone missing and explaining that she was in 
need of a change of clothes and a wash due to her sorry state, I was informed that her lcvcl of personal hygiene was an 
ongoing concern, even within the local care home where she resided Kellys dcmeanour was an ongoing issue. As I 
was told 'She doesn't get calledSmelly Kelly for nothing you know. 
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in mint condition. That smell, I was sure, would linger for weeks. Kelly eventually 
resolved my somewhat personal dilemma 
As we left the station together I noticed that Kelly was acting a tad shifty, 
looking at me and then looking around as if examining the best route of escape. She 
started to lag behind as we walked through the city centre in the direction to where I 
had earlier parked my car. 'She's going to do a runner' I thought to myself In such 
instances an Appropriate Adult can do little except talk to the young person in their 
care. Any form of physical restraint, quiet rightly, could be viewed as a physical 
assault. I stopped and turned round to face Kelly as she slowly and hesitantly caught 
up: "Right Kelly, here's the score. I know thatyou're thinking ofmaking a dashfor it 
and Id advice you not to. Ifyou come with me we can get you back to the Tower, 
you can getfed and cleaned up in no time. I'm walking this way [pointing in the 
direction of my intended route] are you coming? " She didn't answer and I knew that 
she was going to be off on her toes the minute I set off again. I turned and started 
walking. After a dozen or so strides I stopped and turned round. She'd bolted. 
Where she'd gone and where she was going I had no idea. Kelly had made up 
her mind to make a run for it the minute she found out the police wouldn't be taking 
her home. Of that I was sure. I contacted the Tower immediately and was pleased to 
hear that, 'She often does this Rob. Don't worry she'll turn up. We'll report her 
missing andfill in theforms'. Perhaps I'd been in the game too long and my 
participation with some of the more unsavoury factors involved in youthjustice had 
made me now hard-bitten. My main concern should have been where she might turn 
up, not an uncomfortable journey home with a smelly teenager. A vulnerable 
fourteen-year old girl in a strange city, with no money, nowhere to stay, could in a 
nightmarish scenario turn up rapcd, murdered and dumped in the river. Thankfully 
and to my relief, nothing as serious as this occurred and Kelly I was later informed 
had been re-arrested on another shoplifting soiree later that day. 
Studies have found that the risks involved for young people going missing 
from residential care (at this stage Kelly had been under my authority in the care of 
the Local Authority) include, "involvement in offending, substance misuse, rough 
sleeping and sexual exploitation, including prostitution" (Biehal and Wade, 2000: 
211). Whether Kelly was involved in any of these risks while missing from care 
(except for sure, the rough sleeping) I do not know. My particular task was to attend, 
collect and with same sexed young offenders drop off the young people from police 
stations. How the other issues, problems and misgivings were dealt with were not of 
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my concern. What they got 'up to', what they did with who, and why they did the 
things they did, were of no concern of mine. In my youthjustice role these were not 
my designated tasks. 
For a number of young people missing from care, crime becomes "a routine 
feature of their lives while they were missing" (ibid: 83). Kelly's shoplift spoke for 
itself. In my role as Appropriate Adult I could argue that I followed the procedures at 
the police station to the letter. The transporting of Kelly would have been wrong but, 
this in my view I would have argued had it been raised, was due to the structural 
weaknesses inherent within the Social Services Dept, of staff shortages and that the 
police really should have transported the girl but, could not or, would not do it. I 
could have argued that I had the girl's best interests at heart, but if the kid did a 
runner I wasn't paid to chase after her. 
This issue of who is responsible for the young people immediately after their 
release from police custody is fraught with ambiguities. If it is the local beat unit the 
police should and normally will transport young people back to their homes. However, 
as was Kelly's case, she was some distance from home. For a police officer to take her 
back to Sunderland from Georgetown this would take roughly one and half-to-two 
hours out of his shift. He or she would probably not known the way back to the care 
home. Kelly wasn't a driver so the chances that she would know the way by road 
would be slim. In this instance it would be expected that the local Social Services Dept 
would assume responsibility for the collection of their missing young person. As we 
saw in Kelly's case, this did not occur due to the 'ruptions' and lack of staff available 
to do this task. In such situations the Appropriate Adult will be called to do a 'favour' 
even if this breaks local government policy, particularly the transporting of young 
vulnerable females by male workers. These are system failures inherent within the area 
of youth justice and social work teams. 
John-Jon 
John-Jon was fourteen when I first met him. Physically, he was slim, about five foot 
four inches in height, fair-haired with piercing blue eyes. I was later told at the BSS 
project by one of the workers there, 'He's a really bonny lad and to look at him you'd 
think that butter wouldn't melt in his mouth'. However, John-Jon was no 'angel'. 
He'd been offending since he was about six-years of age with petty offences that had 
progressed into a lengthy crime sheet that had worsened in the severity of crimes he'd 
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committed during his offending history. John-Jon was now a heroin addict and his 
crimes were generally committed in order to feed his habit. 
John-Jon had been arrested with another youth on suspicion of a house 
burglary. I attended the police station the same afternoon as his Appropriate Adult 
(John-Jon's mother gave up attending police stations following his numerous and 
increasingly frequent arrests several years ago). After the interview had been 
conducted (John-Jon denied the offence) and photographs, finger-prints and DNA 
samples had been taken, the Custody Sgt. was then required under PACE 1984 to 
undertake a number of possible courses of action. 
Once the interviewing process is completed the police must decide what 
formal action is then required to be taken (PACE, 1984). The police can either release 
the young person with no further action (NFA) to be taken or, they can deal with a first 
offence with a reprimand or final warning (usually dependant upon the seriousness of 
the offence) if the offence is proven and/or admitted (ibid. ). Following a final warning, 
for any ftirther arrests a young person may well find him or her self being charged for 
that secondary offence. These potential outcomes were not available for John-Jon. He 
was a persistent young offender, a heroin addict, had a string of convictions (36 in total 
up to this point in time) had been 'at it' for years now and had become an item of 
6police property' (see Van Maanen, 1978; Holdaway, 1983; Reiner, 1985). The 
Custody Sgt., after consulting with the arresting officer, decided that John-Jon should 
be detained in police custody until the first available court hearing the following 
morning. The 'impartiality' of the custody officer during this particular case is called 
into question. 
In Chapter Three, we discussed the decision-making processes and the refusal of 
police bail to suspects and also examined previous research that criticised the intended 
impartiality of custody officer's in those decisions (Morgan et al 199 1). The 'internal 
regulation' (McConville et al, 199 1) that occurred during John-Jon's detention at the 
station started on the 'front-desk' with the custody officer and the arresting officer 
discussing John-Jon's immediate future. I was sat approximately ten feet away within 
full visual and audible range. It was unmistakable that the arresting officer had some 
impact upon the decision making process as I heard the line, "Keep the littlefucker 
here overnight Steve [the Custody Sgt. ] and we'll try to get him remanded tomorrow at 
court. He's done that house. He's as guilty as sin. We need to keep him in here, 
locked up and tucked in". The conversation then moved into a small back room behind 
the front desk of the charge room and away from earshot. Another two officers joined 
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the discussion and shortly afterwards all returned to the front desk. The decision had 
been made. John-Jon was staying put. 
At this stage of the process John-Jon was brought from his cell, both his legal 
representative and I knew of his immediate fate, a long night in the cell awaited him. 
The following morning he would be presented at court with the strong possibility that 
he would be remanded into custody at a YOI following his impending pre-trial court 
appearance. At the desk he was formally charged with the offence and told that he 
would be detained in police custody until the following morning. John-Jon appeared 
panic stricken. As a heroin-addict his immediate thoughts, perhaps his only thought, 
was of his next fix. He was asked if he understood the charge against him. With his 
offending history he knew fine well what it meant. He also clearly understood that if 
he didn't get that fix the 'rattle' (withdrawal symptoms experienced by heroin users) 
would set in. John-Jon's immediate response was to ask for a doctor to attend for a 
prescription of methadone. The Custody Sgt., knowing of John-Jon's drug related 
criminal activities, said that he would contact the police surgeon but that it 'might take 
some time'. John-Jon was in for a long night ahead of him. 
He began to become extremely distressed as he was led away to be 
fingerprinted, DNA'd (non-intimate) and photographed all of which require an AA to 
be present. I then began a discussion initially with the Custody Sgt. and this 
subsequently turned into an argument between three other police officers and myself. I 
asked the Custody Sgt. to reconsider his decision stating that other options were 
available to him. I was reminded that he was detaining John-Jon at the station because 
of the 'seriousness of the offence'. 
Under the guidance of PACE 1984, s. C: 16.6,1 suggested to the now 
somewhat irate Custody Sgt. that he was required to attempt to find local authority or 
local authority secure accommodation for the suspect. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, PACE governs that children and young people, when arrested and the police 
refuse unconditional bail, are to be accommodated in local authority accommodation. 
This option was refuted by the Custody Sgt. who told me, "He's got a history of 
abscondingfrom care. There is no way I'm allowing him to go into local authority 
accommodation so that he makes a boltfor it and is on his toesfor the nextfew days". 
I then suggested that we try for local authority secure accommodation, also know as a 
'PACE bed', as an attempt to get the vulnerable young person out of the police station 
and into the care of the local authority. I was told, "Feelfree to try this, but you as well 
as I know that the only hopes he has ofgetting a secure PACE bed are Bob Hope and 
106 
no hope. There's never any room at the inn". John-Jon's legal representative let out a 
laugh, looked sympathetically at the Custody Sgt. and then at me, with a somewhat 
bemused look upon his face. I attempted, via the local Emergency Duty Team of the 
Social Services Dept, to locate John-Jon a secure PACE bed. It was a futile attempt. 
As the Custody Sgt. had stated, there is never any room at the inn. 
As a last-ditch attempt I then confronted the Custody Sgt. about his decision. I 
suggested that the issue relating to the 'seriousness' of the offence was open to debate. 
Here, I argued that although I did appreciate that burglary is a serious issue it does not 
equate with, for instance, physical assault, rape or murder. My comments created a 
uproar with the three police officers, standing at the front desk listening intently to my 
ineffectual attempt at securing John-Jon's release from police custody. One officer 
stepped closer to me in an aggressive manner and said: 
Bloody social workers! What ajoke! Are you telling me that you don't think 
burglary is a serious offence? There's people drop down deadfrom heart attacks after 
finding their houses have been done over [burgled]. Andyou don't think that's serious! 
Christ, it's no wonder ourjobs so dijfzcult with people like you andyour view ofthe 
world. 
During this stage of what had turned into a heated exchange, the three officers 
present stepped in closer towards me. The primary argumentative officer, agitated, was 
now right in my face. I refused to back-down and stood my ground. If I were to have 
stood back and shut my mouth this, in turn, would have been viewed as a stand-down 
on my part and my argument regarding John-Jon's release and the police officer's 
decisions regarding his over-night stay at the Custody Inn would have been lost. The 
'discussion' had in a very short time turned into an interaction demonstrating power 
relations. I returned a question to the first police officer, asking him in his experience 
how many burglary victims he dealt with had suddenly had heart attacks due to the 
shock of being burgled? His response was " Well none exactly but, you read about it all 
the time". The discussion had by now transcended into a saloon bar discussion and was 
in danger of getting out of control. The police officer and I were now staring-out each 
other. At this point the Custody Sgt. (who during the short exchange had sat back and 
watched with some amusement) took control, "He isn't going no-where. He's staying 
put-end ofdiscussion". 
The questioning of this police officer's view of the world, in doubting the 
judgements made by the Custody Sgt., and of viewing the situation differently to that of 
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police officers made me an 'asshole' (Van Maanen, 1978 8). 1 then asked the Custody 
Sgt. if I could go to John-Jon's cell to explain what was going on and what I would try 
to do regarding his situation. Unknown to me, John-Jon had a history of 'self-hann' 
while being detained by the police. As an Appropriate Adult I was unaware of this 
and no one at the YOS had informed me of what to expect with this young man while 
he was being detained at police stations. I was escorted to his cell and shown in. 
John-Jon was in tears and said, "Can't you get them to send me to the Tower? " I 
explained to him that I'd tried everything to get him out, that the police weren't going 
to let him go and we'd have to wait until the morning to see what happened in court. I 
told him that the BSS project would be informed and that someone from the project 
would see him before his court case the following momins?. John-Jon became 
extremely agitated and began pacing the floor. He turned to me and said "You'd better 
get me out ofhere you cunt or else Illfucking top meser'. To say I was shocked is an 
understatement. None of the one and a half days of 'intensive' training nor the 
'shadowing' exercises (one hour and thirty minutes in total), with longer serving AAs 
or, any information relating to the role of the AA had prepared me for this. 
The immediate events that unfolded were bizarre. John-Jon tried to strangle 
himself. He wrapped both hands around his neck with his thumbs pressing down into 
his throat and windpipe and started to squeeze. I looked on in amazement. I thought 
'the silly bugger' but then his complexion began to change and the veins on his temples 
began to throb. I stepped forward to remove his hands he however stepped back and 
was now stood upright and elevated on a concrete bed, his hands still clasped around 
his neck as he began to turn purple in colour. The situation had rapidly turned into a 
mute melodrama. I saw his eyes bulging, purple complexion, lips beginning to take on 
a blue tinge and thought to myself, 'He's got to come upfor air soon'. He did of 
course and told me through a rasping splutter, "Youfucking wanker. IfI die when I'm 
in here it'll be yourfault". I made a hasty retreat from the cell. 'Me sight of one 
throttling was more than I could bear. I didn't want to be around for the finale. I left 
9 Van Maanen employs a number of descriptions which fit thcasshole'labcl. Ilerc, my use of Van Maanen's term 
rcfers to police officers' viewing me as "one of those who does not accept the police definition of the situation" 
(1978: 223). 
9 The following morning at 08: 00, although not on duty that day, I rang the project to double check that they had 
received the documents by fax. I also suggested that someone should be there in plenty of time as John-Jon had been in a 
very distressed emotional state when I lcft him. I had raised my concerns about John-Jon's detention at the police station 
on the Appropriate Adult incident form, which had been faxed to the BSS office. I also raised my concerns on the 
telephone the following morning. I was asked to provide written details of my account of the events. What happened to 
these and whether any official complaint was made by the local YOS I am not fully aware. I presumed that the case was 
not pursued with any zeal. My impfcssion was that the local YOS was more concerned that one of its AAs had made a 
complaint about his own treatment at the police station. John-Jon's dilemma appeared to be of little significance to the 
team. I wasn't asked for ay other details relating to this matter. 
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John-Jon's cell and immediately approached the Custody Sgt. and explained what I had 
just witnessed and suggested that a doctor should be called to make an assessment of 
John-Jon. To my amazement John-Jon's legal representative (who was waiting for 
another unfortunate client's arrival into the charge room) said, "Don't let it worryyou. 
He's always pulling stunts like that. He's a daft little bastard. But, not that daft to 
know you've never dealt with him before and that he could try it on with you"' 0. The 
Custody Sergeant advised me, "Yhe best thingyou can do is sit down andshutyour 
mouth". 
Vulnerable Self-Harmers 
The detention of young suspects in custody provides the police with extra work relating 
to those vulnerable young suspects. On entrance to the charge room they are usually 
asked if they self harm, but whether or not a young suspect admits to this is another 
matter. The police will record incidents of self-harm of suspects while being detained 
at the station. One would expect that these data would be available on police 
computerised databases and that vulnerable self-harmers would be 'flagged up' on this 
system. Little is known about the issue of self-harm instances at police stations. But, 
perhaps John-Jon's failed attempt at self-asphyxiation was a trial run if he were to be 
remanded to prison. 
What is known is that in 1998-1999,25 self-inflicted deaths occurred at 
police stations in England and Wales. The following year the rate had reduced to 
fourteen deaths in police custody caused by 'deliberate self-harm' and in 2001 this 
figure of deaths caused by prisoners deliberate attempts to harm themselves had been 
10 1 bore witness to John Jon's self-harm attempts twice more in the course of my two and a half year 
role as an Appropriate Adult. On the second occasion John-Jon attempted to strangle himself with his own 
tracksuitpants. I had just finished a private consultationuith him and he had been returned to his cell. Ffis 
'buzzee (a bell located in each cell which alerts police officers in the charge-room to suspeces cells when 
assistance is required). A yell for assistance went out from a police officer who had been sent to see what 
John-Jon was buzzing for, 1hc Sgt ran to the cell and I followed behind. Inside the cell John-Jon was now 
on his knees with the Custody Sgt. and police constable disentangling John-Jon's item of clothing from 
around his neck. Tbýis was John-Jon's desperate method of attracting attention in a vain attempt to hopefully 
secure his release from police custody. John-Jon was savvy enough to know that the last thing a police 
station needs is the 'death' of a young person in the cells. Unfortunately for John-Jon the police were also 
savvy enough to know, or at least believe, that he was Yust swilging the kad'. The police officer who was first to 
arrive to investigate the 'buzz' from John-Jon's ceJ1 told me. 'So The buZtersgoing and 1, get to the door and take a 
look lbrou , gb lbeflap. 
As I do this the bu! Zýh g stops, just in fime to see him pul4n ,g 
his tracky bottoms (track slit trouser) 
round his nerk. I open the door quick and Then the kak twat stopspulkn 
The ird of his ckthes of him andput him in apa 
g on Me k: gs of his irvusers. Wlell, #*b that, we took 
per suit. We know he wasm ý sedous butyou can never take chance?. Indeed, 
on tl-ýs occasion John-Jon spent the remainder of his time at the police station in his paper suit 
The last incident relating to John-Jon's attempts at self harm incurred John-Jon pulling a draw-string from his 
track suit bottoms and here the chosen method employed was garrotting. This incident happened in the 
holding cells at a local magistrate's court prior to him being remanded into custody. 
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reduced to five (Home Office, 2002e). With increased emphasis upon detention cell 
lay-out and monitoring procedures conducted at police station custody suites, it appears 
as if the police are winning the battle on these types of death in custody (ibid. ). 
The affects of detention (however this generally relates to prison detention) has 
witnessed 'a disturbing trend of suicide and self-harm among young prisoners which is 
coupled with an alarming rise in the custodial remands for fifteen to sixteen year old 
boys" (Inner London Youth Justice Service, 1999: 2). Liebling and Krarup (1993) 
found that 43 per cent of prisoners who attempted suicide were under the age of twenty- 
one, 40 per cent were on remand. 
Liebling (1996) found that vulnerable young first-time prisoners were most likely 
to commit suicide. Research conducted by Grindrod and Black (1989) identified that 
young people on remand were a highly vulnerable sample of the prison population with 
a suicide rate three times that of the general prison population. Between 1996 and 1997 
there were twenty self-inflicted deaths by young prisoners (HM Chief Inspector of 
Prisons, 1998). Judge Turnin has argued: 
The young are particularly vulnerable. They are more likely than 
adults to lack the inner resources to deal with being held in a local 
prison or remand centre. In prison the most outlandish behaviour can 
take a grip ... self-mutilation and suicide can also 
become a fixed part 
of a subculture ... girls under the age of seventeen cannot 
be remanded 
into prison. We strongly believe prison is no place to hold boys under 
the age of seventeen and that in cases where removal from the 
community is necessary, alternative care arrangements should be 
provided 
(HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 1990: 36) 
As an inter-locking process of the remand process, police stations may often 
be the first port of call in which the potential of self-harm might surface. The police 
therefore have some level of responsibility in making assessments of that risk. On 
occasions I did witness Custody Sgts. asking young suspects if they harmed 
themselves, but this was not a systematic process with all the young people who I dealt 
with at stations. Indeed, according to Doug, John-Jon pulled his self-harm stunts with 
some regularity. Perhaps, on this occasion the issue of self-harm may have been 
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overlooked. Perhaps, it was recognised that John-Jon was 'a daft little bastard... who 
often did this type ofthing'but had said that he wouldn't do anything silly while he was 
being detained. 
Perhaps, the police feel there is little they can do in such situations albeit to 
restrain a recognised self-harmer while at the station. However, this would raise far 
more welfare-related issues associated with undue restraint being practised by the 
police. As we can see the police have a dilemma as what to do with this type of 
vulnerable suspect. Despite a Code of Practice that states: 
A juvenile must not be held in a police cell unless no other secure 
accommodation is available and the custody officer considers that 
it is not practicable to supervise him unless he is placed in a cell or 
that a cell is the most comfortable secure accommodation in the 
police station. 
(CYPA 1933; PACE 1984, Code C, para 8.8) 
All of the young people I acted as Appropriate Adult for were held in police 
cells. The assessment of what constitutes 'secure accommodation' at police stations is 
contestable. My own reckoning was that young people were placed in locked cells 
while held at stations, although generally these were cells located close to the front 
desk of the charge room. As Geoff at the BSS project told me, "Well the police are 
hardly going to put in ball-pools and supervisedfun-parksfor them are they? " PACE 
also offers that children and young suspects are required to be observed and questioned 
about their welfare while at the station every thirty minutes. My own observation of 
John-Jon's self-harm lasted seconds rather than minutes which demonstrates just how 
quickly such incidents can and do occur. 
Perhaps the answer lies in that for cells put aside for vulnerable suspects, CCTV 
should always be available to monitor and safeguard against the possibility of a tragic 
incident occurring. This option would be neither too expensive nor disruptive to the 
police. The rapid growth in CCTV in this country as a crime prevention strategy, 
generally targeted towards protecting the populations property and personal safety from 
the likes of John-Jon and his like, presents a strong case that perhaps the personal 
safety of vulnerable young suspects held at police stations should receive a similar 
level of priority. Newburn and Heyman's (2001) study of the use of CCTV in custody 
suites highlights that prisoner's and police officer's alike had positive views of the 
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safety and welfare elements of this type of electronic surveillance. However, as is 
usual in the debate of CCTV there were concerns over the issue of privacy. 
In the previous case with John-Jon, my 'affront' (Van Maanen, 1978: 229) to 
the situation regarding John Jon and the reaction of the police officers' present during 
this altercation was, "a response on the part of the other which indicates to them that 
their position and authority in the interaction are not being taken seriously" (ibid. ). This 
'bloody social worker' had overstepped the mark in questioning the police on-their- 
own turf and had questioned their superior position as agents of social control. I was 
now feeling intimidated by the looks and hushed conversations that were occurring in 
and around passages in the charge room. I returned to visit John-Jon in his cell before I 
made a less than dignified exit from the police station. 
This time the brief conversation took place through the Judas window on the 
cell door. I had no fancy for being too close to John-Jon again. I had seen what this 
young man could do with his bare hands. He certainly appeared far less agitated than 
previously and looked in reasonable physical shape. I tried to explain to him what 
would happen in the morning and who would be there at court to support him and if he 
wanted me to contact anyone for him. He responded with a hearty 'fuck q)ff and off I 
fucked. I then stated to the Custody Sgt. that I wanted to speak with the shift Inspector 
about this incident: 
Sgt: Get in there [Consulting Room]! Sit down and shut up! 
R. H: No! I want this sorting out now! 
Sgt: You will get in there and sit down! Get in there! 
John-Jon had been released from his cell and was running around the charge 
room like a lad possessed, extremely upset and agitated with two police officers, who 
were grappling with him and shouting at him to 'stand still and calm down'. Two other 
police offices had separated me from view with what was going on with John-Jon and 
had moved me into the Consulting Room. My field-notes had the words 'chaos, un- 
organised and unprofessional' written and underlined in the border. Doug, John-Jon's 
legal rep, had moved into the doorway of the consulting room with me. 
Doug: Let's leave. 
R. H: No, I want to stay and sort this out. 
Doug: Well that's up to you but there's nothing we can do here. I'm leaving. 
John-Jon had now been restrained and was brought in to join me in the consulting 
room. The door was left ajar. John-Jon was sobbing, I was angry with the Sgt and I 
really didn't know what to do in this situation, nor did I have the skills or experience to 
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handle it. I put my arm around his shoulder. Doug's earlier statement of John-Jon 
being a 'daft little bastard' had lost all relevance. I was now dealing with an extremely 
vulnerable, sobbing, fifteen-year-old-boy, who wasn't pretending any more. None of 
the training had prepared me for this. I succeeded in calming John-Jon and asked him 
to promise me, whatever the outcome at the station that he wouldn't try to harm 
himself again. I then approached the front desk and the Custody Sgt. to re-assess the 
situation. I was told that John-Jon would be staying in police custody. There was little 
else I could do but tell the Sgt that I was going to report the situation to the YOS as I 
felt that the police decision was wrong and that the treatment of John-Jon and myself 
had been dire. I contacted the local EDT by telephone and explained the situation to 
them stating my concerns and asked them for advice. 
EDT: Will they let you stay with him? 
RH: I'm not sure. But, the problem is I've got another two AA call-outs been 
waitingfor me to deal with them at Hyde Police station [an approximate sixty mile 
round j oumey] they've been waitingfor well over two hoursfor me to get up there and 
the way things are going tonight I'm bound to get more call outs in the meantime'. 
I then conferred with the Custody Sgt. regarding arranging a 'sitter' for John-Jon. 
Sgt: Look here's what I'll do. Ifhe's calm and behaves himselfwe'll leave his cell 
door open. 
I decided not to chance my luck with the normal ritual of leaving the station 
with any of the police officers by exchanging departing pleasantries and instead carried 
on walking towards the exit. The problem was that due to the previous unnerving 
events, I had forgotten that the custody room is a secure area and access and exits are 
controlled from behind the front desk. I made it to the door and then had to double 
back to the charge desk, passing a number of officers who were all 'in' on the previous 
altercation, with a number of them giving me the 'once over'. I had to ask the Custody 
Sgt. if he would be as kind enough to let me out. Nothing was said but the look on his 
face was gleeful. The balance of power and of control of this back-stage remained a 
policedomain. I had just been reminded of my 'place' in that terrain. Alienagency 
workers may at times have invited access into this domain but they should never be 
under any illusions that they can challenge the structure of power and question police 
practices. This back-stage remained firmly controlled by the police. 
I reported this incident to the BSS project the following morning. The incident 
was referred by the project to the Duty Inspector of the shift that evening. I had to 
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record my version of events, which were then passed onto the Duty Inspector. George 
got back to me a few days later when I was at the project. 
George: That thing ... with John-Jon... at the Bridge the other night. The 
Inspector has been on the phone to me and told me that the Sgt on duty that night, says 
that you withdrew your servicesfrom a potential solution. 
R. H: Fucking what! The lying bastard! That's bollocks that is. You've seen 
the Incident Form and Ispoke with you thefollowing morning so you know the 
situation. Christ! I even rang the Bridge and spoke with him [the Sgt] when I got back 
from anotherjob a couple ofhours later to see how John-Jon was and he told me he 
wasfine and was sleeping like a baby. Withdrew myfucking services! Lying bastard! 
George: Aye, I know that Rob, but that's what the Sgt's saying. 
R. H: Wanker! He told me on three occasions, before, during and after it all 
kicked offthat John-Jon was staying put despite me offering alternatives as to where he 
could and should go. He's the one that wouldn't stick to the codes ofpractice [PACE]. 
I withdrewfrom a potential situation? What thefuck was that then? 7hatJohn-jon 
could come and stop at my house 'til court the next morning? 
George: I don't know. It'sjust what the Sgts. written downfor his view ofthe 
situation. Doyou want to speak to him about it? We can pursue it ifyou want to? 
R. H: Is there any point? We all know they'll close ranks on this and I've got to 
keep going down there [the Bridge] for otherjobs haven't I? He's talking shit because 
I did everything I could to get John-Jon releasedfrom there. nat'sthebloodypoint 
in pursuing it! 
Geoff-. [interrupting] Rob, don't let them thick heeded [headed] bastards get you 
down. They are [raps clenched fist on table twice, knock-knock]four-be-fucking twos 
[woodenplanks]. Ofcourse they're going to cover themselves, they always do. And 
although they're generally thick; they always cover up theirfuck-ups to good effect. 
Jack: [intersecting] Hats offtoyou Robforpursuing it but, Iwould have triedto 
get him (John-Jon] to the Tower and lefi it at that. I wouldn't have got into a brawl 
with them about it. 
The issue of challenging police officers at police stations is an unsettling 
aspect of the role for AAs (also see, Pierpoint, 2000). The level of training I received, I 
personally believed did not prepare me for such events as discussed in this section. 
Indeed, how could any training workshop or 'shadowing' exercises prepare anyone for 
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the incidents that I have documented? 11 How could an induction-training event 
demonstrate what to do when a young man tried to strangle himself in front of you? 
How could such an event prepare you to deal with belligerent and condescending 
police officers on their home turf.? 12 As a practising AA, had the event trainer ever 
witnessed such an incident himselD Perhaps he had and decided not to let us in on this 
in order not to frighten us all away from the job. Returning to challenging police 
decisions, once the decision has more or less been made, in my experiences the AA is 
of little use. Custody Officer's in making their bail decisions rarely change their views. 
As has been pointed out in this section of the John-Jon saga, the intended role 
of the AA often becomes impotent. Arguing with police officers is a risky game. This 
is their back-stage and the masks are off. This incident (and the lack of support and 
investigation over it from the YOS) had an affect upon me and the stances that I would 
adopt in confronting subsequent police decisions. After this particularly disturbing 
incident I was reluctant to go in with all guns blazing. Following this event, I generally 
bit my lip, held my tongue, filled in the necessary forms, picked up the phone the same 
or, following day to report 'iffy' incidents. I just got on with the job. I had become an 
AA. The 'social researcher' could write the other 'stuff up. The worries, guilt, 
stupidity and incompetence would all make useful data for the thesis. 
The John-Jon incident and my attempts to get him out of the station presented me 
with the reality that I was relatively powerless in this role. Whether this was down to 
me as an individual or, the level of training I'm not so sure. However, I stayed for the 
duration (and the majority of my AA cohort inductees did not). I was never questioned 
about 'iffy' incidents or situations (unless, as with his case, I raised them) by the local 
YOS. Perhaps the stronger case lies that these areas are police stations and the contents 
within them are police property. There is also an argument that the role of the AA is 
simply a 'stop-gap' with the emphasis placed upon local YOTs simply fill a legislative 
void proposed by policy makers to make 'the best of a bad job. Similarly, to making a 
silk purse out of a pig's ear, at times it just doesn't ring true. 
" My own three shadows with another AA were for two shop thefts and one criminal damage charge. All three suspects 
were conditionally bailed from die police stations. 
12 The training event I attended did attempt to deal with police and AA 'conflice in that sterile and child game-like 
manner such events often do (usually to the great embarrassment of the participants, who are usually quite aware that 
such events are in fact justgames'. Like young children playing ? Jums and Dads'thcy rarely equate to the real thing. 
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Tommy-Boy: A Fucking Little Worky Ticket 13 
Tommy (aged 16) had been bailed on a previous occasion to attend the Bridge police 
station in order to attend an identity parade. Tommy was suspected of causing 
Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH) to an elderly man, aged 70 and as the chief suspect 
Tommy had been bailed to re-aftend the bridge station to be escorted to Georgetown 
for an identity parade. 
The details of the alleged assault were particularly unpleasant. On leaving a 
Working Men's Club on the outskirts of the city on a Saturday night, an altercation 
between a group of youths and the elderly man in the company of some relatives 
occurred. Angry words were exchanged between the two groups and a broken house 
brick was thrown by one of the young people into the opposing group. The brick 
struck the elderly man in the face causing serious injury to the man. Tommy had 
been recognised or, was suggested as the assailant and was picked up the following 
day by the police and questioned regarding his involvement in the offence. Tommy 
denied he was there. He was conditionally bailed from the police station to return at 
a later date to attend an identity parade. In such cases an Appropriate Adult is 
required. 
It was my shift on-call so I attended the police station and on entry into the 
charge room I met up with Tommy for the first time. Tommy was mouthy, flash, 
quick witted and as one of the police officers who passed by as I walked to the 
custody room remarked to his colleague, "He's afucking little worky ticket". There 
was no doubt to who they were referring. As soon as I met Tommy-Boy he fitted the 
description exactly. Tommy-Boy was the epitome of the North East 'charva'. He 
was indeed a fucking little worky ticket. Shell-suited, snide Burberry cap covering 
his dark cropped hair, which wasn't as much gelled but instead glazed with his choice 
of Super Drug hair product and his feet in Kappa trainers. From top to toe his youth 
style encapsulated most of the young people I dealt with at police stations and who 
also came onto BSS following their arrests. Tommy's opinion of himself was that he 
was 'Jack the Lad'. Quick witted, nippy with his repartee he generally gave as good 
as he got (in the 'right' company) in his banter with police officers. The police did 
not like Tommy. He was too mouthy, too cocky and threw house bricks at old men. 
Tommy needed reminding of his place. As I was to shortly find out, the police were 
13 A 'worky tickee is a North cast of Engjand coUoquW description for someone who 'works their ticket' and acts in a 
way that upsets, annoys or offends. 
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out to get Tommy-Boy. As I walked to the charge desk Tommy was in discussion 
with the Custody Sgt. 
Sgt. Hill: Right, so you've attended the station to answer your bail conditions 
and now we're going to take you up to Georgetownfor the ID parade, as you've 
agreed to do. You'll travel up with PC Smith OK? . 4nd don't go out ofyour way to 
wind everyone up young man. [Sarcastically] Remember you're a visiting 
ambassador of thisfine city of ours. 
Tommy-Boy: Will I get back in timefor tea at the hostel? 
Sgt. Hill: [Looking around and assessing the audience] Will you get back in time 
for tea? I thinkyou've more important things to worry about. You're goingfor an 
identityparade on apotentially serious assault charge andyou're worried about 
your tea? [Shakes his head] 
Tommy-Boy: Aye, I knaa what I'm gannin'up therefor, but I'll still be hungry 
wont I! 
Sgt. Hill: Son, inside your head what do you see? I bet your view ofthe world 
resembles a cartoon doesn't it? I bet that inside there [points to Tommy's head] it's 
all crash, bang and wallop, with sticks ofdynamite going offall over the place. You 
view the world like you're in a cartoon. You are the 'Itchy and Scratchy Show' [from 
the Simpson's TV show]. Offyou go. 
PC Smith was to drive both Tommy and me to Georgetown (where the police 
force identity suite was located) in a police van. I signed the necessary documents at 
the custody room and we were escorted out into the police yard to the transport. On 
the way to the van a number of police officers returning from patrol passed Tommy 
and ritual pleasantries were exchanged, 
P. C Oh, Tommy-Boy are you still out? 
Tommy: Course I'm still out. I've done nowt so youse have nothing on us 
[me]. 
P. C: Notfor long Tommy-Boy, notfor long. Either way, you've gotyours 
coming to you. 
Tommy: [smiling] Aye, but it won't be you will it? Not with that gut andfat 
arse you'd never catch me. 
P. C: [Smiles, winks an eye and click-clicks his tongue at Tommy] See you 
around Tommy -Boy and keep on yer toes. 
117 
We made our way to the van. Tommy sat in the back with me, while the 
officer drove us to the Georgetown police station where the facilities for ID parades 
were located. The trip proved to be enlightening regarding the interaction between 
the young offender and the police officer. Initially, the small-talk was civil and light- 
hearted. Jokes were made, references were undertaken regarding some of Tommy's 
previous offending and PC Smith's preceding 'pinches' on Tommy. Thenthejokes 
began to turn more personal, more vindictive. 
Tommy-Boy: You're afuckin'shite driver. Let me drive. It's no wonder 
you've never caught me when you've been chasing me. You'refuckin' crap. 
PC Smith: Aye, youjust crack-on there Tommy-Boy you mouthy little charva. 
I couldn't give afuck what you think I'lljust let you know that me and my mates are 
looking outfor you, you little gob-shite. 
Tommy-Boy: 'ere man youjustjumped a red light. You'dfuckinnick anyone 
elsefor that. [To me] Didyou see that? Wasn't the light on red? [To PC Smith] I 
toldyou, you were shite. Ifwe'd got rammed there offanother car Id have suedyour 
arse. Id have made sure I got all your money. 
PC Smith: It's not me you want to sue Tommy, it's the Chief Constable. He's 
the one you'd have to sue. See what it is Tommy, is that I've gotfuck all, me. The 
Chief Constable's the one with all the money. Come to think of it, ifwe had got 
broad-sided there Id have put a big claim in mysetf. A nice insurance pay out ofthe 
force, jullpension, long-term sick Yeah, that would be nice. First thing Id do 
Tomm isfuck offfrom this place. Shall I tell you why mate? y 
Tommy-Boy: [Now looking somewhat bored with PC Smith's statement] Gan 
on then... bore the arse off us some more. 
PC Smith: Fdfuck offawayfrom all you little bastards. No more dealing 
with shite. Your Social Worker [me] probablyftels the same way as we all do 
dealing with numbskulls all day long. This is shite work Tommy-Boy and it's made 
even worse dealing with you and the motley crew you run around with. Anyway, if 
you get IDd up at Georgetown we 71 be glad to see the back ofyou. ' Cos you won't 
be aroundfor a while will yer Tom? 
Tommy Boy wasn't looking as confident now. In fact, he was beginning to 
look somewhat concerned. I was silent. I was an appropriate 'piggy-in-the-middle' 
adult. The Police Officer was quite aware of the 'reminder' he had given Tommy of 
the event ahead and its possible scenario, if Tommy was identified at the parade. 
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PC Smith: Not soflash now are you Tom? What's the matter, cat got your 
tongue? 
Tommy-Boy: Welijust have to wait and see. I've done nowt anyway, so I 
won't getpicked out. You won't be sofuckinflash then willyou. What's the matter? 
Has the cat got yourfuckin' tongue now? 
The police officer is now looking angry, staring hard at Tommy in his rear 
view miffor and on occasion shifting his glare to nervous glances at myself. Through 
a somewhat agitated laugh the PC responded: 
PC Smith: See what it is Tommy-Boy, you know you've got it coming at you. 
Youjust know it's comingyour way [Tommy immediately jumps in] 
Tommy-Boy: [Laughing] Fuck ofj7 You and whosefuckin'army. You'retoo 
slow you old bastard [By my reckoning the PC was about twenty-eight years of age. 
If he was an 'old bastard' I was decrepit]. There's not one ofyouse who could catch 
me. I'm toofastforyouse man. Youse black bastards arejust too slow man. 
PC Smith: Ho-Ho Tommy-Boy! Just keep on-keeping on there son. When I 
get hack to the station and let my mates now about this, you're gonna be getting it 
sooner, rather than later. 
Up until this point explicit reference to violence had been avoided. However, 
all present knew what 'it' was. 
PC Smith: I'll tell you this Tom wefucking hate you. Everyone at the Bridge 
is talking about getting hold ofyou. "en we do you're going to get such afucking 
pastingyou won't know what's hityou. 
'11' was now out of the bag. In his silence, Tommy tried to remain cool and failed 
miserably at adopting an unconcerned attitude and look. The Police Officer also 
looked un-nerved. He shot quick andjumpy glances at both Tommy and then 
somewhat more nervously in my direction. He'd realised that the 'fuckin little worky 
ticket' had worked him up a treat. He'd gone too far in the presence of a 'social 
worker'. Tommy responded. 
Aye and Illfucking sue thefuckin'lot ofyouse andyourfucking Chief 
Constable. Ifany ofyouse bastards give me a kicking Ifuckin'swear I'll have all 
yous bastards up at court. Yer alljust a bunch ofcunts, man. 
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PC Smith: Tommy, answer me this will you? "en was the last time you heard ofa 
police officer getting donefor assaulting one ofyou little scrotes? Aye, you cannot 
think ofan occasion can you? Now that's because a) We never ever touch you lot 
[Both PC Smith and Tommy burst out laughing] or, b) Because we never get caught. 
Which one willyou gofor Tom? 
Tommy-Boy: Youfuckin'know which one it is! 
PC Smith: Exactamundo Tommy-Boy! And I'll let you know how it works 
shall I? 
Tommy-Boy: You're going to anyway. [To me] He doesn't let up, does he? 
PC Smith: It's because we've got the magistrates in our backpockets Tom. 
See, we and them are on the same side. Ifyou were to stand up in court and say 'PC 
so and so gave me a good going over'they'dprobably startfucking clapping and 
shake the officer's hand Just think when was the last time you heard that an o cer 07, 
had been donefor assault. Itjust doesn't happen. They're [magistrates] on the same 
side as us. No-one likes you lot Tommy. 
The whole scenario had descended into and become an identifiable, 
... occupational reality of the policeman 
flitting between backstage 
behaviour and formal interaction in public is that of an unconsciously 
accomplished actor caught up in a schizophrenic, or even dialectical, 
relationship with a system that dictates bureaucratic, universal 
standards of conduct for him that are deemed situationally 
inappropriate. In brief, the pivotal concern of the active policeman 
represents a near universal dilemma: how does he get his hands on 
the pot of gold without landing himself in the shit. 
(Punch, 1985: 207-208) 
The case obviously lay with Tommy and his lack of respect in not knowing, 
or worse, ignoring the social hierarchy between his role as young offender to that of 
the policeman. The issue was that a 'social worker' was sat in the back of the van. In 
a one to one, between suspect and police officer this would have been 'fair'. For 
Tommy-Boy, "the Policeman is a "fucking pig, " a mindless brute working for a 
morally bankrupt institution" (Van Maanen, 1978: 115). In the presence of his 
Appropriate Adult he could 'safely' express his views. Out on the street, in the 
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confines of a patrol car or, at the station, it would be fair to suggest that Tommy-Boy 
would have been far more reserved in his opinions. PC Smith's perspective in 
dealing with the 'dross' (Choongh, 1998), and the 'assholes' (Van Maanen, 1978) 
was that: 
Policemen generally view themselves as performing society's dirty 
work. The cynicism popularly attributed to police officers can, in 
part, be located in the unique and peculiar role police are required to 
play. The hardness commonly thought to be the mask of many 
policemen arises to fend off the perceived case of doing society's 
dirty work. 
(ibid.: 116) 
PC Smith's dilemma was to dig himself out of the hole he had dug himself into. 
I would imagine that he viewed his comments regarding 'it' as potentially damaging. 
A well-tested method of alleviating the tensions is to make light of the situation. 
PC Smith: Haway Tommy. We're only carrying on aren't we mate? We're 
all right aren't we? Just winding each other up, that's all. 
As he was speaking to Tommy through his forced smile, his eyes were fixed 
notonTommy, butatme. It was just 'intended' as a jolly caper. Tommy-Boyonthe 
other hand lacked the maturity, the social experience, skills and the guile to recognise 
his own role in also creating the unpleasant situation that hadjust unfolded. Much 
like his lack of responsibility in recognising the impact that his long-list of previous 
offending might have had upon many of his victims of his crimes, Tommy-Boy 
carried on regardless. 
We arrived at the station and the ID parade began after a lengthy delay. 
Tommy was locked into a cell. The other paradces arrived in all of their resplendent 
charva regalia. Tracksuits, trainers, sovereign rings, belcher gold chains and baseball 
caps positioned low at the back of the head, with the peaks adorned high up on their 
foreheads. Looking at them all it was hard to tell the difference. Tommy would fit in 
nicely with this bunch. All of them, except Tommy of course, would be going away 
with a tenner in their back pockets. 
The victim and witness arrived. Tommy was brought forth from his cell 
while the victim and witnesses were kept away from the parade line. There was 
much to-ing and fro-ing as Tommy-Boy found the position that he felt comfortable 
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with. He then changed his mind, all the while sizing up the other attendees on the 
line-up quickly trying to make an assessment of the 'one' who perhaps most 
resembled himself. Even at this stage of the process Tommy-Boy continued to play 
the 'chancer', in laughing and joking with some of the other young men lined up with 
him. He found his spot and settled in. The victim, then the witness respectively, were 
brought in and did their walk pasts of the parade gathered in front of them, behind the 
safety of a mirrored Perspex screen. I was watching as the event unfolded. The 
elderly victim didn't spot Tommy. The witness, I was sure, did recognise Tommy. 
She semi-stopped in mid-stride, as she slowly walked along the dividing mirror and 
looked over at Tommy, but then appeared to think twice about it and continued down 
the line. On her second walk past she completely missed Tommy out. She didn't 
even give him a second glance. From her body language I was sure she'd recognised 
him. Even if she had Tommy would have been off the hook as two identifications are 
required to represent evidence of a positive identification in court cases. 
The victim and witness were thanked and then left the station. The parade, 
all except Tommy, was sent on its way into Georgetown and beyond. Paper work 
was processed, finalised and completed. Doug, Tommy's legal rep. (that man again, 
he was always on duty) and I spoke over a coffee. 
Doug: Didyou see that? That lass clocked him. She nearly shouted it out. 
Then shejust stopped and carried on. Didyou see? 
R. H: I thought she seemed to notice him and decided against it 
PC Smith: Everyone knows the little bastard did it. Looks like someone's 
put in a wordfor him doesn't it? 
Doug: I've seen it happen before. They want to pick them out hut, for 
whatever reasons usually money or threats, they remind themselves not to. But they 
always, withoutfail, give it away when the suspects are there infront ofthem. Just in 
their body-language you can spot it a mile off Oh, they've been had all right. 
The dilemmas of being an Appropriate Adult and its uncomfortable 
relationship with the social researcher had again reared their ugly heads. I went in 
and sat with Tommy in his now unlocked cell to keep him company more than 
anythingelse. Tommy disclosed tome that his' uncle had had a word with someone 
in their [the victims] family, ' and that he, 'knew all along that nothing would come 
out ofthe ID parade'. How much of this is true will never be known. However, 
sometimes the little pieces (witnesses' reaction to seeing Tommy) and Doug's and 
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the PC's analysis of the events that had occurred during the parade perhaps, added 
some weight to Tommy's view of the situation. This was information I did not wish 
to be privy to. Unfortunately, in such circumstances as an Appropriate Adult (who it 
should be remembered in such situations should either walk away from the job at 
hand or inform the police of this information) the role of the AA becomes one that is 
clouded in some ambiguity in deciding 'whose side he is on'. Or, as the social 
researcher, (remembering that the well being of participants and their confidentiality 
are intrinsic areas of respect-if asked would I tell? ), situations arise that need to dealt 
with swiftly (no time to refer to a research methods chapter) or, to consult the PACE 
Handbook. Thejob needed doing. Thejob got done. I kept schtumm. 
Doug had previously been in and informed Tommy of the state of play. He 
was free to go. He would of course need a ride back to Sunderland. Doug had 
offered me a lift back into Sunderland, which I initially accepted. Tommy needed to 
return to the Bridge station so that his charge could be NFAd. Tommy would be 
going back with PC Smith in the van. Initially, I thought that Tommy would also be 
joining Doug and me for the ride back. After accepting Doug's offer I automatically 
assumed that Tom would be joining us. I was unaware that he needed to return to the 
station with his police escort to officially dispose of the suspected offence. We were 
just about to depart and Doug asked me if I was ready to go. I said I was. Tommy 
looked at me with some concern. I realised that I had missed something. 'Is Tommy 
coming with us Doug? ' I asked. PC Smith smiled and answered for him, 'No he 
needs to come back to the station with me, isn't that right Tommy-Boy? ' Tommy 
looked anxious. The earlier conversation regarding 'it' Tommy believed, might 
indeed becoming rather far 'sooner' than he expected. 'Will you comeback with me 
please, Rob. Idon't want to travel back on my own with him'. Ihadtodotheright 
thing. After all, whose side was Ion? Mychoicewastheboywhohadhitanold 
man on the head with a broken brick. Whatever the potential of physical damage that 
might, or might not have occurred to Tommy on his way back to the Bridge, this was 
now resolved. I was travelling back with the former suspect and a PC, who had 
earlier reminded Tommy-Boy that it was only a matter of time before he got 'it'. 
Tommy will probably have regretted his request for me to ride with him. PC Smith 
certainly didn't. In fact he told me as we pulled into the Bridge station, 'Thankyou. 
You've made my day'. Inadvertently on the journey back to Sunderland, I was 
instrumental in humiliating Tommy, much to the satisfaction of PC Smith. 
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Tommy and I were idly chatting in the back of the police van when I asked 
him about his local authority care home. 
RH: Oh you'll know all about the incident about a month or so ago when there 
was afight up there then? 
Tommy-Boy: There'sfights up there all the time man. 
RH Yeah, but this one was where that lass gave that lad a kickin' Broke his 
nose [I'd acted as the young female's Appropriate Adult on this occasion where she'd 
been arrested for assault, although due to the young male victim's decision not to 
pursue the charge, the case was NFA'd] 
Tommy-Boy: [Looking blankly at me] 4t my hostel [care-home]? Nah, I can't 
remember that. Ire you sure it was up there? 
RH: Yeah, she [the bone-breaker] was tiny. To look at her you wouldn't have 
thought she had it in her. The police at the station were all laughing about it. Said 
that she'd done them all afavour, infilling in this kid. She's definitely at your home. 
Small, bonny girl, dark skinned, black hair... 
Tommy-Boy had started to gently kick my leg and had a concerned yet, stem 
frown on his face and was gently shaking his head. I was confused, not realising 
what was going on within this interaction. PC Smith however, had surveyed and read 
it all through his rear view mirror. 
PC Smith: [Excited] Fucking hell Tommy! It was you wasn't it? It was, wasn't 
it? It was, it was! You gotyourfucking nose broke offa lass! Yes, fucking YES! 
Tommy-Boy! Tommy! You gotfilled in offa lass. You soft little shite! [Raucous 
laughter] 
Tommy was now looking very disappointed in me. The police officer was 
roaring with laughter. Tommy was embarrassed, as he had lost face. In Tommy and 
PC Smith's versions of masculinity, it didn't come any worse than 'getting filled in 
off a lass'. By way of Tommy's Appropriate Adult, whose role it was to protect 
Tommy's welfare issues, Tommy was now being ridiculed. This would stick with 
Tommy for some time I was sure. All of his juvenile bravado, his exploits of 
athleticism and sharpness, which he had proclaimed during the earlier j oumey to 
Georgetown, now lay in ruins. 
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PC Smith: I can't wait to tell them all hack on shift Tommy-Boy. They're 
gonna piss them-selves laughing. "ooah-Tommy! Cocky little charva Tom gets 
filled in by lasses. She broke yer nose? Is that right Tom? Is that right? 
Tommy-Boy: Aye man, allfucking right. But ye cannot hit lasses can ye? 
PC Smith: No you're right there Tom. You can't hit lasses. [Again, 
laughing] Not when they've broke your nose and left you crying in a heap on the 
floor. You wouldn't be in anyfit state to hit them then wouldyou Tom? 
Tommy-Boy: Fuck off 
PC Smith: They you go again Tommy! Always thefucking mouth with you 
isn't it? nen me and my mates are done with you, that broken nose you got offthat 
lass will seem like a tickle. 
All I could do was apologise to Tommy. I didn't think. I didn't expect it to 
be him. In retrospect I should have acted more professionally and should not have 
mentioned previous cases, even though for all at Tommy's care home it would have 
been common knowledge. His nose had healed remarkably well. If the signs of a 
recent break had been visible I wouldn't have brought the matter up. Although I was 
aware that Tommy continued to be involved in crime in the town and with the local 
YOS, I never saw him again. 
Crime Control and a Matter of Due Processes 
Evaluation of the criminal justice system has commonly focused on this process in 
terms of Packer's Crime Control and Due Process models ofjustice (Packer 1968; 
Bunyan and Bridges 1983; Baldwin 1985; Dixon 1990; McConville et al 1991; 
Sanders and Young 1994). The Crime Control model operates on the assumption that 
the purpose of a criminal process is to suppress crime and therefore "it endorses 
procedures which efficiently screen suspects, determine guilt and secure appropriate 
punishment for those convicted of crime" (Choongh, 1998: 623). This model 
espouses the notion that 'efficiency' is to be located within the terms 
... of speed and finality and accordingly, court-based processes are 
rejected in favour of extra-judicial, administrative and standardised 
procedures in which the opportunity for challenge is kept to a 
minimum. The model is premised on the belief that police and 
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prosecutors, as administrative experts, can and will identify and screen 
out those who are probably innocent. 
(ibid. ) 
This model exerts a great deal of faith in the expertise and incentive of the 
police and for its followers the opposition of imposed restrictions placed upon police 
activities are generally objected to. Packer (1968: 165) likened this Crime Control 
model of criminal justice to a conveyor belt. Within this model, the successful 
outcomes of routine operations are gauged by the tendency to pass cases along a 
systematic process to successful conclusions. 
Conversely, the Due Process model of criminal justice system proposes that 
left unattended and unaccountable police procedures are open to abuse and erroneous 
judgements. This model proposes the assumption of innocence and to uphold this 
presumption a number of obstacles are placed within this system to ensure that guilt 
is proven by the state of a standard of proof for alleged criminal offences. The Due 
Process model: 
... is also concerned to minimize the possibility of 
investigative 
powers such as arrest, detention and questioning being misused, or 
used in an oppressive fashion. Accordingly, police powers are 
limited through mechanisms such as the requirement for 
reasonable suspicion, the right to have access to a lawyer at all 
times and the need for the police to secure prior judicial permission 
for particularly intrusive activity. 
(ibid.: 624.14) 
In both of Packer's criminal justice models a dialogue with legal rules are 
present and are expected. However, in both models two very different methods of 
determining the issue of guilt or innocence exist. Both models uphold the processes 
of criminal justice are to be deployed solely for the purpose of enforcing the 
substantive criminal law and that police officers are made subject to a 'degree of 
scrutiny and control' as to safeguard the 'security and privacy of the individual' to 
ensure that this is not 'invaded at will' (Packer 1968: 156). This entails in theory 
" Also see, Packer, 1968: 165 
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that, "the police, regardless of which of the two models is in operation, must be able 
to account for andjustify their actions by reference to the aims, objectives and rules 
of that model" (Choongh 1998: 624). Although Packer provides details of the legal 
rationality which underlie both Crime Control and Due Process models of the 
criminal justice system, these models fail to provide any analysis of what happens 
outside of these theoretically described boundaries. In short, there is no description of 
how these processes are interpreted by the law enforcement agents of the state. 
Choongh (1998) highlights this weakness and develops a framework that 
extends Packer's analysis with a Social Disciplinary Model of a police system of 
justice. Developing McConville and Mirsky's (1995) Social Disciplinary model 
describing a process used in New York City's state courts to produce guilty pleas by 
defendants, Choongh adapts this model to police activities in dealing with the 'dross' 
of the inner city. The models 
... chief distinguishing characteristic 
is its lack of interest in legal or 
factual guilt. Its concern is with the police objectives of reproducing 
social control, maintaining authority by extracting deference and 
inflicting summary punishment. 
(Choongh 1998: 626) 
Choongh's study examined police activity in custody rooms at two police 
stations in the south of England. The findings of this research examined the coercive 
practices of police officers for particular individuals, groups and classes of people 
and cases that are terminated at the police station. This according to Choongh, does 
not occur due to the 'sifting out' of individual cases due to insufficient evidence or 
public interest, but as a social disciplinary model ofjustice. It is the 'suspects' who 
are treated as 'police cases' not offences as 'criminal cases' (ibid: 625). 
Here, arrest activates a police system of summary punishment in 
which the police station becomes the site in which the on-going 
conflict between the police and particular individuals, groups and 
classes is played out. In this context, the police station is detached 
from the judicial process for which it is supposed to be the point of 
entry. Arrest and detention is not, for this group of individuals, the 
stepping stone onto Packer's conveyor belt or the first stage of an 
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obstacle course. It represents instead a self-contained policing 
system which makes use of a legal canopy to subordinate sections of 
society viewed as anti-police and innately criminal. 
(ibid.: 625) 
The arrest and detention of suspects' in this model is therefore not intended to 
further criminal investigation. Its purpose is to 
... remind an individual or community that they are under constant 
surveillance: the objective is to punish or humiliate the individual, or 
to communicate police contempt for a particular community or 
family, or to demonstrate that the police have absolute control over 
those who challenge the right of the police to define and enforce 
gnormality'. 
(ibid.: 626) 
However, this form of summary police justice does not necessarily occur only 
at the police station. For those individuals or groups for which police surveillance is 
considered worthy 
The intent in all of these cases is clear. The person must be taught 
a lesson. And whether this occurs in public or in the back of an 
alley the person must be shown the error of his ways. 
(Van Maanen 1978: 233) 
The scope and location is of where and how this form of summary justice is 
meted out, is dependent upon individual officers' interpretations of what aspects of 
social discipline is required and at what times and in what places. This can occur on 
the street, or in the (custody) 'suite'. Where 'it' occurs is irrespective. As long as 
'it' occurs is crucial in maintaining the relationship and upholding the issue of power 
and social control (van Maanen, 1978; Holdaway, 1983). Yet, although correct in 
their own analysis and conceptual frameworks both Packer's and Choongh's omit a 
further area of analysis relating to these models. 
My own research unearthed a Pre-emptive Policing Strategy which sits 
between Choongh's (199 8) Social Disciplinary ofPolicing and Packer's Due Process 
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and Control models of police justice. This pre-emptive strategy has two 
interconnected aspects associated to it. First, is that the police arrest, charge and 
detention of young suspects pre-empts the possibility of further offending 
immediately after being bailed from police custody. 
Second, is that in detaining young suspects the police are in fact meting out 
punishment to those young offenders they decide to keep hold of until the next 
magistrates' sitting. This allows the police 'to get in first' and hand some pre- 
emptive justice upon the young suspects. In many situations the young person will be 
bailed with conditions by the court the following morning. Here the previous night's 
detention by the police of the young suspects' serves to act as a pre-emptive 
punishment of summary police justice. It is intended to 'teach' the suspect that this is 
what happens when they cross the line. If, as is also often the case, the young suspect 
is remanded into custody by the magistrates', then the police are exonerated from any 
form of criticism (which rarely occurs), then all parties involved in the bail process, 
from charge (police) to pre-trial hearing (magistrates), have distributed their own 
forms of preliminary justice. 
Bail Prior to Charge 
Prior to charge, the police may bail a young person to return to the police station at a 
specified future date. This allows the police more time to further enquiries into the 
suspected criminal offence the young person is believed to have committed 
(Hucklesby, 1997; Sanders, 1997, Sanders and Young, 2002). The police also govern 
this bail decision pending the delivery of a reprimand or, a final warning to a young 
suspect. The police have no powers to impose bail conditions in these circumstances. 
However, if a young person fails to return to the police station at the appointed time 
this renders the young person liable to charge (Nacro, 2001 a). 
As with the general concept of bail there is a presumption that the young person 
has a right to unconditional bail. Yet, as discussed in Chapter Three, the right to bail 
is at times clouded with ambiguity. For example, the above exceptions to bail rely 
heavily upon police officers, in the appointed roles of Custody Officers, perceptions 
of the term 'reasonable grounds' and 'belief cited in all of the above exceptions to 
bail. Custody Officers can apply conditions when the above exceptions to bail are 
reasonably and legitimately held to apply. At this point in the bail process the police 
should consider the option that conditions attached to bail would alleviate those 
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concerns prior to refusing bail. These possible conditions are wide and varied. In all 
instances, except the condition of 'residing in a bail hostel', the police can impose 
any conditions that may be available to the court. For extremely serious criminal 
offences, for example murder, manslaughter, attempted murder, rape, attempted rape 
or, if a suspect has been previously convicted of one of these offences, the 
presumption of a right to bail is generally inverted. 
As has been highlighted in this section the grounds for refusing bail are quite 
extensive (Sanders and Young, 2002). However, they are also quite specific in that 
the 'rules' of bail only allow the police to refuse bail in relatively rare circumstances 
(ibid. ). The police, in theory, have no power to refuse an individual bail simply 
because the police believe that the offence is 'serious'. Nor, can the police deny bail 
because the young person they wish to detain, without bail, fits the criteria of a 
persistent young offender. In practice, the police in their decision making processes, 
regarding who is granted or refused bail, as was observed in my own experience as an 
Appropriate Adult, the police will, on occasions, withhold the right to bail for 
vulnerable young suspects even when alternative proposals are, or should be, 
available. The detention of children and young people at police stations who are 
refused police bail initially lies with the police. However, at times, it will be argued, 
that the local authority also fail in their statutory duty to provide the police with an 
alternative. This however, does not distance the police from the selective detention 
processes, through the denial of the fundamental right to bail, which young known 
offenders may incur. 
Tucking Up' Young Suspects at Police Stations: Policy and Practice 
What happens to a young suspect between charge and the first court appearance is 
heavily determined by the young person's age. Where the police refuse the young 
suspect bail, he or she must be produced at the next available court. In some 
instances this may be available the same day however; it is normally the case that this 
will occur at some point the following day (Nacro, 2001b). Often, the police will 
have made the decision that, from a number of available options, the young person 
will be refused either unconditional, or in extreme cases, conditional bail. In such 
situations the police make the decision as to where the young person is to 'go' once 
the interviewing, charge and the release of young people are completed. 
130 
For young people over the age of seventeen, they are treated as adults at the 
police station and for subsequent remand purposes at court. Due to this anomaly "a 
17 year old refused bail by the police will automatically remain in police custody 
until he or she appears at court" 15 (Nacro, 2001a: 3). For young people having 
reached their seventeenth birthday, being arrested and denied bail by the police will 
result in some of them being detained from a Friday until a Monday in police cells 
until the first available court hearing (ibid. ). In any 'civil' society this must be 
viewed as an unacceptable policy, particularly, when the decisions to refuse bail are 
rarely based upon 'fact' or standardised and precise decision making processes (for 
example see, Brown, 1989; Phillips and Brown, 1998; Hucklesby, 2002, Sanders and 
Young, 2002). 
For children aged 10- 11 the police must transfer them to local authority 
accommodation (generally referred to as a PACE transfer and/or PACE bed) unless it is 
'impractical' to do so. It is worthy of consideration the meaning of this notion of 
impracticability. For the local authority there is no discretion. Section 21 of the 
Children Act 1991 requires every authority to 'receive and provide accommodation for 
children ... whom they are requested to receive under, 
38(6) of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act'. It is then clear, that the legislation relating to the transfer and 
accommodation of young people cannot be 'impracticable because the social services 
department has trouble finding a suitable placement or for some other reason does not 
wish to accept the transfer' (Nacro, 2001 a: 4). 
However, in practice this does not always occur. At a later stage a discussion 
follows that casts serious doubts upon the capacity of the local social services in 
Sunderland to fulfil those obligations under PACE 1984 and the Children Act 1991. 
Different arrangements apply for those young people aged 12-16. When denied bail 
those young people within this age range should generally be transferred to local 
authority accommodation from police stations unless it is impracticable to do so. If the 
police custody officer attests that keeping the young person in non-secure local 
authority accommodation would be an inadequate measure, in order to protect the 
public from serious harm, the police can insist that the young person is placed in secure 
accommodation. If no such accommodation is available (as is often the case) the 
young person may be detained in the police station (as is often the case) pending the 
first available court session. Yet; 
15 For this age group the anomalous position for which they often find themselves in regarding bail decisions at police 
stations is an historical legacy of the fact thatý prior to the establishment of the youth court by the Criminal justice Act 
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Serious harm, in this context is taken to mean 'death or 
serious personal physical or psychological injury. 
Moreover, the risk of serious harm would have to exist 
during the brief period from charge to the next available 
court sitting. It is therefore clear that the provision is 
intended to be used rarely. 
(Nacro, 2001a: 4) 
The legislation and codes of practice regarding the bail of young people does 
embody some ambiguous use of phrase and language. However, the general 
overview is that the denial of police bail is only to be used in the most extreme 
criminal offences. Although the police are required to present a certificate to the 
court with their reasons for denying bail, i. e. the 'impracticable' issues that arose 
regarding a bail decision. It has been suggested that generally 'such certificates are 
rarely provided, or indeed required by the courts' (ibid. ). 
From a police perspective the notion of 'impracticable' is also clearly defined. 
Although, from my own research this definition was often ignored, or wrongly 
interpreted by police officers in the designated role of custody officers, the case is 
that: 
... neither a 
juvenile's behaviour, nor the nature of the offence 
with which he is charged provides grounds for the officer to 
decide that is impracticable to seek to arrange for his transfer 
to the care of the local authority. Similarly, the lack of secure 
accommodation shall not make it impracticable. 
(PACE, Codes of Practice: 16B) 
This code of practice is also reinforced by Home Office Guidance which instructs: 
The construction of the statutory provision makes it clear that 
the type of accommodation in which the local authority 
propose to place the juvenile is not a factor which the custody 
officer may take into account in considering whether the 
1991, defendants aged 17 -cre processed as adtdts (Nacro, 2001). 
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transfer is impracticable. In particular, the unavailability of 
local authority secure accommodation does not make the 
transfer impracticable" 
(Criminal Justice Act 1991: Detention of Juveniles: Home Office Circular No. 
78/1992) 
The case for accommodating juveniles with the local authority as a condition 
of bail after arrest and charge is then clearly stated. 'Impracticality' regarding the 
release of young suspects from police stations is in theory a non-option for both the 
police and local authorities. Impracticable circumstances regarding the transfer of 
young people from police stations to local authority accommodation are only viable 
in circumstances which make it physically impossible. The only conditions where 
this can be considered are, 'extreme weather conditions (e. g. floods or blizzards) or 
the impossibility, despite repeated effort, of contacting the local authority' (ibid). 
The detention of young people of 17 years of age and under at police stations 
should be extremely rare event even when the police refuse bail. Recent figures from 
the Youth Justice Board provided by YOTs, imply that in practice the national picture 
regarding the transfer of young people to local authority accommodation does not 
occur as regularly as it should. The data suggest that it is the transfer to local 
authority accommodation from police stations is at an extremely low level. 
In England and Wales for the three months between July and September 2000, 
of the 1022 young people aged between 10 and 16 who were recorded as being 
refused bail by the police, 85 16 per cent (865 young people) of these were detained in 
police stations. Of these, 13% (117 young people) were transferred to non secure 
local authority accommodation. Of those 117 young people, only 2% (2 young 
people) were transferred to local authority secure accommodation units. Of the 10 
and II year olds, who it should be remembered cannot be legally held in police 
custody unless transfer is impracticable, 73 %17 were detained at police stations 
(Nacro, 2001 a: 5). These alarming figures regarding the negative impact of police 
bail processes, demonstrate that for young suspects arrested and charged by the police 
there is a strong possibility that such detentions will, in most cases, incur an over- 
night 'sleep-over' or, on occasions, a 'week-end break' at police stations. 
16 All the figures have been rounded to the nearest number and percentile. 
17 No figures were available to analysc this sub figure of the total number population regarding the actual number this 
73% of 10-11 year olds constituted. 
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TableFour 
Children and Voung People Denied Police Bail: July-September 2000 
Total Total No. Transferred No. IYO of 10-11 
Number Detained to non secure L. A. Transferred to year olds 
10-16 by Police Accommodation secure L. A. Detained by 
Years Accommodation Police 
1 865 117 
(100%) (85%) (13%) (2%) 73% 
(Source: Nacro, 2001 a: 5) 
Caution should be applied when interpreting these data. The figures in the 
corresponding columns do not add up to the over all 'Number' total. Anecdotally, I 
was told that this occurred due to a number of the BSS projects not recording the 
outcomes of young people's arrests. In this age of managerialist rhetoric, with an 
emphasis upon monitoring and evidence bases in which to inform 'what works', this 
is a wholly unsatisfactory state of affairs from within the local practice ofYOTs. 
Despite this, what we can assume is that nationally the police are neglecting their 
duties and ignoring the codes of practice which deal with the welfare issues relating 
to young people arrested by the police. The above table constitutes all overview of the 
neglect of the codes of practice relating to children and young people held at police 
stations. The fact that 73% of all (recorded) 10- 11 year olds that were arrested ill 
England and Wales during this period of time and were illegally detained by tile 
police, presents a disturbing finding relating to police malpractice in withholding bail. 
FUrthermore, this malpractice in detaining vulnerable children may indicate that the 
police rernain unaccountable for tlieir actions. It also demonstrates the voids relating 
to localised youth justice practice, by way of local YOS not monitoring or recording 
what happens to the young people within their geographic locations after they have 
been arrested. 
As to how this happens and indeed how it is allowed to occur represents a 
major weakness within the current YOUthjUStiCe system. Perhaps duringthose 
summer months England and Wales experienced uncharacteristic adverse weather 
conditions that made the transfer of a large number of young people (who should of' 
and were entitled to be transferred to local authority accommodation) 'impracticable'. 
Alternatively and perhaps more realistically, police interpretations and (lie 
evident malpractice relating to PACE codes are having a major impact upon what 
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'should happen' to young suspects and what 'actually occurs', due to police and local 
authority negligence. The role and practices of legal representatives and duty 
solicitors as legal advisors to young suspects is also called into question at this 
staging post within the criminal justice system (see McConville et al., 1994; Sanders 
and Young, 2002. Of the majority (fifty-six in total) Appropriate Adult call-outs that I 
attended it was extremely rare, indeed I did not record, nor do I recall, a legal 
representative questioning the police refusal of bail. In most instances the legal 
representatives were rarely present until the bitter-end of the release or charge process 
that often follows the interrogation of suspects. 
An insight of some of the more bizarre participant observations, relating to 
legal representatives at police stations, I was fortunate enough to observe and 
participate in, are discussed at a later stage in this chapter. What is possible to 
suggest regarding the earlier figures relating to young people's experiences 
determined by police bail decisions is that the figures may reflect; 
... the police refusing to transfer or requesting secure 
accommodation inappropriately; or youth offending teams or 
local authorities refusing to accept transfers. A further 
possibility, of course, is that the issue is simply not raised by 
any party. In any event, the data provide a good prima facie 
case for suggesting that the legal requirements are being 
overlooked and that local authorities may, at least on some 
occasions, be in breach of their statutory duty 
(Nacro, 2001 a: 5) 
All of the above possibilities were, in some extreme cases, accountable for a 
number of young people being detained at police stations. With some of the young 
people I worked with being 'tucked up' by the police was a routine activity once they 
had been arrested. I am aware that this will not form a representative sample of these 
decisions. I am also aware that for most young people arrested and charged bail was 
granted by the police. However, the case studies I employ do demonstrate evidence 
of the structural weaknesses and at times, malpractice that has occurred within the 
youth justice system. Perhaps it may be fair to suggest that elsewhere in the England 
and Wales, similar practices occur. 
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The lack of comprehensive research into police bail decision-making 
processes particularly, in the application of bail conditions and as to how these initial 
decisions compare with corresponding court bail decisions, has continued to allow 
the police to remain unaccountable within this relevant aspect of the criminal justice 
process. A number of research studies focusing upon bail processes have argued that 
the police continue to remain the primary control agents in relation to the 
corresponding bail outcomes of defendants at court (see, for example, Hucklesby, 
1997; Morgan and Henderson, 1998; Phillips and Brown, 1998). 
Despite the legislation and codes of practice in how to deal with young 
offenders at this stage of the bail process custody officers often over-ride the official 
prescribed doctrines regarding what is to be done with those young suspects. The 
denial of bail by the police of young suspects is laden with problems. Custody Sgts. 
on duty do not like young people to be detained during their shifts. I was told on one 
occasion, "It's nowt butfucking bother babysitting the little scrotes'. For Custody 
Sgts. young suspect's create-more than the usual work required to detain a suspect at 
police stations. Parents need to be contacted and often they won't attend. 
Between 01/10/00 to 31/03/01 the local YOS had 275 calls from the police for 
requests for Appropriate Adults to attend police stations in the area. This was at a 
time when requests for Appropriate Adults from the YOS had reached an all time 
low. It was described to me as a 'very quiet period'. It is widely acknowledged, that 
in the main, these requests are made because parents won't or, can't attend police 
stations to deal with the arrest of their sons and daughters. Appropriate Adults are 
then required to attend and at times they are not available. In such situations young 
suspects can be left waiting for hours on end. On one occasion during a call out to a 
police station I was told that the young person had been waiting for four and half- 
hours for an Appropriate Adult to arrive at the station for a petty shoplifting charge. 
If charged and detained the police are required to carry out a number of 
procedures relating to vulnerable suspects. Young suspects are accommodated 
differently to adults while at police stations. For example, a juvenile should 'not be 
placed in a police cell unless no other secure accommodation is available' (PACE, 
1984: s. 8.8.9). In the majority of cases young suspects are detained in cells. This 
usually occurs due to a lack of alternative secure accommodation within police 
stations. In locking them up the young suspect is controlled and out of likely harms 
way considering the potential for violence within the custody office. Police stations 
are generally unequipped to deal with young suspects. 
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The observations and interactions I have utilised within this chapter are, of 
course, exceptions to the normal run of the mill bail decisions that occurred. The 
majority of young suspects were granted unconditional bail at police stations. A 
smaller number of young suspects' were granted bail with conditions. For those 
young people where an imposed condition of bail by the police (and also at 
subsequent stages of the youth justice process at courts') was that a young person was 
to 'reside' or be 'remanded in local authority accommodation', and on occasion this 
might occur. However, such police bail decisions are guided by their own 
perceptions of what makes 'good' or 'bad', 'vulnerable' or 'obdurate' young 
offenders, of the 'seriousness' of the alleged offence and thus the label is applied and 
the bail decisions that are made often correspond to those labels. As Bottomley et al. 
(199 1) have suggested the police will utilise PACE in order to 'make it work for 
themselves'. 
Summary 
Sociological analysis of legal processes relating to police decision making has 
questioned how individual officers reach decisions with suspected or alleged offenders 
(see for example, Banton, 1964; Skolnick, 1966; Wilson, 1968; Holdaway; 1977). As 
has been discussed in this and previous chapters, the sociological emphasis upon the 
police decision making should not be under-estimated 'because the police control 
access to the criminal justice process and the police officer's decision is important from 
this social policy point of view' (Manning and Hawkins, 1989: 139). However, for 
young people involved with and often subject to police decisions within the youth 
justice system, it is recognised in theory that the system can in fact create far greater 
levels of criminal behaviour than its intended purpose to eradicate criminal behaviour. 
It is now widely acknowledged that locking young people away either as a sentence or 
on remand, generally fails to stop young people re-offending. In 2001,78 per cent of 
all young offenders who had been sentenced to serve time in Young Offender 
Institutions were re-convicted of a statutory offence within two years of release from 
serving time (Home Office, 2002). 
For those young people detained at police stations and subsequently remanded 
by the courts, the youth justice system has constructed a variety of safety nets to avoid 
the detention of young suspects, who are by all accounts under the presumption of law, 
innocent at this stage. Bail Supervision and Support is one of the policies within the 
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Crime and Disorder Act of which the principal aim is to prevent re-offending on bail by 
young offenders. A central aspect of BSS is that it often picks up the young people who 
have been held at police stations overnight and are considered at risk of being remanded 
by courts during their pre-trial hearings. 
As has been discussed, the role of the AA is a fundamental aspect of co- 
ordinating 'justice' within the back spaces of the youth justice system (Dixon, et al., 
1990; Brown, et al., 1992; Evans, 1993; Bean, 1997; Bucke and Brown, 1997; Pierpoint, 
2001; Jones, 2004). Pearse (2001), despite his and Gudjohnsson's (1996) earlier 
criticism of the potential of such a service, he has recently described the role of 
Appropriate Adult services as the most important contemporary safeguard for young 
people within the youth justice system. The discussion within this chapter has focused 
on the role (and experiences) of the Appropriate Adult. In aiming to secure the welfare 
and release of young suspects, and the potential outcomes of later procedures within the 
system, the encounter is a complex process. This discussion has considered the 
complications involved with legal definitions and also of the equally composite issue of 
disparity in and between organisational cultures in what should be 'done' with 
suspected young offenders. 
In the following chapter the line of discussion examines the BSS Project in 
attaining its aim to reduce the incidences of remands into custody. Moving on 
through the protocols and analysis of bail decisions, the process now develops the 
narrative of young people's experiences relating to bail. In the following chapter, the 
discussion is of the bail supervision and support of those young people who are at 
risk of the more severe aspects of remand management within the youth justice 
system. As this chapter will argue this welfare-orientated youth justice strategy is 
weighted against by other competing 'stakeholders' of BSS outcomes, these being the 
police and magistrates. 
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Chapter Five 
Conflict and Contradiction: The Policy and Practice of 
Bail Supervision & Support 
Introduction 
The Government under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 established the Youth Justice 
Board. The aim of this legislation was to monitor the youth justice system and to advise 
the Home Secretary on the operation of that system, and to identify and disseminate 
good practice. The Board issued grants to identify, promote and develop good practice 
in the youth justice system and the prevention of offending by children and young 
people. The Home Office provided the Boardwith E85 million over a three-year 
period, of which, during that period a total of E35 million was provided for bail 
supervision and support projects (YJB, 2000). 
This chapter details a case study of one such bail supervision and support 
project in the North of England. A central tenet of this chapter focuses upon the aims 
of the YJB of overseeing Bail Supervision and Support, as a national project in order 
to reduce the remands into custody of young people. A further area of discussion will 
examine the organisational strains of the BSS Project in its attainment of those and 
other objectives. 
In this chapter the relevant issues relating to the local BSS Project's 'clients', 
these being the young people who went onto BSS, will add a further dimension in 
understanding the structure and function of this particular aspect of a youth justice 
welfare-orientated intervention. Paradoxically, this can also be viewed as a system of 
social control, targeted towards some of the town's 'serious' and/or persistent young 
offenders. 
In Sunderland a BSS Project had been operating with various form of delivery 
since 1991. It had previously ensured its target group as those young people at risk of 
being remanded by the courts in the district to Local Authority accommodation or 
remanded into secure custody. From 1999 and the commencement of this Youth 
Offending Service pilot project, the BSS Project set out to fully integrate the various 
elements of the existent resources and to strengthen those resources by building upon 
the existing multi-agency partnerships already in place. This was part of a 
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comprehensive YOS arrangement to deal with the most difficult and persistent young 
offenders in the city. These were the city's young offenders most at risk of receiving 
the most severe impediments that the youth justice system is capable of and warranted 
in imposing upon young people, alleged to have committed criminal offences. From 
here on in it was either, bail orjail. This chapter gets to the crux of the matter in 
discussing the legislation, policy and practice of bail supervision and support. 
Policy Provision: Delivering Bail Supervision (and Support) 
The provision of Bail Supervision and Support for children and young people 
remanded or committed on bail, became a statutory duty of local authorities with 
education and social services responsibilities. The central aim of the YJB was to help 
establish Bail Supervision and Support Schemes/Projects as an integral part of Youth 
Offending Teams/Services. The aim of BSS was to reduce re-offending of young 
people on bail, the delays caused by non-appearance in court and the unnecessary use 
of secure facilities for young people remanded by the courts (Nacro, 2003c; YJB, 
2001c). 
BSS is targeted for its primary use in situations where magistrates grant 
conditional bail. An objective of BSS is that those young people placed upon it 
should have access to relevant programmes of intervention (e. g. substance misuse, 
education and training), provided by the Youth Offending Service (YOS) and its 
partners, in order to meet the identified needs of young people. 
From these aims it is clear that BSS is explicit in its focus to address the issue 
of children and young people re-offending while on bail and reduce the incidences of 
court ordered remands (both custodial and, at the Sunderland project, local authority 
remands). Remanding young people into custody is widely acknowledged as a 
detrimental process to those young people facing court based remand decisions 
(Woolf, 1991; Cavadino and Gibson, 1993; Howard League, 1995; H. M. Inspectorate 
of Prisons, 1997, Moore and Smith, 2001; and Goldson, 2002). BSS is intended as a 
'remand management' strategic intervention within the youth justice system (Thomas 
and Hucklesby, 2002). 
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA 98) placed all those working within the 
youth justice system under a statutory duty to have regard to the principal aim of 
preventing offending by children and young people. Under the management of Youth 
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Offending Teams and Youth Offending Services's the standard aim is expected to be 
delivered by the YOTs as the primary vehicles of delivering youth justice. The local 
authority (LA) in co-operation with other agencies have a duty to establish a YOT for 
the geographical area, and to produce a youth justice plan to demonstrate how 
intended services are to be provided and funded. The 'youth justice system' is 
defined as 'the system of criminal justice in so far it relates to children and young 
people' (Nacro 200 1: 1). 
In England and Wales young people become subject to the criminal law at 10 
years of age. Yet, many of these young people who offend also fall within the 
Children Act 1989 definition of 'children in need', of which the response of the 
criminal justice system to young people's offending is intended to ensure their general 
welfare. Three guiding principles underpin the work with young offenders within the 
criminal justice system: 
* Section 44 of the CYPA 1933 provides that all courts should have regard to the 
welfare of the child who appears before them. 
Section 1 (1) of the Children Act 1989 provides that the child's welfare shall be 
the court's paramount consideration in any proceedings under that Act, and 
section 17(l) places a general duty on every local authority to safeguard and 
promote the welfare of children who are in need. 
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requires that in all actions 
concerning children (i. e. those under the age of 18 years of age) the courts of law, 
the best interest of the child shall be the primary consideration. 
(Nacro 2001: 1) 
Bail Supervision and Support is primarily focused upon offering the courts 
an intervention which is welfare orientated, in that its aim is to offer this youth justice 
package as an alternative to 'remands' to secure accommodation. A concise 
definition of bail support stands as: 
Is Originally all of the new youth justice teams were to be called 'Youth Offending Teams'. However, 
the City of Sunderland local authority whose responsibility it was to set up the YOT was uncomfortable 
with the name. I was told by management, involved with this that it smacked of the principle of 'justice', 
rather than a 'welfare' orientated 'service' that the local authority expected the new youth justice system 
in the town to deliver. Sunderland opted for the naming of this new youth justice system as the 
Sunderland Youth Offending Service. A number of other local authorities also opted for a 'Service' 
rather than a 'Team'. 
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Bail support is the provision of community based services, which 
enable bail to be granted to young people who need additional 
(specific) support, and should normally be targeted at those who 
are at risk of, or who have been remanded to local authority 
accommodation, secure accommodation or custody 
(Nacro 1999: 8) 
During the 1990s the number of bail support projects run by local authorities 
increased. In 1994, Nacro conducted a survey of local authorities' criminal justice 
related community programmes and found that approximately seven out of ten local 
authorities in England and Wales claimed to provide bail support. However, Nacro 
also found in 1995 that these bail support programmes operated in a variety of guises. 
Generally, they were believed to provide an important means in reducing the 
likelihood of offending during the bail period and the majority of these 
schemes/projects were aimed to deal with young people (Penal Affairs Consortium, 
1995: 7). 
As a standard, much of the legislation regarding young people within the 
criminal justice system places a great deal of virtue upon the 'welfare' of the 
child/young person. It is widely accepted that young people should be treated more 
leniently, with a far more long-term welfare and personal developmental approach 
throughout their engagement with the criminal justice process, in comparison to adult 
offenders. Bail supervision and support's intention is to be a viable and lenient 
welfare approach in dealing with young people alleged to have committed criminal 
offences. Such offences for this youth justice 'target group' may impose the risk of 
custodial remands and remands to local authority accommodation. 
In order to reduce the risk of being 'remanded' bail support schemes for adults 
as well as children and young people have historically arranged a system of measures 
to offer defendants individually packaged programmes of bail support. These bail 
support programmes have generally included a gamut of varied and rarely tested 
interventions aimed at reducing the possibility of 'bailees' re-offending while on bail. 
The following are an example of those types of interventions: 
Reporting to, and maintaining a contract of agreed level of contact with bail 
support workers from those agencies that were responsible for bail support (for 
example, probation, social workers and youth justice workers): 
* Accommodation/residential requirements 
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* Assistance with education/training/employment 
9 Resolving family problems in order to ensure a suitable bail address and home 
base for defendants 
* Referrals to agencies in dealing with benefits, drug or alcohol misuse 
9 Individually tailored work focusing offending 'risk' related problems. For 
example, anger management, peer group influences 
* Constructive use of leisure time 
(Source: Sunderland Youth Justice Service, 1996) 
As is clear from the above interventions, bail support has historically provided 
its aim as a counter balance of welfare and offending focused interventions, to 
maintain defendants within their communities. However, due to the duration of time 
young people spent on BSS the level of intervention it intended to provide to these 
young people's lives could be extremely limited, in attempting to address aspects of 
the young people's risk related offending behaviour. 
BSS: Background Information of the Sunderland Project 
The Sunderland BSS 'Bail Information and Support Service' commenced as a pilot 
study during 1991/1992. The professional rationale of the project was located in the 
Social Services Department's emphasis of deploying effective resources to maintain 
children with their families, as long as it was consistent with their welfare, with a 
principle of 'minimum intervention'. During this period of time there had been 
increasing numbers of young people being remanded to the care of the Local 
Authority. 
The concerns were raised and focused upon two areas. First, that the numbers 
of young people being remanded to local authority accommodation (RLAA) had been 
identified as a strain upon the Social Services Department residential resources (care 
homes). Secondly, that a 'remand in care' had become synonymous with institutional 
confinement, resulting in a high level of absconding and further offending and a 
breakdown of family and community ties (Sunderland Youth Justice Service, 1998). 
This, in turn, represented a perceived failure to provide the local courts with a range 
of options for young people being considered for remand episodes. The majority of 
final disposals of the courts, at this time, were non-care or non-custodial, which raised 
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questions concerning the purpose served by the remand process (Sunderland Youth 
Justice Service, 1998). 
When Bail Support was granted as a condition of bail the conditions were that 
the young person would return home and would receive visits from, or report to, the 
Bail Supervision, Support and Remand Service (ibid. ). A nominated member of staff 
then worked with the young person and his/her family in order to minimise the risk of 
re-offending whilst on bail and would then report back to the court with details as to 
how the young person had managed and adhered to the BSS project. When courts 
granted bail, with the condition "to co-operate with the Bail Supervision, Support and 
Remand Service" (ibid. ), a contract was immediately drawn up with the young person 
and their parent/carer. The content and intensity of each programme was designed to 
address the grounds for the refusal of bail during the first hearing, the seriousness of 
the offence was taken into account; the likelihood of re-offending; and areas of 
concern to the young person in question were also considered. However, this was a 
'dressed-up' Youth Justice System policy statement. The BSS workers of this period 
had a different remit. The method of delivery was somewhat removed from the glossy 
policy statements relating to bail support prior to the statutory legislation of the Crime 
& Disorder Act 1998. 
Jack: We used tojust please ourselves with what constituted a bail visit. 
What's the record now Geoffof how many bail visits we got done in an hour? 
Geoff. You did six 'drive-bys'infifty minutes, in nineteen ninety-six 
RH: Drive-bys-what's that then? 
Jack: This is what I mean about how unaccountable we were. We used 
to do drive-by bail visits back then. We'd offer bail support to the magistratesfor 
young people who were in danger ofbeing denied bail and remanded into custody. 
Aspart ofthatpackage of bail support and supervision, we would have to visit the 
youngpeople at their homes and check that they were in, sticking to the conditions of 
their bail set by the magistrates. We would see if there was anything else we could or 
should be doingfor the kids to stop them re-offending while they were on bail. We'll 
you know what I mean, like interventions and support which we were supposed to 
discuss with the kids on those bail visits... Well, we used to save them up and try to 
get them all done as quickly as possible to save time and work Notthatwewere 
busy or anything wejust couldn't be arsed more than anything else. So we used to 
have competitions to see who'd get the most bail visits done in the shortest time 
possible. Geoffwas well infront withfour visits in an hour and a half .. So the 
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method was right, that we'd all compete to see who get the most done in the shortest 
possible time. Hence, the 'drive-bys. We'dplan our routes out and ring the kids 
and tell them to stand at the back or, front door, make sure there were no problems 
before we left the office, andjust tell them to wave to us as we drove by their houses. 
That was the bail visit. Fuckin'scandalous isn't it? Well, Geoffmanaged to getfour 
done in an hour and a haýfwhich was pretty amazing really. ButItoppedthat 
[gloating at Geoff, and places fingers in imaginary elastic braces and stretches them. 
Geoff laughs] I did six injifity minutes. And those were our bail visits with the 
hard, core young offenders in Sunderland. [Laughter fills the office] Fucking terrible 
isn't it? It's still the record though, never been beaten. 
Geoff: It'll never be beaten that bastard. I take my hat off to you son. It was a 
truly amazingfeat. It's no wonder magistrates'andyoungpeople think it's [BSS] a 
fuckingjoke. 
(Jack and Geoff. Fieldnotes, May 2000) 
A bail visit should have consisted of sitting down with the young person at 
home and discussing the issues of the young persons bail conditions. For example, if 
there were curfew conditions imposed on the young person's bail supervision and 
support was the young person managing to keep to those conditions? Often a 
condition of bail would be that he or she were not to leave their house between 20: 00 
hours and 08: 00 hours, the social worker (as Geoff was) or, a welfare officer (as Jack 
was) should have discussed this with the young person and his/her parent(s) if they 
were available. Issues, for example, of education, training, drug-use, peers, should 
also have been discussed if these had been recognised as being offence related risks. 
At times, as we have seen in the above statement this was not according to Jack and 
Geoff s description of a bail visit. On occasion, bail visits consisted of Jack winding 
down his window, as he crawled past the young persons home in his car and shouting 
to the young person, who would be stood at an open door or window 'All right then? 
Anyproblems, no? Good lad See you Wednesday then'. 
Perhaps the Audit Commission's (1996) stinging criticism of Youth Justice was 
correct in suggesting that the system for dealing with young offenders was expensive, 
inefficient, inconsistent and ineffective. According to Jack and Geoff and the method 
of drive-by bail support visits, it was quite clear that they shared the Audit 
Commission's opinion of the method of delivery on this aspect of the youth justice 
system. 
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The BSS Project, from a number of discussions and interviews with staff at the 
project, held little credence with its 'stakeholders'. Particularly with the courts in the 
town, bail supervision and support, had over time had failed to maintain its aim in 
providing the local magistrates, with a get ofjail option for the more troublesome 
young offenders located in the town. The courts were beginning to view the BSS 
project as a failure. 
Out With the Old & In With the New: A New Youth Justice Resolution 
The YJB identified three primary objectives for BSS to focus upon. First, was an 
objective to reduce re-offending while on bail. Second, was to reduce the delays 
caused by non-appearance in court. Third, was to reduce the unnecessary use of 
secure facilities for young people on remand (YJB, 200 1 c). 
From the onset of the evaluation of the project, it became clear that the speed of 
change and steadfast commitment by the YOS in the attainment of the YJB aims, that 
the statutory requirements of BSS would be problematic for all concerned at this 
project. The central issue for the YOS lay in how to implement the changes in bail 
support, (as it was previously named) to that of the statutory requirements of the YJB 
(section 38 Crime and Disorder Act 1998). The primary issues of staff dealing with 
BSS were how to do it, who's to do it, and why are we doing it? At this time in the 
'new' youth justice system, suspicion about the speed and delivery of an expansive 
array of changes was abundant. Youth justice staff, (as they were previously known), 
were concerned with increasing responsibilities and workloads (in an already over- 
worked and over-stressed environment) and many of these changes to the system 
were viewed with despondency and resentment. It also became clear to staff that the 
accountability of their work was on the increase. 
In 1998 the City of Sunderland, in partnership with Northumbria Probation 
Service, Northumbria Police and Sunderland Health Authority tendered an 
application to the Home Office for consideration for pilot status for the new youth 
justice reforms under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The bid was based upon the 
piloting, initially for the North Sunderland district, with the objective of incremental 
progression towards a pilot across the whole of the City Council area. The bid was 
accepted in June 1998 and the Sunderland Youth Offending Service commenced the 
pilot in October 1998. 
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The Integrated Bail and Remand ProJect of the Sunderland Youth Offending 
Service set out to fully integrate the various elements of the bail and remand support 
services. The aim was to strengthen the identified weaknesses of the range of 
services that existed at that time. The project had since enhanced its previous 
resources, by building on the multi-agency partnerships already in place, as part of a 
comprehensive Youth Offending Service structure. 
The bid was successful in attracting a total of E680,000 Youth Justice Board 
funding, tapering over a period of three years until 31 March 2002. The initial bid 
application for the funding of the project, for the period April 1999 to March 2000 
totalled 060,374. The release of funds occurred with two annual payments of 
f 180,187. Due to problems of recruitment encountered by the service over the first 
twelve months of its implementation, a financial forecast predicted that an under- 
spend of the funding during that financial period was imminent. An agreement 
between the Youth Justice Board and the Sunderland Youth Offending Service, one 
payment of f 180,187, would be commensurate to the BSS Project for the financial 
period April 1999 to March 2000. 
The shortfall in spending resulted in a revised figure in the Youth Justice 
Board's funding in comparison to the accepted final bid. This revised figure totals 
f 500,187 in comparison to the accepted bid offer of f 680,374 for the period April 
1999 to March 2002 (ibid. ). The vast proportion of funding was directed towards a 
variety of posts. 
The BSS Prqject staffing and structural arrangements were an integrated service 
of the Sunderland YOS and also referred young people to the Community Supervision 
Team at the YOS. They would assist with professional advice regarding, health, 
probation, education, police, social services and housing. 
Table Five 
Funding of Project 
Funding 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 Total 
Y. JB f 180,187 f 220,000 f 100,000 f500,187 
Local f 542,970 f 542,970 f 542,970 f 1629,910 
Authority 
Pro. ject Total f 723,157 f 762,970 f 642,970 f2,129,097 
(Source: City of Sunderland Chiel'Executive's Office, 2000) 
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The intended aim was to allow the service to operate a seamless transition 
between the core elements of a remand strategy. BSS targeted those young people 
perceived to be at risk of a custodial remand and of being remanded into local 
authority accommodation (Sunderland YOS, 1999). As has been suggested at an 
earlier stage of this chapter, much of what the new legislation aimed for reflected 
many of the aims and objectives of the previous BSS Project. It perhaps could have 
been expected that the transition would be a smooth one, in order to meet the 
legislation of the C&D Act 1998. 
It became evident that the previous 'bail support project' which had been 
operating since 1991, had been run aground and left floundering. In attempting to 
gain background knowledge of the earlier data and knowledge of the earlier project, 
issues relating to the management, monitoring and the day to day running of the 
project began to be unearthed. It didn't make for a pretty sight. I found evidence of 
4 miscalculations' of numbers, who had 'actually' been on bail support during specific 
periods. I came to the conclusion that 'exaggerated claims' relating to the numbers of 
young people who were recorded as coming onto bail supervision and support, had 
been reported back to the local authority Social Services Dept and also to the Audit 
Commission (1996). The then manager Andy also told me when I raised concerns 
that during one year during the 1990s, there appeared to be an 'under-record' of bail 
support episodes: 
Look you can only do thejob with the tools that you have at hand During 
[year omitted] we had a lot ofproblems and I dare say you're right in suggesting that 
things weren't being recorded in any meaningful or systematic manner or method I 
recall thatfor about a period ofnine months in [year omitted] much ofthe details we 
should have recorded relating to bail supponjust weren't done. 
(Interview: Andy, February 2000) 
It came down to pragmatic issues of staff being unable to complete the job at 
hand, of competing priorities within a highly pressurised employment vocation and of 
workers whose role it was to deliver BSS and record the inputs and outcomes, failing 
to do so. Observations yielded more insights into the problems in delivering BSS and 
recording its successes or otherwise with the 'tools at hand'. The 'tool' in this case 
was a social worker whose responsibility it was to deliver bail support and provide 
the data relating to it, back to the then local authority controlled Youth Justice 
System. 
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Geoff. She [the social worker responsible] was hopeless. She wasforever off on 
the sick or taking time off to look after her sick mother. You know what's she's like! 
She's as scatty as a scolded cat, and leaving her to run and record thingsfor a 
couple ofyears was pretty irresponsible wasn't it? But worse than that, she got away 
with it! As I've said before things were very different back then because we weren't 
accountablefor much. 
The previous project appeared to reflect many of the scathing criticisms offered 
by earlier audits of the youth justice system (Audit Commission, 1996,1997). With 
the emerging trend for a strategy of youth justice managerialism (Newburn, 1998; 
2002) it was clear that the project was going to struggle in hitting the aims of the new 
system. The new re-vamped youth justice system, as legislated by the C&D Act 
1998, would be stacking the odds against the new BSS Project in meeting the changes 
that were afoot. The new legislation of the 1998 Act was one thing, delivering it 
would be another. From observations it became evident that bail support workers had 
received a great deal of autonomy in their previous working practices. They were 
suspicious and resentftil of the changes within youth justice encroaching upon their 
customary youth justice practices. Suspicion and resentment evolved, mainly due to 
the lack of consultation as to how these changes would affect their professional 
outlook and working practices within the new system. 
It took the BSS Project some time to re-launch it-self. I'd reported key areas of 
the evaluation, back to the management at the YOS and the project. A 're-launch' 
was organised, a seminar format with buffet and state of the art presentation tools (a 
flip chart) were organised by the new project manager for defence solicitors, 
magistrates and clerks to thejustices, who were invited to attend. A number of 
defence solicitors attended. Despite my earlier focus group with the magistrates and 
the consensus from them was that they needed more information about BSS. The 
project needed to 'sell' itself to them. No one from the courts in the area attended, 
despite assurances from the courts that there had been a great deal of interest about 
the forthcoming presentation. As to why one of the main stakeholders to the project's 
outcomes had failed to participate, I was told: 
George: It really doesn't surprise me Rob. The magistrates' in Sunderland are 
an obnoxious lot. They've known that this has been arrangedfor about six weeks 
now and to be honest they're an uneducated bunch andfucking lazy with it. It's the 
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clerks who make the decisions at court, not the beaks. Generally, they haven't got a 
bastard clue and aren't interested as they're only in itfor their own kudos. 
Norm: That's probably afair comment George but, the date was all-wrong as 
well. Everyone knew that England was playing last night but not Dopey [Lydia, the 
manager] there. They [the magistrates] couldn't have been arsed when thefootball 
was on. 
Back to Court: Trying to Keep the Customers Satisfied 
The issue of training for magistrates, particularly during this period of time that the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 implemented a number of new youth justice strategies, 
aimed at responding to concerns about youth crime and disorder, is of importance. As 
has been pointed to in Parker, Sumner and Jarvis's study of magistrates: 
This training, through the local clerks, is sufficient to give 
them an outline of their functions, the objectives of sentencing 
and the role of law for use in their functions, the objectives of 
sentencing and the role of law for use in their local court but it 
does not involve any substantial relearning nor does it look 
beyond the parochial, beyond local traditions and handed- 
down ways of doing justice. 
(1989: 171) 
The Report of Lord Justice Auld which examined the role of magistrates (in (s) 
91 to 100 of Chp. 4 on Magistrates' Training) argued that magistrates' training 'has 
been criticised by those making submissions to the Review as haphazard and lacking 
in structure' (2002: 159). This leads to the claim that Magistrates' Courts Committees 
have failed to deliver quality training to the lay Justices in their areas. However, the 
response to the consultation, on the Review of the Criminal Courts of England and 
Wales, by the chairmen of the benches in Northumbria (of which the Sunderland 
Courts' are a part of) was one of offence to that statement relating to their 'poor level 
and quality of training': 
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Colleagues felt offended that they were not to be trusted as 
potential sentencers at this level. Training for justices is of 
a very high standard and a structured, rational decision 
making approach to their work is well established. 
(Auld 2001: 159) 
Magistrates (at the present time) remain 'lay-people' and perhaps the failure of 
magistrates to attend the organized BSS training seminar, to tackle the problem of 
'educating' the magistrates of the 'merits' of BSS, is rooted in their 'lay-role'. Either 
that, or perhaps as Norm suggested earlier, the timing was all wrong, as the England 
matchwasonTV. What is clear is that the BSS Project decided to sell the re- 
packaged BSS Project to the magistrates. Notice was given, invitations were sent out 
and no magistrates attended. England won the match 2-1 in front of a full house of 
spectators. 
Magistrates are lay people, predominantly middle-aged, 
middle class and highly respectable. They are, in the main, 
intelligent and sensible people who, in their own domestic, 
professional or business lives, would insist on applying rules 
like consistency, accountability and financial management. 
Yet, as magistrates they collectively become something else. 
They put on the mask and play in role and become highly 
selective in which parts of their life-experienced 'selves' they 
employ when acting as magistrates. Their socialization, their 
training and the absorption of the magistrates' ideology 
defines where and how the selection is made. 
(Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 1981: 171) 
Throughout the duration of the field research, and in a number of interim 
evaluation reports to Nacro, it was reported that the credence of the project with 
magistrates was at an all-time low. It has been suggested that the '... indicators are 
that schemes [projects] need to undertake a cycle of promotional activity which 
includes joint training with magistrates and solicitors... (Nacro, 2002b: 36). The 
YOS and its BSS project, to their credit, did attempt to improve this through 
negotiation, 'packaging' and information for the courts in the area. However, there 
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was little enthusiasm by the magistrates or Clerks of the courts, for the 're-branding' 
(from 'Bail Support' to 'Bail Supervision') or the 're-packaging' of the 'old' project 
to its advertised and intended improved 'new' strategy. Similar to the re-packaging 
and re-advertising of 'now improved' washing powders promising 'whiter than white' 
it just didn't wash with the magistrates. A promotional training seminar was 
organised by the BSS Project. The solicitors came, the magistrates didn't. There 
existed a long-ingrained and discordant culture at the courts in the area, in dealing 
with young offenders, particularly with those who were referred to the BSS Project. It 
had been, and remained, a 'tough youth court' "(Pitts, 1990). 
The speed at which the changes were occurring within the system had left them 
out of their depths in understanding the many changes that were occurring within 
youthjustice: 
What do I know about bail supervision and support? To be honest not agreat 
deal really. I mean I'm aware that there is such a project and that we sometimes use 
thisfOryoungpeople but usually it will be the clerk [of the court] who will inform us 
what available options are open to us. Yes, we are influenced greatly by the clerk 
A major problem I think we all [magistrates] share is keeping on top ofthe 
changes that are occurring within the youthjustice system. The changes over the last 
two years have been monumental. I took leavefrom my post to look after my 
daughterfor two-years and when I came back I hardly knew what had happened. The 
whole system had been changed, with so many legislative changes and new 
programmes andprojects to deal with youngpeople in trouble, I couldn't keep pace 
withitall. The amount oftraining courses we are expected togo ontobeinformed 
about these changes has been unreal and I certainly can't attend all of them. 
Therefore, 171 admit, thatfor some ofthe new programmes we place young people 
under I haven't much of a clue about. 
(Magistrate: Interview, November 200 1) 
Doing Bail Supervision and Support 
In April 2000, the YJB published a range of national standards for the practice of youth 
justice in England and Wales (YJB 2000). Paragraph 6.3 and 6.4 of those national 
standards, refer to bail supervision and support, bail information and the assessment of 
19 See Chapter Five for an analysis of the local youth courts' use of custodial sentencing and remands to custody 
compared to regional and national statistics. 
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young people referred to those services. The guidance offered to YOTs for the 
provision of a standardised format that BSS was to be delivered as, failed to include 
details as to how BSS services were to be presented by the new youth justice system. 
The YJB stated that: 
(i) 63.1 Each YOT must ensure that there is local bail support and 
supervision provision and that all young offenders detained in police 
custody for production in court are referred to it. 
(ii) 64.1 YOT Managers must ensure the provision of a bail 
information service at each youth court in its area. It must provide 
factual verified information including Bail Asset to the Crown 
Prosecution Service. This is to enable the CPS to assess whether there 
is information that would enable them to ask the court to remand a 
young offender on bail rather than to secure facilities, and to provide 
access to any bail support and supervision scheme. 
(YJB: 2000) 
This rather vague initial description by the YJB (Thomas, 2004, Thomas and 
Hucklesby, 2002) of what BSS was expected to 'do', and as to how Youth Offending 
Teams/Services were to implement it, may have affected the strategic planning of the 
service. It can be argued that this demonstrates the 'piece-meal' approach of the YJB 
in its implementation and management of the new youth justice system in its early 
stages of development. 
Bail Supervision and Support is defined as the provision of services, which 
encompass 'intervention' and 'support', modelled to assist young people awaiting trial 
or sentence (Thomas and Hucklesby, 2002: 41). The central aim of BSS is to assist 
those young people referred to it to successfully complete their periods of bail within 
the conununity. In providing specifically designed services of support and supervision 
that matched the circumstances of the young person placed onto BSS, the alleged 
offence they were arrested for and the grounds for the refusal of bail (Thomas and 
Goldman, 2001) BSS was intended to tackle the 'risk factors' associated with offending 
(see, Farrington, 1996). On the one hand, BSS is a 'needs' and 'welfare' based criminal 
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justice package of interventions. Aimed at supporting the young person while on bail 
within his or her community, whereas the alternative options open to courts often 
consider remanding young people into custody or local authority accommodation. On 
the other hand, it is also a 'justice' model of supervision directed towards the control of 
young offenders. 
In many ways BSS is a paradox. It aims to be a child focused welfare and a 
'needs' orientated regime. Yet at the same time, it enforces rigorous bail conditions, 
intended to control those young people placed under its authority. BSS has three 
principal aims that demonstrate, or at least suggest, the constitution of a form state 
sponsored social control. The central (national2o) aims of BSS are: 
1. To reduce custodial remands 
2. Increase attendance and reduce non-attendance at court 
3. Reduce offending on bail 
Entry to the Sunderland Bail Supervision and Support Project 
The local aims of the Sunderland BSS Project went somewhat further in attempting to 
protect the interests of young people in the town, in danger of being remanded. 
Referral and entry to the service operated at a number of levels. A summary of these 
entry levels and selected target groups of young people to this project were: 
" Those young people who the CPS were objecting to bail 
" Those young people at risk of being remanded into custody and/or remanded to 
local authority accommodation 
Those young people who had been remanded to custody or local authority 
accommodation as a'remand rescue'Package in which to deploy BSS as an 
intervention to offer BSS to 'rescue' remanded young people 
9 Those young people identified as persistent young offenders (PYOs) and suitable 
for the Intensive Supervision and Surveillance Programme (ISSp)21 
The 'national' and 'local' aims of Bail supervision and Support were intrinsically the same. However, 
at the local level of BSS Projects would often have a further number of similarly related 'welfare' 
orientated aims for BSS. For example, the Sunderland project also aimed to 'prevent young people 
being remanded into local authority accommodation' be this 'secure' or local care homes. This was 
widely accepted by the projects long-standing social work ideology and ethos to be detrimental to 
young people to be placed outside of the 'family' environment. 
21 The ISSP project went live, in September 2001. 
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Those young people who were suspected of committing a single very serious 
offence 
The BSS Project endeavoured to submit bail information to magistrates at a 
young person's first pre-trial hearing. The project also attempted to ensure that it was 
kept informed by the courts of young people who had been refused police bail, as 
they were awaiting their initial appearance before the magistrates and were held in 
custody at the cells at the magistrates' court. This would usually occur in situations 
where a young person had been refused police bail, following arrest and had been 
detained by the police and then presented at the first available court appearance. 
Here as we have seen in Chapter Four, the role of the 'appropriate adult' in informing 
the local BSS, project becomes an intrinsic factor. AAs provide vital information and 
support to the local BSS project about the detention and impending court appearance 
of young people following arrest. It was also not uncommon for the police to 'forget' 
that young people were being detained by the police overnight, intended for 
appearance at court the following morning. 
For example, on more than one occasion, despite early morning phone calls to 
each of the police stations (these phone conversations usually involved talking with 
the respective Custody Officers at each of the local police stations) in the town. The 
BSS Project would enquire as to whether the police had juveniles detained in the 
cells. The police would occasionally 'forget', 'misplaced' or would 'not know' if 
juveniles were locked up a few feet away from them. On one occasion Geoff 
returned from the court after being surprised that two young people had been 
transported to the local court from a police station in the town, after being detained 
overnight with the BSS Project being unaware of the situation. 
Geoff. George, I thought you said we had no young people locked up overnight 
and waiting to be dealt with at court this morning? 
George: Aye, that's right. I rang all the stations this morning at quarter to nine 
and they all told me they had no-bodies detained and waitingfor court. Why? 
Geoff- I gets there (court] and I'm told that Peter Sorkeld and Billy Pearce 
[known young offenders] are being held in the cells at court and had been detained 
overnight at the Bridge [police station]. 
George: That Sergeant Lawes is afucking wanker. I rang him this morning 
and asked him ifthey had anyone for us. "at a thick-headed bastard he is. How 
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thefuck does he not know that he's got two youngpeople in his cells? He's got shit 
for brains that twat. 
(George and Geoff: Fieldnotes, January 2002). 
On occasions the safety net relating to tracking and catching of young offenders 
would have gaping holes in it. While held at the court in cells awaiting their pre-trial 
hearing for their suspected offences, the BSS Project would go into action. In such 
instances the young people would be interviewed by BSS staff, bail information was 
provided to the young people and magistrates at the related initial hearing. This had 
been a particularly useful method, when applied at 'adult' magistrate court hearings of 
young people suspected of criminal offences. 
The BSS project made a concerted effort to ensure that at all youth courts and 
magistrates court hearings that court duty officers were present at these hearings. The 
aim of this objective was intended to rescue young people who may have slipped 
through the net, in terms of not being identified as potential remand cases. For all 
young people who attended court hearings 'Bail AsseV22 forms were completed, and 
where considered appropriate, bail supervision would be offered. As a welfare- 
orientated intervention, the project made stringent attempts to address the issue of 
'slippages' of young people who could be under the threat of a remand episode. 
The Remand Management Trail 
On the following page a flowchart diagram following the pathways and protocols in 
remand and bail decision-making process is provided. The aim of this flow chart is 
to simplify the readers understanding of a quite complex area of the youth j usticc 
system.. This area of the youth justice is compounded by a variety of interlocking 
protocols that are required to be considered within the remand management process. 
I have attempted to simplify the information within the following diagram. However, 
the flow chart does remain somewhat complicated and thus mirrors this particular 
area of law, youth justice policy and practice. As a guiding tool for understanding the 
remand management protocols undertaken in the pre-trial process, it should be noted 
on the diagram the bolder the font of interconnecting passage lines, into distinct 
22 'Bail Asset' Forms were used systematically to record important details relating to the young people who 
might benefit from being placed onto BSS. Ile form records details of the young persons suitability for 
bail, current legal status, risk and need associated factors, issues relating to known incidents of self-harm by 
the young person, and their current accomniodation issues. 
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Diagram Two 
The Flow of Youth Justice Bail and Remand Decisions 
1 --" 
Abbreviations used on diagram 
Proposal not accepted 
Proposal accepted Y= Yes 
BSS = Bail Supervision and Support 
PO = Probation Officer 
YOS = Youth Offending Service 
SW =Social Worker 
L. A = Local Authority 
Y. P = Young Person 
The aim of the above diagram is intended to simplify the reader's 
understanding of the flow of court's decisions relating to the remand process for 
young people within the youth justice system. However, as can be seen in the above 
bail and remand flow chart, the routine is complex, with many inter-twining youth 
justice decisions and interventions to be considered relating to issues such as gender 
(girls are not sent to prison although they can be remanded into secure 
accommodation), and age (only boys over the age of 15 can be remanded into YOls 
[prisons) or remand centre). 
Likewise, issues such as a young person's level of vulnerability and the 
threats posed by young people to public safety also have to be considered at key 
stages of this process. Within the protocols of the youth justice system relating to bail 
and remand decisions, the 'types' of young people entering the system have to meet 
certain criteria to be placed onto certain youth justice interventions. I do not intend to 
explain in any meaningful manner these processes, as there is not the space or scope 
within this thesis to consider such a complicated issue. However, let me suggest that 
these interlocking areas are distinct interventions within the youthJustice system and 
it would take an expert to explain in substantive detail each distinct area ofto its full 
and foremost understanding. 
Instead, I'll allow Norm (who was an expert practitioner in these matters) to 
explain the above flow system, and fundamentally this relates to the decision-making 
as to who comes onto BSS. Norm, during the early weeks of my entrance into the 
youth justice system, assisted me when I began designing this flow chart, to help me 
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understand the bail process. He allowed me to tape his discussion of it (which I 
considered might be useful in terms of getting to grips with some distinct areas within 
the system). Norm, as was his manner, explains it on a 'need to know' basis. 
Norm: Right, see the left-hand side of the chart? That's where you want to be 
within the decision makingprocesses ifyou've been a bad lad, 'cause that's the least 
that can happen to you when you get remanded on bail by the courts. Left-hand side 
and bottom box, that's it, Remand on Unconditional or Conditional Bail, that's when 
you've been up at court, and it might befor a minor offence or something you've 
done that might not warrant any causefor major concern to public safety ... stuff like 
that. That's where you'd want to be at this stage ofthe youthjustice process. You 
might get some conditions slapped on your bail, but that's the least ofyour worries 
because ifyou start sliding over to the right hand side ofthe chart you're basically 
slippingfurther into the shit in the youthjustice system, over on that right-hand side. 
Where you don't want to be is in the bottom box on the bottom right. 
Basically, you'refucked ifyou're in there, andyou've been remanded into custody. 
That'sfor the bad-lads and usually, not always, but usually, once you've gone over to 
that side you're gan tae [going to] keep sliding back over to that side of the system 
and end up right up to your neck in the soft and smelly, [basically, in the shit]. 
The box next to Remand on Unconditional or Conditional Bail on the bottom 
left-hand side, in there, that's it, that's being Remanded into Local Authority 
Accommodation, which are local care homes. Most ofthe kids who get remanded in 
there, Id say eight or, nine out ofevery ten cases who get remanded by the courts 
into care, those happen because their parents wont have them back home. They've 
just given in really, sick oftheir kids acting up, getting in trouble andjust throw the 
towel in and sayfuck it, you [local authority/YOS] take over, I can't do it anymore. 
In getting remanded into there is now when you start to hit the slippery slope and 
pickupspeed. You're awayfrom home, which must be bad enoughfor the most part, 
andyou're in with other kids who are known offenders. Although places like the 
Tower do there best, it's not really equipped in dealing with some ofthe offenders 
who get sent up there. 
The next box to it, Remand to Secure Accommodation, you're in the sticky end 
now bonny lad You're not consideredfit to be out in the community, and this is the 
haýf-wqy house before prisonfor young offenders. It's not as bad as prison because 
they're more structuredfor the needs ofyoungpeople and run by social services, but 
you're in the shit anyway. Thing is, for your information, this don't happen that 
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much in Sunderland because the magistrates usually, ninety per cent of the time, send 
the lads straight to the big-house [prison]. We call remands into secure 
accommodation 'secure beds'and the problem is, notjust here, but up and down the 
country, there's not enough secure beds to go roundfor the amount ofkids that get 
locked up. So in most cases it's off to prison you go. 
That last box, the Remand into Custody one, this is right in at the shitty end, 
well I've already toldyou about that one. That's the naughtyfarm and in there things 
often goftom bad to worsefor young offenders. 
Between coming into the system at the top box, the Bail Decision, that's where 
it all starts with the decisions the court's make. Ifyou're coming in there what you 
really want, whether you're a lad or a lass, is to stay asfar to the left as possible of 
all those routes in the chart that can be taken, hopefully the magistrates will keep you 
to the left hand side. Ifyou start veering right there's a chance that bail support 
[BSS] might have to come in and make plans on trying to rescue youftom being sent 
into care [Remand to Local Authority Accommodation (RLAA) or worse, a secure 
bed [Secure Accommodation (SA)] and much worse, a remand into custody (RIC). 
The clearest way to basically understand it is, in a scoring system with 
number one at the lowest end ofpre-trial punishment and numberfive at the highest 
end of it. So, number one would be being remanded on unconditional or conditional 
bail, two remanded onto bail support, three would be remanded to local authority 
accommodation, four, a secure bed and afive, in custody. It's as simple as that in 
weighing it all up. 
We try to use bail support as a youthjustice safety net to ward offthe 
possibility of being remanded [RiLAA, SA and RIC]. There's a load ofdecisions get 
made in the mean time with the courts, police, CPS, YOS, bail suppor? 
3, parents, all 
jockeyingfor position in how best to deal with the situation. And within that, there 
are also decisions to consider like, will there be any secure beds ifwe pushfor that 
because we think the bench might want a remand or, do we go for a remand to local 
authority because we think that they wont let him or her come onto bail support? All 
of that stuffhas to be weighed up at court. 
(Norm, Interview and demonstration: December 1999) 
23 Despite the re- naming and re-branding of the intervention to 'bail supervision and suppore most of the 
'old-guard'of workers continued to call it 'bad support'. Old habits diehard and cultures take even longer 
to transform. 
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Norm's working description provides the basic details of some of the 'pros' 
and 'cons' from within the youth justice and relating to the issue of court bail 
decisions for young people. It is now that we will turn to the youth justice 
intervention of bail supervision and support as a welfare orientated mediation to 
rescue those young people who are at risk of being sent to care homes, secure beds 
and, 'right in at the shitty end' by being sent to the naughty farm. 
In attempting to rescue young people from a range of possible remand 
scenarios (custody, local authority secure accommodation or local care homes) BSS 
will attempt to persuade the courts that it can offer community based bail supervision, 
to stop young people from re-offending while awaiting trial. On entry to the BSS 
Project individually tailored packages of intervention were assessed for each young 
person. The following chart provides details of the range and intended level of 
intervention of the BSS Project. 
Chart One 
Interventions and Level of Supervision and Support 
OCounselling 
13 Monitoring of 
bail/remand conditions 
N Compliance with court 
orders 
S Health 
0 Leisure activities 
13 Assistance with 
education, training or 
employment 
OAccommodatlon 
0 Support for court 
proceedings 
0 Support to young person 
and family 
(I -3 Equates to Degree of Intervention Intensity of Intervention) 
Referral and entry to the service operated at a number of levels. A surnmary of 
those entry levels and selected target groups of young people are: 
IC-1 
INTENSIVE INTERMEDIATE BASE 
* Those young people who the CPS are objecting to bail 
9 Those young people at risk of being remanded into custody and/or remanded to 
local authority accommodation 
e Those young people who have been remanded to custody or local authority 
accommodation as a'remand rescue'package to BSS 
9 Those young people identified as persistent young offenders (PYOs) and suitable 
for the Intensive Supervision and Surveillance Progranune, (ISSP) 
Those young people who are suspected of committing a single very serious 
offence 
The core elements of BSS intervention are as follows: 
Basis of participation: for each young person accepted onto the BSS Project, a 
contract stating the conditions of bail was formulated. The young person signed, 
agreeing to adhere to the imposed conditions and level of participation expected. An 
'Action Plan' was designed to meet the needs of the young person after consultation 
with the young person and her/his parent(s)/carer(s). 
Attendance required: a minimum of three contact meetings per week for each 
young person were arranged and set as a bail condition. These contacts took place 
either at the young person's bail address or at the BSS office. Again, although a 
minimum of three appointments per week were standard, the programme attendance 
could be, and were on occasion increased for those young people it was considered 
would benefit, regarding individual 'risk' and 'need' factors, from an increased 
attendance requirement. 
Hours of attendance: the project did not set specific contractual hourly 
requirements. This aspect of bail supervision was negotiated, judged by the young 
person and a BSO, on an individually merited perspective. BSOs arranged 
appointment visits to young people's bail addresses, which varied between 
approximately ten minutes to one hour in length. Initially the project did not register 
the amount of time the BSOs spent with their individual or aggregate casework. 
However, towards the end of the research the project began to record the amount of 
time and content of the bail visits conducted by BSOs. For arranged contact visits by 
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young people to the project, the approximate length of time while attending BSS 
appointments varied between thirty minutes and one hour. 
Intensity: The project designed individually packaged programmes of bail 
supervision and support, based upon the 'need' and 'risk' associated with young 
people referred to the service. At its most intense level of support and supervision, 
specific packages had been implemented to deal with areas associated with re- 
offending whilst on bail. At the base scale of intensity, three meetings per week were 
arranged with young people and BSOs. Bail conditions were stipulated and any 
concerns regarding areas of risk and need could be discussed and monitored. 
As a part of the Sunderland YOS, the BSS project also engaged with local 
partners in dealing with its targeted group of young people. These agencies, 
organisations and individuals would be referred to when considered appropriate. The 
following diagram provides an overview of the agencies the project would refer to the 
project. 
Diagram Three 
Multi-Agency Approach of the BSS Project. 
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This provides a clear indication of the 'risk' (risk of re-offending, risk of 
being remanded) and 'need' (of accommodation, education, health, Social work 
services of intervention) related factors in delivering bail supervision and support. In 
theory this appears to be a somewhat comprehensive and holistic approach in dealing 
with the most pressing problems associated with youth offending. However, in 
practice these partnership approaches often struggled to entwine in order to produce 
the intended aims (Crawford, 1998). Elsie, the Health Representative seconded by the 
local YOS (Elsie was a District Nurse from the area) highlighted the issue of the inter- 
agency strategy being displaced by the realities of practice. 
R. H: You've been in postfor ahoutfourteen months now haven't you? How 
many referrals have you had during that timefrom the bail support projectfor young 
people they've been dealing with? 
Elsie: None, absolutely none. I reallyfeel that the BSS Project is avoiding or 
ignorant to the health issues with the youngpeople on bail support. Ijustfeel that 
those who are supposed to address this matter [BSOs] just aren't qualified due to a 
lack of training to address the health issues ofthe young offenders they deal with. So 
here is another chance to engage with excludedyoung people that is being missed or 
avoided. 
(Elsie: Interview, Feb. 2002) 
As Elsie points out, the causes for those policy to practice fragmentation's are 
located within the wider sphere of issues relating to significant organisational 
shortcomings such as training (or the lack of it) of the newly recruited staff in 
recognising key areas which have been identified with a range of incorporated factors 
associated with youth offending (Pitts, 2001 a; Smith 2003). 
A range of other structural contexts and young people's relationships to them 
also impacted upon the potential of success for this multi-agency approach. A range 
of social exclusionary issues were evident for the young people who came onto BSS. 
The majority were, in the main, excluded from mainstream education and lived in 
families were the main sources of income came from benefits. They lived in areas of 
the city where child poverty rates ranged from 26 to 60 per cent of the local ward 
youth Population (National Statistics, 2002; City of Sunderland, 2001) where issues of 
teenage pregnancy rates were high (Selman, 2001), poor diet was the norm rather than 
the exception and alcohol abuse within the city made its cirrhosis of the liver rate 
double that of the national average (Arunachalam, 2003). The young people who 
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came onto BSS were, as a matter of course, from the most socially and economically 
deprived backgrounds and areas from within the city (Goldson, 1999,2000; Pitts, 
2001b). The aim in retaining a criminal justice strategy with a variety of welfare- 
orientated approaches in dealing with a variety of recognised causes related to young 
people's offending behaviour were intended to come by way of that the multi-agency 
approach (Crime and Disorder Act, 1998; Social Exclusion Unit, 1999). However, as 
Elsie described it, it appeared that the multi-agency strategy could fail in its objective 
of this approach due to, in this instance, a lack of clearly defined protocols and 
pathways within inter-agency activities (Pearson et al. 1992; Crawford, 1998). At 
times the 'joined up approach' in dealing with a holistic welfare orientated approach 
in dealing with young offenders just did not fully integrate that multi-agency and 
multi-focused ethos in dealing with the target group. As Crawford (1998) suggests 
the strains and tensions within these criminal justice multi-agency approaches despite 
the holistic and 'joined-up thinking' (Social Exclusion Unit, 2000; Clarke, 2002) are a 
process of complex organisational negotiations and at times competing organisational 
cultures, which: 
In other words, partnerships not only bring all the benefits offered 
by the inclusion of each partner, but are accompanied by the internal 
disputes and conflicts that sometimes rage within organisations. 
This can occur at an interpersonal as well as at a more structural 
level. 
(Crawford 1998: 181). 
Here lies an important aspect of understanding the methods employed within the 
youthjustice system in tackling youth offending. The immense issues that often 
accompanied those young offenders and the agencies, whose roles are to address 
identified risk and need factors that often are associated with adolescent offending 
behaviour don't quite connect into the promoted 'seamless transition'. For Elsie, the 
trail of causes of offending went far deeper into territories of the family, of culture 
and perhaps of ignorance in obtaining the 'basics' offered for 'free' by the State. For 
Elsie some people: 
Just don't get it, which isfine ofcourse because they're adults ... But when this 
affects their kids, and I mean who would do such a thing to their kids in not accessing 
basic medical treatment, the problem deepens. Whatyou then have are youngpeople 
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living their lives thinking that health doesn't matter and they remain uneducated and 
many ofthese kids will, in the not to distantfuture, be having their own [children] 
who, ifthe past is anything to go by, will take after their parents view ofhealth issues. 
Can you see where I'm going with this? This town is one ofthe sickest in the UK and 
in some quarters its difficult not to put this down to a cultural trait. 
Things Can Only Get Better 
It was not until October 2001 that Nacro Cymru and the YJB produced the finalised 
version of 'National Standardsfor Youth Justice'. This guide to bail supervision and 
support was produced for YOTs and their practitioners, to standardise the national 
delivery of this highly relevant aspect of the youth justice systeM24. Indeed, it was not 
until 13th November 2000 that the YJB informed the BSS Projects, that the YJB in 
partnership with Nacro, were developing national standards for BSS to produce 
guidelines for 'good practice' and to provide training for project workers. 
(Wamer/YJB, 2000). The BSS Project I was evaluating had by October 2001 been 
operating under joint YJB and local authority funding for over two-years at this point. 
By March 2001 in England and Wales 109 (97%) BSS Projects' were being funded by 
the YJB. At this point in time, the YJB had to yet produce a set of formal 
standardised guidelines for the implementation and organisation of BSS (Nacro 
Cymru, 2002b: 4). 
As we shall see later in this chapter, bail supervision and support as a 
Government sponsored programme within the youth justice system was hastily 
implemented, organised and supervised during its initial stages of operation. BSS was 
put into practice hot on the heels of a wide variety of youth justice initiatives that 
occurred during the same period of time. This entailed a number of over-bearing 
challenges not only to the YJB, but also to local YOTs that were responsible for the 
new youth justice system within their local areas. 
BSS, at this stage of its implementation and delivery, took on the appearance of 
a 'on the hoof proj ect-poorly managed (at the central level) and untested in any 
comprehensive manner. Indeed, it was time to 'suck it and see, as to whether, or not, 
BSS could attain its intended aims and objectives. By November 2000, it had become 
apparent to the YJB, that BSS at the national level was incurring a number of 
24 In May 2001 the YJB published 'Draft Practice Guidance to Accompany National Standards for Bail Supervision 
and Support'. However, this document was viewed as a 'work in progress draft document'. The final version of 
National Standards for Bail Supervision & Support was not published until October 200 1. 
166 
problems at the practice level. Lord Warner, the Chair of the YJB, contacted all the 
YOTs/YOS in England and Wales to voice his concerns regarding 
The Youth Justice Board is becoming increasingly aware that 
the quality of provision and use of bail supervision and 
support projects across England and Wales is 
variable ....... Whilst there are areas that demonstrate effective 
practice there are many others where there is still some way to 
go in achieving an acceptable standard despite the funding the 
Youth Justice Board has made available for bail supervision 
and support schemes. We must work together to ensure that 
young people are not locked up who could be offered bail 
supervision and support and that remands to custody and 
secure accommodation are kept to the essential minimum. 
(Wamer/YJB, 13 th November 2000. Own emphasis added) 
Problems had begun to emerge and all was not well with bail supervision and 
support at the national level of implementation and delivery. The YJB highlighted a 
number of focal concerns relating to the delivery of BSS25 . They were as 
(highlighted) follows: 
'Delayed Implementation 1: That at this time, despite fiinding being released, 
nationally 17% of the projects had not 'gone live. This had occurred due to the speed 
of change in implementing YOTs, the range of programmes, including bail 
supervision and support, on the back of the Crime & Disorder Act 1998 in re-shaping 
the delivery of the youth justice system. The main concern was centred upon the 
issue that bail supervision and support was now a statutory requirement under the 
1998 Act. In England and Wales 17% of local authorities had not met that statutory 
requirement. 
'Distracted Staff: There were major concems by the YJB that staff recruited to B SS 
and paid for by YJB funding were undertaking other youth justice work, that was not 
specified in their bid to the YJB. For example, in writing pre-sentence reports, which 
25 All of the concerns below were highlighted in the same letter to YOU See Warner/YJB, 13'h November 2000. 
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was not there role to do, was viewed by the YJB as 'unacceptable practice' in 
diverting them away from developing and promoting bail supervision and support. At 
the Sunderland project there was evidence of this malpractice. Vic had been recruited 
under a bid to the YJB for funding, as an educational worker at the BSS Project. Her 
role was to design and deliver an educational package to young people, who were on 
BSS and were without mainstream education (this was the majority as most had been 
excluded or had just stopped going to school). 
The YJB invested a substantial sum of money for this much-needed role. 
Despite Lord Warner's warning relating to this 'unacceptable practice' (ibid. ), the 
education programme never got off the ground. It became a standing joke between 
Vic and my self. 
R. H: How many lessons have you delivered today Vic? 
Vic: None as usual, I've been sat on my arse at court all day as court duty 
officer. Loads ofyoung people in dire need ofsome basic education, and no education 
to give them. 
(Vic: Fieldnotes, April 2002) 
My own experiences, in talking with and observing the young people who came 
onto BSS, were that they were generally very poorly educated in terms of 'academic' 
ability and credentials (see for example, Robins and Hill, 1966; West and Farrington, 
1973; Kolvin et al., 1990; Maguin and Loeber, 1996). Many were illiterate and it 
would be more than reasonable to speculate that, by the time these young people 
reached official school leaving age, there would be few who came away with any 
formal qualifications. Despite the inter-agency and partnership approaches in dealing 
with the 'holistic' picture in dealing with offending related 'risk' factors (education 
being at the top end of those factors), disparity in how to apply interventions across 
the multi-agency approach was a common occurrence. Attempts to steer young people 
back into mainstream and/or specialised education the failures, or at least the 
disappointments, far outweighed the successes. Mark aged sixteen and regarded as 
one of Sunderland's most prolific young offenders, told me: 
Every school that I've been to I've been kicked out of There was nowt they 
could with me. I was pure rotten. Telling the teachers toJuck off, just walking round 
the corridors smokingjoints, doing buckets [a more potent method of smoking 
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marijuana/cannabis resin]26 in the toilets and all that, so they kicked me out. And I'm 
just hanging around with the older kids who didn't garn tae school, See, my mates 
were all a canny bit older than me, fifteen, sixteen and seventeen most of them. So 
they're all on the streets getting pissed, stoned and taking cowies [ecstasy] and I'm 
around them and it wasJun, so Ijoin in don't LI mean you cant tell me what I was 
doing wasn't a lot morefun than gannin' tae school? I haven't really done any 
proper schooling now since I was eleven or twelve. 
(Interview: January 2002) 
Truancy and expulsion from (and rejection oO schooling have long been 
recognised as perhaps one of the most common causal associations that can be 
attached to deviance and crime for young people (West and Farrington, 1973,1977; 
Farrington, 1996). The failure to fully address young people's educational 
disassociation has also been recognised as an important element of young people's 
continued, and often escalating involvement in criminal behaviour (Farrington, 1990; 
MacDonald, 1997; Ball and Connelly, 2000). A number of studies have clearly stated 
that for those young people who don't attend school the possibility of continued levels 
of involvement in crime are strong and may worsen over time (Cavadino, 1994; 
Hagell and Newburn, 1996; Audit Commission, 1996). Research has also found that 
the role of the youth justice sytem in tackling this well known youth offending risk 
factor was largely ignored at key stages of the youth justice process (Ball and 
Connelly, 2000) and that 'many youth justice workers seem to distance themselves 
26 A Tucket' or 'Lung' as they are also referred to, consists of a large two litre plastic bottle (often a 
coke/lemonade type of plastic bottle). The very bottom of the bottle is cut off and a bucket is fined with 
cold water. If a bucket isn't available, 'bucket heads' (a term applied to those who use this method of 
smoking marijuana were often referred to as), will use a larger three litre plastic bottle with the top cut off 
so that the smaller bottle can be inserted into the neck of the larger bottle and then filled with water. 
VVhatever receptacle is used, for example a larger bottle or bucket, this is filled with water. 'ne next stage 
of the process usually involves making a 'chilm'. This is a gauze, usually made from tin foil, and holds the 
cannabis resin during the lighting and smoking process. The chilm is placed over the top of the bottle and 
wrapped tightly over the lip of the bottle-neck to secure it in place. 
A pin is then used to make numerous small holes (of indiscriminate number) to let the smoke 
from the burning cannabis rise upwards from the partially submerged bottle within its water holding vessel 
(the bucket or larger bottle). The force and vacuum effect from the cannabis holding dissected bottle 
being plunged downwards into the water holding vessel drives die vacuumed energy upward intensely 
burning the contents within the chilm. 
Again, the water, the smoking bottle create a vacuum, of which the smoke from the cannabis 
slowly spirals upwards to the expectant bucket head who will suck inwards sharply from his or her mouth 
positioned just slightly above the bottle to inhale the intoxicating fumes. For a far more detailed 
ethnographic and intriguing insight and sociological analysis in the use of 'buckets' see Kate 013rien 
(forthcoming) 
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from the educational circumstances of young offenders' (ibid: 602). Such apathy was 
apparent from my own observations at the local BSS project. 
It was rarely the case that in bail supervision visits I observed and conversations 
between workers regarding new bail supervision applicants that the issue of education 
was raised as a priority or indeed a secondary topic of discussion. There appeared a 
general acceptance that the vast majority of young offenders were without education 
and that at this stage of the process there was little scope to tackle this somewhat 
significant (although it rarely appeared to be of significant concern to many of those 
in the BSS office) aspect of offending related risk. 
Many of the workers within the youth justice system are aware that their roles 
and interventions they offer in steering young people away from crime are often 
limited and that the new managerialism strategy (Newbum, 2002), with much of the 
emphasis placed onto supposedly improved monitoring and evaluation protocols 
which aimed to provide data as to 'what works' (YJB, 2002; Goldblatt and Lewis, 
1998), but also placing significant emphasis upon the accountability of the new 
system (YJB, 2000). Yet, as Dee suggested: 
The kids are just put on a pile, they really are, what their real needs are, 
obviously come secondary to what ... emm... resources you've got, what time you've 
got and what funding is available. Most of these kids are poor, we know that, you 
know that, not all but by and large, the vast majority are in desperate need for 
specialist, tailored education interventions which many of them, for whatever reasons, 
they're not receiving. 
(Interview, September 2001) 
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Exclusion and/or disassociation from mainstream education was the one variable 
that was an intrinsic factor with the majority of young people who came onto BSS. 
Whatever problems they brought to BSS assessment procedure, educational matters 
would be the most common factor involved that the majority had in common. This 
factor was so ingrained within the aggregate make-up of all 188 who came onto BSS 
that the project did not monitor, evaluate or analyse the 'education' factor to any 
substantive level. It was taken as a 'matter of fact' that these young people just didn't 
do schooling. In Gregg's (a BSO) opinion of the education situation. He suggested 
that: 'Nine times out often, as sure as the sun rises every morning, these kids don't and 
just won't go to school. I don't mean like playing the 'nick' [truancy], they are beyond 
that. Some of them haven't been for years. We place them into 'specialist' education 
programmes but often the kids just stop attending these as well. So what happens? 
They're on the street, too much time on their hands, no routines, no discipline and low 
and behold they carry-on offending'. 
Vic's 'revised' role within the project at this time was to sit in court and make 
assessments of young people and consider as to whether BSS should be offered to the 
court. This was not a run of the mill 'education package' for educationally disaffected 
young people in any shape or form. The education programme was in a dire straight 
before it was launched. This was due to internal wrangling between the local YOS, 
Vic, the local education authority, and the local YOS and BSS mismanagement of the 
situation. With no manager at the helm of the BSS Project, the newly intended 
intervention to improve the service the project's delivery of its newly realigned 
education aim and objectives sunk without a trace. 
Vic: They [YOS] had no idea how to implement and organise the education 
programmefor young people on bail support. To be honest Rob, in the early days, 
they didn't have afucking clue. 
So I set about trying to implement one and at every stage I was knocked back 
It became clear that the LEA were being initially obstructive and then they started 
to have a change ofheart in thinking that the minority ofthose young people [on 
BSS] who were still going to school but might be troublesome to teach... you know 
like the ones who were on the verge of exclusion... we would become the education 
dumpfor those young kids. 
Rather than work at keeping them in school they knew that we might have the 
education programme and would rather exclude the kids rather than work with 
them and I wasn't going to be party to that. 
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It's [the intended education package] been a monumentalfuck upfrom the 
start and we're still nofurtherforward. The management ofthe Youth Offending 
Service and at bail support has been absolutely pathetic. I'm sopissedof with it 
all that I'm not even bothered ifyou were to go back to them and tell what I've 
said, that's exactly how Ifeel about the situation. We've got kids coming onto bail 
support who are absolutely desperatefor intervention with their education, a role I 
was recruitedfor, and how many young people have I taught, none. 
(Vic: Interview June 200 1) 
A somewhat summarised statement of Vic's intended role with the BSS project 
can be offered as, 'the appointment of a specialist education officer [April 2000] to 
ensure the needs of young people are not neglected through bail and remand periods' 
(Hornsby, 2002). However, after two-years the intended BSS Education Programme 
had failed to deliver. In shoM it just didn't get off the ground. Yet the YJB funding 
continued to roll in for the Education Project and its Education Officer. Such neglect 
of a well-known contributory factor within the delivery of youth justice has been 
recognised elsewhere and termed as 'disparate agency responses' (Ball and Connelly, 
2000: 612). This however is not solely a localised issue, as in 1996 it was found that 80 
per cent of young offenders sentenced to supervision were without education or, had 
severe learning difficulties that impeded the learning process (ibid: 613). 
The interconnecting linkages between youth crime and education are now well 
established. Low educational attainment, often beginning at primary school, has some 
implications for later attachments to school (Downes, 1966). A number of longitudinal 
research studies have demonstrated that for children whose academic performance has 
been considered as 'below average' during the later years of primary school the 
association with crime increases (Robins and Hill, 1966; Elliot and Voss, 1974; Kolvin 
et al. 1990; Maguin and Loeber, 1996). For the majority of young people who came 
onto BSS it appeared that it was their perceptions and frustrations of the experience of 
'failure' at school which accelerated their disassociation (Downes, 1966) from 
mainstream education which by just hanging around and 'doing nothing' (Corrigan, 
1979) brought them into a subculture where the association to 'anti-social behaviour' 
and drug and alcohol use often became normalised routine activities (Gold, 1978; 
Farrington, 1991; Jessor, 1976). 
At the project a central issue remained. Bail Supervision and Support and the 
remand management for young people was a highly specialised programme of 
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intervention. New projects were being brought in, such as the intended education 
package and coupled alongside the BSS Project, with the intention of strengthening the 
overall remit of BSS. Thus, the internal and external organisational partnership 
wrangling relating to the planned education programme of intervention stalled and was 
eventually quashed. Despite all the academic evidence and practitioner savvy relating 
to the undeniable importance of education in turning round young people's offending 
behaviour, the local level delivery could not supply it. Indeed, as there was no direct 
BSS project Operations Manager to implement, oversee, and indeed, manage this 
complicated role it ran aground before it got the opportunity to be launched. As 
George, the 'line manager' told me one morning, particularly flustered with an ever 
increasing workload (and the stress that would often come with it): 
Belle thinks she's going to push the responsibility onto my shoulders to oversee 
the management of this project. Well I've got newsfor her. She canfuck right offl. 
It's not in my contract to run this project andfair enough I'm the immediate line 
managerfor much ofwhat goes on here but I am not thefucking project manager. If 
she [Belle] wants to give me thejob then I'll consider her offer. But ifshe thinks I'm 
going to do Andy'sjob [the now long-departed former manager of the project] for 
seven grand less a year than he was getting, she canfuck off WhatIamstupid? 
Have I got 'Silly Arse'stamped across myforehead Rob? 
This new youthjustice system has turned out to be afuckingfarce. We've got new 
staffstarting with projects that I haven't got a clue about and have no intention of 
sitting down and designing with the new starters, because Ijust haven't got the time. 
What thefuck do I know about setting up an Education Programme? Andy should 
have had all ofthis sorted out a long time ago and although I like the man he must of 
sat in that office and donefuck allfor the last two-months while he worked out his 
notice. 
The intra-agency conflicts appeared so deep-rooted and problematic that as time 
progressed, the atmosphere within the office and also at the YOS was thick with 
tension. Sickness increased and staff with over twenty year's service working in 
youth j ustice threw in the towel and left (in some instances not for other j obs, but by 
opting out of the system forever). As the research began winding down there was an 
influx of young fresh faced social woTk graduates, some obtaining relatively high 
supervisory positions and it was not to everyone's taste. 
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Geoff. It's an oldpolitical ploy this one. Drive out the older and more cynical 
troops, it doesn't matter about the years ofgraft, ofthat immensefucking experience 
ofunlimited skills and drop in somefreshfaced easily manipulated kids that willplay 
the game. Surroundyourselfwith ýes men'. That's what she's done. Time to watch 
yer backs lads. 
Despite a fresh drive in recruitment, the BSS project instead of recruiting was 
'side-tracking' one of its BSS Officers into other areas of the youthjustice process. 
Hilda was now mainly dealing with the Final Warning Programme, which had nothing 
to do with BSS. The YOS management tried to manipulate the situation, for example, 
I was told that this was 'just using its resources to best effect' as 'bail support is very 
quiet at the moment'. However, I felt that this did not carry too much weight in 
explaining as to why sixteen-thousand pounds of YJB funded money for BSS, was 
being spent on a worker intended to deliver bail supervision and was instead now 
being spent on Final Warnings. It should be noted that BSS was intended to 'reduce 
the remands into custody', not to deal with those young people who were considered 
to be in danger of entering the system, at its lowest forms of involvement, by way of 
issuing Final Warnings to those young people who would have previously got away 
with a caution. One thing was for sure, the YJB would not have viewed the situation 
as the project as 'just using its resources to best effect'. Indeed, the YJB got wind of 
such scenarios happening, on a frequent basis, right across the system in England and 
Wales. Letters were sent from the Board to all of the Youth Offending Services, 
insisting that the practice ceased. The Board stated that if found evidence of 
continued misappropriation of roles, funding could and would be stopped. Hilda was 
back delivering BSS in no time at all. 
Relations with YOTs/YOS 
The YJB were concerned that local YOT/YO S were regarding BSS as a 'peripheral 
activity' of YOT/YOS objectives. It was believed that this was more likely to occur, 
if project workers were isolated from the local YOT. It was generally found that 
many BSS workers were not fully integrated within the local YOTs and access to 
information the BSS workers required was not always available. 
The Sunderland project, although an 'integrated' aspect of the local YOS, 
possessing a relatively long operating history prior to YJB involvement, experienced a 
far more worrying aspect of the BSS Project's delivery. Without an immediate 
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manager at the project for well-over a year, newly recruited staff, and new legislation 
regarding the delivery of bail supervision and support, the BSS Project and its staff 
faced a multitude of problems. Indeed, when the project advertised positions for the 
newly created posts of 'Bail Supervision Officers' (A) and offered the posts to the 
'ideal candidates' all but one of the four, this being June, turned down the job offers. 
I could only speculate as to why this had happened. However, George suggested: 
To me it was obvious. First the money [wage] is terrible and these were very 
well qualified and experiencedpeople to take on the posts. Second, they all saw 
through us and could see that the project was ramshackle. In the end two ofthem 
were interrogating us [interview panel members] and I could tell that we'd been 
caughtout. There was only June who accepted thejob offer and I'm pleased about 
that because she is very smart. So, we then had go to the next ones we'd interviewed. 
Well to be honest with you they were the only other ones on the list, as we weren't 
inundated with applications. So, we were really scraping the bottom of the barrel, 
I don't mean to be rude, but they're not the smartest ofpeople are they? [Raps 
his fist upon the desk-to indicate 'density'] Look at Mikefor example, he's as thick 
as apiece offour-be-four. I bet the magistrates think 'what thefuck's this'when he 
stands up in court to offer bail support. 
(George: Interview, November 2000) 
Initially, it was clear that the attitudes of the longer established workers at the 
project and also at the YOS were far from hospitable to the new BSS Officers. 
Comments were made behind their backs, rooms would go quiet when they walked in, 
sarcastic skit would be directed at them, and vexed-eyes would be raised upward 
when they asked questions relating to the bail process. The newly appointed BSS 
Officers in the 'new' youth justice system were considered as untrained amateurs, as 
second-rate and annoying novices by the skilled 'professionals' within the local YOS. 
Indeed, the impression given was that the organisation had scraped the bottom of the 
barrel when they recruited this bunch of perceived unskilled misfits. Between the four 
new recruits taking on the role of Bail Support Officers (BSOs), there was little to no 
prior youth justice experience. 
It was difficult not to sympathise with the new recruits. The BSS Officers', like 
Vic the Education Officer, had been dropped right in 'it'. They were left, in the main, 
to tend and fend for themselves. When I left the field some two-years after they took 
their positions of employment, none had been trained in the fundamental aspects of 
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'bail' (for example, The Bail Act 1976). These were the youth justice workers, whose 
role it was stand up in court and argue the merits of 'bail' supervision and support and 
rescue the young people from potential secure remands. In terms of offering 
interventions to reduce the possibilities that the young people place on BSS might re- 
offend, It was clear to the newly recruited BSS Officers' that their intended roles 
within the local YOS, had not been thought through at the management level within 
the BSS Project. Grant, another of the new BSS Officer recruits, reinforced this. 
They recruited three of us as Bail Support Officers and didn't know what the 
hell to do with us. There was an existing Bail Support Project [as it was then known 
as] withfunding I believe that camefrom the Youth Justice Board to improve this 
service, but they didn't have a new Project in place. So we came in to do ajob with 
youngpeople at risk of being remanded, you know in at the sticky end, and there 
really wasn't a bail support project in place to do it. We had to sort ofdesign our 
own, or to be honest, make it up as we went along. There was very little guidance, 
little management input into designing the project. We still don't know ifwhat we are 
doing really works [approximately eighteen months after recruitment]. 
(Grant: Interview, August 200 1) 
And as Geoff told me: 
I suppose someone should have taken them all out to show them what we used to 
do. But then again we never really knew ifwhat we'd been doing all those years was 
'right'anyway. 
(Geoff. Interview, February 2002) 
These obvious organisational conflicts impeded the envisaged policy rhetoric. 
Instead the intended smooth, harmonious and seamless transition taking on board the 
new policy directives did not occur. The project stuttered and stammered its way 
along in incorporating the rhetoric of the new youth justice system. TheearlierBSS 
project had been hastily and somewhat shoddily cobbled together. This must not have 
been what was intended by the YJB emphasis on 'best practice'. As we have also 
seen in an earlier chapter the issue of 'evidence-based practice' (see Holdaway, 200 1: 
1) within the BSS office, by way of its monitoring procedures, also left a good deal to 
be desired in turning around many of the failings highlighted vAthin the previous 
system which appeared, to some significant extent, to have been culturally transmitted 
onto the new recruits. 
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Gregg: We were, Ifeel very much, left to our own devices as it were. To be 
honest, apartftom George, I don't think any of the other managers [at the local YOS], 
either at an equal level or at a senior level, actually knew what the Bail Support team 
did. There was no shadowing... no guidance... I was told to go out and do my best. 
Basically I built up the system mysetfand then when thefull-time staffcame in, I took 
the other three ofmy colleagues one at a time and showed them how I did it. 
Obviously over the two and a hatfyears or so, each one has built up their own 
methods of bail supervision. We may not all do it the same way. ... Infact ... really 
there's nofeedback whether we're doing it right or wrong. 
(Gregg: Interview, March 2002) 
Despite years of practice delivering BSS, nobody at the project had decided that 
a training programme was required for the new BSO recruits. In short, Gregg et al. 
had to turn up at young people's houses and deliver, what he thought might constitute 
a bail visit. At court, despite some training undertaken by the local YOS and some 
'shadowing' exercises for the new BSS Officers, by more experienced team members, 
the new recruits were poorly equipped to deal with this previously skilled role. The 
issue of the de-skilling of the new BSS workers' roles, inasmuch by definition of one 
of the longer serving social workers at the project was that: 
Yvette: The case is now that we've gotformer generic youth workers standing 
up in court without the skills to take on the magistrates, Clerks ofthe courts, the 
police and the CPS shows youjust howfar this system is sliding down the pan 
(Yvette: Fieldnotes, May 2000) 
However, as we have seen in earlier by way of Geoff and Jack's explanation of 
the 'drive-bys' it would be wrong to presume that all was well within the delivery of 
BSS in its previous context and methods of delivery. However, within the older and 
more established team (George, Geoff, Jack, Dee, Pam and Yvette) there was a 
consensus that the latest recruits, in the main, just didn't cut the mustard. 
Not Waving but Drowning ... and Tucked By Wanton Neglect Son' 
It was generally accepted at the BSS Office and within the local YOS, that the 
conditions of BSS work was being downgraded and also deskilled. Braverman 
(1974) has argued that routine white-collared work had become deskilled, to the 
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degree that it differed little from 'manual work' in its context. Whether, or not BSS 
had been de-skilled was difficult to assess. I wasn't there to make objective 
judgement on what had existed prior to the C&D Act 1998, in the delivery of BSS. 
However, when I attended court with Social Workers from the BSS project it was 
clear to me that they did, at least, appear more professional, more 'skilled', more 
competent in 'taking on' the courts' in arguing the case for BSS for young people. 
They were better educated, more experienced, knew the rules, the procedures, the 
culture of the courts. They were intrinsically aware of the important factors relating 
to bail for young people. They were also better 'read'. They were, for example, well 
versed in the Bail Act 1976, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the Young Persons 
and Children Act 1969, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. They knew their 
stuff'. 
The same was hardly true of the new BSS workers. Due to their lack of 
experience and training it was a somewhat embarrassing situation to observe. The 
new BSOs with their eagerness and guile, set about learning the ropes. The 'old- 
guard' of youthjustice workers made life difficult for them. They offered paltry 
advice, little guidance and this became all too evident in the BSOs initial stumbling, 
clumsy and ill-informed addresses to the courts in the observations I undertook of 
their work during youth court hearings. It was clearly evident to all of those within 
the B SS office that the 'old-guard' was unreceptive and uncooperative to the newly 
recruited BSOs. At times the hostility and sarcasm directed towards the new BSOs by 
some of the old guard was embarrassing to witness. Cold-shouldered and left to 'get 
on with it', the new recruits struggled in delivering this significant area of the youth 
justice system at its intended level of intervention for a considerable amount of time. 
However, the 'blame' of the current state of affairs relating to the project's 
standing within the local youth justice system, can not be laid at the feet of the new 
workers. BSS, over the years it had been operating in Sunderland, had been left to run 
its course without much consideration as to whether or not it was fulfilling its 
intended aims and objectives. 
The emphasis upon bail supervision and support, as a worthwhile intervention to 
reduce the remands into custody of young people, was intended as a counter-balance 
within system that had adopted a range of 'anti-child' themes (Goldson, 1999a, 2000a, 
2000b). As has been discussed in this chapter to this point the conflict between policy 
and practice, in delivering BSS at the ground level, was far more difficult than the 
civil servants and politicians would have imagined. Remands in custody of young 
178 
people in Sunderland remained relatively unchanged throughout the two and a half 
years of evaluation. 
Grant, a BSS Officer, reinforced the general opinions that were to be found 
within the project and its intended 'integrated' role within the local YOS. 
R. H: How do you view the project has developed over the last two and a half 
years Grant? 
Grant: Well to be completely honest, when wefirst came here it was a shambles, 
it was shit. Even now, and I've worked in a number ofvoluntary, you know voluntary 
(emphasises the point] organisations, this project is a mess. I mean, ifsomeonefrom 
a private sector organisation came into here they'd think it was a bloodyjoke. The 
level ofmanagement and strategy is terrible. When Ifirst came here, the other BSOs 
and my selrcame in and this project was supposed to have a history, it had been up 
and running since the early nineties I believe. It was in a terrible state. 
R. H: How difficult was thatfor you to get on with the job ofproviding bail 
support? 
Grant: Can I be metaphorical about it? It was ifwe were on a ship, and we've 
got to sail this ship somewhere, but nobody knows where it's supposed to be going 
and how we're going to get to this place that nobody knows where it is, and remember 
we're without a skipper. So then we get a captain, and the management still haven't 
got a clue. So we're like saying, 'Where are we going and how are we going to get 
there'? 'We don't know. 'Should we hoist a sail up then? ' 'Yeah, go on. Stick one 
up'. 'Well what type ofa sail do we use? I've got no idea-just stick something up - 
and we'll see how it goes'. 
It doesn'tfill you with confidence does it? That is what we we're dealing 
with when we came in here. As one ofmy colleagues at the pit [Grant was a coal- 
miner for a number of years] used to say, and I think this sums up the situation we 
were confronted with, and to a lesser degree we are stillfacing now, we're battling on 
but 'werefucked by wanton neglect, son'. 
(Interview: Grant, BSO, March 2002) 
It was clear that the project's development, implementation, maintenance and 
overall management had gone astray. This is not to suggest that the project did not 
'deliver'. The level of delivery of its aims and objectives often appeared 'piecemeal' 
and inasmuch at times it took on the appearance, from those back-spaces that I 
observed the daily rituals of delivering BSS. Of course, some great work was in fact 
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done. BSS would be applied successfully to the courts' and young people were 
rescued from the potential of being remanded into custody or local authority care. 
The BSS Officers tried to work closely with the young people placed onto BSS and 
their parents/carers. Services were referred to through the multi-agency approach for 
example, with education, drug use, employment training, leisure activities. 
Housing/accommodation issues were addressed and referred to, those particular 
agencies in order to deal with those pressing basic requirements that many of the 
young people placed onto BSS may have been socially excluded from. 
Summary 
This chapter has examined a number of areas that were brought to the forefront of this 
research in the legislation, policy and practice of bail support. As a form of social 
control directed to young offenders, there remained a precarious balance in dealing with 
troubled children in need of welfare orientated interventions. This was balanced against 
the imposition of restrictive bail conditions, in order to appease the local courts' that the 
young people could be maintained within their communities. 
The heralding by the YJB of Bail Supervision and Support as an intrinsic youth 
justice strategy in order to appease political concerns regarding young people re- 
offending while on bail, did little to explain the organisational difficulties that would be 
experienced by this BSS Project particularly in delivering this youthjustice system 
intervention. The long-standing organisational culture, which was transmitted from the 
earlier Youth Justice Service into the new YOS Bail Supervision and Support project, 
has been discussed. The problem of attaining its expected aims and objectives were 
firmly rooted in the differing expectations of a variety of stakeholders. From this 
situation, conflict and contradiction would rise and jeopardise the successful referral to 
and delivery of BSS. 
The organisational tensions experienced by the project in its development, no 
doubt affected the standing of the BSS Project as it was without a manager for over a 
year. New recruits weren't trained up, and the magistrates continued to lock up a 
disproportionate number of young people on remand. As one specific and specialist 
agency the BSS project certainly struggled within the multi-ag . ency approach. Here the 
tensions that existed not only intemally within the project but also externally with other 
key agencies (for example the local youth courts who were an intrinsic aspect of this 
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multi-agency approach, they were part of the court users group which brought together 
all those agencies who dealt with young people at court) certainly appeared somewhat 
disjointed and at times a paradox of the often heralded merits of partnership and multi- 
agency working. The experiences of this rolling transition of the local BSS project 
attempting utilise its operational aims to best effect within the multi-agency approach in 
delivering youthjustice encountered many obstacles. As an interconnected mechanism 
within the youthjustice machine, BSS encountered many areas of conflicting 
organisational interests, traditions and cultures within this organisational political 
system. As Liddle and Gelsthorpe suggest: 
Although terms such as 'inter-agency', 'co-operation' and 
'partnership' enjoy a wide currency in the crime prevention 
field, they tend to suggest that relations between agencies 
involved in multi-agency work are more straightforward than 
they usually are in practice. As participants in multi-agency 
work are usually quick to recognise, agencies having an 
interest in crime prevention seldom share the same priorities, 
working practices, definitions of the problem, power or 
resource base. 
(1994: 2) 
Following on from Liddle and Gelsthorpe's poignant statement, which 
relates to what happens when someone or something sticks a spoke in the wheels of 
the desired multi-agency process, the following section deals with a number of other 
interlocking agency approaches in delivering youth justice. In the following chapter 
we turn to the next stage of the BSS process. Here a discussion follows that 
examines what happens to young people when BSS has not been selected as a 
suitable intervention and the threat of a remand decision takes over the process. 
Despite the intention to provide a range of other remand rescue interventions for 
young people under threat of being 'sent away' to various institutions, the following 
chapter examines a range of difficulties in the 'remand management' aspect of the 
BSS project in providing such welfare-orientated youth justice resources. 
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Chapter Six 
Between A Rock and a Not as Hard Place: 
Alternative Resources to Locking Up Children on 
Remand 
Introduction 
This chapter examines a number of inter-related dilemmas in providing a range of 
interventions that attempt to maintain the equilibrium between the welfare and 
punishment of young offenders. The discussion that follows provides details of inter- 
related areas of youth justice provision to bail supervision and support. Here, the 
provision of local authority secure accommodation for young offenders, intending to 
offer a 'better' and more welfare focused alternative, to that of remanding young 
people into Young Offenders Institutions, is examined. 
This chapter argues that the relapse in the wider scale of youth justice issues 
relating to accommodation for the more troublesome of young offenders left young 
people vulnerable to the worst kind of remand scenarios. It was often the case that the 
local BSS Project and the magistrates were impotent to follow a welfare orientated 
protocol in dealing with those young people, due to widespread problems within the 
system of providing less stringent remand accommodation measures. 
Secure Accommodation 
Secure accommodation, in the provision of local authority secure units, is recognised 
as being a proactive resource in providing an intervention for assisting young people 
requiring professional care and standards in order to address and deal with offending 
behaviour. However, the expertise involved in dealing with these challenging young 
people comes at a price. 
Resources are also spread inequitably. Young offenders convicted 
of very serious offences may find themselves accommodated in 
local authority secure facilities at a cost to taxpayers of fl, 800 to 
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E3,500 a week while others are held in young offender 
institutions which the prison service estimate cost taxpayers E400 
to E600 a week. 
(Crime & Disorder Act, 1998: http: //www. homeoffice. gov. tik/does/ýcl3. html 
It is often recognised that from within the functioning of the system that the 
issue of remanding young people is often not weighted within a debate of 'what's 
best' for a young offender, but instead focuses upon a fiscal crises of 'what's 
cheapest' for the system (see Monaghan, 2000). As George at the BSS office 
explained this fiscal function of youth justice: 
Look there's no getting awayfrom it It'sfar cheaper to have the kids locked 
up in prison than it is in secure accommodation. The local authority has to buy, like 
lease bedsfrom other local authorities who have secure units. We got a billfor one of 
the young lads we dealt with and got a secure placement with another local authority, 
forfiftythousandpounds. That worked out at over three grand a weekfor aboutfour 
months he'd been remanded to that secure unit. The amount ofkids we have 
remanded into custody or, to local authority accommodation would bankrupt this 
local authority ifthey had to place them all in specialised secure units. 
R. H: I sort of think that you're trying to tell me that the local authority prefers, 
ftom a purelyfinancial perspective, that it would be cheaperfor them if the young 
people go to prison rather than secure accommodation? 
George: Theyjust couldn't afford to do it. Prison costs aboutfive hundred 
[pounds] a week and secure placements at local authority units cost between two and 
three grandper week You don't have to be an accountant to work it out, do you? The 
local authority has to work to a budget as well. 
(George: Interview, November, 2001) 
It is clear that in delivering youth justice the aspect of 'justice' becomes 
weighted against the economics involved in delivering it. This factor raises 
incredulous ideas relating to the youth justice system's rhetoric in dealing with young 
offenders and the potential of offering resources that, if not ideally suited in dealing 
with the outcomes of the harsher elements of the regime, at least offer a less severe 
and often damaging aspect of the youth justice system (Monaghan, 2000; Goldson, 
2002). Government plans which initially recommended that five extra secure training 
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centres for young offenders be built in order to alleviate the national shortage of 
secure accommodation unit placements were blocked by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in 2002. The YJB had proposed that an expansion programme of secure 
accommodation units increasing the current number by four hundred and fifty extra 
places. Despite the damning reports from the Chief Inspectorate of Prisons about the 
juvenile prison system, the director general of the Prison Service has directed that 
these extra places should be placed in "enhanced quality prison service provision" 
(Guardian, October, 2002: 1). Since 1998, three secure training centres have been 
built and although these have assisted in alleviating the problem they fall well short in 
providing highly sought after secure placements. As is discussed in the following 
section of this chapter, a range of inter-locking conflictual arrangements within the 
system can often be viewed as creating detrimental outcomes to young people 
engaged with the system. 
Johnny Too Bad: Up at Court Again and RealIy Up Against it 
On one occasion I had intended to attend the local magistrate's court for observation 
purposes. The primary aim was to observe the young people who were often to be 
found waiting around the corridors before going into court hearings. I wanted to 
record their mannerisms, clothing styles and general attitudes to the processes they 
were engaged with. It was at court that the 'group' could be located in larger 
numbers than usual. A lot of my time researching the young offenders would be on a 
one-to-one basis or, otherwise in small groups of three or fours. Court was the ideal 
place to observe on Tuesdays and Thursdays for these were the days in which the 
Sunderland Youth Court hearings took place, where the charvas and their families 
would be congregated (albeit this would hardly be by choice). It was an ideal place 
to assess the cultural disparity in terms of language, attitudes and style. The court was 
where the Charva population of Sunderland assembled en masse and caught up with 
eachother. It was also here that the youth justice system caught up with the town's 
young offenders. 
I bumped into June from the BSS project. She informed me that John-Jon 
was being held in the cells below the court and filled me in on the case. The initial 
reason for my attendance at court that day was abandoned there and then. I quickly 
decided that I could catch up with the initially planned aspect of the observation 
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process at a later date. John-Jon's court attendance was important to my research, as 
it was directly linked to the bail process at the police station (where John-Jon had 
been detained overnight); the court bail pre-trial hearing (how were the magistrates 
going to handle this particular case? ); and for the BSS process, in what it had to offer 
the magistrates if they considered a remand to custody? This was bail supervision and 
support at the front end of youth justice delivery. It was here that the conflict and 
contradiction involved within this aspect of the youth justice system would occur. 
What I wasn't prepared for, in the events that were to unfold relating to John-Jon, was 
a systems breakdown that involved a number of agencies within the youth justice 
system and ultimately impinged upon his right to bail and his freedom. 
John-Jon and his mother had been arrested and charged on suspicion of arson 
with intent to endanger life. John-Jon, at this time, was already placed onto BSS for a 
previous arrest for burglary. The latest charge against John-Jon and his mother was 
that there had been some long-standing hostility, between John-Jon, his mother and 
the next door neighbours. The previous evening the police had been called to the 
neighbour's house, after a report was made by the tenants that someone had fire- 
bombed their front door. 
A week earlier someone (presumably, the neighbours in question) had lobbed 
a brick through John-Jon's mother's front window. John-Jon and his offending were 
beginning to feel the heat of some summary community justice. The neighbours 
blamed John-Jon and his mother for trying to bum their house down, as an act of 
retaliation from the previous week's house-brick incident. The 'victims' were 
outraged. They had kids asleep upstairs and someone could have died. John-Jon and 
his mother were arrested, questioned by the police, charged, denied police bail and 
held overnight until the first available court hearing the next morning. 
For June from BSS the aim was to try to get John-Jon into the care of the local 
authority. It was clear that John-Jon was in danger of being remanded into custody 
by the magistrates, due to the seriousness of the charge against him. Bail for John- 
Jon diddt look as if it was going to be an option, as the CPS was objecting to John- 
Jon being released on bail. His mother was also facing a similar outcome, but that 
was a secondary concern of BSS as it is the welfare of the child that is the main 
priority. This could be obtained by a number of potential avenues including a remand 
to secure accommodation placement, a remand into local authority care or remand 
foster carers, anything but a remand into custody were John-Jon's and the BSS 
project's objectives. 
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In discussions between defence and CPS lawyers it was clear that neither of 
the suspects were going back home. It was considered too dangerous, as tempers on 
the estate, relating to the arson attempt on a family home had ignited a general 
loathing of the alleged culprits. The courts' are entitled to remand a young person 
either to custody or local authority secure accommodation (also known as court 
ordered secure remands), to local authority accommodation if it is believed to be 
necessary, in order to protect that young person. Both defendants needed suitable 
bail addresses for bail to be granted by the magistrates and that address would have to 
be well away from the area where the offence was alleged to have been committed. 
Both defendants solicitors (in cases where the defendants are co-accused they are not 
permitted to have the same solicitor as this may raise conflicts of interest) darted off 
to the holding cells for consultation with their clients. 
The only available bail address for both defendants was John-Jon's eighteen 
year-old sister, who lived with her young child over the other side of town, which the 
magistrates would accept as suitable as it was more than four miles away from the 
site of the alleged offence. The magistrates informed John-Jon's solicitor that they 
believed this address to be anunsuitable'bail address for John-Jon. It was however, 
deemed suitable for John-Jorfs mother. The magistrates accepted it and John-JoWs 
mother was bailed to that address with conditions. She was free to go leaving her 
fifteen-year old son, at the mercy of the local YOS in what it could offer the 
magistrates and also how they would view what was on offer to them. June and I 
weren't privy to the discussion between the magistrates, regarding this decision 
although she was outraged suggesting that 'they [magistrates] couldn't give a shit 
about that boy's wetfare'. The options were running out for John-Jon. 
John-Jon's solicitor went down to the cells to inform him that his mother had 
snatched the sister's address from his grasp. We followed him down after he had 
finished his brief consultation with John-Jon. We met on the stairwell to the cells. 
June: How Is he taking the news? 
Solicitor: Not very well I'm afraid. He's very upset. His mother'sjust been 
released Can you believe that she'd do that to her own son? I'm sure she could 
havefound another address to putforwardfor bail. 
June: Nothing surprises me with Sharon [John-Jon's mother] 
Solicitor: We're still left with the problem ofwhat we can offer the 
magistrates. 
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June: I'vejust rung the YOS to see ifwe canfind him some secure 
accommodation, but the chances are there won't be any. We can always hope we get 
lucky. 
Solicitor: The bench is going to lookfor something along those lines. Things 
are quite tense on his street and I doubt the magistrates will even consider a remand 
into local authority accommodation, as I've been told by the police that people are 
outlookingforthelad So the chances of us getting him put into care are pretty 
limited. No chance ofBail Supervision now either with his mother out ofthe 
picture 27 . It's looking like a remand in custodyfor 
him ifhe doesn't get a secure 
[accommodation] place. 
June: I'mjust waiting to hear backfrom the YOS, It should only be about ten 
minutes and 171 letyou know as soon as I know. We'd better get down there and see 
how he's doing. I'll speak with you shortly. 
As June and I continued down the stairwell she said to me, 'Poor little sod 
hasn't got a chance ofgetting a secure placement Don't let on mind Rob, because I'll 
have to let him think that he might have a chance'. June let John-Jon know that she 
was trying everything in her power to try and find him some alternative 
accommodation, including secure accommodation in order to prevent him being 
remanded into custody. The court was in adjournment and June and I left a tearful 
and somewhat distressed John-Jon in his cell in order to make some last ditch 
attempts to avoid John-Jon being sent away on a remand into custody. 
The court session resumed after the short adjournment. John-Jon was brought 
up to the dock and stood beside a security guard. John-Jon looked extremely 
anxious. June approached him and told him to remain calm, " "atever you do John 
don't lose it, because it will only make matters worsefor you" she advised him. He 
was now fully aware of what was going to happen to him. The magistrates arrived, 
and questions were asked about the secure accommodation issue. They were 
informed that there were no available places within any of the secure units in England 
and Wales. Over my shoulder I could see John-Jon starting to panic. His eyes were 
shifting wildly to anyone in the court who would hold his stare. He started rocking 
from side to side and was talking quietly to himself. The security guard moved a 
little closer to his side. The magistrates' and the clerk to the justices huddled briefly 
27 For BSS to be considered as a bad condition it is imperative that the young person has a suitable bail address with a 
legal guardian. With Sharon, John-Jon's mother, now out of the frame due to her suspected involvement in this crime 
and with no other relative willing or able to offer John-Jon a bail address the options availablc to him and BSS were 
rapidly declining. 
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for a last minute check of the legislation. John-Jon was remanded into custody for 
three weeks until the police and CPS could gather the facts and evidence relating to 
the case. John-Jon was being sent on his way to a regional YOL 
John-Jon: [frantic] Ahfuck offyou bastards! This isn't right! I'vefuckin'done 
nowt. Ah-naw, haway man! Fuckin'hell... June! 
John-Jon started to flit around the dock like a moth around a light bulb. There 
was nowhere for him to go of course, as the security guard and a ten-foot high 
Perspex screen prevented his panic turning into an escape attempt. The security 
guard restrained John-Jon by holding his arm and handcuffing him, while telling him 
to keep quiet. June left her seat and made for John-Jon in the dock directly behind us 
and told him to calm down. The magistrates were not happy. 
Magistrate #2: Young man, ifyou continue with this I will, do you hear me, I 
will sendyou downfor contempt. Calm yourselfand listen to what has to be said in 
this Court. Another outburstfrom you andyou willfindyourseýf injar more trouble 
than you currentlyfindyoursey'in. Do you understand me? 
If the magistrate, in his concerns regarding John-Jon's behaviour, had any 
understanding of John-Jon's view of the situation he might have understood his 
reaction. For John-Jon the situation really couldn't have got any worse. He had 
calmed somewhat since his panic stricken outburst and placidly, John-Jon nodded in 
agreement. The magistrates' could have been far harder on him considering his 
contemptuous outburst, but then again, perhaps they could empathise with this young 
man's fear of the situation he was facing. 
I returned to the cells with June. John-Jon was locked in a cell waiting at the 
door for us to return and appeared panic stricken. He was sobbing and looked 
desperate. June was visibly shaken and upset for him. Even though I had worked 
with both of them before in differing capacities, I looked and behaved like an 
embarrassed stranger. Like someone who was looking in on a personal situation 
which they shoulddt have been privy to. Stood in front of me was a very edgy and 
frightened young man and there was absolutely nothing I could do to assist him. 
The cell door remained locked and the conversation took place through the Judas 
windov? 8 of the cell. 
28 Judas window/hatch is the observation flap positioned at head height on prison/policc/court cell doors and they can 
only be opened or closed externally. 
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June: I'm sorry John we've tried everything and there's nowhere that can 
takeyou. There's not a secure accommodation placement in the whole ofEngland or 
Wales and with you included there are six Young people waitingfor a place. 
John-Jon: [Distressed again] They cannut send me to Castleton June, I'm 
fucked ifI get sent there. There's kids in there whofucking hate me and will get me 
ifIgothere. Please June, please, get them to put me into local authority care 
[despite all the evidence pointing to the contrary John-Jon was still clinging to the 
desperate hope that he wouldn't be remanded into custody]. Ohjuck man, fuck! IfI 
get sent to Castleton I'mfucking dead. 
June: John, there's no way the magistrates are going to let you go to the 
Tower and I'm in agreement with them on this one. There are people where you live 
who are talking about doing damage to you John-Jon and I'm not prepared to take 
that risk 
John-Jon: [Now increasingly agitated and is pacing the cell floor] Fucking 
damage, damage? Not as much damage as what I going to get up at Castleton You 
fucking bitch. You're sending me down! I can't believe you're doing this to me. 
First me Mam, the cunt, now you! Youjucking bitch! At least ifl'm out on the 
streets I've got somewhere to run. I'mfucked in Castleton. There's nowhere to run 
when I'm in that bastard. Fuck.... juck ... fuck! 
John-Jon was glaring at June, his fists clenched knuckle-white, and then he 
started sobbing again. June in her calm and professional manner ignored John-J&s 
personal slur against her. 
June: Look John, I need to go and speak with the office and then your 
solicitor and let him know what the situation is... 
She stopped mid-sentence as John-Jon swiftly pulled a waistband drawstring 
from his tracksuit top and screamed at June, "Paint going tofuckin' Castleton. You 
can allfuck ofj7" He wrapped the drawstring round his neck in a makeshift ligature 
and pulled at both ends of the string. June screamed for a security guard. A guard 
sprinted down the short corridor, his rubber-soled boots squealing on the tiled floor of 
the cell-block. June was shouting in a panic at John-Jon to stop. I stood and 
watched, frozen. I'd seen something similar to this before in my dealings with John- 
Jon (see Chapter Four), but this appeared as somewhat worse and far more serious 
than the previous self-harm escapade I had seen him undertake. The security guard 
unlocked the door and was in the cell in a flash. 
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guard unravelled the string from John-Joes neck two thin white parallel welts began 
to rise from his now rouge neck. He was sobbing again. The guard doubled checked 
John-Jon with a pat-down [search] and asked him to sit down on the bed in the cell. 
"Are you ok? " he asked. John-Jon nodded his tear tracked head. June entered the cell 
and sat beside John-Jon and placed her arm around him, "John, I know you're upset 
and things are looking desperate to you, but thisjust isn't worth it because one day 
you'll take it toofar and really hurtyoursetf " The guard and the drawstring left the 
cell and June was asked to keep an eye on him. I decided to walk with the guard, so 
that John-Jon could have some personal space away from my prying eyes and ears. 
'I've got a load of bloodypaper work to do now because ofhIs silly arse 
game'remarked the guard. He then decided to return to John-Jorfs cell but first 
placed the drawstring in a draw on his table. "He's too much ofa risk to leave with 
his cell door open, even ifsomeone is in there with him. Ifhe sees a chance to do a 
runner hell take it and I'm not going to give him the opportuniv'. Heaboutturned 
and returned to the cell with a somewhat bewildered researcher in tow. We waited by 
the door and he had the keys in his hand ready to lock up John-Jon once more after 
June had finished tying to placate him. June picked this up as a signal to leave the 
cell. She left the cell and the guard locked the door. The Judas flap was left open. 
June asked me to stay at John-Jon's cell door'to keep an eye on him and try and cheer 
him up', while she went out of the cells to an office in the court to make some phone 
calls. The security guard nodded in agreement. This went beyond anything I'd read 
about social research. In terms of participant observation techniques and suicide 
watches this went beyond the pale. I stayed. 
June had informed me of this case and had invited me along to observe the 
procedures. Despite the shocks I encountered I was grateful to her. At no point did 
John-Jon question my role. He told me in an interview conducted sometime later that 
during my observations of him at court on this particular occasion, V thought you 
were a trainee or something like that with the project ýI stood outside his cell door 
and he was sat on the concrete bed. It was an awkward situation to be in and I was 
clumsy in my effort. 
R. H: Are you okay mate? 
John-Jon: Not really, no. I'm notjoking when I say that I'm going to get my 
fuckin'head kicked right in at Castleton. I owe money to some ofthem in there and 
some ofthe others hate my guts. I've never been in prison before and I'm shileing 
mesel'. 
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R. H.: Look John, I know June will let the staff up at Castleton know that 
you're vulnerable. The prison officers up there will keep an eye on you and look after 
you. 
I did know that after the self-hann incident John-Jon would be 'flagged up' on 
his travel documents to the YOI, as an 'at risk of self-harm' inmate and that the Prison 
Service would have to maintain observations of him. John-Jon is by no means 
exceptional in his attempts to injure himself while in the care of the youth justice 
system. High numbers of incidents of self-harm occur and since 1990 at least 63 
young people under the age of 21 have taken their lives while in prison on remand 
(Inquest, 2002). John-Jon then repeated his earlier statement about'having nowhere 
to run to inside prisod. 
John-Jon: June'sfucking sent me down the bitch. 
R. H: Whoa John-Jon! I've been around June all morning and she's bent over 
backwards to get the best resultfor you. You really shouldn't call her like that, 
because she's upset about all ofthis, as wellyou know. She really has tried 
everything available to her not to get you remanded to Castleton. You can't stay in 
Sunderland because you haven't got a bail address and the magistrates won't even 
consider a remand into a local care home. Her hands are tied Try not to be so hard 
onher. She really tried her bestfor you. 
John-Jon diddt view the situation in this way. To John-Jon the world and his 
neighbour (particularly John-Jon's neighbours) were out to get him. Parker's (1974) 
study of 'The Boys' found that their understanding of their relationships with 
authority, were grounded in an understanding of conspiracy in which their "distrust of 
it are centred around an embittered and perhaps occasionally exaggerated sense of 
injustice" (169). For John-Jon, it is fair to suggest from my observations, that his 
feeling of a conspiracy by those in authority around him, perhaps not at a 'personal 
level'but at the structural level, were well founded. The systems failure found within 
this particular case study highlight the negative consequences that can occur within 
the youth justice system. And despite the court's right to remand him for his own 
protection, the magistrates certainly didn't explain this as a critical element in the 
decision making process. Ideally, in such a situation it would be expected that the 
young person should be remanded into secure local authority accommodation, but as 
was usually the case in Sunderland this type of remand decision rarely occurred. 
For John-Jon, the events that had unfolded for him during the last twenty-four 
hours would have certainly assisted him in is re-collection of a'memory file that 
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collected and understood those injustices' (Matza, 1964: 102; Parker, 1974: 169). 
After all, the youth justice system was dealing with a fifteen year-old boy whose 
understanding of the term 'justice' would have been limited. From his arrest and 
over night detention at the police station (where he should have been accommodated 
in local authority accommodation); the failure of the local authority in which to 
provide secure remand for him (which it is legally obliged to do so); the lack of 
remand foster placements (the local YOS/BSS Project had none); the magistrates for 
taking the interests of the co-accused-John-Jon's mother-before the interests of the 
child (they may have argued it was in his best interests); his mother, in John-Jon's 
terms, for being a'cunt'and leaving him high and dry (a matter of opinion-but 
perhaps-one that John Jon was entitled to). John-Jon had received a raw deal from 
the youth justice system. In many ways, knowing of John-Jon's history he had 
generally received a raw deal in his short life and one that continued to deliver rum 
deals to him. 
John-Jon: Aye, I know that really, June's good to me, but everyone's let us 
fucking down man. Me Mam, shejustfucked offwithout a word and then June's 
saying that there are no placesfor me in secure accommodation so I'm going to have 
to go to prison. How come the court won't let me stay at our Mandy's and then say 
it's okfor me Mani to go there? Oh, fucking hell! Finfucked man. 
R. H: John, I don't know why your Mam got your Mandy's bail address and 
you never. I can't explain that. But I know that there was only one secure bed in the 
whole ofthe country andfive people waitingfor it and unfortunately mate you were 
the last one on that list offive. 777ey've got nowhere to sendyou. But, they'll look 
after you up at Castleton, I mean like, watch outfor you. Everything will be alright. 
I had no idea that this would be the case. In fact, much of what I'd read and 
understood regarding the experiences of vulnerable young people on remand 
conferred with John-Jon that he might be in for a rough emotional and physical ride 
whilst being remanded (Howard League, 1995). 
John-Jon: How long will The up therefor? Three fucking weeks and then I'll 
probably get sent back there again, cos there's no wherefor me to go. I'll get no 
visitsfrom anyone and me Mam won't be bothered to come and see me. 
R. H: Look John, I'll come up and see you in a couple ofdays and I'm sure 
June will also come up to Castleton to see how things are going. Infact I know she 
will. 
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John-Jon: Will you really come and see me? 'Cos I'll get no visitors you 
know. Me Mam won't travel to see me and there's no one else really since our Mandy 
[sister] had the bairn [baby/child]. 
R. H: Ipromise I'll be up to see you in the next couple ofdays. OK? 
John-Jon: Thanks. 
This in it self may have been beyond the call of duty for the social researcher. 
It will also raise questions of the objectivity and impartiality of my role. However, it 
was hard not to be concerned or, to care about what this young man was 
experiencing. He'd never been to prison before, as those agencies involved in the 
youth justice system, whose interest was primarily focused upon the welfare of the 
child, had previously managed to avoid John-Jon being remanded to prison. This 
time the options had run out. I believed that a prison visit to see John-Jon would be 
the right and proper thing to do. Not as aTriend'but, as someone who cared about 
the social injustices he faced. And also, in a self-interested fashion, I could view the 
remand situation, tracking the remand processes encountered by John-Jon from 
behind the walls and the experiences encountered by him of prison. 
My promise to John-Jon never materialised. I'd forgotten about my summer 
holiday (I can only blame this oversight on the nature of the observations I'd been 
privy to that morning) which was due to start in two days time in a sunnier and what I 
hoped to be a less depressing climate. I only realised that evening when I was 
reminded that 'the cases needed lifting out from under the bed. Howdifferentthe 
life of the researcher, to that of the participants. John-Jon had never been on holiday 
in his life. I had also let him down. Where John-Jon was due to go he would be 
arriving empty handed, with just the clothes on his back and whatever he had in his 
pockets. 
On her return to the cell, he instructed June to contact his Mother, to pack up 
some clothes for him and to send some money for his stay while being remanded. 
June agreed and told him she'd bring these up to Castleton in the next few days. I 
told John-Jon to keep his chin up when he got to Castleton, not to look weak, and to 
keep his head up and be proud. I was quite aware that in confined spaces such as 
prison those looking scared and/or weak can be targeted. I reiterated that I'd see him 
soon and said fair-well to him through the flap in his cell. I left June to finish off. As 
I got to the secure exit door and signed myself out, while waiting to exit, I turned 
round and could see June, her arm through the window of John-Jon's cell-hatch, 
obviously trying to comfort John-Jon again. 
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I left the court angry and upset. This couldn't be right. Why the magistrate's 
chose the mother over the son for the bail address was never accounted for. It may 
have been that they may have believed that Mandy was not a suitable adult to 
supervise John-Jon at this bail address, although that was never expressed in the 
court. It may have been that the mob on the Uphill Estate believed John-Jon to be the 
main culprit in the arson attempt. After all he was a young offender, and the 
magistrates' believed the address not to be as safe for him as it would be for Sharon, 
his mother. But again, there was no clear reference made to this made to John-Jon by 
the magistrates. It could have been that the magistrates were now sick of seeing him 
up in front of them and that John-Jon had now run out of chances. 
June was needed elsewhere in the courts' to carry on the business of bail 
support. I'd had enough and decided this was the time in which to return to the office 
to write up my field-notes. As I walked across the town from the magistrates' courts' 
towards the BSS office I saw John-Jon's mother, in the company of another woman 
and a man leaving one of the town centre pubs. All had had a good drink and were 
well under the influence, talking loudly and laughing as they entered another pub. 
They were obviously celebrating Sharon's good fortune. John-Jon wasn't so lucky 
A Catalogue of Injustice 
The Criminal Justice Act 1991 recommended that provisions were to be made for the 
abolition of prison remands for children. However as Goldson argues: 
... in so doing it appeared to signal real progress to those who 
had 
consistently raised concerns about the practice of remanding 
children in prisons for the best part of the previous twenty years. 
Although the provisions of the 1991 act have never been 
implemented, few people could have anticipated what was to 
follow. A radical and reactionary shift in public mood and political 
priorities served to dampen their optimism. In the ten years that 
have succeeded the 1991 act, the practice of remanding children in 
prisons has not only endured but has been substantially extended. 
The most recent legislation, the criminal justice and police act 2001 
opens the floodgates: a further massive increase in the numbers of 
children remanded to locked institutions is certain. 
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(Goldson, 2002: 16) 
The concerns relating to the remanding of young people into prison runs through 
political, public and practitioners debates about the unnecessary harm remands inflict 
upon many (although perhaps not all) young people sent away on remand to prisons. 
Goldson study of young prisoners provides evidence of these concerns. 
They're not guilty of anything necessarily, it isn't an appropriate 
place for them, not at that age. 
(Prison Officer, Quoted in Goldson, 2002: 76) 
We cannot guarantee their safety if we are honest. We fulfil a 
function for society I suppose, in holding them until the courts' 
decide what they want to do, but in honesty, we do a very limited 
job. 
(Senior Prison Officer: ibid) 
It is clear that the remanding of young people into custody remains high on 
the agenda of an ongoing crisis within the youthjustice system. It is also evident that 
successive governments have failed to seriously address the problem in any 
meaningful manner in which to tackle this issue. The United Kingdom has of late 
received its second censure, from the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (2002) for failing to uphold the principles and standards of the UN Convention, 
particularly in relation to children involved with the criminal justice system. Article 
40 stipulates that children held in custody have the right to be treated in a manner 
consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth, yet the prison 
system is unable to ftiffil this obligation. The continual cycle of over-crowding, poor 
educational facilities, bullying, self-harm and drug use are visible in the majority of 
custodial institutions, and the needs of individual children are not met (Her Majesty's 
Inspectorate of Prisons, 1997,2000 and 2002a, Howard League, 1997, Goldson, 
2002b, Neustatter, 2002). The plight of young people on remand appears to be a 
particularly intractable problem; indeed, young people on remand in prison have been 
described as a 'forgotten' group (Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons, 2002a: 3 7). 
If the local YOS had been successful in recruiting remand foster carers John- 
Jon might have decided to stay put rather than absconding from their care. Then 
195 
again, he might not have. There were no remand foster carers anyway, so this was 
not an option (although it should have been). BSS was helpless, as Norm pointed out 
earlier in this chapter, 'most of the remands occur because the parents won't have 
them back home'. John-Jon just didnt have a bail address. A remand into local 
authority accommodation was not considered plausible. John-Jon often absconded 
and it was believed that he would be at risk of summary street justice from the people 
of the Uphill Estate. Prison was considered to be the most suitable and safest place 
for John-Jon, considering the options that were available to the youth justice system 
for this case. 
Later that afternoon June returned to the office, furious with the events that 
had unfolded at the court. She immediately went to George's office, her face like 
thunder, to express her concerns regarding the magistrate's decision relating to John- 
Jon's remand into custody. George, I'm sure had heard it all before and knew fine 
well that with no bail address. John-Jon was stumped. A short time later, they 
entered the main office carrying on the aftermath of their conversation from the Line 
manager's office. Her anger and annoyance was directed at John-Jon's mother, 
Sharon and at the local Social Services Dept. for allowing the miserable saga that was 
John-Jon's life to have continued for so long. June was speaking to George in the 
main office about the situation. 
June: I'm absolutely disgusted John wanted to go to his sister's, but the Mam 
had also used this address as her get ofjail card We all thought that John would be 
ok and get this bail address and that the emphasis wouldprobablyfall on Sharon to 
find somewhere suitable or, risk being remanded. Christ, it's not as ifshe's never 
been inside before. She did eighteen monthsfor GBH not too long ago. They [the 
magistrates'] initially took on board John's applicationfor bail using this address and 
decided it wasn't suitable and then allow the mother to go there! It's disgusting the 
way that lad [John-Jon] has been treated The total ineptitude ofsocial services in its 
dealings with John over the years is disgusting. Heads should role for its inadequacy 
in dealing with John and his mother. 
George: Well we all know it's unfair, but what options did the magistrates' 
have? His mother took his kip, he's in danger ofgetting hurt ifhe's left in the town, 
and we've got no secure accommodationfor him. They only had a remand in custody 
availablefor him. 
(Field-notes: June/George, September 2001) 
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June was smart and knew most of the ins-and-outs of the system and 
realistically was aware, after all she'd reluctantly agreed, in the end, that a remand to 
custody, although not the best result for John-Jon, was as things stood the safest place 
for him. 
George moved from the table he had been sat upon and walked to the office 
door and then looked at June. He used a sideways head motion at June, chinning her 
in the direction of his office. June was about to receive some of George's wisdom 
and line management. She left the office and followed George. George came back 
into the office about an hour later. June had left to attend a bail supervision visit at a 
young person's home address. George and I were alone. 
George: I take it, it got messy up at court today then Rob? 
R. H: Well, it shocked me George. 
George: It's badfor the kid we know but I doubt we'll everfind out why the 
magistrates took the decision they did. It'll get raised at the next court users group 29 
but it'll get swept under the carpet. There will be other more immediate problems to 
deal with at the next one [court users goup] anyway. 
R. H: Yeah, but that wont help John-Jon any I guess. 
George: Yeah I know, and June's right about the issues she's raising, but this 
system isfull ofcompeting issues and all thefuckingproblems that come with them. 
Ifwe dealt with each and everyone we'd never get any work done with the young 
offenders we'd spent all week sat about in meetings raising points and arguing about 
this and that. We have enough of that anyway and in most cases the magistrates and 
the police come out on top. 
(Field-notes: R. H/George, September 2001) 
Later that afternoon when June had returned from her bail supervision visit, 
she came into the main office and over coffee we sat talking through the day's earlier 
events. June was still angry. She continued her attack on the Social Services Dept. 
I was doing a bail visit to John's home last week It was nine o'clock in the 
morning and John and his Mam are there, and there are two strange men sat in the 
living room. Sharon was obviously offher head, pissed, and they were drinking 
29 Court User Group meeting were bi-monthly. A range of the court users, YOS, Police, CPS, Magistrates, Clerks' of 
the Courts' would attend to discuss issues relating the youth courts' in the town. 
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spirits out ofmugs, classy like. So, I asked John if he wanted to go to another room 
to talk through the bail visit and John said: 
'No, we canjust do it here ý 
So, I asked one ofthe men, 'Sorry to ask-but who are you? ' The guy explained 
to me that he was aftiend of thefamily and that he had known John-Jon since he was 
a bairn [child/kid]. I suggested to him that if this was the case then perhaps it might 
be a good idea ifhe could try and support John-Jon as a positive male role model, 
because John-Jon was quite vulnerable at this time. Sharon started laughing and 
saIJ 
'Role model-Him? He's the man that battered me with the hammer the other 
month! Oh aye, he'd make a great role model he would'30. 
I then asked the other man in the room who he was and hejust started 
laughing. I asked him what it was that hefoundso amusing and Sharon butted in 
saying, 
'Ipicked him up in the Crown [pub] last night. He's alright. John-Jon slept 
with me and him in the bed last night ý 
Can you believe this Rob? The mother'sfucking some stranger she's picked up in a 
pub and her son's in bed next to them while this is going on. 
R. H: Doesn't John-Jon have his own room with a bed? 
June: Oh yes he 's got his own bed, but MC. Hammer-Time had crashed in 
John's bed andJohn had decided to sleep in his Mam's while her and the arsehole got 
inebriated They must have decided that the bed would have been more comfy and 
got in beside John-Jon. I mean that is absolutely outrageous behaviour in any one's 
books. It gets worse mind'you. It turns out that the bloke that Sharon picked up, and 
is having stay over in bed with her and her son, was later arrested by the police. 
He'd done a bunkfrom a local mental hospital were he'd been sectioned and was 
later picked up by the police in the town. 
June was irate with John-Jods mother for placing her own son in such a 
vulnerable situation with two individuals. One, who she barely knew and who had 
serious mental health issues relating to violence, the other who was known to set 
about his victims with hammers. John-Jon had been on the Child Protection Register, 
on and off, for much of his life. John-Jon's father (his parents had been separated for 
30 1 attended court some two months earlier when Sharon had made a rare attendance at court for her son. Usually, 
Sharon stayed away from court cases involving John-Jon and it was left to the local BSS to act as his 
representatives at court. On this occasion Sharon turned up black and blue in colour to her face and arms. She had 
been attacked by her male partner at that time with a hammer. She didn't press charges against her assailant. 
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years) was a Schedule I Offender and it had been known for John-Jon to be placed in 
his care as part of his bail conditions. According to June this had occurred because: 
It's the easiest optionfor Social Services. It saves them money, time and limited 
resources in terms ofp1acements. It'sjust a very dodgypractice, Social Services 
placing a boy like John-Jon in the care ofa known Schedule One offender even if it is 
hisfather. Ifthat's the best social services can do here then things are in a bad way 
and it's a very iffy practice. 
June told me that she'd spoken to John-Jon and Sharon's family social worker, 
about the concerns she was having about the issues she had just raised with me. She 
told me that the social worker had responded to June's concerns by saying, 'He 
should have been taken away and we should have triedfor adoption when he was six. 
Now all we can do is mount a damage limitation exercise relating to his and his 
mother's behaviour'. 
Epilogue 
My involvement with the BSS project temporarily broke for two-weeks while I went 
away on holiday and I'd broken my promise to John-Jon about getting up to Castleton 
to pay him a visit while he was on remand. On my return it was the first thing I tried 
to arrange. I rang June to ask how John-Jon was doing regarding his remand. 
June: He's out. Yhe charges and case were dropped after about ten days of 
him being up there. 
R. H: What do you mean dropped? It was arson, with an endangering 
people's lives charge. What happened? 
June: Turns out that the neighbour's wanted a newfront door off the council 
and setfire to it themselves and blamed John-Jon and his motherfor it. 
R. H: You'rejoking! You can't be serious. Really ? 
June: Yep, I'm afraid I am. 
(Phone Conversation with June: October 200 1) 
I never heard anyone in the team question the original charge. Indeed, neither had I. 
Like the courts', the police and the local community of the Uphill Estate we expected 
that it would be the usual suspect up to his criminal ways again. We all ignored that 
John-Jon's crimes were never violently orientated (he saved that for himself). 
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Usually, he was searching for goods and/or money in which to feed his habit. At 
court, on the day he was remanded for this suspected offence, his solicitor had argued 
to the bench that John-Jon had been arrested on suspicion of the alleged offence. He 
also argued that there was at this stage of the police enquiry, no evidence by way of 
witnesses, forensic, or admission of guilt that he was responsible for the alleged 
offence. The solicitor also made a play to the court that John-Jon was also a child. 
This held no weight in granting John-Jon bail. As the case study demonstrates, the 
decision-making processes in the youth justice system are far more complex and 
influenced by a melange of stakeholders. John-Jon was a usual suspect and that 
would do in the terms of justice. 
The complexities involved in granting John-Jon bail, his mother residing at 
the sister/daughter's address, and the restrictions that the co-accused could not share 
the same bail address; that John-Jon had no suitable bail address, so BSS could not be 
offered by the project; that a remand into local authority accommodation was deemed 
unsuitable due to the perceived risk of harm which might be inflicted upon John-Jon 
by the good people of the Uphill Estate; the severe lack of secure accommodation at 
the national level; no remand foster carers; too young for a bail hostel placement; too 
young for a bed and breakfast placement and; too young to be placed at the local 
YMCA meant that John-Jon was excluded from these youth justice welfare orientated 
options. He spent time remanded in prison for a crime that (in its original recording 
and context) hadn't been committed. The new Labour catch phrase of being, tough 
on crime, tough on the causes of crime took on a whole new perspective in this 
particular case. One thing was for certain, it was tough on John-Jon. Bart Lubow, a 
child advocacy official, has raised a similar issue in the US regarding foster children 
who spend months in detention centres and poignantly suggests: 
Awaiting placement in detentions is one of the dirty little secrets of 
the system. It's an issue across the country, an example of kids being 
blamed for a bunch of stuff adults should be fixing. 
(New York Times, 31 st May 2003). 
Perhaps John-Jon and Parker's 'Boys' are correct in their conspiracy theory of 
the 'Authority' (Parker, 1974: 157-194). Defendants' rights to bail have consistently 
been eroded, by the enforcement of increasingly repressive legislation, including the 
Bail (Amendment) Act 1993, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the 
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Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, 
culminating in the implementation of section 130 of the Criminal Justice and Police 
(CPJ) Act 200 1. The latter Act empowers the courts' to impose secure remands on 
children who have committed repeat offences whilst on bail, irrespective of whether 
or not such offences are considered to expose the public to serious harm. However, 
this was not the case in Sunderland. 
The magistrates rarely implemented secure accommodation orders on those 
types of young offenders the CJP Act 2001 intended to sanction with this order. The 
courts' in Sunderland blindly continued to resort to the old tried and tested sanction 
of remanding these types of young offenders into custody. Although the allegation of 
John-Jon's suspected offence, may have been high on the tariff of 'seriousness' my 
own opinion of the situation was that, this was not the deciding factor for the 
magistrates. If it were the case how could the magistrates allow the co-accussed 
(Sharon-John John's-mother) to walk out of court? If it were a case of protecting 
John-Jon from potential physical harm then the Social Services Dept in Sunderland 
badly let down John-Jon. They had nowhere to care for him. Perhaps due to John- 
Jon's repeated drug-related offending this was beginning to tag him as a nuisance and 
the 'seriousness threshold' was thereby replaced by a 'nuisance test' (Goldson, 
2002b). It is anticipated that this amendment will have a considerable effect on the 
number of young people remanded to secure facilities (Goldson, 2002b, Nacro, 
2002). 
Hard Bitten and Tough Justice: Young Offenders and Court Remand Decisions 
The main court in Sunderland did have a reputation for being punitive. For example 
the courts' in Sunderland during 2000 placed 17.1 per cent of all 10-17 year old 
defendants into immediate custody (Home Office, 2001). This figure equates to 222 
fifteen to seventeen years olds were immediately sent to prison upon sentencing. The 
national average was 13.9 per cent (ibid). 
A regional comparative analysis of sentencing indicators for persons aged 10- 
17 for all indictable offences provides as useful overview of the situation at this 
period of time. 
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Table Six 
Local and Regional Magistrates' Courts' Custodial and Community Sentencing 
Rates of Young Offenders: 2000 
A 
Court & Total 
Proceeded 
Against 
B 
Number 
Committed 
for Trial at 
Crown Court 
C 
Total Sentenced 
at Magistrates' 
Courts, 
D 
Number Given 
Immediate 
Custody 
E 
Number Given 
C0111111LIflity 
Sentences 
F 
Average 
Sentence 
(111011ths) 
Gateshead 18 278 17 112 
453 (4%) (6.1%) (40.3%) 8.6 
(2) 
Houghton le 4 93 3 32 
Spring (2.3%) (3.2%) (34.4%) 3.3 
175 
(3) 
Newcastle 53 667 14 239 
1,094 (4.8%) (3.9%) (35.8%) 9.3 
(4) 
N. Tyneside 27 358 14 158 
570 (. 1.7%) (3.9%) (44.1%) 3.7 
(5) 
S. Tyneside 25 231 18 105 
418 (6%) (7.8%) (45.50/0) 8.1 
(6) 
Sunderland 13 340 63 92 
600 (2.2%) (18.5-Yo) (27. I'Vo) 6.8 
(Source: Home 011-ice, 2001: Volume 4) 
In analysing the above data it is evident that at Sunderland Magistrates' Court 
(Row 6) the use of immediate custody (Row 6, Column D) was disproportionately 
higher than the other courts' in the region. The use of community sentences (Row 6, 
Column E) was used significantly less than other courts' within the Tyne and Wear 
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district. It was widely acknowledged for those involved in the youthjustice system, 
that the courts' in Sunderland were 'hard' on the young offenders who stood before 
them. As George told me in the initial stage of the research "Sunderland magisfrales 
court is renowned. for being one of the worst courts'in the country. for remanding and 
serving up custodial sentences" (George, Fieldnotes: November 1999). It is also 
interesting to see that both Sunderland and Houghton le Spring (the Houghton le 
Spring court is in the a borough of Sunderland) young defendants were committed for 
trial at Crown Court, with less frequency than other courts' in the region. The 
following table provides details of the remand decisions by age and gender decided 
upon by the magistrates/youth courts' in the town. 
Table Seven 
Remand Decisions by Age and Gender in Sunderland: 01/04/00-31/12/2000 
(Source: Sunderland Youth Offending Service, 2001: 29) 
Remand abbreviations from above Table. 
U/C Bail = Unconditional Bail 
C. Bail = Conditional Bail 
BSS = Bail Supervision and Support 
LAA = Remand in Local Authority Accommodation 
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CO, Remand = Court Ordered Remand (Secure Accommodation) 
RIC = Remand in Custody 
Relating to the use of BSS by the magistrates during this period of time in 
Sunderland, a number of important factors are discussed from the above table. First, 
is the courts' non-use of CO Remands (Secure Accommodation Remands). The 
courts' did not use the secure accommodation estate during this period. The research 
I conducted failed to provide any detailed knowledge (from the magistrates' 
perspective) as to how and why the secure accommodation estate was not used for its 
intended purpose. As has been highlighted elsewhere in this study the magistrates', 
to any large extent, failed to co-operate with the research. 
After my initial engagement with magistrates' at the main court in Sunderland 
further repeated requests, by my self and the YOS Head of Service, failed to engage 
the court in any meaningful discussion about the court's practices relating to a 
number of areas connected to BSS. Tbeyjust wouldn't play ball. The lack of 
acknowledgement from the court to my requests left me with the feeling that, I was 
being 'stone-walled' by this intrinsic group of stakeholders in the success, or 
otherwise, of the Bail Supervision and Support project. However, there are 
potentially two reasons why young people weren't being remanded into secure 
accommodation, a) that there were no available places within the secure estate and/or 
b) that potentially the magistrates' just didn't consider the option of secure 
accommodation remands. As I have suggested elsewhere, the court was renowned 
for being a 'tough youth court'. It was also the opinion of not only some the 
magistrates but also some of the BSS workers that for some of the more persistent 
young offenders. 
Norm: Some reach apath in their criminal routes where we choose not to 
offer bail support because we know it'sjust a waste ofeverybody's time. They are so 
ingrained into a culture ofoffending that.... Christ, what all of us are doing isjust 
pissing on the edges ofa ragingfire. It doesn't make any bloody difference. 
(Fieldnotes: October 200 1) 
It is clear that the 'targeting' of the BSS project at times was widely perceived 
to be of limited use to the 'hardcore' of persistent young offenders. The magistrates' 
believed this to be the case and more disturbingly so did a number of BSS project 
workers. The fundamental aim of the BSS project was to 'reduce the incidences of 
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remands' of young people in the town. Remands, in this context, relate to not only 
custody, but also remands into secure and local authority accommodation. If we take 
a closer view of the total remand figures during this period, it becomes clear that tile 
BSS project was struggling to win the magistrates' over, in using BSS as an 
alternative to remanding young people in the town. The following table provides 
some evidence of the project's incapacity to fully engage its intended target group. 
Table Eight 
Remand Episodes Ordered by Courts' in Sunderhand: 01/04/00-31/12/20003 1 
Age 12 yrs 13yr 14 yrs Iff-) y rs I Oy I-S t7yrs Totill 
G, ender MFMF NI FMF NI I ., MF NI ji, 
BSS 10130 15 091 19 0 IJ 0 ý4 1 
ILAA 11 0 12 0 14 1 17 1 16 1 10 0 120 31 
and 00 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0000 
lo o fo o 1,2 oIo 4) -37 
(Source: ibid) 
If these data are further analysed in order to calculate rernand decisions by the courts' 
and the success of the BSS project, in attaining its target group of young offenders at 
risk of being remanded to local authority accommodation or custody, tile following 
data emerge. 
This table excludes the categories ol'Unconditional Bail and Conditional Bail (without IISS) as these categories do 
not represent 'remand' decisions by the courts'. 
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Chart Two 
Rates of Remands by category by the courts' in Sunderland: 01/04/00- 
31/12/2000 
Remands into Custody were the option that the magistrates' in the town relied 
heavily upon. This remand strategy was the one which magistrates' would rely upoll 
for significant numbers of the town's young offenders. The role of the BSS project iri 
achieving its stated aim of reducing those remands fell significantly short in 
attainment of that aim. The following graph demonstrates this significant short fall. 
The categories of Remands into Custody and Remands into Local Authority 
Accommodation are aggregated as one category. The reasoning for this relates to the 
BSS project's central aim which was 'to reduce the incidents of all remands. 
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Chart Three 
All Remand Decisions and BSS Decisions 
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Assessment of the BSS project's significant shortfall in directing its services 
to the stakeholders involved the assessment of remand options for young offenders at 
peril of being remanded into custody or, to local authority accommodation. The 
figures will demonstrate what appeared to be a trend amongst those stakeholders. 
From the I" of April 2000 until 3 1" of January 2000, BSS was only successftilly 
referred to in 55 per cent of those cases. The remand picture presents a far more 
worrying trend that of those remanded young people 63 32 per cent were remanded in 
custody, and only 36 per cent were placed into the remand care of the local authority. 
At this stage it will be useful to provide a snapshot analysis for this specific period of 
time relating to re-offending on bail by the BSS target group. Offending by Young 
people placed on either the BSS proýject or remanded into local authority 
accommodation during this period of time remained relatively high. The following 
table (below) presents an overview of the size of the problem relating to young 
people re-offending, while on bail and placed with services which are intended to 
combat the offending behaviour of the young people, placed onto those respective 
services. 
12 1 ýigurcs havc been roUnded. 
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Chart Four 
Young People Charged Whilst Subject to BSS and RLAA Remand 01/04/00-31/12/00 
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and of those remanded into local authority accommodation were disappointing. 
Simple analysis of the above data, suggest that during this period there was a one in 
three ratio (35/12 or, 34.28%) that young people remanded onto BSS were re-arrested 
and charged for new offences while on the project. For those young people remanded 
into local authority accommodation the odds of re-offending were slightly reduced, 
with a ratio of one infour (23/6 or, 26.08%) young people being re-arrested and 
charged for re-offending while on bail to the local authority care homes. It is clear 
that for a significant section of the young people, known as young offenders in the 
town, the odds of reducing re-offending while on bail may have been limited. The 
local YOS in its Youth Justice Plan stated that the "numbers re-offending whilst on 
bail are of concern" (Sunderland YOS, 2001: 28) and that to improve the stakeholders 
opinion of the BSS project, a far greater effort would be required in which to build 
confidence in the range of service provision provided by this project (ibid: 69). A 
detailed analysis of the BSS project aims and objectives will be further addressed in 
Chapter 6. 
Moore's (1998) study observed that more than 2000 boys were remanded into prison 
custody in 1997. This entailed a 100 per cent increase to that of the remand 
population of young men in 1990. Goldson (1997,1999,2000) has defined this as a 
're-politicized' statement in which youth crime and young people in trouble have 
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become 'systematically demonized'. Carlen (1996: 48) refers to the contemporary 
process of 'folk devilling of children and young people'. In a similar vein Young 
(1999) sees the 'creation of monstrosity' to describe the current political context of 
the situation relating to young offenders. These of course are useful theoretical 
insights into the current political phenomena relating to young offenders yet they fail 
to consider the structural weaknesses within the system as a working mechanism. In 
terms of pragmatic guidance they offer little insight into what is wrong at the more 
practical level of dealing with young offenders in the current system. Although, these 
highly important theoretical arguments provide a useful cushion, in which academics 
and practitioners can frame their mind-scts in an overview of the current situation 
they do little at the practical level in which to appease the immediate 
suffering/injustice and abuse of welfare rights that many young offenders have 
experienced and continue to face. Social opinions inform us that something must be 
done about crime and criminals. As one of the YOS workers told me: 
Gregg: I'm fully aware that these young people are victims and that generally 
society has offered them a somewhat shitty deal in their lives. So Yes they're victims 
but they also create a trial ofvictims in their wake and we are required, we're 
responsible to do something about that. 
(Interview: December 2001) 
The longstanding and escalating trend in remanding suspected young 
offenders, who at this point of the youth justice process are legally innocent, requires 
a somewhat more pragmatic approach in which to deal with the intransigent position 
of locking up young people in institutions and establishments, that are ill-equipped in 
which to deal with, and transform, young people's recognised offending behaviour. 
It has long been recognised that the youth justice system requires far more secure 
accommodation units in which to alleviate the damage that remanding young people 
into custody is widely acknowledged to inflict (see, Millharn et. al, 1978; Stewart and 
Tutt, 1987). However, the sheer numbers of young people being remanded into 
custody confirm the scale of the task that would be required to be undertaken in 
providing secure accommodation for those young people. Although justice must be 
seen to be done the juvenile remand estate requires a far greater overhaul than is 
currently being addressed by the government. The concern focuses upon what is to 
be done with those young people remanded or sentenced to prison. 
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But no one is suggesting some of them shoul&t be locked up. The 
issue is how many, where, and under what regime - in secure units 
run by local authorities with a duty of care, or by hard-pressed, 
under-resourced prisons that turn the already disturbed, madder and 
badder. 
(Tonybee, Guardian, November 24,2000). 
The statistics speak for themselves. Reconviction rates are very high for 
children with 84 per cent of 14 - 17 year olds discharged from prison in 1997 being 
reconvicted within two years of their release (Home Office, 2000). Prison, as a 
rehabilitative model of criminal justice, just doesn't work. The number of prisoners 
on remand in England and Wales has more than doubled in the last 15 years. 
Likewise, the number of 15 - 17 year olds in prison has doubled over the last ten 
years (Prison Reform Trust, 1997). The Prison Reform Trust has called for an 
immediate end to the remanding in custody of 15 and 16 year olds, and for acquitted 
remand prisoners to be entitled to apply for compensation (ibid). The majority of 
those children in prison (including remand prisoners) have been convicted of non- 
violent offences. Of the boys who received custodial sentences in 2000 nearly half 
were convicted of property crimes such as burglary and theft (Home Office, 2000). 
The juvenile prison system has also been criticised for its inability to cope with and 
provide services for young offenders. Referring to the HM Chief Inspector of Prisons 
report on HMP/YOI Ashfield 33 , Juliet Lyon, 
director of the Prison Reform Trust said: 
This utterly damning report by the Chief Inspector raises the 
question of why it was ever considered acceptable to place our most 
vulnerable and challenging children in the care of a private company 
with such a dismal international track record in work with young 
offenders. More than anything children who offend need consistent 
care and guidance, far too often what they get is state sanctioned 
33 Premier Custodial Group Ltd is a subsidiary of Wackenhut Corrections Corporation Ltd, an American company. 
When Wackhenhut won the contract to run Ashfield in 1999 the company had no experience of working with 
juveniles and had faced problems in America and Australia where they had lost contracts to run detention facilities for 
young offenders. HMP/YOI Ashfield has had the worst record of reported incidents of self-harm of all prisons in 
the juvenile estate. In 2000/2001 there were 112 out of a total of 231. In 2001/2002 there were 128 out of 
a total of 312. Up to end of September 2002 there had been 51 incidents out of a total of 132. (The Prison 
Reform Trust, 2003). 
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neglect and abuse. This report must act as a wake up call to review 
the policy of incarcerating children. Intensive supervision and 
surveillance, specialist fostering and small local units close to home 
all offer more chance of success than bleak institutional settings. 
(Prison Reform Trust, Press Release: 5h February 2003) 
Following on from the Report by the Inspectorate of Prisons which provided 
damning evidence of HMP/YOI Ashfield's inability to provide the necessary services 
in which to look after young offenders the Youth Justice Board decided to withdraw 
sentenced young offenders from this establishment. HMP/YOI Ashfield was 
recognised as the worst example within the prison system in providing the necessary 
welfare and services for its detained young people. 
There are therefore already significant barriers to the Prison Service 
being able to provide a safe and positive environment for children; 
and the question of whether it should continue to do so is a live one. 
Yet during the year the number of children has risen, to close to 3,000, 
and looks set to rise flifther. Promises to reduce unit size and locate 
children nearer to home are further than ever from being delivered. 
(HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales 2001/2002: 36) 
The report also highlighted the problem of a 'forgotten' group of children held in 
prisons, these being remanded young people. 
It was hoped that they, too, would be held outside prisons, but they are 
still there, in increasing numbers and often for longer periods than those 
who are sentenced. Yet there are no mandatory standards for the 
education, training and activity they should receive, and no requirement 
to plan their period in custody so that it is as productive as possible. 
Some establishments are making laudable attempts to fill those gaps, 
but this should not be left to individual initiative and innovation. But 
this is not simply a question for the Prison Service. Children in prisons 
211 
are often ignored by other departments and bodies which should have 
responsibility for their welfare. 
(ibid: 37) 
Bail Supervision and Support is aimed at 'rescuing' those young people at risk 
of being remanded. As we have seen in John-Jon's case study, without a suitable bail 
address BSS is impotent. From my observations and participation with the system it 
was clear that many of the young offender's parents just couldn't handle the 
situations they found themselves in, relating to their sons and daughters offending. 
They'd often refuse to have them home, even if this meant that their child was at risk 
of being remanded into custody. In such scenarios the BSS project would attempt to 
acquire a local authority secure accommodation placement, as an option to present to 
the magistrates. Yet, a truth of the matter was that this rarely occurred locally, as 
secure placements were in high demand and extremely limited. Remands into local 
authority (unsecured) accommodation could often alleviate that situation and these 
were widely recognised as being the better option to that of a remand into custody. 
At times the magistrates would refuse these requests from the BSS project. 
Magistrate's refusals of such remand management scenarios would often be related to 
young people's histories of absconding from care on previous occasions. 
Alternatively, the 'nature of the offence' the young person was up at court for could 
also merit a 'protection of the public' caveat, where either a remand into custody or, 
to a local authority secure accommodation was preferred by the court. It was usually 
the case that in such circumstances a remand into custody would result, as there just 
weren't the local authority secure 'beds' available. 
However, it was also recognised by the YOS and the BSS Project that because 
of the nature of some of the young offenders they placed into the care of the local 
authority the situation was far from ideal. As we have seen in earlier chapters the 
workers at the project often were concerned about the impact some of these young 
offenders could have on more vulnerable children at these placements. Local 
authority residential units have been found to struggle to adapt to difficult and 
disruptive behaviour of young residents (Colton, 1988, Chamberlain, 1998, Walker, 
et al 2002). 
Research has also shown that problems such as bullying and intimidation are 
common within local care homes and that some young people are encouraged by 
others to participate in delinquent behaviour (Hazel, 1990, Walker et al, 2002). It is 
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evident that in accommodating some of the more persistent young offenders, the 
system is ill-equipped to deal with this particular aspect of youth justice delivery. The 
over reliance upon an increasingly over-stretched prison estate (Young Offenders 
Institutions) as supplement used instead of secure accommodation units for young 
people, is an unacceptable youth justice strategy. 
What often occurs in such scenarios is that it is not the nature of young 
offender's criminal acts or, the threat to public safety that sees remands into prison 
custody occurring. Rather, it is the lack of local authority secure accommodation 
facilities, with trained social workers and relaxed welfare orientated regimes that sees 
many young people being remanded into prisons. And, anecdotally it is well 
established within the youth justice system that the welfare aspect of remand 
management of young offenders is weighted and restricted by fiscal consideration 
(Monaghan, 2000). This fiscal and strategic crisis within the delivery of youth 
justice remains as Moore suggests is something '... the Youth Justice Board for 
England and Wales to openly acknowledge that state policy since the early 1990s has 
been an expensive and damaging failure' (2000: 126). 
Along the inter-connecting youth justice strategies other less punitive 
measures to remands into secure facilities (whether these are local authority or the 
prison estate) should also be provided. Often they are, for example, in the use of 
Remand Foster Carers. Yet, as the discussion that follows will argue, the lack of 
specialist 'crisis' foster carers also disrupts the mechanisms of a far more welfare 
orientated approach in dealing with young offenders placed onto bail, and this 
increases the possibilities of young people being remanded into custody. 
The uncoupling of some of the key areas of welfare orientated youth justice 
linkages due to a lack of available resources, government funding and a political 
unwillingness to increase the number of available local authority run and owned 
secure accommodation units, more than hints of an unspoken emphasis towards a 
continued punitive rhetoric for some of the more troublesome and persistent young 
offenders. 
Remand Foster Carers 
A further option for the BSS Project to provide alternatives to remands into custody to 
magistrates was the option of a 'remand foster placement'. The aim of this service 
was to provide a team of specialist remand foster carers to foster a selected target 
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group of persistent young offenders while they were on bail and whose parents 
refused to have them back home. It is this group of young offenders who are at risk of 
being remanded into custody or to secure accommodation. As has been discussed, the 
use of remands into secure accommodation within the district was extremely limited. 
Many of the young offender's who perhaps should have been remanded in this way, 
were instead sent to prison. Remand foster placements are proposed to further reduce 
this risk and the service is intended to provide an increased level of welfare focused 
options. 
This particular aspect of the BSS Project had been running for a number of 
years and had proved to be a very useful aspect of the project's armoury in offering 
the magistrates alternatives to custodial remands. When I first engaged with the 
fieldwork late in 1999, the project had only one remaining couple engaging in remand 
foster care to provide this much needed service. Bert and Frieda were in their late 
sixties and were now retired. They had often been called upon for their services as 
remand foster carers by the project. They were by any standard, from the 
'respectable' working class and lived away from the City of Sunderland in a small 
town named South Side, some fifteen miles away from the project. They cared deeply 
for the young people they offered to provide a stabile home environment for. Over 
the years Bert and Frieda had with assistance from the BSS Project, looked after 
scores of young people. At the office however there seemed to be an embarrassing 
undercurrent of the project's role in continually sending some often disturbed and 
very persistent young offenders into the care of Bert and Frieda. Sat in the office one 
afternoon, just after Bert had called in to report a missing young person from his care, 
a conversation started up relating to the BSS Project's continued use and exploitation 
of the elderly carers. Bert hadjust left the office. 
Geoff. It's afucking shame isn't it? 
Norm: [Laughing, and already seems to know what Geoff is referring to] Aye, 
it's a shame all right 
Jack: I think it's sad. Them two [Bert and Frieda] are saints with all the shit 
they've had to put up with over the years. Some ofthe kids we've sent up there to 
them should really have been in prison and not beingfostered by an old couple ofold 
agedpensioners with big hearts. 
Geoff. [Sarcastically] Oh yes, in our wisdom over the years we've sent them 
some evil little bastards. 
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Jack: But we've got no one else to do it have we? But that doesn't make it right 
for us and social services in general to exploit the good nature ofthese people. Bitly 
bit all the otherfoster carers have seen sense andpacked thejob in. It's no surprise 
to me that nobody has appliedfor the posts. Surely in this day and age there can't be 
people out there that nafve, or desperatefor money that they'd take on the nightmare 
job of looking after the kids we get coming through this project? I mean, we're 
supposed to be the professionals and we can't stop some ofthem offending while 
they're on bail. Here Rob, you answer me this one. Wouldyou take one ofthe kids 
into your home? 
I was on the spot now and I had to think hard and fast about this one. The 
Social Services Department and local YOS had recently engaged in a regional blanket 
media re-advertising campaign for Remand Foster Carers after a previous recruitment 
drive had failed to attract a single application for the available posts. The latest 
recruitment drive had offered a relatively good rate of pay, training, and support in 
what looked like an appealing deal. The up take had been slow and finally the local 
YOS gave up its central role in the recruitment and training of remand foster carers to 
be integrated into the BSS Project. The unfilled vacancies and the role itself were 
handed over to the local Families and Children Services of the Social Services 
Department. At that stage the local youth justice system just couldn't attract anyone 
to take on the role. 
R. H: Well, I'm not sure, but the money's good What was it advertised as, about 
twenty-six grand? That's not a bad rate ofpayfor sitting at home and looking after 
troubled kids is it? It would give some ofthe kids who are always being remanded a 
chance to stay out ofjail, I guess you might also get some satisfactionfrom thejob as 
well ... sort ofputting something good back into society and helping out these kids. 
Geoff. [Laughing] You'refuckingjoking aren'tyou? There's absolutely no 
chance that Id let any ofthe scumley little bastards across my door and any where 
near my own kids. I don't care how much money they offered, there is absolutely no 
fucking way Id contaminate my kids with the shite we work with. 
Jack: Wouldyou Yvette? You wouldn't let them anywhere near Chloe would 
you? 
Yvette: I can honestly say that I wouldn't touch thatjob with a barge pole. I 
know the kids are vulnerable and need lots ofsupport but there is no way Id ever 
consider letting them into my home or anywhere close to my daughter. 
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Pain: There's no way Id do it. I mean a lot of them are canny kids and that, but 
youjust don't know what problems they've really got. 
Jack: Really Rob, even though you've been working with them and know what 
they are like, wouldyou let one ofthem near yourfamily? 
Jack was right and no, I wouldn't have. Bert and Frieda decided that they'd 
enjoy what remained of their retirement and decided to stop fostering young people on 
bail supervision. During an interview in their home the pensioners explained: 
Freda: Ifwe had had children at home, you know young children we wouldn't 
havefostered these types ofchildren [remanded young people]. Absolutely, not. I 
mean when we werefostering the remand kids I wouldn't let my own grandchildren 
comeandvisit. We were certainly never that naYve to think that the young people we 
fostered couldn't have damaged our ownfamily members. We decidedftom the on-set 
that, because our own lads [sons] had left home and settled down with their own 
families, that we would we keep the two things separate. We'dfostered other young 
ladsfor about twenty years on and offbefore we decided to do the remands. Butif 
we'd had kids at home we would never have considered doing the remandfoster care 
work Isn't that right Bert hinny? 
Bert: Ayepet. It wouldn't have been right. Imean the young lads we took in, 
and it was always lads, never nae lasses, were all canny bairns but we weren't daft 
enough to not knaa that those bairns came laden with problems. Sofortheremand 
bairns, we waited until our lads hadflown the nest and then decided tofoster the 
remand lads. But as our lass [Freida] has said, we keep thefamily away while the lads 
stay with us, like the grand bairns, ifyou knaa what I mean like ... ? 
Freda and Bob were quite aware of the challenges that fostering remanded 
young people would offer. However they were adamant that the young men they 
fostered were generally rewarding. They only ever offered their service to young men 
on remand as Freda suggested, "Because I've two lads ofmy own and we'vefostered 
lots ofother young lads over the years and I know how their brains tick UsuallyI'm 
two or three steps infront ofthem and can see what they are up to before they even 
think of it". Their experience of remand foster care work was one that both stated 
they 'wouldn't have changedfor the world, notfor all the tea in China'. They were 
specially trained for the role in issues such as drugs/alcohol and the associated risk 
factors of offending behaviour of young people (see for example, West and 
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Farrington, 1973,1977; Utting et al. 1993; Farrington, 1996; Rutter et al. 1998). They 
also received training on the youth court and remand process. Freda stopped going to 
court in Sunderland because; "It was too rough. I didn't know there were so many 
rough people in Sunderland. The court wasfull off them and I decided I couldn't be 
around them so I stopped going to court". They started remand foster care in 1997 on 
a short-term basis and stopped in early 2001 because as Bob put it, "we were getting 
on [too old]". It was recognised by many within the youth justice system that the role 
of remand foster carers was perhaps one of the more demanding positions. Freda told 
me: 
When we took on the role, the police, social workers and those at the bail 
project all thought we were absolutely madfor doing it. But we loved it and most ofthe 
bairns who stayed with us made really canny progress. Every now and again it 
wouldn't work out and they might leave the house within an hour. Theyjust left 
because itjust wasn'tfor them, but in the mostpart the kids enjoyed being here. Ofthat 
I'm sure. We loved it didn't we Bert hinny? 
Bert: Oh aye, it was like, what is it they call it nowadays, like 'a challenge'but 
both one me and our Freda enjoyed. 
Policy orientated rhetoric regarding the valuable resource that remand foster 
carers can provide to the youth justice system is clear: 
The Remand Fostering Project is a positive alternative to youth 
custody whereby young people on remand are placed by the 
local authority in the homes of foster carers. Instead of being 
surrounded by other young offenders, the young people are 
placed into a stable family environment outside their 
community. Remand Fostering is not an easy option. Curfews 
are strictly adhered to and, unlike prison, young people are 
required to take decisions and responsibility. 
(www. e-politix. com) 
Recent proposals in the White Paper, Justicefor All, have suggested extending 
the use of foster care for young people on remand, and introducing the use of 
'intensive fostering' for sentenced young people (Home Office, 2002). These 
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proposals echo calls from campaigners and practitioners (see, for example, NACRO, 
1999, Moore, 2000, Lipscombe, 2002) for more remand foster placements to be made 
available, and they generally reflect the views of Youth Offending Teams who see 
foster care as an essential element of their remand management strategies. Despite, 
the BSS office staff hard-bitten cynicism about many of its young offenders and as to 
the impacts that remand foster care could make, it was still evident amongst them that 
this was perhaps one of the more useful integrated remand management tools 
available. However, attracting potential foster carers to commit themselves to this 
difficult role is a problem in itself. 
The recruitment and retaining foster carers is awkward and despite a E2 
million national recruitment campaign that was conducted in 2001, only 1,000 
applications were received from potential foster carers (McVeigh, 2001). It has also 
been estimated that currently there is a shortage of approximately 7,800 foster carers 
required to ease the demands upon this service (Fostering Network, 2002). As 
Lipscombe suggests within "the current political climate, it is unlikely that children on 
remand will be seen as a priority for foster care" (2003: 46). 
Remand foster carers continued to be considered a useful resource to the 
Sunderland YOS and determined efforts were made to recruit new foster carers to 
undertake this role. Two recruitment drives across the region were implemented. 
Yet, both failed to attract much interest from the surrounding communities. A new 
post had been created for a social worker to co-ordinate the Remand Foster Carers 
team and to provide training and support for the prospective team of remand foster 
carers. It didn't happen. There were no ideal candidates, there was very little interest. 
Perhaps the general public was aware that this particular group of young people might 
not be worth the money or the trouble. The project was abandoned and the BSS 
Project would not have this very valuable resource to rely on at court and offer to 
magistrates' when a remand to custody appeared to be on the cards. 
The use of remand foster carers remains a positive step in providing the 
intrinsic welfare and rights that should be afforded to young people in serious trouble 
within the youthjustice system. However, it has been argued that the welfare 
orientated drive to expand this service "is based more on 'blue skies thinking' than 
rigorously conducted research" (ibid. ). There have been few recent, independent 
studies of foster care for young people on remand, and one on-going study suggests 
that it is not suitable for all alleged young offenders (Lipscombe, 2002). The policy 
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orientated rhetoric that lies beneath the emphasis on the services of remand foster 
carers, it is argued: 
In terms of criminal justice requirements, remand foster 
placements are expected to provide a safe environment for 
young people whilst on remand, to ensure their appearance at 
court hearings, to prevent them from absconding, and to reduce 
the incidence of offending whilst on remand, thereby protecting 
the public and maintaining community safety 
(Lipscombe, 2003: 52) 
Remand foster care also remains a far cheaper option than remands into 
custody and secure accommodation units (Fry, 1994, Walker, et al 2002). Studies of 
mainstream and specialist foster care indicate that fostering teenagers is highly 
problematic, and that the disruption rates for placements of adolescents are high (see, 
for example, Berridge and Cleaver, 1989, Triseliotis et al, 1995, Farmer et al, 200 1). 
Research has also found that foster carers often feel isolated during periods of crises 
in the family home (Nixon, 1997). Wilson, Sinclair, and Gibbs (2000) longitudinal 
research of 950 foster carers with 'looked after' children found that high levels of 
stress were experienced by over two-thirds of the sample. In many of these events 
experienced by the foster carers, the support provided by the Social Services 
Departments were insufficient and the effects associated with the stress experienced 
by the foster carers resulted in mental ill-health problems and their attitudes to 
continuing fostering were significantly impacted upon. 
Walker, Hill, and Triseliotis's (2002) evaluation of a specialist foster care 
project set up in Scotland, studied the use of alternative accommodation placements 
with foster carers for young people who might otherwise be remanded into secure 
accommodation. This project in many aspects mirrored the Sunderland BSS Project's 
intended use of remand foster carers. The study found some worrying evidence that 
within the independent foster care provided to this particular project, there a business 
like rhetoric involved with the relationships between the agents involved (social 
workers, local authority, children and foster carers). Such arrangements led to unjust 
pressures being placed upon the foster carers at that project. Many of the foster carers 
found themselves having to see through a foster placement that was either 
discomforting or unworkable, thus placing them under further stress. 'nie study 
219 
concluded these types of specialised foster placements' pose different dilemmas to 
that of 'mainstream' foster care. They require new and diverse forms of management 
to assist these foster carers to cope with and mange the particularly distinct context of 
remand foster care. 
Lipscombe's (2003) research of remand foster care demonstrates that the use 
of such an intervention within the youthjustice system is relatively successful. The 
study found that its was a useful resource in preventing offending by young people 
whilst on remand and in getting the young people to attend court when required. Yet, 
reservation was called for in believing that the project would be successful in attaining 
its objectives for all of the young people placed into its services. Increasing the level 
of the remand foster care service is considered a: 
... very positive move towards calling 
for an increase in remand 
foster care and intensive fostering for young offenders is a very 
positive move towards balancing young people's needs, rights 
and responsibilities, but it is somewhat premature in light of what 
is known, or not known, about fostering young people during 
periods of remand. However, in spite of these difficulties remand 
foster placements must be recognised as amore humane and 
beneficial way of providing for young people who are on remand 
than are residential or custodial placements. 
(Lipscombe, 2003: 53) 
The intended use of remand foster carers and secure local authority 
accommodation are welfare-based interventions, which are affianced in order to 
cushion the impact of a young person being removed from his or her normal place of 
residence. The use of remand foster carers is therefore an extremely important aspect 
of the youth justice system, in providing a resource to the Youth Offending Teams 
that employ such measures to offer magistrates an alternative to remands to secure 
accommodation and/or remands to custody. The BSS Project was running out of 
alternative options to offer to magistrates. During the period of evaluation of the BSS 
Project both secure accommodation and remand foster carers were rarely used. 
Between November 1999 and March 2002 remand foster carers were used by the 
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project on only four occasions. 34 The project's ability to place young people in local 
authority secure accommodation was also negligible. During the same period of time 
the project could only successfully place eight young people in secure 
accommodation35. This was not necessarily a failing of the projectper se as has been 
discussed earlier in this chapter. The YJB has a remit to ensure that the most 
vulnerable young people are held away from prison in Secure Training Centres 
(STCs) or Local Authority Secure Units (LASUs). However, at the local level the 
Sunderland YOS and its BSS Project the utilisation of secure accommodation was the 
exception rather than the usual course of events relating to the remands of young 
offenders. Due to this failing young male offenders in Sunderland continued to be at 
an increased risk of being remanded in custody. 
The BSS Project would often attempt to get those young people who were at 
risk of being remanded into custody (usually due to a lack of local authority secure 
accommodation) into the care of the local authority with a remand into local authority 
(un-secure) accommodation. For certain elements of the target group this might not 
be deemed acceptable by not only by the magistrates, but also by BSS Project 
workers. It was widely acknowledged by those at the project and the local authority 
care homes that some elements of the young offenders' in the city and its surrounding 
districts would be too much of a threat, too risky, too 'criminal' to even consider a 
remand into local authority accommodation. They went straight to jail. 
The wider issues of a national shortage of local authority secure 
accommodation placements and a lack of interest, and consequentially, suitable 
candidates for the role of remand foster carers played a significant role in the project's 
inability to provide these two fundamental interventions to reduce the number of 
young people being remanded into custody. Both of these issues require far greater 
emphasis placed upon them at the level of central and local government in order to 
alleviate the continued emphasis upon locking young people up while on remand. 
Until these issues are resolved the ability of interventions such as the Sunderland BSS 
Project, will continue to encounter barriers that restrict these BSS Projects' aims. 
34 The BSS Project failed to record the overall extent of this problem, in any concise details, as to the 
extent of the problem of the lack of remand foster carers. It was recognised as a problem but at no point 
did the project provide data that could have highlighted to what expected level would remand foster 
carers reduce the incidences of remands into custody. 
3' The project also failed to systematically record the number of times referrals/requests for local 
authority secure accommodation placements were executed and refused due to a lack of secure 
accommodation throughout England and Wales. Within the project there was an over-riding atmosphere 
that to obtain a secure placement was down to 'luck'. Over time this had an impact upon emphasis of the 
project regarding the corresponding data recording exercises and Management Information Systems. In 
short, there was a work-place atmosphere that it 'just wasn't worth the effort'. 
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Worse than this, young people will continue to be remanded unnecessarily due to the 
structural failures within youth justice system. 
And Back at Court Again 
As has been discussed, the Sunderland court has a long tradition of being renowned as 
a tough youth court. My own observations at courts' in the region (I attended, on BSS 
related court observations four of the six courts in the region) found an post-industrial 
harshness equating to a romanticised and industrial disciplinary model of how 
working class youth should appear, present themselves, and more importantly how the 
magistrates at this Particular interpreted this romanticised and eugenic viewpoint of 
their relationship to these young people's life-worlds at the Sunderland courts' that 
was not apparent at the other courts I attended. In many aspects the courts' the young 
people attended for pre-trial hearings [prior to judgement and sentencing] mirrored 
Parker's account of the judicial processes The Boys' had to endure: 
The Boys' part in the drama is usually a small one; often it is a non- 
speaking part, seldom is it eloquent. The more important actors 
will often proceed without even looking to the dock or 
acknowledging the accused's presence 
(1974: 170) 
However, on occasion a magistrate would either voice his or her opinion on the 
matter at hand (often a moral judgement regarding the young person's behaviour). At 
times magistrates would 'stare down' the accused from the safety of the bench some 
thirty feet away from the young defendant who was accompanied by a security guard 
and shielded from the main events being acted out within the court behind a twelve foot 
high Perspex screen. On one occasion, attending court with Jamie, I noted a magistrate 
after entering the court and hearing the charges, stare hard at Jamie, eyeing him up and 
down in an intimidating manner. To Jamie, incidents such as these were all a part of the 
proceeds. 
Jamie: Didyou see that old cunt trying to stare me out. Fuckingfat bastard, 
trying to think he's all hard and that. Giving me the evil-eye when he knows there's 
fuck all I can do about it. It's not like you can stare back at them is it? 
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R. H: nat can you do about it? I mean how do you react to something like 
that? [I had witnessed the event and was aware that the magistrate in question was 
trying to intimidate Jamie. I had initially glanced over my shoulder as the event 
unfolded and saw Jamie shifting his weight from foot to foot and then look down- 
wards at his feet]. 
Jamie: There'sfuck allyou can do is there really? Keep your mouth shut and 
keep your eyes down. He knows I can dofuck all and ifwere to say anything to him 
then Idbe right in the shit. Even though you try to keep your head and that they 
[magistrates] know you're shitting yoursetf There's no needfor thatfatfuck trying to 
large himsetf up thinking he's hard. He'd shit himseýfifhe saw me out on the street. 
These dramaturgical and intimidatory processes (Parker, 1974: 170-171) within 
the court and delivered at young offenders are viewed as antiquated settings. 
To them the pomp and rigidity of nineteenth century justice, still 
retained in today's Court, would be farcical were it no so 
powerful. As we unravel their view of this crucial part of the 
prosecution process one thing should be made explicit. The 
Court's kadi, the judge or the magistrate, is trying to assess the 
accused's moral character. 
(ibid.: 170) 
This industrial pomp was still evident in my observations of courts in the town. 
The magistrates often appeared to adopt some by-gone and alienated view of the 
world which mirrored their own moral codes and one that was somewhat 
disassociated from the subjective realities to that of the young offenders who appeared 
before them. I heard one middle-aged male magistrate say to young a female, 
believing that he was offering some paternal and informal advice to the young 
defendant, 'You'll never get a boyfriend or a husband ifyou carry on like this'. On 
another occasion, a different magistrate told a young female defendant: 
'You're back here in two weeks. Now, when I next see you before me I will 
expect that you've got yourseýfajob. There's no reason in this day and age that an 
attractive young woman like you shouldn't work In two weeks when we next meet 
andyou're before me again in these courts I'll be expecting thatyou have ajob and 
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have put all this offending behaviour behindyou. It's time you settled down young 
lady'. 
The fact that Sunderland had one of the highest unemployment rates in the 
North east region, that one in five of it's working aged population were on incapacity 
benefit (National Statistics, 2002), and the fact this young woman had no prior work 
experience, no formal qualifications and indeed was only partially literate, had little to 
no bearing upon this magistrate's view of the 'other' social worlds that he made 
judgement upon on a weekly basis. In terms of the assessments made of young 
offender's morals, it has been suggested that as a theoretical perspective a 'conflict 
theory' remains deeply embedded within the culture of magistrates courts (see 
Baldwin, 2000: 240). It is argued that the poor, the young unemployed and ethnic 
minorities (who generally make up the core of criminal defendants) are the most 
likely disadvantaged groups within the court process (Box 1971; Sanders and Young 
1994). Furthermore, others have argued that the continued traditional route of the 
criminal justice process in its aim to establish truth neglect to consider that these 
'truths' are social constructs (see, Baldwin, 2000: 241; McBarriet 1976; McConville, 
Sanders and Leng 1991). What is argued to occur at court is a process of 
'interpretation, addition, subtraction, selection and reformulation' (McConville, 
Sanders and Leng 1991: 12). As we have seen, John-Jon's case, for the prosecution 
were 'constructed from competing and malleable accounts presented by the parties' 
(Baldwin, 2000: 241) involved with that case. 
It was often remarked to me that the magistrates would often 'make it up as 
they went along' and had little knowledge or empathy of the impact their decision 
making would often incur upon the young people stood in front of them awaiting 
crucial judgements to be made for them. It wasn't unusual for the same magistrates to 
treat similar cases of comparable offence related backgrounds to face very different 
pre-court hearing outcomes. On one occasion a request for BSS had been made by 
the court duty officer for a young person at risk of being remanded for a car theft and 
this was accepted with the accused young person being placed onto the BSS Project. 
An hour later in another adjourning court a similar case was being heard. Again it 
was a car theft. Again an application was made for BSS. However, this time the 
request was refused and the young person was remanded into custody. As Vic the 
BSS Project worker who had dealt with both cases I was observing told me: 
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It's afriggin' lottery. Both those kids had committed the same type ofoffence 
with remarkably similar backgrounds in terms oftheir offending histories. The cases 
they were up infront ofthe courts'were exactly the same but one gets bail support 
and the other gets remanded I sometimes wonder ifthe magistratesjudgements come 
down to things like whether or not they got their legs over the night before. seriously, 
this is a major issue. I know a little bit about the issue o ustice by geography but 
this is something else ... more likejustice bypersonality. 
BSS would often be asked for by solicitors to magistrates when BSS court 
duty officers believed that BSS was not required. The magistrates would accept the 
solicitors request for BSS despite the BSS court duty officers' protestations that he or 
she believed that BSS was not required for a young person. At times when other 
young offenders who were well known to the BSS team, the magistrates and solicitors 
recommendations for BSS would be turned down. Here it is clear that the 
interpretations of 'who' is best suited for BSS is a dichotomous process. On the one 
hand, solicitors will generally attempt to get the best possible result for their clients. If 
this means requesting BSS as a condition of bail perceived to be a better result than a 
possible remand into custody then solicitors will, without doubt, attempt to pursue 
that youth justice outcome. On the other hand, a BSS worker might not believe that 
the young person in front of the magistrates will benefit from this intervention. Such 
knowledge might be grounded upon previous instances where the young person may 
have come onto BSS and has comprehensively failed in keeping to the conditions set 
by BSS. In such cases BSS will be withdrawn as a condition of bail and the young 
person may end up being 'remanded' by magistrates who ultimately make the 
decisions as what remand management scenario will be best suited in each case. 
In such instances BSS might attempt to protect itself from potential 
recrimination by magistrates who might view BSS as unmerited or unjust and not 
worthy as a form of youthjustice intervention. However, competing interests 
between young people and their solicitors (aiming for the best possible result) and 
BSS workers (with the young person's welfare at heart-but weighted by selected 
targeting of the intervention) mean that somewhere in the middle of this often 
competing youthjustice dilemma sit the magistrates who make the decisions that, 
whatever the outcome, will possibly have detrimental effects upon individuals. For 
example, if the young person is remanded both the solicitor and the BSS Project can 
be viewed as failing in their intended objectives. For solicitors in such circumstances, 
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'word gets around' amongst potential and some of the more well-heeled young 
offenders used to the processes at court and other areas of the youth justice system. In 
such circumstances there is the possibility that the young people will consider their 
options and go elsewhere for legal representation. For the BSS Project the deficit is 
far clearer. It failed in applying its intended services and aims in reducing the 
possibility of being remanded. 
A further important aspect of the accommodation issue also requires a very 
brief assessment at this point. Many of the young people who went in front of the 
magistrates at pre-court hearings did not have suitable bail addresses to go onto BSS. 
Often these young people had been turned out of their homes by their parents. In a 
number of cases local authority accommodation was not believed to a suitable place 
of accommodation due to previous episodes of absconding from the care of the local 
authority care home or issues of 'contamination' by prolific young offenders onto 
other young residents with no previous histories of offending. Here, it was widely 
accepted that some of the more persistent young offenders 'preyed' upon younger and 
often more gullible young people to engage with offending behaviour. Despite some 
of the alleged offences of being amongst the minor-tariff scale, for example, a petty 
shoplift, young people in such situations, simply because of the lack of suitable 
accommodation issue had been remanded to prison. Again, such examples highlight, 
and are recognised within those at the practice and management level of youth justice 
service delivery (but rarely spoken about openly beyond the system of youth justice), 
the restrictions currently in place in dealing with young offenders in a far more 
positive method of supervision and potential correction. 
Beyond the policy shortcomings of the system there lies a far more emotive 
issue. In March 2002,2,915 young people were held in secure accommodation of 
which 2,713 were boys and were 202 girls. Of these, 86 per cent (2,379 boys and 118 
girls) were kept in Young offender Institutions and 14 per cent (334 boys and 84 
girls) in non-Prison Service accommodation such as local authority secure 
accommodation (Social Exclusion Unit, 2002: 41). Clearly the remand 
accommodation issue is an area within the youth justice system which requires a 
great deal more focus upon. There was little scope to provide a thorough discussion 
of this aspect of the breakdown of mechanisms within the cogs of the youth justice 
system. However, what has been provided here will go some small way in 
highlighting an intrinsic short-coming of the current system. 
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The court users group (I attended two of these meetings) was a body of 
agencies which came together regularly to address issues that made impacts upon 
those agencies that were represented at youth courts in the area. They include the 
police, magistrates, probation service, local YOS, clerks to the courts, CPS and 
defence solicitors. On the basis of their empirical research, Crawford and Jones 
(1995) found that the structural conflict to be found within inter-agency partnership 
work is an absence of, rather than the presence, of overt conflict. This absence arises, 
they suggest, from creative strategies that circumvent conflicts and, "Rather than 
being aired or resolved, conflict is avoided" (Crawford, 1998: 177). This was a 
common trait I observed with heated complaints bounding around the BSS office 
about the police, magistrates, probation, and social services (particularly the Family 
Services section of this agency). Liddle and Gelsthorpe are quite correct in stating, 
"Relations between particular agencies involved in multi-agency crime prevention are 
highly complicated, seldom static, and influenced by a variety of institutional, 
individual and local/historical factors" (1994: 26). These often conflicting influences 
were found in my own study to be inherent not only at the inter-agency level but also 
at the infra-agency stages. 
Table Nine 
All England and Wales Remand Episodes 01/01/01 to 31/12/01 
Age RC RS Total 
15 41 274 -, )Is 
16 584 147 736 
17 1,339 95 1,452 
Total 1,966 516 2,506 
(Home Oftice, 2002) 
As the above table demonstrates the RC (Remands to Custody) far outweigh tile 
RS (remands to local authority Secure Accommodation) numbers. The above table presents 
the crux of the problem faced by local authorities when dealing with young offenders who 
are deemed to be a risk to the public and/or to them selves. In such situations magistrates, 
under guidance from the government, are expected to place these young people in some 
fon-n of 'secure accommodation' (either secure local authority units/accomi-nodation or 
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Young Offenders Institutions). The lesser of the two evils is widely recognised and 
supported as being secure accommodation provided by local authorities. The discussion 
within this chapter has focused upon a range of inherent problems and conflicts within the 
system which often and for a range of contributory factors sees young people being 
remanded into prison. It is evident that there are a number of inter-related and quite 
complex issues at play here in the continued over-reliance upon prison remands' within the 
youth justice system. 
Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the problems associated by those working within 
the system in delivering welfare focused remand facilities for young people. As has been 
discussed, the issue of remand foster carers, local authority secure and un-secure 
accommodation and the often desperate reliance by the system upon remands into prison as 
a way to plug the gaps in official state provision of accommodation services for young 
people engaged with the youthjustice system. At court when BSS is considered unsuitable 
as an intervention the remand management strategy takes another form recourse that 
attempts to reduce the potential for remands into custody. However, as has been discussed 
the strategy is compromised by a range of inadequacies inherent within the youth justice 
system that limit the potential of welfare-orientated discourse from operating at its intoned 
level of involvement. 
In the following chapter we examine the overall findings of BSS delivery. This 
chapter brings the key elements of the preceding and inter-connected youthjustice 
discussions to the focus of bail supervision and support's intended aims and objectives. 
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Chapter Seven 
Bail Supervision & Support in Practice: The 
Findings 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of two and a half years of research of the BSS 
project. Here, the aims and objectives of bail supervision and support as an intrinsic 
factor of the youth justice system, aimed at offering an alternative community based 
supervision intervention for young people to magistrates are considered. 
As has been discussed in the preceding chapters, BSS does not operate in 
isolation from a range of intertwined components situated within the youth justice 
system. As the findings of the evaluation have already been provided elsewhere (for 
full details see Hornsby, 2000a; 2000b; 200 1 a; 200 1 b; 2002) and due to limitations in 
word-length of the overall thesis, I have been selective in presenting the policy 
orientated findings of the evaluation process 36 . In the provision of 
key areas of 
findings relating to the success or otherwise of BSS in meeting its organisational 
aims, a number of inherent areas of the project's objectives are reviewed. As the 
participants within the BSS project play a fundamental role in providing their shared 
experiences of delivering youth justice, it is perhaps correct to provide an overview 
of the lay out of the BSS office. It was here that much of the participant observation 
and interaction for obtaining the data were obtained, and upon which key areas of this 
study are based. However, this section of the thesis does not deal only with the 
ethnographic approach in obtaining data gained from my interaction with workers at 
the project. In this chapter the triangulation of data sources are applied. In a number 
of interweaving ways qualitative and quantitative data are coupled, often referred to 
as to as 'mixed strategies' (Douglas, 1976) or 'multi-strategy research' (Bryman, 
1988) as a method to validate the findings. Such a methodological approach has been 
recommended elsewhere as a useful strategy to further support research findings 
(Webb et al. 1966, Denzin, 1970, Bryman, 1988,1992, May, 1993; Bottoms, 2000). 
36 These reports can be obtained in fiiU from Nacro's BA Supemision Dissemination Unit and the author of this thesis. 
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In using this methodological approach, emphasis is placed upon observational, 
interview and self-completion questionnaires. The project's recorded process outputs 
(in evaluation terms the 'things' that needed to be done by B SS to achieve its aim) 
and the outcomes (the resources available to complete specific pieces of work 
intended to meet those project aims [see, Patton, 1988]) were also analyzed. In 
deploying this strategy the aim is to provide theoretical insight into the 
'interconnections between different parts of the complex world' (Bottoms, 2000: 21) 
of B SS and those complexities within the youth j ustice system that BSS as a youth 
justice intervention intended to manage. 
Below is a diagram of the BSS office and its key-players. My location within 
it was an essential ingredient and method to obtain much of the data that is used to 
gain views from the 'first-hand experience' (Atkinson et aL 2001: 4)) of those at the 
frontline of this particular form of youth justice intervention. 
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Diagram Four 
The Office: The Key Players 
Jack 
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From the above diagram It Should be clear that 1rom nly owil location within 
the office (R. H. ) I was well positioned to hear and observe the daily interactions and 
rituals that occurred in the delivery of youth justice. 
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Paras, Bangers, and Other Pragmatic Youth Offending Conflicts 
Within the office some members of the team played far more active participant roles 
than others. My location within the office opened up areas of organizational tensions 
and resistance during a period of rapidly changing contexts within youth justice 
delivery, and this enabled access to observe a range of overlapping experiences and 
insights. 
For example, Geoff37 had, for some time, decorated the wall behind his desk 
with a large poster of the leather clad, hot-panted, crop-topped and Botex induced 
pouting celebrity Pamela Anderson. Prior to the evaluation he was asked to remove 
the offending Ms Anderson from his wall. 
Geoff. [Narrating the story] Belle [the Head of the new YOS] comes in to the 
office and looks at the picture, she'd seen it before and I knew she was uncomfortable 
with it, but she never had the balls to say anything about it. Anyway, she comes in 
one day and tells me it's inappropriate. I mean, what's inappropriate about Pammy? 
She'sJucking gorgeous [slaps the back of his head in an Eric Morecombe style 
comedy sketch routine]. She'd been up therefor well over a year but as she [Belle] 
was now 'Head ofService'in the new supa-doopa Youth Offending Service she 
considered Pammy as'inappropriate. 
Geoff combated the newly installed political correctness that was being 
implemented (although how he got away with this prior to that moment is any one's 
guess) at the project in his own distinct manner. 'Right, fuck her I thought. I've got 
something else that will rile her'. Geoff was also a volunteer Warrant Officer in the 
Territorial Army (TA). He had earned his 'wings' as a parachutist and took great 
pride in the fact that he had trained with and was a member of the 4 th Battalion 
Parachute TA Regiment. Following Ms. Anderson's enforced departure he brought 
to the office and stuck on all the available wall space around his workstation, posters, 
photographs and drawings of camouflaged men in maroon berets leaping out 
aeroplanes and posing menacingly with self-loading automatic rifles . His piece 
de 
resistance was a Royal Air Force Airfix model aeroplane suspended from the ceiling 
by a piece of cotton. Dangling from the aeroplane were scaled models of 
37 Geoff was also a Union Representative for local authority workers employed in Sunderland and at the YOS. 
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paratroopers, parachutes opened and sailing downward towards the battlefield that 
was Geoff s desk. Geoff s comer of the organization was turned into something that 
more resembled an army recruitment office than a workplace occupied by a social 
worker within the youth justice system. 
Geoff: I know she thinks this [pointing upwards to his suspended brothers in 
arms] is inappropriate as well, but she can't dofuck all about it, can she? What's 
she going to say? That she thinks my open support and involvement with the army is 
inappropriate? I don't think so. It drives herfucking mad and I know it. That's the 
whole point of it. Bye-bye Pammy - Hello boys! Watch herface next time she comes 
over here and walks into this room, she hates all this [pointing to the 4 th Battalion of 
the Parachute Regiment carrying out its planned assault on the local YOS]. She looks 
like she's sucking a lemon when she sees it. 
Such internal conflicts of 'micro-level practice' (Harris and Webb, 1987) 
within organisational systems are compounded by the fact that those working within 
organisations recognise the reality of having to work together, despite 'contradictory 
elements that create various kinds of role conflicts' (Morgan, 1986: 157). These 
conflicts brought the complexity of delivering youth justice to life. Such personality 
clashes often transgressed the 'micro' occupational relationships and appeared at the 
4mezzo' practice level, which put workers at odds with managerial and organisational 
politics (ibid. ). 
What follows are deeply rooted and contextualised understandings of 
working within the organisation and attempting to deliver youthjustice. The reader 
may be hard pushed to find anything from within the youth justice system and studies 
of it, that provide such negative views of the potential of roles and the operation of 
the system intent at turning around known young offenders' criminal behaviour. 
Jack was a welfare assistant at the project. His role, within the division of labour at 
the project, was generally to run around with, and after young offenders who came 
onto BSS. As he viewed his role, 'I'm the youthjustice delivery boy'. He did bail 
visits, passed on information regarding young people to other professionals, did court 
duty attendance and also fetched and carried young offenders to court when their 
parents, because, as Jack viewed such situations 'can't be arsed to turn up at court to 
deal with their kid's behaviour. See what we're dealing with here, Rob? What type 
ofparent doesn't turn up at court to deal with their kid's offending behaviour? 
Society's misfits, that's what. ' 
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In his early thirties, Jack lived in the town with his schoolteacher girlfriend 
and possessed enough local knowledge to offer assessment of the town's rougher 
working-class element that he dealt with on a daily basis. Six foot tall and constantly 
watching his weight because, as Geoff often reminded him (and others within the 
office environment) that Jack, 'Used to be a bit ofa bloater, a reet [right] fat bastard 
was Jack there. We... well me really, used to call him Dinners. Done well though in 
keeping offthe weight, that he has'. Jack was dapper and the only youth offending 
worker I knew of who wore Armani suits, Dolce and Gabanna glasses, and a 
hundred-pound pair of shoes. Jack pitied many of the young offenders he had to 
work with, others he despised. He also thought the town he lived and worked in was, 
in Jack's words, 'overflowing with shit'. 
Jack: The thing about Sunderland Rob, is that unlike say Durham or 
Newcastle, no matter how nice or, at least decent your own street might be in the 
town [Sunderland], you're only a stones throw awayfrom the shite that's scattered 
all over this town. I mean look at the place. It'sjull ofshit. The town centre's a 
fucking disgrace, the people are scruffy, the shops are shit and it'sjull ofcharvas. 
Sunderland's the charva capital ofthe world. It's cheap, low-rent stuff. What was it 
your professor was told when you came upfor that meeting? 
R. H: A woman told him it wasjull ofpasty eating scum. 38 
Jack [Laughing]: That's afucking great description ofthe place. Spot on, 
that. The kids we deal with, andIreally believe this, is thatfor about eightyper cent 
ofthem there is absolutely nothing we do that will make a major difference. The vast 
majority ofthem comefrom shite, theirfamilles are shite and the kids themselves turn 
intoshite. It's like a culture thing. You're the sociologist you tell me what it is if it's 
not that then? 
Geoff. Aye, that's spot on my son. Here, I'll let into a little trade secret Rob. 
See what you got here Rob, in this youthjustice system? It's like a sausagefactory. 
At one endyou got all the shit that goes into making cheap, nasty bangers. All the 
offal, gristle, cock and balls, all that nasty stuffthat's padded out with stale 
breadcrumbs that no one else will touch or can do anything with. [Now performing 
an ad hoc demonstration] So, all that shite trying to pass itselfoffas meat is dumped 
offat one end We then, just likefactory workers, push the stop through the entrance 
38 In October 1999, my supervisor, co-supcrvisor and my self were invited to the Sunderland YOS for meeting for the 
role of evaluating the BSS project. My supervisor and co-supervisor had arrived early to the town and called into a bakers 
in the town centre to buy a sandwich to cat before meeting up with me to attend the meeting. While standing in the 
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point ofthis sausage machine. Inside there [pointing to the imaginary machine he 
was demonstrating his point with, by way of an impromptu rendition of a butcher-all 
that was missing was a straw boater and a blue and white stripped apron] it gets 
churned around, moulded and shaped into something that will hopefullyfit the bill of 
what a sausage, or in this case, a decent human-being might look like. Then, hey 
presto, it'sforced out the other end wrapped up in a protective skin and sent on its 
waytowherever. The problem is that inside that skin you've still got the same shite 
ingredients that were there when itfirst came in. We send them away and the 
chances are that within a short space oftime, surrounded by the mush [the raw 
ingredients] that made them into that scanky mess in thefirstplace, the skins come off 
and we're back to square one again. Never mind eh, justpush 'em back through the 
machine again. (Fieldnotes: March 2000) 
Geoff, as with others at the project, was quite aware that with significant 
numbers of the most persistent young offenders the system, at that time 
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, had its 
limitations. That 'skanky mess' Geoff referred to lay beyond the parameters of the 
youthjustice system and was situated within wider structural contexts of societal 
relations themselves. Disassociation from education and the labour market, and 
hedonistic leisurely pursuits (Downes, 1966) often brought them into contact with the 
police and subsequently the youthjustice system (see Hornsby, forthcoming). 
Professional perceptions of the limitations of criminal justice policy desires for 'quick 
fix solutions' (Smith, 2003: 193) in dealing with a sub-culture that represented many, 
if not most, of young offenders they dealt with. These divisions within society 
produce a significant minority being brought up within the 'compound social 
dislocations' of a culmination of 'drug misuse, family violence, teenage pregnancy, 
children taken into care and school failure' (Hope, 1998: 52). 
Such dislocations from the mainstream of society, as others have 
convincingly argued, remain embedded within offending related cultural dislocation 
of factors associated with what is now commonly termed as social exclusion (Wilson, 
1987; Davis, 1990; Anderson, 1992; Wacquant, 1996; Madinapour, 1998; Young, 
1999; Pitts, 2001 a; Social Exclusion Unit, 2002). YOTs are expected via a multitude 
queue a local female customer noted his cockney accent and asked him where he came from. She replied, thinking he was 
g imm'. just a Iondoner visiting the town, 'Yom don ý want to stV amond km in Sunderlandpet, i6full qfpasty eafin 
39 At that point in time the local YOS had not began its intervention of Intensive Supervision and Support Programme 
OSSIý which would aim to provide far greater levels of survciUance and interventions which attempted to offer a more 
credible alternative to custody. 
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of methods and interventions, to fill and attempt to correct these damaging aspects of 
young offender's life styles. However, for many of the participants involved with this 
research, the professional and structural limitations of the system were recognised. 
As we have seen in an earlier chapter relating to John-Jon's remand to a 
Y01, for an offence that he did not commit and indeed that did not occur, the system 
was not equipped to provide a less severe (i. e. secure accommodation or remand 
foster placement) pre-trial outcome. 'Out-there' amongst the lived realities of 
poverty and social exclusion, bigger and far more complicated components and issues 
than the provision of a placement suitable for a vulnerable child require addressing. 
Most of the young people entering into the machinery of Youth Justice came from the 
poorest sectors of the populace and constituted to what Byrne (1999) has described as 
the 'reserve army of [working class] labour'. Many experienced and lived with a 
multitude of associated offending related risk factors (see, Graham and Bowling, 
1995; Farrington1996, YJB, 2001 a) such as family difficulties, low educational 
attainment, truancy from school and outright rejection of education, mental ill-health, 
alcohol and drug abuse, poor housing and low income (YJB, 200 1 b, 200 1 c). They 
also committed a magnitude of criminal offences that often went well beyond what 
could constitute (generally) working-class youth low-level deviance. Many were 
well 'at it'. The potential to 'repair' such fundamental contributing factors associated 
with the BSS project's offending target group, was widely recognised by staff as 
generally being beyond the potential of any 'quick fix'. As Russell, one of the newly 
recruited BSOs who generally toed the new policy line by adhering to the emphasis 
on 'good practice' explained: 
How do I know ffmy practice will make a difference? To befrank, I don't 
know. It might not. I'm more than aware that with some ofthe kids I don't and they 
just go through the motions. But, it might be that in a year or, perhaps infive years 
time, they might say 'I remember what Russell said and now it makes sense. Now I'm 
going to change, now's the time to start anew and change direction. 
(Interview: February 2002) 
Practitioners recognition of the limitations of the new youth justice system, it 
might be expected, would fail to appease many of the concerns raised in the highly 
politicised debates relating to Youth Justice (Newbum, 1997; 1998; Goldson, 1999b, 
2000b; Muncie, 1999 (Ch. 6); Pitts, 2001b; Muncie and Hughes, 2002b; Smith, 
2003). As Muncie has argued, this 'process of public sector managerialization' has 
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involved 'the redefinition of political, economic and social issues as problems to be 
managed rather than necessarily resolved' (1999: 288). As has been discussed above, 
the workers on the frontline were quite aware that there were issues involved in 
addressing and correcting criminal behaviours that they had little control over (Pitts, 
2001 a: 109). As Yvette suggested: 
We can only do so much, ofcourse and that has always been the case. We 
attempt to recognise the risk- associatedfactors and where possible offer potential 
interventions that reduce those risks. But, these kids, ifwe can keep them out of 
prison, have to go home, go back to their communities and streets where the outlook 
on life can be, and often is, very differentfrom our perspectives of 'right' or 'wrong'. 
Ifthe male partner in the home is a drunk; beats hispartner and the kids in the house, 
and let's say the home is generally chaotic we're limited as to what we can do there 
aren't we? If the boundaries are loose or non - existent we can advice the parent 
they need tightening but really that's all we can offer. Thefact that afifteen-year old 
more or less represents himseý(in such situations, when he has to present himsetf 
here [at the BSS office] without a parent being with him perhaps says something. 
But, and by and large that's the norm. 
I mean, the session you sat in this morning with Billy [a persistent young 
offender] you heard what home was likefor him. He'sfifteen, no education, drinks 
and takes drugs every night ofthe week comes home at two or three in the morning, 
sometimesjust doesn't make it home. He's been in care, police are always at his 
door, his mates are offenders, no one works and it's a chaotic lifestyle, notjust in his 
house but throughout the estate, this is the way the world is. His Mam thinks that's 
ok that'sfine, that's the way she was brought up. The problemsfaced by these 
young kids are not individual issues. It's much wider than that. Other thingsfeed 
into these young kids that are, to be honest, beyond the scope ofwhat others within 
the team, or I can cure. 
(Yvette: Interview, December 200 1) 
The quest for addressing and turning around the problematic behaviour of 
young offenders identified by the system is of course an honourable and indeed 
needed function of social control. Yet, the depth and scale of such individual and 
cultural disassociation from mainstream practices suggests that the system will 
continue to flounder in attempting to meet its intended aims (Pitts, 200 1 a). 
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However, there is, particularly at policy and management levels, much self- 
congratulatory hyperbole relating to the triumphs of the system (Burnett and 
Appleton, 2004). This 'air-brushing' out of the flaws within the system is at odds 
with the practice of delivering youthjustice, and impacting upon those factors which 
workers such as Yvette, Gregg et al. recognise as being associated with continued 
offending. 
In the following section of this chapter I will examine a number of 
significant areas of BSS provisions which are aimed at curtailing the offending 
behaviour of its target group of young people 40 . The aim and objectives of the 
project were to offer a range of interventions to limit the risk of offending by its 
target group and to promote the project to a range of stakeholders connected to BSS. 
Promoting the Project 
The YOS and BSS project made a number of attempts to promote the intervention to 
essential stakeholders. The YOS delivered 'Bail Support and Remand Project - 
Informationfor Professionals' to magistrates and clerks of the courts in the district, 
and to the police and solicitors firms. Similarly, leaflets were also designed and 
distributed for young people targeted for the BSS. It is important to understand that 
the project required its acceptance to a range of inter-connected agencies concerned 
with young peoples re-offending whilst on bail, and to promote the use of YOS and 
reduce other remand decisions. 
In particular the project made a determined effort to inform magistrates, clerks 
of the courts and defence solicitors of the aims, objectives and beneflts of the BSS 
project. This occurred by way of invitation to a seminar presented by senior 
managers and BSOs from the project. Attendance by solicitors was better than 
expected and was well received. Surprisingly, no magistrates or clerks to the court 
from the two magistrates' courts in the city made the effort to attend this seminar4l. 
Although, significant progress had been made by the BSS project in improving levels 
of communication and information sharing between the project and courts, there was 
a strong feeling that the courts in the area were unenthusiastic in engaging with the 
project. 
40 In this chapter not all of aspects of the service delivery, are provided. For a thorough analysis of the BSS 
projeces intended aims and objectives see Hornsby 2000a, 2000b, 2001 a, 2001b, 2002. 
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There's A Hole in My Bucket 
During the last two phases of the evaluation, of the two youth courts in the area, one 
agreed to participate in a focus-group interview schedule. The other youth court 
failed to acknowledge or, communicate with the research. Verbal and written 
requests (six in total) for interviews with magistrates and clerks to the courts, 
requested by me in my role as the University of Durham's local evaluator of the 
project were unanswered and/or ignored. The absence of magistrates and clerks to 
the justices in the area invited to attend the BSS project seminar demonstrated the 
difficulties the project faced in its adaptation of the much heralded 'multi-agency' 
approach in tackling local youth crime 42 . As George put 
it: 
Well what can you do? Ifthey [the magistrates] won't play, they won't play. 
Wejust have to keepplugging away at it and hopefully in time we'll win them over. 
But, with that lot [the magistrates'] it really doesn't surprise me, as much ofthe time, 
for me anyway, Ifeel we'rejustpissing into the wind when we [BSS/youth justice] try 
to bring anything new in to deal with the remands [into custody] that they continually 
rely upon. It would take a lot more than some halr-arsed seminar to change their 
opinions anyway. 
R. H: So how does the project [BSS] overcome this? I mean, what do you do to 
win them [magistrates'] over and change that culture ... those opinions? 
George: You'd have to ask the magistrates that one Rob. We've asked them to 
attend a seminar to try and negotiate and educate them about what we intend to do 
with BSS, to improve its standing with the courts, but theyjust didn't turn up. 
R. H: Well, as you know I've bent over backwards to try to get into the 
Sunderland court to interview them and get their views but... 
(George: Interview, November 200 1). 
I stopped. George had a wry smile on his face. He started humming the tune of 
a song that I hadn't heard since I was six or seven years of age. The tune was from 
Harry Belafonte's cover of the satirical song 'There's a Hole in My Bucket. It took 
me a moment to recognise the tune and as to what it meant in context at that 
42 See University of Durham (2001 a) 'Local E. )aernal Evaluadon Report Number Three. The Sundffland Youth 
Ofendmg Service lntýgated Bail S4, erýijvon and Support Service' 
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particular moment in time. It sank in. George and I both burst out laughing. The 
situation had turned into a farce. The interview ended. 
Despite regular 'court-user group' meetings with a range of partnerships 
involved with BSS (the courts, the BSS project, police and probation) it was evident 
despite the official rhetoric of the partnership approach, where the aim of each partner 
agency was to be an 'active co-producers of crime prevention and public safety" 
(Crawford 1998: 169), the various partners, remained organisationally and culturally 
segregated. As Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994) suggest: 
Although terms such as 'inter-agency' 'co-operation' and 
'partnership' enjoy a wide currency in the crime prevention field, 
they tend to suggest that relations between agencies involved in 
multi-agency work are more straightforward than they usually are in 
practice. As participants in multi-agency work are usually quick to 
recognise, agencies having an interest in crime prevention seldom 
share the same priorities, working practices, definitions of the 
problem, power or resource base. 
(1994: 2) 
There has been considerable research undertaken at magistrate's courts' 
(see for example, Carlen, 1976; Burney, 1979; Baldwin, 1985; Parker, et at. 1989; 
Brown, 1991), and all of those studies were successful, both in gaining substantive 
access and in providing useful insights into a range of important issues regarding the 
organisational culture of the courts. From my own perspective I was granted two- 
hours of the magistrate's undivided attention, by way of two interviews and a focus 
groups of five magistrates. The data obtained were useful as 'guiding points' to plan 
for later interviews. However, and as has been discussed in earlier chapters, the 
magistrates simply failed to participate in a substantive manner. 
Access was blocked by the local courts' apparent disinterest in 'opening up' and 
discussing in detail the connections with the outcomes (intended and unintended) of 
BSS. This area of the research was potentially one of the most significant areas of 
this research, and sought to interview the decision-makers involved in this critical 
stage of the youthjustice process. In attempting to gain access to the courts and 
researching variations in the acceptance of bail decisions (see, for example, King 
1981) this area of the study can only be regarded as a failure. Althoughthe 
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evaluation was 'officially sponsored', or as Parker et al. suggest 'bona fide' (1989: 
38) one of the local courts simply failed to acknowledge, despite numerous requests, 
for its continued involvement with the research. The other court agreed in principle, 
but this came towards the end of the research and thus limited the potential to fully 
exploit this access. However, the research did gain (accompanied) access to the 
'semi-private world of the court' (ibid: 37) and selected observations have been 
utilised (again see, for example, John-Jon's pre-trial case in an earlier chapter) in 
order to demonstrate areas of structural weaknesses in the BSS. 
Conducting empirical research in areas of the delivery of law and youth 
justice policies has been described by Baldwin and Davis as involving "the study, 
through direct methods rather than secondary sources, of the institutions, rules, 
procedures, and personnel of the law, with a view to understanding how they operate 
and what effects they have" (2003: 880-881). For youthjustice policy, for example 
bail supervision and support, involving a disparate range of non-complimentary 
organizational and multi-agency aims and objectives there remains a continued need 
for 'Rigorous empirical research of law and the institutions of law as they operate is 
needed to underpin many areas of legal and social policy' (Nuffield Foundation, 
2004: 6, original emphasis). As has been discussed above, my own study failed to 
'underpin' how variations in the acceptance of BSS by the courts may have occurred. 
The absence of empirical data relating to the decision-making processes that 
occurred in the courts is regrettable. Particularly as others have suggested that in the 
early stages of the implementation of the Crime and Disorder 1998 the courts would 
have far greater powers to remand suspected young offenders (Children's Society, 
1999; Monaghan, 2000; Moore, 2000). In assessing potential remand decisions and 
in weighing up the perceived potential of BSS as an intervention the courts have to 
consider: 
... what constitutes a 'violent offence', a 'recent history of 
absconding', 'serious harm' and 'vulnerability'. In the face of robust 
applications from the Crown Prosecution Service, a probable history 
of failing to complete a final warning and often, an apparent failure 
to apply with bail conditions, the new youth court will be placed 
under ever-increasing pressure to lock children up on remand. 
Moreover, such pressure will only be exacerbated by the extremely 
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limited range of local authority accommodation or, in some cases, 
the complete absence of the same. 
(Monaghan, 2000: 148) 
Again, in reminding the reader of John-Jon's earlier experience at court seems to me 
to be fitting, as it is a case study that perhaps epitomizes what can and does go wrong 
when the interconnection of mechanisms within the system grind to a halt. In such 
situations there is a real threat that jail, not bail, beckons. 
Staffing, Structure and Competing Cultures 
The Bail Supervision and Support project was an integrated core programme of the 
YOS at Sunderland. For the Sunderland Youth Offending Service 'integrated 
approach' in dealing with young offenders, the BSS project was fundamental to this 
advancement. Staff funding at the Project was received not only from the Youth 
Justice Board, but also from other partnerships associated with the project, including 
the local authority Social Services Department and the Probation Service. The BSS 
project worked closely with the YOS in areas of standards, at both national and local 
practice levels, and in the use of data to provide a 'joined-up' approach in dealing 
with young offenders. 
The areas of significant difficulty encountered by the BSS project during the 
overall evaluation were as follows: 
1. The recruitment of staff 
2. The strategic and operational planning of the project 
3. The use of quality information for internal evaluation purposes 
4. The level of guidance proposed and accepted by magistrates in the area 
The BSS project, it was acknowledged by the Youth Offending Service, 
suffered during the earlier stages of implementation, in the recruitment of ideal 
candidates for the role of Bail Support Officers. Although this was eventually 
overcome it did have an effect on the envisaged strategy of the project. 
This challenging area was further complicated by the secondment of the 
existing operations manager of the BSS project, to another Youth Justice Board 
venture. Although the project was well informed of the challenges ahead for bail 
supervision and support under the guidance from the YJB, the 'Bail Supervision, 
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Support and Remand Project' as it was named at this time, was poorly prepared and 
unclear of a coherent local strategy to tackle the challenges that lay ahead. 
The secondment of the previous 'bail support' manager from the BSS project, 
which at that time was undergoing a major conversion in the expected approach for 
the delivery of bail supervision and support, occurred at a crucial period in the 
development of the 'new' BSS project. The project was, at this critical 
developmental stage without an operations manager for approximately eight months. 
The outcome of this significant problem became apparent during interviews 
with staff and through participant observation techniques. The local evaluation found 
evidence that at the strategic level of planning the development of the project's 
intended outcomes and outputs and of senior level management input was found to be 
wanting. Interviews conducted during earlier stages of the evaluation, found that the 
newly recruited BSOs, themselves not yet accomplished in their understanding of 
both practical and legal issues surrounding the youth justice system, were in the 
unsatisfactory position of attempting to design the development of the 'new' Bail 
Supervision and Support project. Although senior and experienced personnel at the 
BSS project and the YOS were involved in the development of BSS, the level and 
quality of professional guidance in this key area of development were neither clear 
nor efficient at the operational level. 
The subsequent dilemmas were clearly a consequence of the problems 
encountered by the YOS in the recruitment of the ideal candidate for the Operations 
management post. The difficulties experienced by the project at this time were 
severe and were recognised as: 
" An impact upon the organizational arrangements 
" An impact upon the implementation of organizational innovations 
A lack of literature on the planned organizational changes 
A failure of the administration at the YOS in the implementation strategy 
regarding the above 
A decline in staff motivation to implement the innovation of the BSS project 
Resulting in, strain and fatigue of more senior and experienced staff in dealing 
with increased workloads and responsibilities due, in the main, to the absence for 
a significant period of the project development stage of an Operations Manager. 
It was recognised that the difficulties encountered during the early stages of 
the local evaluation were beginning to be overcome due to the Operations Manager 
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taking post and a more focused strategy being in place in order to develop the BSS 
project projects and interventions. However, there remained conflict between 
middle-level management and "shop-floor" workers concerning the selection of the 
candidate for this post. Experienced workers had little faith in the new appointee's 
credentials and experience in running, what they perceived as, a highly complex area 
of youth justice delivery. 
George: Id rather have you running the show than that useless bastard [the 
new manager]. No offence intended with that by the way Rob. But, she knowsJuck 
all about it [BSS]. Ifthat's the best they [local YOS management] can do, then we're 
allfucked. 
A mid-level. manager at the YOS expressed a different point of view "It's a 
service delivery andyou don't have to be well-versed in the ins and outs oftoo many 
details in the provision ofBSS in order to provide that service. IfI thought there was 
a suitable candidate who was a super-market managerfor that, or any other post, Id 
give them thejob. It's about the management ofpersonnel and making them provide 
a service to its best effect. " 
Such disparity and conflict between management and frontline workers was 
commonplace. Such grounded internal discord within youth justice has, to date, 
rarely been considered. In observing the unfolding of organisational flux and 
transformation from within the youth justice system, it was evident that the cultural 
and practical upheavals requested and sanctioned by the Audit Commission (1996; 
1997), the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the YJB (2001 a, 2002), were somewhat 
naive in their respective understandings of the internal conflicts that such 
fundamental organisational issues of interests, conflict and power would involve. 
In essence, the difficulties that have been briefly discussed at earlier stages of this 
thesis, relating to 'partnerships' and 'joined-up thinking' strategies, with regard to 
how to deal with youth crime under the umbrella of the new youth justice system, 
were compounded by the internal agency conflicts that also ensued during the same 
period of time. 
Within the organisation of the local YOS there were many different and 
competing value systems which, under the guidance of the 1998 Crime and Disorder 
Act created 'a mosaic of organizational realities rather than a uniform corporate 
culture' (Morgan, 1986: 127). As we have seen, the frontline workers delivering BSS 
wanted a "boss" who understood the many legal and practical issues involved in 
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providing BSS. They wanted, and believed the job required someone who had dirtied 
their hands in delivering BSS. The senior (and mid-level) management of the YOS 
viewed the situation differently. The belief was that someone with limited knowledge 
of bail law, but with the credentials to drive through reforms and make the workers 
toe the new organisational line would and adhere to the managerialism agenda (Pitts, 
2000; Newburn, 2002). As Blau has noted in his thesis of organisational change: 
Social cohesion enables the members of a group to institute 
adjustments that finther their interest. These adjustments will, 
however, not advance the objectives of the organization, if operating 
employees feel that their interest conflicts with that of management. 
(1969: 397) 
During, what should be considered as the initial period of YJB involvement, 
in the full implementation of the managerialism strategy of the overall direction of the 
new youth justice system, it was evident from observations and interviews with staff 
at the project, that a conflict of operational interests were embedded within the 
delivery of BSS. With a focus upon partnership approaches implemented by the local 
YOS and then directed down-wards onto workers at the frontline delivery end of 
youth justice, many workers experienced a distinct sense of alienation. 
Jack: That bloody session yesterday was a waste oftime. [Laughing] Bail 
Asset what a load ofbollocks. I'm going to shame myselfhere. When that woman 
was talking and trying to demonstrate the use of it, the best I could was to keep my 
friggin'eyes open. Honestly, Ifeel asleep three times during the session. I haven't got 
afuckin' clue what she was talking about. I can't remember a thing about it. A lot of 
use I'm going to be aren't I? 
George: You're not the only one mate. It was about as useful as a chocolate 
fireguard, These sessions [instruction seminars] they're sending us on... ifyou gave 
me a one-sidedpiece ofnote-paper I couldn'tfill it with information about the new 
practices we should be delivering and monitoring. 
Pam: I'm lost in it all. I haven't got a clue 
(Fieldnotes, April 2001) 
245 
'Fucking Paper Work': Bail Asset 
'Bail Asset A3 information was comprehensively and routinely collected at all youth 
court hearings by the project members acting in their capacities of Court Duty 
OfficerS44 . This aspect of the project's 
delivery was intended to provide a crucial 
'safety-net' to limit the possibility of slippages of young suspects into the harsher and 
more intrusive elements of the youth justice system (for example, a remand into 
custody). Court Duty Officers from the BSS were present at all scheduled youth 
court hearings and on-call for unscheduled youth appearances at magistrate court 
hearings, in order to make assessments of the suitability of young people for BSS. 
This aspect of the service delivery also offered the potential to provide the courts 
with alternatives to remanding young people if the courts' considered that the young 
people before them might have posed a significant risk to their communities, and 
other viable options may not have been suitable. 
In providing assessment of the perceived risk posed by young offender, Bail 
Asset is a mechanism intended to measure and classify individual's requirements for 
specific interventions available within the cuffent system (Smith, 2003). The longer 
serving members within the BSS team viewed the situation relating to Bail Asset 
information gathering procedures in a different light to that of the YJB. 
Geoff. Fuckingpaper work; put that in your thesis! We spend more timefilling 
in bastardforms than we do in any shape orform doing quality work with kids, 
actually making an impact and doing ourjobs in helping them desistftom offending. 
Norm: You're right there, the kids are now well at the bottom of the pile. The 
paper work and the sheer amount of it we have tofill in and trudge through is now 
far more important than actually working with the kids. As long as the Youth Justice 
Board is getting the quantity ofyoung kids thefigures can be manipulated, there's 
little concern about the quality ofwork that actually goes in. 
Do you remember the days when we used to actually work with young 
offenders ... you know in a social workfocused approach to making 
differences in 
43 'Bail Assee Forms presented a detailed overview of assessment of the young person being referred to the 
BSS. For example, the form includes information relating to the young person's current legal status, home- 
life, and issues relating to vulnerability. 
44 National Standards are set for the YOT to maintain consistent court duty cover for all scheduled Youth 
Courts. 
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youngpeople's lives? These Bail Assets and them fucking PSRS 45 [Pre-sentence 
Reports] are a pain in the arse. 
Geoffi Tell me about it! I've had to write three ofthefucking things this week 
How much time have I spent with the scumlies? I'll tell ye, about two hours this 
week That's really going to make a difference to them isn't it? We're really going to 
change their offending behaviour sat on our arses writing reportsfor the magistrates. 
(Geoff and Norm: Fieldnotes, September 200 1) 
Geoff s seemingly contradictory attitude of what went before (i. e. the drive-by 
bail visits) to what was now occurring in delivering youthjustice (i. e. being bogged 
down in that 'fucking paper work') was common within the team, which understood 
that their previous professional and often autonomous working practices were being 
infiltrated and weakened by the new youth justice managerialism strategy (Newbum, 
1998). 
Geoff and Norm's disgruntled annoyance and reluctance with regard to the 
recording of data, is a concrete result of the managerialism shift in the organisation of 
the new youth justice system (Newbum, 199 8). As has been discussed at a number of 
previous stages of this thesis, the managerialism strategy (ibid. ) remained an 
incessant gripe of the new routine activity expected of the daily frontline activities 
expected of the ground troops involved in delivering youthjustice. Such conflicts 
were embedded within the pragmatic realities of delivering interventions, of making 
the job run as smoothly and as simply as was possible. The intended introduction of 
Asset forms within the new youth justice system, was directed towards the 
troutinization of practice' (Smith, 2003: 99) prior to 'any intervention ... made with a 
young person' (YJB, 2000: 9), as a 'clinical approach to the risk and assessment' 
(Annison, 2003: 119) of young offenders entering at a variety of access points into 
the system. 
The Bail Asset form was generally viewed, and particularly at its initial 
introduction and prior to some revisions regarding its format, as a cumbersome, time 
consuming and somewhat academic exercise. In providing such systematic evidence 
45 Pre Sentence Reports are reports which are written by members of the YOS to provide detailed 
information about young people who have been to court and are awaiting sentence to be passed. 'Me 
information provided is expected to be a balance between objective and subjective information relating to the 
young person's history of offending and the latest offence for which they are awaiting sentence. Issues such 
as education, family, drug use, interaction with the YOS while awaiting sentence may all be included if 
believed to be necessary. 
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the Asset forms at this time included the completion of twelve pageS46 of detailed 
information. The workers at the project were not as enthusiastic as the YJB in 
providing such levels of 'evidence-based practice'. The following statement occurred 
during a somewhat lively discussion when the 'evaluator' (R. H) attempted to explain 
the merits of data. A somewhat irate Geoff voiced his opinion and explained: 
Here, I'll give it youfucking straight shall Z Doc. Bob? I visit the holding cells 
at the courts on a Monday, Wednesday and a Friday to see which ofthe little shites 
have been locked up by the police and then brought to the courts, who are by the way, 
in danger ofbelieving everyfucking word or lie that the police have told the CPS and 
following suit and remanding the little darlings. So, I'm down in the bowels of the 
court mixing it with the shite and I'll have anything between seven or eight young 
'uns to get through before the court starts sending them offto the naughtyfarm. I've 
got thatform [Bail Asset] and those arseholes who designed it47 have no inclination 
ofthe pressure to get round and suss out the kids being held over [detained] in a 
matter ofminutes before they're brought up inftont of the courts. The aim is to keep 
themfrom being locked up not asking stupid questions about 'How theyfeel about the 
situation'and 'what got them there in thefirstplace' Forfuck's sake! "y not ask 
them what they'd likefor breakfast while we're on, shall we. I know how theyfeel. 
Theyfeel like they want to gofucking home and wished they'd never done the crimes 
in thefirstplace! 
(Fieldnotes, April 2000) 
Cynical concerns of YOT members relating to the emphasis upon statistical 
data for the government and YJB, the uniformed approach to practice and the 
sweeping aside of professional discretion highlight many aspects of practice concerns 
within the system (Roberts et al. 200 1; Smith, 2003). The emphasis upon manageable 
data to inform practice for many at the BSS project was perhaps 'stating the obvious' 
(Bottoms, 2000: 20). However, the complexities in 'getting the message through' to 
the quality of newly recruited staff and the failure of those managing, at the local 
level of youth justice delivery, in ensuring that there was a filtering of policy rhetoric 
to those delivering at the practice level. 
Due to widespread complaints from practitioners within the system a Bad Asset form was subsequently produced 
which was a much shorter and less time consuming document to complete. 
47 Ilose, in Geoff's opinion. 'arseholes' in this instance being the Centre for Criminological Research at the University of 
Oxford. 
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The four BSOs, in the main, were reluctant to engage in the data processing 
of BSS outcomes. They were still reliant upon 'hard-copies' (paper and files) of the 
recordings of individual episodes of BSS and were collectively naYve of the benefits 
that electronic monitoring could provide in utilising the data for aggregate data sets. I 
attempted to offer some guidance to the BSOs as to how to use the system for 
computerised monitoring that Nacro had implemented for its national evaluation of 
BSS. Ann was reluctant, and almost childlike in her appreciation of the system. 'I'm 
hopeless with computers. I don't seethe point anyway. Can't wejust carry onfilling 
in theforms like we've been doing? ' I spent about an hour and a half in showing her 
how to go about it. Disinterested, surly and lacking in confidence, Ann failed to see 
the point in it all. 
At a number of stages 1, without the knowledge of the BSO team (I was free 
to use computers, rifle through filing cabinets, file store-rooms and generally fit in as 
if I were one of the BSS team) began to notice the over-recording (by way of 
individual double-counting) and under-recording of episodes of BSS. Locally and 
nationally this would present an overview of the numbers of young people coming 
onto BSS that was not valid. This created a research dilemma, should I tell, and if so 
to whom? In the interests of the evaluation my opinion was that I should perhaps be 
obliged to inform of areas of 'poor practice'in the monitoring of data relating to BSS. 
These data would be instrumental in forging both local and the aggregated national 
findings relating to BSS. These were basic mis-recordings of some of the more 
simplistic areas of monitoring the numbers of young people who actually came onto 
the project. This in turn, caused me to worry about some of the more intricate 
variables that were also required to be monitored and evaluated, for example issues 
relating to young people's health, education, numbers of offences, family issues and 
offending risks. However, in conducting this ethnography of the workplace within 
the overall evaluation of BSS, this raised a serious dilemma. Was I to keep quiet 
about this and allow the day-to-day working practices within the frontline delivery of 
youth justice to run its course unimpeded? After all, this was occurring as a course of 
practice within the system. This ethnographic ethical dilemma was placed in situ 
within two guiding principles of research practice. 
First, is that the practice of non-maleficence (Beauchamp et al. 1982: 18) 
[that researchers should avoid harming participants] should be upheld. The danger in 
spilling the beans was that reprimands, or worse, might occur to some of those 
involved with this issue. These were data being fed back to the YJB in order to 
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inform the Home Office of the successes and failures relating to BSS. Second, is 
that the practice of research in the field should adhere to the principles of autonomy 
or selr-determination [meaning that the values and decisions of research participants 
should be respected] (ibid. ). 
According to sociological research protocols it might be in the best interests 
of the research practice to 'protect' the participants and allow them to continue with 
their sloppy monitoring procedures. For example, while chatting in the office with 
the BSO team members, some eighteen-months into the research Ann let it slip out 
that: 
Oh, I don't bother recording [B S S] episodes ifthey're only on itfor a 
couple ofdays. It's hardly worth it ifthey [young people] are not on bail supportfor 
any more than a week because we hardly do any work with them in such a short time. 
I was concerned, as this demonstrated the passive organizational cultural 
implications relating to the monitoring of data at the youth justice 'shop-floor' level. 
R. H: Ann, everything's supposed to be recorded. It doesn't matter 
whether they are on [BSS] for two-hours, two-weeks or two-months it's all got be 
recorded and monitored You record them onto the normal paperforms don't you? 
[Trying to plan ahead and rescue the situation by doing a paper trawl by inputting the 
missing data onto the electronic database] 
Ann: Well I didn't know! Rjust seemedpointless getting bogged down 
with the paper work ifthey were only on itfor a day or two. I can't see the point. 
Glenn was starting to look uncomfortable and pretended to look 
interested in a pile of documents resting on his desk. I thought to myself 'Oh shit. 
This is bad. This is very bad'. Russell chipped in 'I record everything, me. It doesn't 
matter whether they are only on [B SS] for an hour and then get them selves re- 
arrested and remanded into custody. It all gets put down'. An uncomfortable silence 
descended within the small office and I took this as my cue to leave. The YJB's angle 
that everything was coming-up roses in the new youth justice garden, didn't carry 
much weight here. How many of the 'short-termers' that came onto BSS during that 
eighteen-month period went unrecorded will never be retrieved. What is clear 
however, is that both the local and national figures used to demonstrate the numbers 
of young people who came onto BSS during that period of time were invalid. Later in 
the day Ann caught up with me when the office was quiet and nobody else was 
present. 
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Ann: Rob, I didn't realise it was so important. You won't say anything 
willyou? Ijust didn't think it would make much ofa difference. I could get into 
serious trouble over this couldn't I? 
I wanted to answer her question with a 'yes' and I also wanted to know 
approximately 'how many' short-termers she'd 'forgotten' to record. I bit my lip and 
instead mumbled 'Iwon't say anything butyou really should record everyone who 
comes on [to BSS]. You must do it. " 
Although, and of course, the previous youth justice system recorded data 
relating to young offenders, it was clear that the new system that replaced it expected 
far more detailed and systematic monitoring procedures within this recent 'paradigm 
shift' (Pitts, 2002) that has enfolded the current youth justice agenda (Newburn, 
2002; 2003b). This was an aspect of the organisational culture overhauls that the new 
youth justice system had to overcome, in order to present a far more professional, 
slick and systematic method in dealing with young offenders. Youth justice workers' 
resistance to the implementation of 'science' and evidence-based 'theory' within their 
working practices has subsequently been refuted by evidence as; 'It is reported that 
the Asset form has demonstrated its diagnostic value, by achieving almost a 70% 
success rate in predicting the likelihood of re-offending' (Baker et al., 2003: 36; 
Smith, 2003: 113. Also see YJB, 2002: 9). Yet, the new implementation of this 
'evidence based practice tool' (Annison, 2004: 122) was not appreciated or used to its 
fullest potential (Baker et al. 2002). 
The working practices of personnel within the system, often reluctant and 
resistant to change as we have seen by the evidence presented above, are contraire to 
findings that have since been demonstrated in the efficiency and perhaps 
effectiveness of Asset as a youth justice tool. However, the neglect and lack of 
understanding of some of the workers in the basic requirement of recording and the 
monitoring of data suggests that the 'systemic managerialism' (Newburn, 2002: 55 8) 
advocated within this new system was not being practised during intrinsic stages of 
youth justice delivery. 
Geoff, Jack et al. views of the evidence-based findings were often so 
personalised within their lived experiences that the 'bigger picture' of potential 
change and successes within the system, by way of the analysis of data to inform 
practice, was often abstract to their experiences of delivering justice. 
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BSS and Targeting Young People 
In this section areas of the project's delivery of initial targeting and assessment; the 
type of activities undertaken by the project; the content and length of programmes; 
and the degree of supervision and support provided by the project to young people 
placed on BSS are assessed. 
The project initially targeted its resources at four distinct groups of young 
people. The target groups identified as benefiting from BSS fell within the following 
criteria: 
9 Those at risk of receiving a custodial remand 
* Those remanded to custodial establishments, in order to maximise the possibility 
of a non-custodial option at the next court appearance 
Those identified as persistent young offenders 
Those who have been identified of committing a serious criminal offence 
BSS Referrals 
The referral process of young people to the BSS followed two distinct routes of 
recourse: 
e Court based referrals; in which court duty officers attend all youth court sessions 
to assess and offer (where applicable) bail supervision and support referrals to the 
project generated at court 
'Remand rescue' bail supervision packages; offered (for those suitable for and 
benefiting from) to young people remanded in custodial establishments as an 
alternative possibility for magistrates to consider at a subsequent scheduled court 
appearance: 
'At risk' referrals; which include the above target groups and the following: 
9 To provide prograrnmes of bail supervision and support for young people aged 
from 10 to 18 years of age and most at risk of a custodial remand or local authority 
care remand. 
9 For those most at risk of re-offending whilst on bail. 
* For those most at risk or previously known for non-attendance at court. 
At subsequent court appearances where changes in circumstances or new 
information might lead to an application for a remand to be made. 
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BSS was also targeted at those young people who after assessment were 
placed onto the Intensive Surveillance and Supervision Programme. This was 
considered as a provision for those who would benefit from more intensive methods of 
surveillance and supervision, from the integrated projects that the YOS could offer 
young people and the youth courts in the area. 
The targeting of young people by the project was negotiated through a chain of 
individual consultations with representatives from a range of participating 
organisations. These negotiations often involved competing priorities centred upon 
notions of 'welfare' (of the young person), 'justice' (regarding bail conditions) and 
'safety' (of not only the young person, but also, of the public). This created a complex 
and difficult negotiation process. The project had to set target performance indicators to 
provide benchmarks of measurement regarding the successes/failures of the project in 
attaining its specific participant target groups (YJB, 2001). However, at no point 
throughout the evaluation did the project provide any form of detailed internal 
evaluation of the success or, otherwise of the attainment of its specified aims and 
objectives. 
Due largely to, and because of, the numbers of stakeholders with often varying 
perspectives associated with the project's intended target groups, The complex and 
often competing negotiations affected the varying stakeholders' viewpoints of the 
intended benefits that the project aimed to deliver. The BSS project had made 
concerted efforts to tackle this weakness, by way of the publication of information 
leaflets to distinct categories of stakeholders involved with BSS. These categories 
involved young people who may have been targeted by the project and professionals 
(including magistrates), to inform them of the BSS aims and objectives. 
Furthermore, as already discussed at length, the project had conducted a seminar for 
defence solicitors and magistrates in the area, to instruct these stakeholders of the 
benefits of the project 
The project attempted to provide a bail information sheet for all young people 
due to appear at court who, after assessment by BSS workers, it was considered 
might have been at risk of a possible remand episode by the courts. Following this 
Bail Information was submitted to the magistrates at the young person's first court 
hearing. Information was secured by BSS workers from young people held in the 
cells, and at this stage of the detention process assessment was made about the 
suitability of the young person for bail supervision. If considered necessary an 
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application for 'Voice Verification ')48 might also have been included as a further 
condition of bail. 
Entry to the bail supervision and support programme 
After the court had placed a young person onto bail supervision and support, the 
project immediately interviewed the young person, and when available, the young 
person's parent or carer. The project eventually secured facilities at the courts in the 
area to conduct such interviews. Staff from the project explained to the young people 
how the programme would operate; provided an outline of the programme to be 
undertaken and then explained the obligations expected of the young person. A 
signed agreement/contract was then completed for the initial programme outline. 
If a parent or carer was not present at this court appearance, a home visit was 
arranged for the next working day. At this initial appointment, contact was made and 
information was made available to the parent/carers regarding the obligations and 
requirements of the bail supervision programme. A formal signed agreement, 
containing the details of the bail supervision and support programme, including 
breach procedures, was completed within (for the majority of young people) within 
one working day. 
Referral and entry to the project operated at a number of levels. A summary of 
these entry levels and selected target groups are: 
e Those young people who the CPS was objecting to bail 
e Those young people at risk of being remanded into custody and/or remanded to 
local authority accommodation 
Those young people who had been remanded to custody or local authority 
accommodation as a'remand rescue'package 
48 Voice verification works by checking the voice print of the young offender over the telephone at times 
specified in a contact schedule, in order to confirm that they are where they are supposed to be. It 
therefore provides additional surveillance and flexibility above and beyond traditional curfew approaches. 
However, due to the socio-economic background of many of the young offenders who came onto BSS in 
Sunderland problems arose in the early days of this youth justice programme going Eve in 2000. The vast 
majority of young offenders just didn't have land-line' telephones in their homes. Mobile telephones were 
cheaper to run (Pay as You Go) and there is no line rental to incur. Mobile telephones are not compatible 
with this system of youth justice as part of the curfew order with Voice Verification meant that the young 
person would usually have to be in their own home to carry out this court ordered procedure. This was a 
major (and somewhat overlooked issue by the YJB in implementing this particular programme) by the 
project in the early days of this project. 'Me outcome was that the YJB made a deal with the agencies 
responsible for over seeing the running/technology of this programme Securicor and then later Group 4 
security to organise the connection of land lines (inward calls only to these homes) to the homes of young 
people placed onto Voice Verification which did not have a telephone land line. 
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Those young people identified as persistent young offenders (PYOs) and suitable 
for the Intensive Supervision and Surveillance Programme (ISSP) 
Those young people who were suspected of committing a single very serious 
offence. 
The BSS project endeavoured to submit bail information to magistrates at a 
young person's first court hearing. Staff at the project ensured that they were 
informed by the courts in the area of young people who had been refused police bail 
and were awaiting their initial appearance before the magistrates and were in custody 
at the cells at the magistrates' courts'. In such instances, BSS staff interviewed 
young people and bail information was provided to the young people and magistrates 
at the related initial hearing. This was a particularly useful method when applied at 
'adult' magistrate court hearings of young people suspected of criminal offences. 
The YOS made a concerted effort to ensure that at all youth courts and 
magistrates court hearings, where young people had been identified by the project as 
due for attendance, that court duty officers were present at these hearings. For all 
young people who attended court hearings 'Bail Asset' forms were completed, and 
where considered appropriate, bail supervision may have been offered. The BSS made 
stringent attempts to address the issue of 'slippages' of young people who could have 
been in danger of a remand episode. 
Content and Length of Programmes 
The content of programmes of supervision and support, were categorised into three 
distinct groups with varying degrees of intensity of BSS specification relating to 
young people's individual needs. These three categories offer support at the base, 
intermediate and intensive levels of programme inpue9. The support the project 
offered consisted of- 
" Counselling projects 
" Monitoring of bail and remand conditions 
" Compliance with court orders 
" Health 
" Leisure activities 
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" Assistance with education, training or employment 
" Accommodation 
" Support for court proceedings 
" Support to young person and family 
However, the evaluation found scant evidence to suggest that the BSS project 
operated any method of rigorous assessment. This is not to suggest that the more 
'difficult' offender's who came onto BSS, did not receive extra attention. These 
offenders often did, but during the course of the evaluation it was not evident that 
specifically designed packages of intervention were in place. In a number of ways 
this aspect of the BSS project's objective in delivering specifically designed and 
packaged programmes of intervention i. e. the base, intermediate and intensive levels 
of programme input were no more than 'dressage' for reports and outside enquiring 
agencies. The project and its workers, in the main, dealt with the job at hand and this 
often meant basic interventions and referrals to other agencies. 
The length of time of BSS episodes and the degree of impact the 
interventions offered by the project was difficult to assess. The project did not record 
data which could be analysed of the length of time young people had spent upon bail 
supervision or, the degree of impact the programmes of intervention that young 
people placed onto BSS have made with young people. When asked about how the 
BSS project was viewed as 'altering' young people's offending behaviour Gregg 
suggested: 
I guess we'll never know. How can we make suggestions as to the long-term 
impact we can make relating to youngpeople's offending, when sometimes they might 
only be on BSSfor a week or two? I've had one kid who only lasted an hour on BSS 
before he was picked upfor another offence and then got remanded into custody. All 
we can hopefor is that we get them through bail support without re-offending or 
breaching [bail conditions]. 
(Gregg: Interview, February 2002) 
George and Norm had another anecdote regarding what level and degree the 
project could make roads into young people's offending behaviour. 
George: Aboutfour years ago Belle was working with the old Youth Justice 
Service [which had preccded the YOS. Bcllc was latcr to bccomc the Hcad of 
Service at the local YOSI and she was taking an offending behaviour and victim 
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awareness type intervention programme, with some of the hardcore young offenders 
in Sunderland at that time. I think she had a small group offour orfive ofreal hard- 
bitten delinquents. 
So Belle's giving them all this talk about how the victimsfeel and the dangers 
these ladsfaced in stealing cars and driving them recklessly, getting chased and that 
innocent victims might be injured or killed because oftheir offending. Anyway, the 
sessionfinishes, it was held downstairs here [at the B SS office, in an open planned 
common room type environment-sofa-pool table-etc. ], and they allfuck offafter 
being given some ofBelle's professional wisdom. Belle goes upstairs to do what ever 
she had to do, before leaving and locking up the building. She comes outside and her 
fucking car's gone! 
Norm: [Laughing] Priceless, absolutely priceless. I love that story. She did 
well there then didn't she? Remember the time she stopped doing the small group 
sessions here because she couldn't control the lads who, just used to take the piss out 
ofher? They'djust muck about, tell her tofuck offandjust be daft in those small 
group sessions. 
George: Aye, she got me tofill infor her. I thought she was going to crack 
up when she said she couldn't do them anymore. Stupidjucking idea anyway, those 
small group sessions. no thefuck thought that that would be a good idea to get 
some young hardcore offenders in a room together to discuss their offending? 
Norm: Some type ofacademic or someone with too much brain and no 
fucking sense. 
All eyes were on me. I led the laughter. 
George: We had to scrap them [small group sessions] because they were 
chaos. Yhere'd be kids in there wanting tofight each other, stab each other, 
generally taking the piss out ofeach other, and we werejust wasting everyone's time. 
(George and Norm: Fieldnotes, December 2000) 
Leaving the irony of the situation aside, this anecdote perhaps demonstrates 
that at times with all the will in the world, youth justice strategies may sometimes 
appear futile in their attempts to tackle youth offending. 
By and large the BSS project had been viewed as welfare based intervention 
with the voluntary involvement of young people on bail supervision. However, if 
young people did not wish to engage or attend with specific interventions that the 
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project attempted to instigate, the young person would be under no obligation to 
partake in such an intervention. 
The length of time that young people spent on bail supervision also 
determined the quality and quantity of areas of involvement by BSOs. The project 
made concerted efforts to deal with those areas of young people's lifestyles that may 
have affected the aspects of risks associated with the young person's individual 
offending behaviour. 
The level of involvement and subsequent content of individual bail 
supervision packages of interventions for young people who came onto the project, 
were often determined by the length of time a young person spent on bail supervision. 
The less time a young person spent on bail supervision the less input BSOs had to 
comprehensively address the risk offending issues of that young person 50 . 
The project attempted to make determined efforts to deal with the issue of 
young people and their family relationships (again, a widely acknowledged and 
accepted determinant variable associated with young people's offending behaviour 
[see Farrington, 1996]). BSOs made assessments of the relationships within the 
family home and analysed the positive and/or negative aspects of those relationships. 
If required the intention and understanding was that referrals could be undertaken to 
other specialist agencies within that partnership approach. 
Passing the Parcel & Too Hot to Handle 
At each initial home visit BSOs made assessments of the existing family relationship. 
Referrals to the Social Services Department's 'Children and Families Department' 
were conducted routinely as problems within the home were often identified. The 
strategy at the BSS was to inform and involve the Children and Families Department, 
once problem areas were identified, aiming at widening the level of expertise to assist 
with identified problems which might influence risk related offending behaviour. 
This stood as a noticeable example of the development of good practice by the 
project. Yet, problems with this aspect of the project's degree of involvement were 
made evident during the evaluation. During interviews it was made clear that 
difficulties arose from workers' experiences in the 'partnership approach' adopted 
within the local authority district. One worker informed me of bail supervision 
50 See, for example, Graham, J. and Bowling, B., (1995) Young People and Ctime. Home Office Research Study 
No. 145 and Home Office Research Findings NO. 24. London: HMO 
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involvement within this multi-agency approach that produced unacceptable 
outcomes: 
Gregg: In my experience once we make a referral to the Children and 
Families Department, and they may inform us that they're already involved with the 
family, once they know we are in with the young person and also dealing with aspects 
ofthefamily relationship, that Department's involvement decreases. You get the 
feeling that they arejust easing offtheir workload onto you, a bit like passing the 
parcel. Yhe problem is we [BSS project staffl don't have the length of time or 
continuation to really make any significant change, you know long lasting changes on 
those problems. "at we can do is refer those issues to Department's who can offer 
professional expertise and continuation ofsupport mechanisms that are intended to 
have a major effect upon the positive aspects ofthefamily. "at wefeel is that they 
just pass the parcel onto us, but at some point they have to get back in there andpick 
itbackupagain. And really that is very unfair on the young person and theirfamily. 
(Gregg: Interview, January 2002) 
The formal as well as informal action undertaken in this type of work is 
likely to be located within existing organizational structures, roles, and practices. 
Workers within each organisation, whose professional expertise is considered 
relevant to crime prevention are often identified as 'link personnel' (Crawford, 
1994: 171). Their core tasks remain largely altered, as multi-agency work is grafted 
onto existing practices or those existing practices are redefined (ibid. ). The 
redefining of roles and expectations has created 'disjunctures' within multi-agency 
partnership approaches (ibid: 501). 
It is recognised that inter-agency working and partnerships play an important 
role in effectively tackling youth crime (Audit Commission, 1996; Newburn, 2002; 
Thomas and Hucklesby, 2002). However, it was acknowledged by those dealing with 
young offenders on BSS, that when the local Social Services Department got 'Wind' 
of the project's involvement, they backed off believing that the local BSS project 
would take over, providing a number of welfare based resources and professional 
experience in assisting these 'children in need'. But, and as Gregg suggested: 
I mean what can Iprovide to a youngperson on the Child Protection 
Register? I'm not as skilled or experienced as a social worker in any shape orform. 
The project [BSS] can't offer the resources or scope of involvement that these kids 
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desperately need but the social workers drop these kids the minute we get involved 
with them. It's not right and something needs doing about it. 
BSS Level of Intervention. 
The content factor of episodes of bail supervision and support were individually 
packaged to deal with areas of risk and need, associated with individual young people 
placed on bail supervision and support. At the most intense level the content of bail 
supervision and support can, and does, provide the following interventions: 
" Seven days a week contact with young person (entailing five arranged visits to the 
young person's home and/or appointments at the BSS). This level of intensity 
operates at personal visits Monday to Friday and two telephone conversations 
over the weekend period. 
" Referral to any integrated programme of support supplied by the Youth Offending 
Service deemed appropriate for the young person e. g. education, health, housing 
employment. 
* Escorts to court appearances (where and when appropriate) 
Escorts to answer police bail (where and when appropriate) 
Monitoring of curfews 
Use of leisure time (for official school levers) with refeffals to the 'Solutions' and 
'Springboard' programmes for young people to assist in training or education 
needs. 
Use of leisure time (for 'unofficial' or expelled school age young people). 
Voice Verification 
At a base level, the content of bail supervision and support provides assessment of bail 
conditions and areas of support in the following areas. 
" Three pre-arranged weekly visits to the young person's bail address and/or 
appointments at the BSS project. 
" Further discussions regarding 'risk' and 'need' factors and referral to programmes 
of intervention and support if areas of concern or assistance arise. 
The areas of support offered by the project cover the individual needs related to 
young people in dealing with the following areas: 
* Confidence 
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" Anger management 
" Leisure activities 
" Education and training 
" Employment 
" Decision making 
" Family 
" Peers 
" Offending behaviour 
" Drugs and alcohol awareness 
" Accommodation 
These areas of 'need' associated factors of young people, were assessed by 
BSOs who could refer young people in need of professional specialist advice through 
its partnership approach, in addressing the needs and risks of young people accepted 
onto the project. However, none of the newly recruited BSOs, nor indeed some of the 
more senior professionals had little knowledge of the some of the above 'risk' and 
'need' factors. None of the BSOs had had any training on issues such as 'anger 
management'. In the best case scenario BSOs would attempt pass on the identified 
areas of concern onto those who within the multi-agency approach who might be 
better qualified to deal with such issues. Tbis, for a number of reasons, such as time 
on BSS, young people's willingness to engage, re-arrest and remand might not 
always be feasible. 
It was acknowledged by the BSS project that there were areas of concern 
relating to the delays that sometimes occur in referrals from the project to other 
partners of specialist intervention and assistance in accessing those services that they 
provided. 
Contact with the Young Person 
Whilst on bail supervision and support, there were three contacts per week (at the 
minimum) with the young person, except under exceptional circumstances. The BSS 
could and on occasion did increase the level of contact when this was considered 
appropriate. 
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Programme Content 
The project had access to programmes addressing and integrating young people into 
mainstream education, training and employment. Young people placed onto bail 
supervision and support also had access to social skills programmes (Springboard 
Solutions), health and substance misuse interventions (YOS Health Worker and 
Drugs Worker through the Youth Addictions Project) and opportunities for the 
constructive use of leisure time. 
Once a young person had been accepted to onto BSS, the role of the BSO is to 
work closely with the young person for the duration of the bail episode and for the 
young person to co-operate fully with the contract of bail conditions. This included: 
" Compulsory attendance for at least three weekly bail supervision sessions at the 
young persons place of residence and/or appointments at the BSS project 
including one home visit with the young persons parent(s)/carer(s) in attendance 
" Attendance at any additional appointments arranged by the BSO and/or the YOS 
" Referrals to other partnership arrangements at the YOS and the existing inputs 
from the YOS were as follows: 
Drugs counselling 
e Housing 
" Health 
" Probation 
" Police 
Probation 
Education 
Attendance at Court 
The project placed a great deal of emphasis upon the attendance of young people, 
placed on bail supervision and support at scheduled court appearances. The BSS had 
been successful in ensuring the court attendance of young people and where there 
was a perceived risk of non-attendance, the project made a stringent effort to ensure 
that young people turned-up at court. The project had achieved a good attendance 
record of court appearances by contacting young people, their parent or carer to 
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remind them to attend court or where difficulties were encountered by escorting 
young people on BSS to court. 
Young People's Opinions 
During the last twelve months of the evaluation it was requested to the project that 
BSOs should ask (on a voluntary basis) young people on bail supervision and support 
to complete questionnaires related to the project. The completed response-retum. rate 
for the questionnaires was poor. Out of a possible sixty-eight individuals placed onto 
bail supervision and support from the P April 2001 to the 24th January 2002 only 
twenty-eight completed questionnaires were returned. Therefore, the sample should 
be viewed not as a representative response rate of the population of young people 
placed onto bail supervision and support. However, for recording purposes these 
responses are listed. 
The reasons for the poor response rate may have occurred for two distinct 
reasons. First, during the initial sweep of questionnaires an attempt was made to 
conduct a postal questionnaire survey of young people who had recently finished 
their episodes of bail supervision and support. This strategy provided an extremely 
poor response rate. Of a total of twenty-three postal questionnaires only two 
completed questionnaires were returned. From this I deduced that another method 
was required for the questionnaire data collection exercise. 
The subsequent method was to inform the project of the questionnaire data 
process. Management and staff at the project were informed of the details of the 
questionnaire, its purpose and the method of delivery. Senior management were 
requested to ask members of staff (BSO's) to distribute the questionnaires to young 
people nearing the end of their individual episodes of bail supervision and support 
and to ask the young people (on a voluntary basis) to complete the questionnaires. 
Staff at the project were reminded of the importance of this exercise on a number of 
occasions. Yet, as previously stated the response rate was poor. 
Two scenarios can be credited for this poor response rate. First, that the young 
people who were asked to fill in the questionnaires refused to do-so although at no 
stage of the of the evaluation was I informed of this. Secondly, that staff at the 
project whose responsibility it was to request that forms were completed and returned 
to the evaluator failed to do so. A number of attempts during the latter stages of 
research to rectify this shortfall in completed responses, (both formal through senior 
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management, and informally, through repeated face-to-face requests to staff 
members), failed to amend the noticeable poor response rate. A more successful 
method would have been to have personally distributed the questionnaires to young 
people on bail support, which I was confident would have produced a far more 
favourable return rate which may have been representative. Yet, this method would 
have been too time consuming (thus restricting other methods of investigation) and 
may have restricted the numbers of young people on BSS that I could have personally 
contacted and distributed the questionnaires to. 
The following table focuses upon the responses I received from the survey. The 
questionnaire asked young people on BSS to comment upon areas of the project 
activities, which looked at aspects of the project's delivery of risk related offending 
behaviour interventions. The questionnaire also asked the young people whether they 
believed they had found these useful in dealing with areas that might influence their 
behaviour. 
The analysis of the questionnaires examines the focus areas of the 
programme input of BSOs dealing with for example, confidence, anger, education 
and family relationships. The following table categorises the specific areas of focus 
that BSOs dealing with young people on BSS are expected to at least address and 
make assessments upon those specific areas, which are believed to be associated 
variables of young people's offending behaviour. Included in the analysis of 
responses is the numbers of young people who answered positively (the Yes column); 
the percentage of the sample group who believed that these areas had been addressed 
(the % column); the numbers of young people who believed that these issues had not 
been addressed (the No column) and the corresponding percentage rates (the % 
column); there is also a 'No-response' column-numbers and percentages. The table 
demonstrates the numbers and percentage of young people who believed that the 
areas of focus were of use (Useful-Yes); and were of no use to them (Useful-No). 
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Table Ten 
Young People's Views of Specific Areas of BSS Focus 
FOCUS Yes % No yo Non Useful 'Yo Useful 'yo Non 
(n) (n) Response Yes No Response 
(n & %) (n) (n) (n & 
Confidence 9 32 1 -) 43) 7 I 11 9 3 
(25%) (57%) 
Anger 6 21 15 54 7 3 11 6 21 19 
(25%) (68%) 
Leisure 15 54 6 21 7 12 43 6 21 10 
(25%) (36%) 
Education 12 43 15 53 1 6 21 9 32 13 
(4%) (46%) 
Employment 12 433 12 43 4 15 54 0 2) 3 
(14%) (46%) 
Decision 18 64 3 11 7 9 32 6 21 1 3) 
making (25%) (46%) 
Family 12 43 6 21 10 12 43 3 11 13 
(36%) (46%) 
Friends 18 64 3 11 7 12 43 6 21 10 
(25%) (36%) 
Crime 21 75 3 11 3 18 42 11 7 
(I 1%) (25%) 
Offending 24 88 1 4 3 12 43 6 21 10 
Behaviour (11%) (36%) 
Victims 15 54 9 3) 2 4 9 32 6 21 13 
(14%) (46%) 
Drugs 12 4 3) 12 43 4 9 32 6 21 13 
(14%) (46%) 
Accommodation 3 11 15 53 10 6 21 9 32 1 -1) (36%) (46%) 
Analysis of the above data dernonstrates the following areas of intervention on 
categories of risk with this sample group who completed questionnaires that: 
9 49% of the sample were of the opinion that all of the areas of behavioural, 
welfare and risk focus had been addressed by BSS 
31 % of the sample were of the opinion that not all areas of behavioural, welfare 
and risk focus had been addressed by Bail Supervision Officers 
e 20% of the sample did not respond to some of the overall specified categories 
they were asked to respond to, for example, issues such as education, 
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acconnnodation and whether they believed that these had been addressed by the 
project. 
Of the above aggregate percentiles the young people were asked to pass 
judgement upon whether or not they believed that once these areas had been 
addressed that the input of BSOs was of any use to the young people: 
0 32% believed that the addressed areas had been useful and made some form 
improvement to the young people's lifestyles 
0 19% believed that the addressed areas had been little or no use and had little 
impact upon their lifestyles 
0 48% did not respond in this section of the questionnaire and therefore can be 
viewed as having no opinion on the matter. 
Again, I am not of the view that these data are an overall representation of the 
total population of those young people who had entered onto the BSS project during 
the period of the evaluation. Yet, I am confident that the data does provide evidence 
that from this limited sample of the population group, although the project may have 
believed that in the main it was dealing with some of the problematic issues of its 
target group related to their lifestyles many of this sample (remembering that these 
were the recipients of BSS) viewed the situation somewhat differently. There were a 
number of areas the project was not adequately dealing with in order to make positive 
actions to assist young people on bail support to desist from offending. 
Approximately half of the sample group believed that all of the areas had at 
least been addressed (and as stakeholders of the intended aims and objectives of BSS 
these opinions are of significance). Only approximately a third of the sample 
believed that if areas of focus had been addressed that any positive outcomes came of 
it for those young people. 
The time available to address and make substantial changes in a young person's 
lifestyle, personal circumstances and assessed risk associated patterns of offending 
behaviour is often limited on BSS (Thomas and Hucklesby, 2002: 46). Over half of 
all BSS programmes run for less than four weeks (Nacro/BSPDU 2002). Therefore, 
the time available to make substantial changes to those identified areas of offending 
behaviour are limited for BSS (Thomas and Hucklesby, 2002). 
Yet, it is also reported that that even within the limited time-scale of young 
people's involvement with this aspect of the youth justice system, BSS can initiate 
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fundamental change for those young people it targets with its interventions 
(Nacro/BSPDU 2002). It has also been recognised that the abrupt withdrawal of 
those services and support mechanisms often results in previous patterns of risk and 
offending relating behaviour returning (ibid. Also see, Chapman and Hough, 1998). 
As Gregg's earlier statement referring to youth justice and its partnership approach to 
tackling offending behaviour and the 'pass the parcel' scenarios, the damage caused 
could often be severe. The aim should be to build upon the strengths of earlier 
interventions and continued strategies should be in place that will assist the young 
person in his or her long-term development (Chapman and Hough, 1998). 
Completing Supervision & Support 
The following table presents the findings of the successful (completion of individual 
periods of BSS) and unsuccessful (BSS terminated prior to completion) episodes of 
BSS from November 1999 until March 2002. Successful episodes of BSS were 
considered as those that ended without re-arrest or, termination of BSS due to 
reported breaches related to the young person adhering to his or her conditions of 
BSS. Therefore, unsuccessful episodes of BSS are those where young people were 
arrested for offences they were suspected of having committed while on BSS (re- 
offences) and/or breaches of that period of conditional bail that either the project, or 
the police, reported young people to the courts for breaching their conditional bail. 
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Chart Five 
Re-Offending & Breach Rates on BSS Nov. 1999 - Jan. 2002 
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From November 1999 to January 2002,188 young people came onto bail 
supervision and support in Sunderland. Of this total, 34 young people were re- 
arrested for Suspected criminal offences while on BSS. A further 42 young people 
who were on BSS were reported for breaching their bail conditions. At first glance 
the figures do not present a too pessimistic overview of the success rate of the BSS 
project. As individual categories the BSS column by far outweighs the other two 
categories. However, if further analysis is applied to these outcomes a somewhat less 
optimistic picture can be viewed. 
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BSS Re-offending Breach 
Chart Six 
Aggregate BSS and Breach/Re-Offending Data 
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In the above table the 'unsuccessful' categories of re-offending and breaches 
have been aggregated and removed from the overall BSS sample (188 in total). This 
results in a BSS success rate of 112 young people getting through bail supervision 
and support without being re-arrested for new suspected offences or, breaching their 
conditions of bail. In total 77 young people were unsuccessful in completing their 
episodes of BSS. 
A more detailed breakdown of the courts' decision making relating to BSS, as 
compared with Remands into Custody (RIC) and Remands into Local Authority 
Accommodation (RiLAA) during five phases of the evaluation starting in November 
1999 and ending in January 2002, presents the following findings. 
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Chart Seven 
Remand Management of Target Group 
BSS & Remand Episodes 
Nov 1999 -Jan 2002 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
E3B SS 
MR IC 
CIR iLA A 
As an overview of the BSS project's development during the above time- 
scale a number of key, albeit somewhat summarised findings can be highlighted. 
During Phase One of the evaluation it is evident that the magistrates were 
not viewing BSS as a viable youth justice alternative to both remands into custody 
and local authority accommodation. Indeed, the Phase One data demonstrate that 
BSS was a poor third place in these court remand decisions. The reasons for this 
have been discussed at length throughout this study. In summary, much of this can be 
located in the standing and credence of the project at this time with those involved 
with the youth justice dealing with bail supervision and support. During this phase of 
the evaluation remands into local authority accommodation were particularly high. A 
concise explanation as to why this occurred is difficult to elucidate. However, as 
Norm explained and perhaps added a worthwhile area of potential research. 
More parents arejust having enough qI'lheir kids olknding behaviour 1vilh the 
police at the door and all the rest of the trouble it brings them and arejust rýlusing to 
have their kids back home. Without a bail address bail support is a non-slarler, so 
the magistrates'are pushed into a corner and have to resort to a rentand in local 
authority. Not as a Punishment, buljusl to gel the kidvsoineu, here to stay 111111 a 
temporary legal guardian while the criminal. juslicesysleins proceeds in dealing ivith 
them. 
(Norm: Interview, February 2000) 
270 
PHASE PHASE PHASE PHASE PHASE 
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Worker's accounts can provide innate understandings of the complexities 
involved in delivering youth justice that highlights the difficulties involved in 
delivering interventions. The interconnections of a range of criminal justice agencies 
are often compromised by way of others that can render the potential aims of such 
interventions as impotent. However, beyond Norm's account of the issue of 'suitable 
bail addresses', the structural weaknesses within the system in its failure to have other 
available resources. For example, the absence of remand foster carers (see Chapter Six) 
clearly demonstrate that the system is often ill-equipped to deal with the many welfare 
associated requirements it often proclaims to offer. The local YOS and the BSS project 
did not record detailed information of these incidents at this stage of the evaluation. 
Indeed, as to why BSS was refused at courts' in the town was not recorded. This 
further demonstrates the project's lack of accountability at this stage of its 
development. 
Phase Two: saw a far greater acceptance and use of BSS by courts in the town 
with a 41% rise in successful BSS applications to the courts. Remands into local 
authority accommodation were reduced by approximately 50% whereas remands into 
custody increased by 72%. It was clear from my observations, discussions and 
interviews with stakeholders to the BSS project, that a far greater emphasis was being 
placed on BSS by the local YOS and that the promotion of the project was being 
addressed. It was suggested that this occurred due to concerns from the local 
authority of the strain this was placing upon this limited resource. The magistrates 
increased the remand to custody sample by 72% on the previous phase of the 
evaluation. This may have occurred due to the concerns of the local authority on the 
strains being placed upon the limited placements available in local care homes and 
the magistrates' resorting to remands into custody to compensate this (also see 
Monaghan, 1999). 
Phase Three: witnessed a reduction in both remands into custody and to 
local authority accommodation and a small decrease in the numbers accepted onto 
BSS. This offers a somewhat intriguing insight of the target group and stakeholders 
(particularly the courts) roles and input into the up-take of BSS. The Phase Three 
columns indicate that although remands into custody and local authority 
accommodation decreased during this period of time this does not suggest that BSS 
was $rescuing' young people from those court based remand decisions. Indeed, 
during this period the acceptance of young people onto BSS also decreased slightly. 
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The obvious explanation for this is that less numbers of young people in the town 
were committing offences at this time, which could have resulted in a remand 
episode. Yvette, a Social Worker at the project also told me: 
The policejust aren't picking the kids upfor breaches that, in other 
incidences might have, and often would, result in youngpeople being remanded. 
"y? Because they [the police] are short ofpolice officers as they're all trying to 
catch up on their leave after the millennium New Year scare ofriots and disaster 
because ofthe perceived computer crashes that never occurred. 
(Yvette: Fieldnotes, March 2000) 
On more than one occasion there was a general understanding at the project 
that the scenario cited above may have been an underlying cause for the drop in remand 
decisions. The police were simply not producing the previous levels of youth justice 
'fodder' at courts' in the town. It was also pointed out to me that a number of the more 
prolific of the town's young offenders had been sentenced to Detention and Training 
Orders (DTOs) during this interim period thus reducing an aspect of the remand to 
custody and local authority intake. 
Phase Four: as the corresponding columns in the above table demonstrate all 
three variables increased during this period of time. Again, there were no clear 
indicators as to why this was occurring. Staff at the project offered some insight and 
opinion as to the fluctuations and as Geoff put it, "How thefuck are you going to 
speculate orpredict when the kids are going to commit crimes? How are you 
supposed to know or guess which ones [criminal offences] they'll get away with and 
which ones they'll get caughtfor. It's impossible to answer and impossible to 
predict". Without the magistrates' input due to their overall reluctance to engage 
with the research a potential answer to this problem remained unsolved and requires 
studying. 
Phase Five: saw a far more holistic and strategic approach beginning to be 
established by the BSS project in its direction in tackling the remand crisis situation 
that had plagued the pursuit of its central aims and objectives. Much of this emerged 
from a far more integrated approach within the local YOS and the BSS project now 
beginning to establish itself in terms of its intended direction. BSS uptake by the 
courts' increased to its highest level throughout the period of the evaluation and this 
certainly had an impact upon the levels of remands into custody. However, remands 
into local authority accommodation also demonstrated a slight increase. 
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Furthermore, there were some concerns by some of the 'old guard' of the BSS that 
the BSS project was 'net-widening' its intended target group that BSS was now being 
offered to young people who it was believed were better suited to other less stringent 
bail conditions. 
The following chart presents an overview of the BSS success 'flit rate' of its 
intended target group of young people at risk of being remanded into custody and/or 
local authority care. 
Chart Eight 
BSS Target Group and Remand Decision Outcomes 
BSS, RIC and RiLAA Totals 
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It is evident that BSS was used more by the courts than either ofthe separate 
alternatives of remands into custody and/or remands into local authority care. 
However, we should bear in mind that the BSS project's target group was for both 
remands into custody, and remands into local authority care. If this two targeted 
remand group's figures are aggregated a different picture emerges. 
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Chart Nine 
Remand Totals Nov. 1999 - Jan. 2002 
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At the end of the evaluation period (March 2002), it was evident that BSS 
was not reaching its overall intended target group of young people at risk of being 
remanded. This does not imply that the project failed but that it perhaps could have 
done more to meet those aims. 
The above chart perhaps presents the most pessimistic overview of the BSS 
project's attainment of its intended target group. During the evaluation 302 young 
people were either remanded into custody or to local authority accommodation. BSS 
was successful in targeting 188 young people were in danger of being remanded. 
Both the BSS and Remand columns in the above chart represent the pro. 1 ect's overal I 
target group. If both columns are aggregated as the selected target group for BSS tile 
figure comes to 490 (100%) young people that bail supervision and support was 
intended for as its target group. This implies that the BSS project's 'hit' rate was 
38% (188 of 490) of the total remand population of young offenders in Sundcrland. 
This may have been due to the projects targeting of young offenders which the 
courts' in the area believed to be unsuitable for BSS. 
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T0TAL 
As we have seen in this and earlier chapters it was not only the courts' that 
perceived BSS to be of limited use in addressing the immediate offending issues of 
some of the young offenders in the town. There is also evidence presented in this 
study to suggest that young people and project workers believed that for individuals 
or particular groupings of young offenders' the scope of BSS in attaining its intended 
aims and objectives were limited. At times the BSS project was well wide of the 
mark. However, the role of the courts' in the town in their continued and somewhat 
institutional culture in producing high remand rates should not be under-estimated. 
As has been continually referred to in this study these were 'tough' youth courts. 
George: I'm concerned that we're now offering bail support to young people 
who shouldn't even he consideredfor it. The danger is Rob, as you well know, that 
once you start offering bail support and say the youngperson breaches or perhaps 
commits afurther offence while on BSS the options to the magistrates' begin to 
reduce. 
There is a real danger that the courts will start remanding young people into 
custody who really shouldn't be there because the BSS cards have been laid on the 
table too soon. Once bail support's been used where do the magistrates often go 
from there? Exactly, remands into local authority or worse, custody! I've got this 
gutfeeling that in the pursuit ofnumbers and valuefor moneyfor what the YJB have 
spent on this project that come what may we've got to appear to get the numbers up 
so that it doesn't look as ifte'refailing. Sod the potential consequences that we may 
be putting youngpeople at risk of being remanded, who previously this wouldn't have 
appliedto. Thisism greatest concern. y 
(George: Interview, March 2002) 
George may have had something in his insight of the net-widening approach 
within the new youth justice system (Cohen, 1985). With more category offender 
focused programmes coming into place employing a 'what works' ethos to reducing 
offending, the danger is that with a gamut of new 'interventions' someone, some 
groups and certain people are expected to placed upon them in order to fulfil he 
function of those programmes. 
The YJB, under direction and funding from the Home Office, in channelling 
New Labour's emphasis upon more effective and managerial 'crime control', with 
this contemporary drive to expand the quantity and level of services/interventions 
within the system has adopted an expansion of the youth justice net reminiscent of 
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Cohen's (19 85) thesis of the 'punitive city'. The emphasis locally and nationally to 
'get the numbers in' and accelerate and expand (Gelsthorpe and Morris, 1999) the use 
of BSS to those who had previously remained as an inappropriate target group to 
apply such intensive methods of social control. As George's insight of the expanding 
of target groups suggests, once this aspect of social control intervention fails others, 
with far more intensive levels of surveillance await just around the youth justice 
comer. 
The political rhetoric and policy counter-balancing of the 'punitiveness' 
(Bottoms, 1992; Newburn, 1997) approach (for example, there is always prison), 
towards an increased 'surveillance of welfare approach' (for example, we now have 
ISSP to add onto BSS rather than prison, although prison will still remain an option), 
creates a desensitised youth justice strategy in making the 'system appear less harsh, 
that people are encouraged to use it more often' (Cohen, 1985: 98). With the 
broadening of the level of surveillance strategy open to BSS by incorporating ISSP as 
a further intervention this extended the scope in its use. This may have had the 
advantage of broadening the scope of the BSS target group to those right at the heavy 
end of the youth justice scales, whilst also maintaining the potential to lower the 
constitution of its intended target group, to young people who would have previously 
been outside of its target boundary. In effect the 'net' practice becomes a youth 
justice 'trawling' expedition. The net's length is widened, made stronger, and the 
holes within it reduced in size therefore catching larger loads and a more varied mix 
(or perhaps 'species') of catches. 
Norm added a further insight of the local YOS manipulation of YJB 
strategies to herald, 'spin' and 'spread' the success of its interventions to agencies 
within the youth justice system through somewhat dubious practices. 
Didyou know that ISSP is now being applied at court as a condition ofbail? 
You did? Oh, right. But, not as a bail supportpackage? Oh, you didn't know that? 
Well bail support can offer it, but what usually happens, because the magistrates 
aren't daft, they'll accept it at thefirst, or secondpre-trial hearing as a bail support 
package and what is really happening is that ISSP comes into its own with bail 
support taking a very limited role. 
The Youth Offending Service claims that this is one ofthe triumphs of bail 
supervision, you know, like trying to spread a success asfar as they can possibly 
stretch it but, really it's ISSP on its own as a condition ofconditional bail. Sofor the 
serious or the same oldfaces ofyoung offenders up infront of the court, ISSP has 
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taken over and is claiming some successes. Bail Support is still being offered at 
court, but as a consequence ofthis, because the money's there and we're expected to 
deliver and be accountable, bail support is now being offered as a bail package to 
youngpeople who a couple ofyears ago we wouldn't have touched with it. 
The danger is that this strategy widens the net of those considered to be 
more risky young offenders. As you know, one of the consequences ofbreaching or 
re-offending on bail support is that it has a strong risk of increasing the chances of 
being remanded to custody or local authority accommodation. It's now getting 
people on it who wouldn't have come on to it and categorising them as more serious 
young offenders than used to be the case. 
(Norm: Interview, February 2001) 
The danger is that youth j ustice services such as BSS, in diverting young people 
away from custody, has also increased the potential for net-widening (Hucklesby, 
2001). YOTs/YOS should be pro-active rather than reactive in preventing remands 
into custody, being held unnecessarily in police custody and imposition of the courts' 
restrictive conditions of bail (Nacro/BSPDU, 200 1). The greatest danger the new 
youth justice system appears to be facing, as Geoff and Norm view the situation from 
their professional capacities, is the net-widening of targeted groups of young people 
who would have previously been dealt with in far less intrusive and potentially 
damaging ways. 
The provision of services to young people should be assessment 
led to ensure that they are not 'up-tariffed' so that interventions 
are appropriate and proportionate to the circumstances of the 
case and the young person's background and situation. 
Responses to young people should be proportionate. 
(Thomas and Hucklesby, 2002: 7) 
If this is to be the case and the pursuit of the 'new' youth justice system is to 
open up the net then far more young people will be targeted by increasingly 
restrictive procedures of the youth justice system. 
Goldson and Jamieson's study of BSS projects in the North West of England 
maintain that BSS made 'a tangible impact on reducing the numbers of unconvicted 
and/or unsentenced juvenile remanded in prisons' (2002: 7 1). Likewise, the 
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Sunderland research found that for many young people the intervention, when 
suitably applied, had the potential in which to make positive inroads for young people 
and limiting the potential of remands. However, in many cases these positive results 
came from some of the 'less' persistent and lower grade offenders. Yet, despite those 
successes it is evident that many more and indeed a substantial amount of its clients 
were charged with a least one re-offence and/or breached their conditions of bail (for 
a detailed analysis see Hornsby, 2002). As has been discussed throughout this 
chapter, a range of inter-locking factors were accountable but by no means steadfast 
in attempting to explain the conflicts within the organisation. It is recognised that the 
development of BSS was by no means a trouble-free process of implementation. The 
organisation encountered increased and burdensome pressure placed upon those 
delivering and managing BSS, alongside a range of other associated and somewhat 
rapid policy developments within the system at that point in time (Goldson and 
Jamieson, 2002). 
The provision of BSS, akin to most interventions within the youth justice 
system, involves a multi-disciplinary and multi-agency array of involvement (Ball, 
McCormae and Stone, 1995). Such situations create a labyrinthine of competing and 
contextual organisational disparities that reflect upon the success or otherwise of BSS 
in meeting its commendable aim. 
Summary 
The emphasis placed upon the practice of BSS clearly delivered a new range of 
protocols which firmly placed this intervention within the managerialism. strategy 
(Newburn, 1998) of the 'new youth justice system' (Goldson, 2000). This 
fundamentally altered a range of frontline working procedures and practices within 
the system aimed at promoting and delivering 'evidenced based practice' (Holdaway 
et al. 2001). However, the difficulties encountered by frontline workers in delivering 
both the national and local aims of youth justice were compromised by a range of 
mis-aligned organisational protocols and the subsequent cleavages that have occurred 
have impeded the envisaged strategy that was intended to be delivered. 
BSS encountered a significant range of both inter and infra agency conflicts 
which related to grounded organisational counter-cultures (Morgan, 1986) and 
workers experiences and realities relating to the routinization of practice (see 
Goldblatt and Lewis, 1999; Smith 2003). Such contradictory elements, to that 
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proposed by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, have witnessed a range of 
contradictory practices within multifaceted organisational aims and the increasing 
emphasis upon multi-agency approaches (Crawford, 1999) in dealing with young 
offenders within a continually shifting contextual terrain. 
In attempting to deliver BSS the shortcomings experienced within the project 
were located at both policy and practice levels. These weaknesses were situated 
within organizational resistance, poor levels of local youth justice management 
implementation of new practices, and a wide and often composite range of resistant 
perceptions and attitudes relating to the system of those involved in the frontline 
delivery of its intended outcomes. In the following and conclusive chapter, the 
delivery of BSS is discussed with a range of other connected findings that relate to 
the inherent tensions relating to the complex conditions found within the new youth 
justice system. 
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Chapter Eight 
Overview and Conclusion 
Course, I wouldn't want you to think that everybody born in trouble was bom 
bad and they even had to get good or, stay bad. But some of them born on 
that side of that railroad track just never could find the time or, a good enough 
teacher to learn about being good. 
(Lee Hazelwood 'Run Boy Run', 1968) 
Introduction 
The study has researched a disparate range of distinct patterns of opinions and 
experiences from inside the machinery of the youthjustice system. It has been 
discussed that, during these embryonic stages of the new youth justice delivery, the 
politicized rhetoric of youth offending (Goldson 1999a, 2000b; Pitts, 2001 a) gathered 
momentum and was transferred to the practice of the previous Youth Justice Teams. 
This incurred a substantial amount of policy and practice realignments of locally 
based frontline management and practice of youth justice (Smith, 2003). An aim of 
the Crime and Disorder Act was to 'design out' (Pitts 200 1 a: 142), by way of an 
uniformed approach (Pratt, 1989) of delivery, many of the identified weaknesses 
within the previous system's approach in dealing with young offenders (Audit 
Commission, 1996,1997). 
The changes in practice procedures encountered a vast array of 
organisational complications, at both inter and infra organisational levels of 
delivering interventions such as BSS (see for example, Souhami, forthcoming). In 
conducting this research it became clear that the weaknesses that were highlighted 
within the previous system did not disappear and indeed, they may have also have 
been exacerbated. The project encountered a variety of problems relating to issues of 
disparate youth justice organisational cultures and ideologies that hampered the 
success of the project. Within this 'new terrain of youth justice management and 
delivery' (Smith, 2003: 89) the long-standing cultural hangovers inherent within the 
previous system, and the early experiences in delivering the new system, were laden 
with long-standing conflicts within not only, the multi-agency partnership approach, 
but also to that of other criminal justice organisations (for example the police and 
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courts), who often espoused competing objectives in how 'best' to deal with some of 
the more troublesome young offenders who came into the youthjustice system. The 
remainder of this chapter provides a synthesis of the main findings described in this 
thesis, which are then connected to the wider implications of delivering youth justice 
within the contemporary milieu. 
A Methodological and Theoretical Overview 
The data obtained and analysed for this study came from examining key components 
of BSS delivery. This has seen the research sites and personnel range over and 
between a variety of inter-connected locations involved with remand decisions 
relating to young people. The structure of the thesis follows the narrative of young 
people's involvement at key stages of the youthjustice system following their arrests. 
To date, academic debates relating to the delivery of this 'new youth justice' system 
(Goldson, 1999a, 2000a) have generally focused upon policy debates (Souhami, 
forthcoming). This 'administrative focus' (Morgan, 2000: 71) has largely ignored 
how policy has been played out in practice, and has tended to neglect the issues of 
organisational conflict that are to be found within the system (see, Burnett and 
Appleton, 2004). What empirical research has that has been undertaken has tended to 
concentrate its gaze principally upon the implementation of the new measures 
(Holdaway et at 2001; Crawford and Newburn 2003; Burnett and Appleton 2004). 
A central aim of this thesis has been to illuminate a range of inadequacies 
involved within the contemporary youth justice system, and in particular, of those 
associated with the youth justice intervention of bail supervision and support. An 
original aspect of this thesis is that it is critical of the approach of the system in 
dealing with young people at risk of facing the worst case scenarios within the 
remand management of young offenders. This critical analysis alone, I argue, 
provides a far more focused approach of perspectives from inside of the youth justice 
system, by way of a commitment to the 'first-hand experiences' (Atkinson et al., 
2001: 4) of those involved within it. Evaluations of the current youth justice system 
to date, have generally been concerned with the process of comparing the outcome 
effectiveness of youth justice programmes (Bottoms, 2000: 43) rather than 
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explaining, by way of observation, as to how the workers involved in the system view 
and do their work". 
To date, studies of the new youth justice system have tended to remain 
steadfastly embedded within the 'customary technicist limitations' (Morgan, 2000: 
62) of predominantly government funded criminological evaluations. They are, in 
fact, system's management evaluations that aim to make what's currently in place 
function more efficiently. Of course, such an approach, particularly with the current 
criminological enterprise (ibid: 69) of emphasis upon evaluations of youth justice 
interventions and providers, has a multitude of potential uses. They provide local and 
national crime reduction programme aims with data and related findings which can be 
used to refine and/or promote particular interventions. They are also of use to the 
government, so that it can obtain and deploy to its political advantage, in producing 
youth crime (often highly selective) interventions that have 'immediate results-a real 
quick impact' (Home Office, 1999a. Quoted in Morgan, 2000: 74). 
Such emphasis within the current Crime Reduction Programme has been 
widely critiqued as lacking any theoretical substance (see, for example, Mair, 2000, 
Morgan, 2000). Yet, at the same time and despite the atheoretical context of such law 
and order programmes, it is of relative importance, as Morgan suggests that 
'Independent evaluation will demonstrate whether or not the initiative works within 
the timescale of the project' (2000: 74). The relationship between the Home Office 
Crime Reduction Programme and criminological research has witnessed a 
prostitution of the criminological discipline (ibid: 76) to meet its political punter's 
desires and fetishes for 'quick fixes'. Yet, within the contemporary milieu this 
relationship between the state and criminological research has compromised a variety 
of recognised factors which are connected to youth offending behaviour (Smith, 
2003; Morgan, 2000). The continued cycle of 'structural economic and political 
problems at the heart of social exclusion' (Pitts, 2001 a: 9) has far deeper implications 
than the current managerialism, agenda (Newburn, 1998) cares to or, has the scope to 
focus upon. This ultimately brings us no closer to better understandings of the causes 
of youth deviance and crime (ibid. ) than to those who have undertaken such academic 
projects during previous eras. 
However, the system of the management of young offenders is riddled with 
complexities (Holdaway, 1979: 3). Regarding my own managerialist state-sponsored 
SI For an alternative assessment of examining the organisational and cultural conflicts embedded within the new youth 
justice system's managerialism approach see Souhami (forthcoming). 
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research I gave the client what he requested and took his money. Yet, at the same 
time, and unknown to the client, I also rummaged around and looked for a variety of 
other information. In applying this particular methodological approach the theory 
emerged as an 'ever-developing entity, not as a perfected product' (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967: 32) from observations from within the system. 
Main Findings 
In examining BSS this thesis has aimed to disrobe much of the self-congratulatory 
hyperbole (Bumett and Appleton, 2004) of the system's performance and to raise key 
questions about the 'purpose and efficacy' (Smith, 2003: 71), of BSS as a youth 
justice intervention. As this thesis has argued, the youth justice system remains far 
from a culturally homogenous mechanism and is instead, conversely situated within a 
disjuncture amongst the policy rhetoric and actual experiences of delivering and 
receiving the system's intended aim. The aim of this thesis, by way of its critical 
analysis has been to 'problematize what has been taken for granted' (Smith, 
2001: 225) in the continued dislocation of social processes inherent within the youth 
justice system. 
This thesis has observed the chronological processes that the young 
suspects' who came onto Bail Supervision and Support progressed through the 
system, by way of a number of inter-locking stages of youth justice protocols. In 
approaching the research in this manner the aim has been to attempt to replicate the 
first-hand experiences that were associated with a variety of youth justice platforms 
connecting to that intervention. As should be clear at this stage of the thesis a diverse 
range of participant's often uncomplimentary experiences have been addressed. This 
strategy has been adopted in order to provide understandings of weaknesses within 
the system, by way of specific and interrelated organisational and cultural 
differences, which at times rendered the success of BSS in achieving its aims 
somewhat impotent. 
My own participation within the system, revealed a somewhat less than well 
oiled and maintained piece of social control machinery than YJB embellishment has 
had us believe (Burnett and Appleton, 2004). This is of course is not to suggest that 
positive results did not occur, there was a good deal of important and influential work 
undertaken at the local BSS scheme. Yet, as has also been discussed, at the earliest 
stages of implementation of the new system, the local scheme was ill-prepared and 
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poorly managed in order to carry out the 'micro-politics of social control' (Smith, 
2003: 63) with a significant minority of Sunderland's youth offending population. 
The local BSS project carried with it many of the previous organisational 
youthjustice cultural idiosyncrasies that the Audit Commission (1996) had shed light 
upon, and that the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 had attempted to overhaul in 
improving the youthjustice system. Within the internal politics and practice of BSS 
the project was inadequately staffed and woefully neglectful in its monitoring of data. 
As an intervention it was riddled with a range of conflicts and tensions that impacted 
upon its level and quality of delivery. As has also been argued, the connections to 
wider youth justice situations rendered the scope of work with young offenders as a 
challenging and an often-conflicting state of affairs. These conflicts occurred due to 
the nature of converging professional identities, disparate occupational cultures and 
organisational change in an attempt to utilise a multi-agency approach (also see 
Souhami, forthcoming). 
Inter and infra-agency conflicts within the system witnessed a dissonance 
between policy and practice with a variety of organisational tensions between 
ideological standpoints within the youthjustice system. The new youthjustice system 
is, despite YJB and political claims to the contrary, a labyrinth of cultural disparities 
and inter-agency discord. Such tensions produce grounded ambiguities that restrict 
the success of welfare-orientated interventions such as BSS, with detrimental 
potential outcomes to its expected target group. - 
Overview of the Discussion 
Chapter One provided an overall context for this study. The aim is to provide 
'empirical monographs' (Silverman, 1997: 239) of the back-stage processes that 
occur within the delivery of youth justice. As an ethnography of the contemporary 
youth justice system the research provides insights into the organisational culture, 
changing legislation, tensions, conflict, contradictions and the working practices in 
the delivery of an area of youth justice provision. 
Chapter Two provided an overview of the methodologies that were utilised as 
social research strategies across and within a number of youth justice practice sites. 
The research initially began as a YJB/Nacro evaluation of BSS. However, as deeper 
insights into the back practices of youth justice began to develop I found myself to be 
equally, if not more so intrigued, by a number of areas associated with BSS. This, as I 
284 
have pointed out, was not a planned strategy, but gained from sitting in the BSS 
office listening to youth workers concerns about the new youth justice system. I also 
observed organisational weaknesses, and experienced the cultural disparity between 
and within youth justice agencies, and in particular noted the poor implementation of 
bail supervision and support. Inadequacies in staffing, in data collection protocols and 
monitoring were also apparent, as was a general sense of staff confusion and at times 
resistance to YJB and YOS progressive managerialism (Newbum, 1998,2002) 
cultural frameworks. These observational and participatory insights shifted my focus 
away from a process of evaluation strategy (Patton, 1988) now firmly embedded 
youth justice managerialism (Muncie and Hughes, 2002a) that aims, in an often 
sterile manner, to reflect the way services such as BSS are organised and delivered 
(Smith, 2003). 
This is not to discredit evaluation exercises per se, as they do often assist, 
despite the emphasis upon 'quick-fixes', in directing longer-term directives, making 
both systems and operatives accountable for their actions. However, throughout the 
evaluation/research experience it appeared that for the frontline workers the 
accountability of their actions became a somewhat simplistic 'hoop-jumping' 
exercise that they could have done without. As Jack, letting rip and voicing his 
ridicule on the issue of 'accountability' suggested. 
We were never accountable. The only thing that really worried us was if 
someone [in the previous Youth Justice Service] fucked up and made a wrong 
decision. Like getting one ofthe kids onto bail support who was laterfound drowned 
the River Wear in the car they'd stolen, when the police had been pushingfor a 
remand into custody in thefirst place. See, and I've said this before to you, we're 
employed by the Social Services Department andyou'll be hardpushed tofind 
anyone really getting in the shit, like as you say 'being made accountable' because of 
the shoddy work they've done. Christ, I dare say it [shoddy practice] happens every 
day in this office'. 
(Jack, November 2000) 
The cultural disparities within the implementation and organisation of the new 
system have been widely ncglected. Worker's suspicions towards management 
encroachment upon their working practices during this period of youth justice 
transition to 'managerial diktat' (Smith, 1999: 163), incurred a grudging and 
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somewhat half-hearted acceptance of organisational overhauls and/or a resistance to 
the implementation of new systems of practice. 
Chapter Three provided a discussion of bail as a socio-legal definition 
of young offender's entrance into the criminal justice system. In this chapter an 
analysis of bail law, policy and practice was provided in order to understand how bail 
supervision and support is intended to act as a welfare-orientated youth justice 
intervention. This chapter provided an understanding of what bail is, what constitutes 
a bail decision and the ways this crucial component of the criminal justice process 
can affect young offenders during the pre-trial stage, and later involvement within the 
system. I discussed entrance into the criminal justice system for young offenders, 
with particular emphasis upon decisions made at youth and magistrate's courts and at 
police stations. 
This chapter has argued that the granting of bail is weighted against a 
number of conflicting agency responses. Despite the underpinning assumption of 
bail as a given right of suspected offenders (Hucklesby, 1997; Hucklesby and 
Marshall, 2000), this chapter provided a range of evidence that suggests that this right 
is weighted against other individual criminal justice organisations focus upon known 
suspects and targeted social groups (see, for example Holdaway, 1983; Reiner, 1992; 
Choongh, 1997). Yet, such methods of social control continue to be determined upon 
the most disadvantaged, less articulate and easily apprehended individuals. Following 
arrest this creates, particularly for the 'usual suspects' charged and refused police 
bail, a domino effect of youth justice remand decisions that compromise the legal 
right to bail without detention (Hucklesby, 1997,2001). 
The structural dependency of the police and CPS often influences courts' 
decision making processes (Sanders and Young, 2000), and has immediate 
detrimental affects upon young suspect's involvement with the mechanics of the 
system. As most workers within the welfare orientated wing of the youth justice 
system recognise, sending children to prison is a 'bad thing', it really should not 
occur, and other mechanisms should be in place and operational that limit the 
potential for such remand decisions to be imposed upon young suspects involved 
with the heavier end of youth justice protocols (see, Nacro, 2001 c; Goldson, 2002). 
Chapter Four continued the narrative approach concerning young offenders' 
experiences, via observations conducted at police stations following arrest. The 
analysis within this section is based upon fieldwork conducted as an Appropriate Adult 
at police stations. I offer an insight into police decision making processes regarding 
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who 'got out', and who 'stayed in' at police stations after charges to young suspects 
have been made by Custody Officers. This aspect of the study marks the entrance point 
for most of the sample of young suspects who were the target group for BSS. 
From a theoretical perspective an examination of three models of the criminal 
justice system are reviewed and considered. These models ofjustice are compared 
alongside the empirical data drawn from my own experiences and observations as an 
Appropriate Adult. Sociological analysis of legal processes relating to police decision 
making has questioned how individual police officers reach decisions with suspected 
or alleged offenders (see for example, Banton, 1964; Skolnick, 1966; Wilson, 1968; 
Holdaway; 1979). Police officers, often viewing many of those young offenders as 
the 'dross' (Choogh, 1997), employ strategies to refuse the right to bail and thus 
potentially restrict future bail decisions made at pre-trial court hearings (Hayes, 1981; 
Hucklesby, 1997; Sanders and Young, 2000). The sociological emphasis upon police 
decision making should not be under-estimated, as this remains as a strategy which 
can, and often does, control access to a range of future criminal justice outcomes. The 
role of the Appropriate Adult, despite its accompanying welfare focus, is usually 
impotent in guaranteeing that bail decisions are objectively considered by the police 
who often use the codes of practice of PACE in their favour (Bottomley et al, 199 1). 
At these stages the intervention of BSS comes into focus as a 'remand rescue 
package' intent upon restricting a range of negative outcomes that can occur to young 
suspects. 
In Chapter Five I examined the policy and practice of BSS. This intervention 
is intended to target those young people perceived to be at risk of a custodial remand 
or, of being remanded into local authority accommodation. In following the narrative 
of youthjustice protocols involved with the BSS intervention, I have discussed that 
preceding decisions made at police stations and then at courts will influence further 
procedural outcomes. BSS takes on a role of a youthjustice 'last chance saloon' to 
rescue young people from the clutches of far more serious remand decisions. Within 
these inter-connecting and often conflictual organisational protocols, a routine of 
complex and inter-twining youth justice remand decisions and interventions are 
considered. The argument within this chapter focuses upon the organisational and 
ideological tensions inherent within youthjustice partnerships. However, the internal 
disputes and conflicts that raged within the BSS project itself also accompanied a 
range of external incompatibilities (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994; Crawford 1998). 
Therefore, the internal and external cultural conflicts had a major effect upon the 
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achievement of setting commonly defined goals, and the methods by which they could 
be attained. T'he tensions that existed not only internally within the project, but also 
externally with other key agencies restricted the potential for BBS successes. For 
example, the local youth courts' were an intrinsic aspect of this multi-agency 
approach, yet the approach was often grounded in an ideology that was incompatible 
with the welfare-orientated functions of BSS. Such organisational conflicts presented 
a disjointed, and at times paradoxical state of affairs. The organisational behaviours 
that were inherent between primary and secondary bail decision-makers, created 
conflicts and produced results that jeopardised the falfilment of the BSS intervention. 
Chapter Sh examines the next case scenario, where BSS may be refused as 
an intervention and other remand outcomes are considered. Here, the focus is of other 
forms of accommodation for young suspects involved with the criminal justice 
system. In such cases a number of quite complex and often emotive factors are 
consistent in influencing the remand process. It is often the case that young 
offender's parents will reffise to allow their sons or daughters to live under the same 
roofs as them. In such scenarios these young people become 'emergency cases' 
within the system. Due to the decisions made by parents in such cases, these young 
people are left isolated as they do not have a suitable bail address and thus, BSS can 
not be applied as an intervention. In short, for BSS to be successfully applied as an 
intervention those who come onto it need a suitable bail address. When situations 
such as these occur, the options available to the courts, the project and the young 
people are reduced in scale and scope. 
Often the case will be that the magistrates will view that a remand to local 
authority (un-secure) accommodation is not suitable for the young suspect. In such 
scenarios the options left available for the young person are further reduced. The 
issue of a lack of secure accommodation units and placements within youth justice is 
recognised as increasing the potential for young suspects to be remand to prisons 
(Bateman, 2004: 162). In Sunderland this was certainly the case. Take for example, 
John-Jon's case study, which clearly demonstrates the inequitable spread of resources 
within the system (Home Office, 1998; Bateman, 2004; Hagell, 2004). For John-Jon, 
the potential for other less severe and damaging remand scenarios to be applied as 
conditions of bail, quickly evaporated due to the lack of resources available within 
the system. 
The failure of the local YOS to attract potential recruits for its 'remand 
foster care service', also clearly demonstrates society's negative view of such 
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troublesome young people, despite the recognised positive impacts that such welfare- 
orientated services have been shown to provide (Lipscombe, 2003). Despite the 
recruitment drive offering a handsome scale of pay, resources and training, no one in 
the North east region opted to help out these young offenders. This youth justice void 
creates an austere vacuum in which young people often, and by no fault of their own, 
encounter the most severe forms of remand decisions. This occurs due to the youth 
justice system's failure to provide appropriate levels of alternative forms of 
accommodation for some of society's most vulnerable young people. It also impacts 
upon the potential of interventions such as BSS to provide far more child-focused 
supplementary remand management interventions. In a number of instances young 
people were remanded into custody simply because their parents had had enough, and 
the courts decided that other forms of accommodation were not suitable or could not 
be secured. It is recognised by those working within the system that this aspect of 
youth justice delivery has been and continues to be one of the most grotesque 
examples of the state's mis-management of youth justice. 
In Chapter Seven I analysed the aims and objectives of bail supervision and 
support. As the focal point of this study, BSS aims to offer alternative community 
based supervision and interventions. As the data presented and analysed within this 
section reveal, it was often the case that the courts in the district believed that other 
associated remand resources were more suitable for dealing with young suspects' on 
remand. However, such remand decisions are recognised as creating a range of 
dysfunctional and highly emotive episodes in the lives of young people (Goldson, 
2002). Such decisions do little in rehabilitating the risks which brought the young 
people into the system in the first place (H. M. Inspectorate of Prisons, 1997; 2000). 
Remands into local authority care homes and worse, prison, outweighed the 
acceptance of BSS during the research period. Even when successful in'winning- 
over' the courts and offering BSS as a resource of 'monitoring and scrutiny' 
(McLauglin, Muncie and Hughes 2001: 317), it is seen that the project's aim to 
restrict the potential for further offending and breaches of bail conditions, was 
complex and often compromised by a range of factors that those delivering the 
intervention believed impeded the successful delivery of BSS. 
The politics of youth justice during the 1980s and 1990s, fuelled by moral 
panics concerning the escalation in youth crime (see Newburn, 2002), focused upon 
the deviant youth of a perceived 'underclass' (Murray, 1990). Many, from this 
perceived 'sub-stratum', locally termed as 'charvas', were labelled as 'persistent 
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young offenders' (Hagell and Newburn, 1994), who continued to commit offences 
while they were on bail. The 1980s and 1990s became marked by policies that 
stigmatised a perceived deviant class in British society (Bagguley and Mann, 1992; 
Taylor, 1999; Young, 1999) and political rhetoric intent on 'out-toughing' other 
political voices and actions (Goldson, 1999,2000; Pitts, 2000,2001b). During these 
decades the adulteration of 'rights and responsibilities' to 'self responsibility and 
obligation' have been referred to as a 'symptomatic of reactionary thematization of 
late modernity' (Garland, 2001: 165). These reactionary processes created an era 
where 'politics and culture have become saturated with images of moral breakdown, 
incivility and the decline of the family' (Muncie and Hughes, 2002: 5). The young 
offender and his feckless parent became political ploys. Images relating to that 
deviant youth subculture undermining the social fabric, fitted the picture of social 
malaise in the UK during that period (Goldson, 1999a, 2000; Muncie, 1999b, 2000; 
Pitts, 2000). The functioning of the youth justice system also came into question. 
Delivering Youth Justice 
The changes implemented by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 aiming to 'toughen 
up and tighten up' the technology of social control throughout the youth justice 
system were driven forward. The explicit political demand focused upon a new form 
of social control and governance that would herald the reinterpretation and 
reorganisation of youth justice (see Newburn, 1998; Pitts, 2000,2001 b; Muncie, 
2000; Goldson, 2000c, Smith 2003). During this era of fundamental change within 
the delivery of youth justice policy and practice, bail supervision and support was 
implemented as a vanguard intervention in dealing with some of society's most 
prolific and troublesome young offenders. 
With the implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 a pendulum 
swing occurred within youth justice towards a re-birth of 'punitive populism' 
(Bottoms, 1995; Newburn, 1997). This has been overseen by the gradual emergence 
of a 'corporatist' (Pratt, 1989; Smith, 2000) agenda concerned with 'efficient, 
effective (and cheap) forms of service delivery' (Smith, 2003: 36). The overriding 
agenda amongst all of these policy initiatives, following on from the scathing attacks 
upon the preceding system of youth justice delivery, as emphasised by the Audit 
Commission's Misspent Youth (1996) and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, has been 
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to promote as a matter of priority (and come what may) the appearance of an 
effective system of social control (Pratt, 2000). 
The Conflictual Processes of Delivering Bail Supervision and Support 
The relationships between youth justice policy and its culturally ingrained formal and 
informal power relations within the system continue to impact upon the achievable 
welfare-orientated targets offered by this coordination of social control. At the 
frontline of the delivery of this particular youth justice intervention, it is clear that the 
tensions of political management and a range of conflictual agency orientated 
ideologies stalled and impeded the level of effective delivery of BSS. Meanwhile 
young people continued to be sent away and locked up. If this is the best that the state 
can offer in treating damaged children, this 'best' is simply not good enough. 
However, the local level of delivery of BSS is but a small cog in the larger scale of 
the whole mechanism of youth justice. On many occasions the intervention was 
rendered powerless by far greater structural weaknesses embedded within the system 
of youth justice. Bail Supervision and Support emerged as a 'tactical intervention' 
(Smith, 2003: 39) of youthjustice during the 1990s and was targeted towards 
persistent young offenders, who continued to commit offences whilst being placed on 
bail for previous offending behaviour. 
The aim of this intervention, during a period of rapid increases in the rates of 
custodial remands (Nacro 1996a; Home Office, 1997b; Monaghan, 2000), was 
intended to boost the confidence of magistrates in applying bail to young offenders 
who might otherwise have been facing remands into custody (Moore and Smith, 
2001). In Sunderland, as with a number of other local youth justice organisations 
across England and Wales, bail support was delivered as a youth justice intervention 
which held young offenders viewed as 'children in need' (see, Children Act 1989, 
Part I 11, and schedule 2,7 (b)). 
As this thesis has argued, BSS was one of many interconnected cogs within the 
machinery of the youth justice system. Each respective cog, at lesser or greater 
degrees of impact and severity, often impedes the function of others they are 
connected to. This systems failure occurred at the detriment of those young people 
that BSS was intent on rescuing. At key stages of this process of delivery, when one 
cog within the system failed to operate in a complementary and functionary fashion 
to another, the systemper se could stall and at times would grind to a halt. In basic 
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terms, BSS did not operate in isolation in attempting to deliver an intervention, which 
at its essence, is a welfare-orientated youth justice strategy operating within a throng 
of distinct and often competing and contradictory youth justice agendas. The remand 
situation remains as one of 'persistent ambiguity' (Harris and Timms, 1993) in how 
the state deals with and what it can offer young offenders. The taut relationships that 
can and do occur within the multi-agency approaches (see Pearson et. al, 1992; 
Crawford, 1999) meant that the delivery of BSS was often dependant upon other 
interconnected aspects of the youth justice system which it ultimately had little 
authority over. Therefore, in attempting to achieve its aims and objectives BSS could 
often be isolated amongst a flow of competing youth justice organisations (for 
example the police, Crown Prosecution Service and youth courts). 
It has been argued throughout this thesis, the cultural idiosyncrasy within BSS, 
in relation to that of the managerialist agenda promoted and sanctioned by the YJB, 
incurred a disparate counter culture of organisational working practices. The 
ethnographic observations and participation that underpinned the methodological 
approach to this research witnessed conflict within the social-relational dynamics and 
working realities in the delivery of BSS as a youth justice intervention. The 
relationships between youth justice workers, their managers, and the new youth 
justice system were grounded within work place realities, and often contrasting 
organisational cultural frameworks that exposed infra-agency conflict and resistance. 
Furthermore, the issue of significant numbers of young offenders not reaching the 
intended aims and objectives of BSS has demonstrated the range of complexities 
involved in delivering youth justice. 
Within the delivery of BSS tension and conflict was evident. Worker's 
resistance to the changes initiated by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and 
implemented and monitored by the YJB during this period of increased 
managerialism (Newbum, 1998) was most apparent, and both inter and infra-agency 
reluctance and resistance to change had detrimental outcomes. Using the 'target 
group' attainment rate (see Chapter Seven) as a statistical data indication of the 
project's achievement in obtaining its target group, the failings of the project 
ultimately incurred quite severe remand decisions upon those young people it 
attempted to rescue. 
Whilst this study has been concerned with explaining, by way of empirical data, 
how bail supervision and support operates as a strategic youth justice intervention, it 
has also revealed that within its broader scope, the mechanisms of youth justice are 
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impeded with deeply entrenched organisational and cultural inconsistencies. BSS 
remains as a significant welfare option within the contemporary youth justice system 
which has been criticised for its punitive (Bottoms, 1995; Newbum, 1998) and 
populist (Goldson and Peters, 2000; Pitts, 200 1 a) approaches in tackling youth crime 
and delivering justice. In aiming to rescue those young offenders in at the 'deep end' 
of the youth justice pool, BSS is a much-needed intervention which should offer 
magistrates with viable alternatives to that of remanding young people to institutions. 
I have argued that this was generally not the case in Sunderland. A number of 
explanations as to why this occurred have been offered. 
However, I am also conscious that this study may raise more questions than it 
answers. Fundamental factors involved with youthjustice, for example, magistrate's 
understandings of young offenders and the culture of the courts require far greater 
assessment, as do policing methods and the views of law enforcers. In essence are 
they with us or against us? How, if against us, does this impact on their methods of 
policing and of manipulating policy? The views of young offender's involvement 
within the new system, and in particular the social relations which brought them to it 
in the first place, have been widely neglected within the current climate of evaluation 
research, creating a void within our understandings of contemporary youth crime and 
the youth justice system. These and other connected areas of youth justice require far 
more substantive areas of study. Such research will perhaps broaden our knowledge 
regarding how to set about addressing the conflicts and contradictions that are 
embedded within this system of social control. 
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Appendix A 
A Dispossessed City: Chewing on the Gristle of a By-Gone 
Era 
Introduction 
In 1992 Sunderland was afforded the title of 'city. As the largest urban conurbation 
between Leeds and Edinburgh with a population nearing 300,000, it was widely 
expected that in being made a city many of the post-industrial downturns experienced 
by the town could be improved. City status was expected to provide Sunderland with 
far greater appeal for inward investment, providing a way out of the disastrous social 
and economic consequences experienced in the town due to the decline and 
subsequent death of its former industrial base. This, as this section of the thesis will 
argue, has not been the case. 
Social exclusion is deeply entrenched in Sunderland and the consequences of 
aspects from that exclusion will be discussed here. This section I believe is important 
as it sets the scene and describes much of the structural and contextual understanding 
of the place where the young offenders committed their crimes and experienced their 
social exclusion. 
They were, in the vast majority of cases, young people who faced a range of 
issues that have been identified as social, political and economic factors widely 
acknowledged as contributory factors associated with the notion of social exclusion. 
They generally lived in the 'rougher' parts of town, they were without mainstream 
education in a town that possessed low basic indicators of average school 
achievement; poor health; high unemployment and a startling level of working aged 
people who were 'incapable' of work. It is a poor city and these were poor white 
young people. They fitted the bill ideally of many criminological and sociological 
studies that have focused upon poor working class young men as a culturally deviant 
social stratum (see, for example, Mayhew, 1983; Mays, 1954,1972; Downes, 1966; 
Anderson, 1992; Willis, 1977; Corrigan, 1979; Bourgois, 1995; Wilson, 1996). 
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As a working class town which developed rapidly during the 18 th and 19 th 
Centuries the economic prosperity and development of the town were imbedded 
within the heavy industry of coal mining and the craft and of shipbuilding of the 18 th 
and 19th centuries. These two main employment industries provided much of the 
economic and social context of the town for approximately three hundred years. 
Shipbuilding: It's Just a Rumour That Was Spread Around Town 
Sunderland has a long and proud tradition of being one of the most productive 
shipbuilding towns in the world during the industrial epoch. Alongside coal mining, 
shipbuilding remained a relatively constant mainstay within the town, over a three 
hundred year period. However, this is not to neglect that these industries were open to 
the effects of the market, and the subsequent fluctuations that occurred during this 
period of time of which "Shipbuilding was undoubtedly a precarious commercial 
venture" (Clarke, 1981: 85). 
'Me height of Sunderland's economic role and as a prominent town of the 
industrial revolution occurred between the mid-I 800s and early 1900s (Corfe, 1988). 
This period epitomised the town's heyday until the depression of 1907-08 brought to a 
close Sunderland's rapid growth (Dennis, 1970: 135-138). During the 1920s and 1930s 
the North-eastem region and subsequently the town had 'the reputation of a depressed, 
poor town-a northern relic of some old forgotten, far-off time' (ibid). 
During the 1930s many of the town's slums were demolished and their 
inhabitants re-housed. During the mid-thirties 445 families were re-housed by the local 
authority. Previously they had occupied 881 rooms in the slums. In their new council 
houses they occupied 1,671 rooms (Dennis, 1970: 15 1). However, this did not mean 
that the dispossessed working class position had been dramatically improved. A study 
by the Sunderland Medical Officer of Health (MOH) undertaken in 1936, found that 
nearly one half (44 per cent) of the relocated families from the slum areas of the town 
derived all of their incomes from public sources i. e. Unemployment Insurance Board; 
Unemployment Assistance Board; Public Assistance Committee or, from a 
combination of welfare payments from all three agencies. A further 33 per cent 
derived part of their income from these agencies. In total 77 per cent of the sample 
population derived their incomes from welfare payments (Dennis, 1970: 153). As will 
be discussed at a later stage in this Appendix the town has continued to have a sizeable 
state welfare dependant population. 
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Because of its industrial background, Sunderland failed to shake off the 
consequences of its over-reliance upon its heavy industrial economic base within the 
post-industrial milieu. The town has, and continues to be, a dispossessed, 
marginalized, and socially excluded area. As Robson stated in 1969, within the context 
of the post-industrial milieu the town was struggling to adapt to the changes within the 
economic and political climates. 
Sunderland is a town which is living on the dwindling fat of its 
Victorian expansion. The legacy of the Industrial Revolution is 
apparent in its appearance, its industrial structure, its population 
growth and in a host of social and economic characteristics 
(1969: 75) 
Bauman has suggested that the move from the society of producers which the 
town of Sunderland was built around and upon, to the dispossessed position the town 
now finds itself situated within, as the society of consumers have left the poor of this 
world without auseful function (1998). The culture that is still evident within the 
town is one of dispossessed 'traditional workers' (Weber, 1976). Work, for works 
sake and stripped of its previous meanings except as a means of survival has 
fundamentally altered to a far greater degree the levels of exclusion within this 
former working-class enclave. As Bourdieu (1990) has argued, consumption and the 
many levels in which it can be engaged with fulfil a social function in the 
legitimisation of social differences related to those consumer distinctions. In a 
number of ways the dispossessed of this city remain 'traditional consumers' and thus, 
'flawed consumers' (Bauman, 1998). And of course, this factor assists in 
maintaining the deeply rooted and concentrated level of poverty in the town which 
impacts upon and maintains the consumer economy found within it. 
As contemporary capitalism goes, they are a lost-and-hopeless 
case. There is no point in appealing to their 'repressed desires' 
and trying to sow new ones. No wonder they are seen as a 
needless burden; the one service they could render is to quietly 
disappear, at least from view 
(Bauman, 2002,96) 
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An attempt through private-public partnerships in which to improve the 
transport infra-structure inter and infra regionally has fell well short of the expectations 
of those partners. The introduction of the Metro rail service to the town has not 
delivered on its intended expectations. The introduction of the Metro was intended to 
improve the antiquated transport-infrastructure (and some of its satellite housing 
estates) and to develop travel to and from the town. Ibis has shocked and disappointed 
the rail operator and, one would expect the local council of Sunderland. The numbers 
of people expected to use the transport system just didn't turn up 52 . As to why this has 
happened is largely due to the over estimation by the operators of this public transport 
system to its intended passenger target group. 
In 2002-2003 it was estimated than within the city of Sunderland 10 million 
tunitS953 a year would travel by Metro in the town. The figure for actual users fell well 
short of this expected total at 3.7 million passengers. This resulted in a 6.3 million 
short-fall which accounts for a quite spectacular over-estimation by the rail operator 
and local council. 54 The employment user profile of Metro passengers in the South 
Hylton district of the town during 2002-2003 were, 27% full time employees, 19% 
part-time employees and 1% self employed. 55 In total this amounted to 47 per cent of 
working passengers using this system, in the main, to travel to and from work which in 
hard data amounts to 1,739,000 (multiple) work rides over a one year period. I was 
informed by an official at this company that 'the town's level ofsocial exclusion is of 
course is a major causefor this shoq/all in passengers' 56 . 
It's Shrinking In Size, But it's Not Healing 
A sure sip of the growth or decline in an area's status is the movement of people into, 
and away, from that area. Sunderland is now a city from which people are turning 
away. 
52 A quite ridiculous suggestion for this failure reported on the local TV news was that people from Sunderland wouldn't 
use the Metro and travel to Newcastle because of the longstanding, intense, and ingrained local rivalries that exist 
between the ncighbouring football teams, Sunderland AFC and Newcastle United. 
53 A ýurtie represents a 'single' ride. 
54 7IIiis information was gleaned through personal correspondence with a senior Nexus/Metro official on Tuesday. 20 
May 2003. 
55 ibid 
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Table Eleven 
Sunderland Population Estimates and Projections 1961-2011 
1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 
287,000 291,000 297,300 296,000 287,700 275,000 
Year 1961-71 1971-81 1981-91 1991-01 2001-11 
% +2.3 +1.3 -0.3 -2.9"/o -4.2 
Change 
(Source: TWRI, 2000) 
The post-industrial milieu has witnessed a continued flight of people from the 
town. During this decade (2001-2011) as is estimated by the above forecast, the 
population will continue to fall by approximately 4.2 per cent frorn the previous decade. 
It is fair to suggest that this movement of people away from and the lack of migration to 
the city is employment focused. 
The overall rate of employment growth in the North east since the war 
has been slower than the national average, fluctuating with national and 
regional conditions of prosperity and depression, and with an 
unemployment rate typically double that of the UK. 
(House, 1969: 59) 
Attempts to diversify the industries within the town to take over the I'adifig 
industries during the 60s, 70s and 80s have, in the main, failed to reinvigorate the 
overwhelming decline of the previous industries and the town's internal economy 
(Stone, Stevens and Morris, 1985: 116). The result of national and local policies has 
resulted in: 
The prospects for the local economy given the conStitUtiOn II'pOliCiCS 
similar to those which have been in force for the last six years, is one of' 
56 ibid 
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continuing general decline, with a marked difference between the 
performance of the older industrial parts of the Borough-sufflering 
increasing unemployment, high rates of out-migration and income 
deterioration 
(ibid: 118) 
House describes the town as, 'self contained community life and a distinct 
community blend, with greater problems in general, through the degree of dependence 
on shipbuilding and the need to widen the range of industries' (1969: 20). 1 lowever, tile 
region and the town itself have been here before and encountered a continual: 
.. slight net exodus of people which has characterised the North east 
ever since.. a net loss trickle of 19,000 in the I 800s became a net 
outflow of 33,000 in the decade before the First World War, rose to 
a great net ebb-tide of 141,000 in 1911-21, and culminated in a 
massive net out-migration of more than 190,00 between 1921 and 
1931. 
(ibid: 45) 
Manufacturing in the city employs a far higher proportion of the workforce than 
it does in comparison to the national picture having increased in Sunderland while 
decreasing nationally (City of Sunderland, 2000: 15). The service sector employs 
approximately around 67 per cent of the workforce, whereas nationally this figure has 
increased from 67 per cent to almost 76 per cent during the last decade (ibid. ). This, if 
speculative economic forecasts and accounts are correct, may continue the trend of' 
economic and unemployment hardships of this city. 'Analysis suggests that 
Sunderland could be vulnerable to a downturn in some high volume, lower skill 
manufacturing sectors, but has the potential to expand considerably both its higher 
skills niche manufacturing and its service sector' (ibid). 
The town as with many other urban conurbations in tile North east, has a history 
of dependence on externally owned manufacturing firms and has suffered from tile 
short duration of their investment and propensity to shed Jobs (Charles, 2001: 87). 111 
order to compensate for lost manufacturing Sunderland, as with tile North cast ill 
general, has had to compete with other less prosperous areas for inward private 
investment in which to attract the new service employers, mainly in the 11orin ofcall 
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centres (Richardson and Belt, 2001). In 2002 call centres were the highest contributors 
to the net overall employment growth in the region (ibid. ). 
However, with a generally poorly skilled existing workforce and continued low 
levels of educational attainment evident in the town, a fundamental weakness exists in 
attracting firms to locate business in Sunderland. The land and labour may be cheap 
(although within a globalized context of a world economy both of these can and will be 
exploited elsewhere in developing nations) yet, without the skills the workforce 
remains uninviting within the current economic climate for potential inward investors. 
During the 1980s and early 1990s shipbuilding and coal-mining in Sunderland went the 
way of the 'lamplighters and knockers' up' (see Hobbs, 1995: 96). Manufacturing 
(food, chemicals, and textiles) also encountered losses (Stone, Stevens, and Morris, 
1985: 49). However, these manufacturing losses were comparatively small sectors of 
the remaining overall employment in the area (ibid). 
In the same study it was found that the role of local government was an intrinsic 
aspect of the local economy. In 1981 public sector employment in Sunderland stood at 
42 per cent while the national average for this employment at tile local level stood at 30 
per cent (ibid: 115). The towns long-drawn dependence upon an industry subject to 
sharp fluctuations in business first recognised in 1908-1909 (Corfe, 1988) as recession 
through the decline of shipbuilding impacted upon a massive scale of job losses. 
It was the fall of the remaining bastion of the masculine employment sector, 
engineering and its associated allied industries, which were the more significant at this 
time and these losses where almost twice the national rate (see, Stolle, Stevens, and 
Morris, 1985: 52). This resulted in not only job losses and the effect this would have 
upon the town's economy, but, also in the masculine identities of those male workers 
and their male off-spring now dumped lock, stock and begrimed barrel within tile post- 
industrial setting (Campbell, 1993; Winlow, 2002). Sunderland now stands as the 
embodiment of a 'clapped-out industrial dump' (Byrne, 2001: 59) created by I'ar too 
many aspects of the negative processes of de-industrialisation. The economic dowilturn 
encountered by the city during the protracted process of de-industrialisation ofcourse 
makes headway into the social and the cultural aspects ofthe town's composition 
(Anderson, 2000). 
The basic employment skills' levels of the city's population are low. For 
example, "42% of the population aged 16-60 have low or very low numeracy skills in 
Sunderland, compared to 33% in England as a whole" (Basic Skills Agency, 1998. 
Quoted in, City of Sunderland, 2000: 13). This may well be tile continuation ofa 
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cyclical cultural trend within the town in which the workl'orce skills (or lack ol'tlicin) 
may well be a consequence of previous generations low educational attainniclit levels. 
"A socially telling statistic is the low proportion of Northern children staying oil at 
school age beyond the age of 15, [North 36 per cent; UK 46 per cent]" (House, 
1969: 51). 
GCSE results in the town have continued to remain well below the national 
average for higher grade passes. In 1997,93.7% of Sunderland's pupils gained at 
least one A-G pass, compared with 94.0% nationally but only 35.2% gained five A-C 
grades compared with the national figure of 43.3% (OFSTED, 1998). Thirty years on 
and this highly important aspect of the town's long-term prospects continue to appear 
to be interconnected with a cultural misgiving relating to the education of the town's 
children. 
Robson's (1969) urban geography thesis of Sunderland focused upon the 
human ecology of the town, its working class culture, and its associated attitudes to 
education in the area. Testing a hypothesis of the multivariate sub-areas of attitude to 
education and neighbourhood placement it was found that: 
The neighbourhood, or the immediate physical and social 
environment in which people live, is an important source of some 
of these common forces which influence the development of 
attitudes towards education. 
(Robson, 1969: 199) 
The study did not rely solely upon 'neighbourhood' as tile only variable worthy 
of consideration. Robson, employing the classic Chicagoan sociology of tile early 
twentieth century also took into consideration the importance of the, "home, the 
workplace, the neighbourhood, the influence of relatives, and of other 11orinative factors' 
(ibid) which contribute to 'moulding the attitudes that develop, will depend oil tile 
particular 'social world' of each individual' (ibid: 200). The findings presented from 
this research suggest that the development of attitudes towards education inhibited the 
development of favourable ways of thinking about education in certain areas while 
encouraging it in others (ibid: 215). 
School performance, educational attainment and college/university aspinitions 
have continually been found to be governed (to a very large degree) by social class (see 
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for example, Downes, 1966; Bourdieu, 1974; Hargreaves, 1967; and Corrigaii, 1979). 
Bourdieu suggests, 
The same objective conditions as which determine parental attitudes 
and dominate the major choices in the school career of the child also 
govern the children's attitude to the same choices and, consequently, 
their whole attitude towards school. 
(1974: 74) 
Social Exclusion 
As has been suggested throughout this section, the town has been and remains 
predominantly working class. It has been argued throughout this chapter that for a 
significant section of this population the cyclical nature of poverty has impacted upon 
the town since its industrial development and this has continued until the present day. 
The social, political and economic spheres at local and national level impact 
upon individuals and groups and their shared social dynamics. As Byme states, "When 
we talk and write about 'social exclusion' we are taking about changes in the whole of 
society which have consequences for some of the people in that society" (1999: 1). The 
consequences for 'some of those people' in the town have resulted in a continued cycle 
of 'deprivation', 'exclusion', 'poverty', 'dispossession' or, 'niarginalisation' 
throughout their relationship with the town and its industrial and post-industrial legacy. 
The formation of a 'lowly' class of people be they, 'the lunipcn', 'the 'poor', 
'the excluded', 'the surplus', 'the residuum', 'the underclass' or, as Geoff at the BSS 
Office would often remind me 'the scumlies', have long been the formation of, and 
also at the receiving end, of the consequences of the social, political and economic. 
Like Byrne, (ibid. ) I also prefer Madanipour's definition of social exclusion: 
Social exclusion is defined as a rnulti-dimensional process, in 
which various forms of exclusion are combined: participation 
indecision-making and political processes, access to 
employment and material resources, and integration into 
common cultural processes. When combined, they create acute 
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forms of exclusion that find a spatial manifestation in particular 
neighbourhoods. 
(1999: 22) 
Most of the town's inhabitants are of course integrated within a common 
cultural process, are working and engaged with obtainable material resources. 
However, the clusters of entrenched poverty and wider social exclusion in the town 
raise issues relating to the cultural aspect of what some have considered as all 
'underclass' of the population, 
For Byrne (1999), social exclusion although manifesting in a localised context 
through the decline of manufacturing industries, the development of a fragmented 
service sector employment market and the subsequent structural unemployment this 
has resulted in a structural dynamic affair. For areas such as Sunderland, social 
exclusion becomes localised in its impact but is a global phenomenon in its causes. 
Byme argues: 
The crucial element for any understanding of the nature and 
implication of social exclusion is a grasp of the significance of the 
real dynamics of social life under post-industrial capitalism. These 
dynamics are very different from those of Fordism. Indeed they are 
probably different from the dynamics of advanced capitalist 
societies between the 1860s and 1970s. 
(1999: 126) 
Byrne's argument moves on and away from individualistic accounts of flawed 
people creating their own exclusion from social 'norms', to an account of' those 'doing 
the excluding'. In short, the exclusion is done by sorne people onto other groups of 
people. In this context social exclusion derives from inequality (ibid: 137). 
Murray's highly (politically) influential Losing Ground (1984) and its 
bastardized British sequel, The Emerging British Undcrclass ( 1990) essential ly fiocused 
upon an individualistic account of an inadequately motivated underclass, creatitig their 
own self-exclusion and withdrawal from mainstream society, aided and abetted by tile 
state and an over generous welfare system. His account relates to a state of 
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'dependency' in which, according to Murray, even whenjobs are available the 
underclass will not take them. 
This style of attack upon those 'social misfits' relates to the unintended 
consequences of poorly thought out social policies which have created the 
materialization of the compilation of individuals unwilling to work and accept personal 
responsibility thus creating a 'culture of welfare dependency' through the refusal of 
'poor work' and 'shitjobs'. Lewis's (1966) reference to a 'culture of poverty' was 
subsequently picked up by the American New Right although as Byrne points out, 
"those who picked up the idea failed to pay any attention to the role that Lewis 
assigned to culture as a resource of the poor" (1999: 20). Dennis (1997) and Dennis 
and Erdos (1992) 'ethical socialist' stance provided a UK based view, Mirroring in 
many aspects the New Right position, of absentee fathers and inadequate parenting 
skills of the new residuum as a crucial factor in creating a cyclical trend of 
dispossession and deviance. 
For Wilson (1987,1990), the problems for dispossessed social groups are 
located within the political and economic systems failure of the provision of work. The 
subsequent pockets of social isolation in which the notion of an absence of positive role 
models and the spatialized isolation of employment, are the central and most poignant 
factors relating to social exclusion. Wilson relates the dynamics of urban spatial 
change to the de-industrialised processes of political, economic, and social changes to 
the cultural impacts or, perhaps collision, upon particular social groupings Within those 
isolated settings. 
Rather than purporting an individualistic account Wilson (1997,1996) and 
Wacquant and Wilson (1989), deal with a social collective aspect ofsocial exclusion 
and in dealing with 'numbers' rather than 'Individuals' shifts tile analysis away fi-oln 
individual (flawed) status toward disposed collective social grOLIpilIgS. 'I'lle '11ollowing 
out' (Lash and Urry, 1994) of state involvement and intervention at this stage of 
capitalist development and 'high modernity' (Giddens, 1991: 28) has created a 'risk 
society' (see, Beck, 1992) in which the spatial polarisation within the post- i nd ustrial 
milieu have shaped terrains in which: 
... today's underclass ... inhabit a space charactcrizcd 
by a 
deficit of economic, social and Cultural regulation. In such 
spaces older organized capitalist social -structures- i ndustrial 
labour market, church and family networks, social well'are 
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institutions, trade unions-have dissolved or at least moved 
out ... unlike the spaces of the city centres and the suburbs they 
have not been replaced by the information and communicative 
structure. 
(Lash and Urry, 1994: 8) 
The consequence of this has created a greater degree and concentration of urban 
spatial polarization (Byrne, 1999: 109). This is of course nothing new. The classical 
work of the Chicago School sociologists provided great detail of the urban ecology of 
the city and the symbolic interactionist studies of the urban area and the social groups 
that inhabited them. It was often the case that these types of studies found distinct and 
at times somewhat conflicting sub-cultural practices to those of the mainstream norms 
(see, Downes and Rock, 1989 and Massey and Denton, 1993). Engels (1969) provided 
insight of the distinct differences of the industrial working class and their spatial 
differences to that of the middle class sense and sensibilities during the rnid-nineteenth 
century. Mayhew's (1983) chronicles of a 'London Underworld' and its 'rookeries' as 
separate and distinct sinks of iniquity provided intriguing accounts of the fractures in 
the socio-spatial structure of Victorian English society (also see, Chesney, 1970). 
Anderson's (1998) Ytreetwise, clearly focuses on the largest problems of tile 
Village-Northton community, poverty, drugs, lack of trust between blacks and whites, 
which is a problem of any large city in America. The working class of America is 
often banished to ghetto or low-income areas because the wealthy take their homes in 
the name of gentrification. Most of the people of the Village lack the street wisdom 
that is necessary to live in the city and especially in this specific area where contact 
with people of other races occurs daily. Fear and uncertainty are poorly hidden 
behind the faces of these residents who act out of this fear of blacks rather than 
attempt to learn the street wisdom that would enable them to live more comfortably in 
their community. By placing some of the blame on the de-industrialization ofl-astern 
City and some of it on the federal government's econornic plans, Anderson tries to 
explain why the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer. Tile low skill, 
low education jobs have moved away from the city leaving unskilled and poorly 
educated workers without real job opportunities. They are lorced to work at last flood 
restaurants and other low paying jobs that rarely pay enough to SLIpport themselves 
and their families. The US government's discontinuation of many welfare progranis 
also contributes to the decline of the poor. They can no longer rely oil SLIppleniental 
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income from the government, which puts these people in desperate situations and they 
often turn to crime or they try to leave their neighboLirhoods in search ofbctter 
opportunities. 
In the context of a British underclass much of this rings true (albeit removing 
the distinct racial element found in most of the US studies) with the 'new, lulylpen, 
residuum, underclass, the excluded located within the inner-city sink estates or the 
dispossessed city edge satellite council estates (see Campbell, 1993; Byrne, 1999). 
Yet, as Young suggests, "there is no such precision here: the poor are not as firmly 
corralled as some might make out" (2002: 469). Citing Mooney and Danson's (1997) 
study of social exclusion in Glasgow, Young (ibid) argues that the concept of tile 
'dual city' (not in the issue of social divisions but, ) in terms of distinct borders is 
misplaced as: 
... within peripheral estates there 
is a marked differentiation 
between the various component parts in terms of unemployment, 
poverty and deprivation. This is almost completely neglected in 
the dominant picture of these estates which has emerged in recent 
years which stereotypes the estates as homogenous enclaves of 
'despair' or 'hopelessness'. 
(Mooney and Danson, 1997: 84-5) 
Mooney and Danson present a strong case that dispels the notion that within 
these estates a homogenous static class structure exists. They found that variables 
within the class structure were present and visible and although social exclusion and 
poverty was rife attitudes to that poverty differed. In many ways the study reinforces 
the previous infra-class definitions that were constructed within definitions of tile 
'rough' and the 'respectable' working classes. 
Young's (1999) The Exclusive Society traces the transformation ofrelative 
deprivation in late modernity and the likely impact of this oil the quality and nature of 
crime. Relating the 'golden age' of the 1950s and 1960s to that ofthe period of'lligh 
modernity' in which he claims contradictory elements within society have emerged 
from that 'golden age' of a social embeddedness, and a strong sense ofpersonal and 
social narrative and attempts to assimilate the 'deviant', the immigrant and tile 
6stranger', to the generation during high modernity of, "both economic and 
ontological insecurity, a discontinuity of personal and social narrative, and all 
exclusive tendency towards the deviant" (Young, 2002: 465). 1 lowever, Young's 
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analysis provides a somewhat wistful account of the social construction and tabcllilig 
of the 'lowly' and deviant classes. This neglects the consideration that the 'roLigh, 
and 'respectable' may have always been amongst us and that the historical accotmts 
of the 'deviant' class present evidence that the 'golden age' never quite existed in t1le 
romanticised image that is often conjured up in discussing accounts of' tile working 
class (see, for example Pearson, 1983). 
Bauman's (1998) analysis of capitalist restructuring and the social positioning 
of the 'reserve army of labour' argues that the 'New Poor' are surplus requirements 
in both the production and consumption within the consurner society despite the 
underclass's similar aspirations relating to material wealth. For Bauman; 
The underclass offend all the cherished values of the majority while 
clinging to them and desiring the same joys of consumer life as 
other people boast to have earned. In other words, what Americans 
hold against the underclass in their midst is that its dreams and the 
model of life it desires are so uncannily similar to their own. 
(1998: 73) 
Having discussed a number of theoretical perspectives of social exclusion it is 
to Sunderland that we now return to in order to. Here I assess a number of key areas 
relating to the town's economic and social position and these indicators ofsocio-spatial 
exclusion within the town. Housing statistics in the town are as follows: 
Table Twelve 
Housing Statistics: Number of Dwellings April 2000 
Type 
Owner occupied 
Number 
74,122 
Local authority 37,869 
Housing association 4,695 
Other public sector 90 
Privately rented 4,684 
Total 121,450 
(Source City of Sundcriand, 2001) 
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Table Thirteen 
Average House Prices November 2000 
Housing Type Sunderland UK Average Difference 
Detached f 104,020 f 102,589 f57,963 
Semi-detached f5'3,663 f 92,260 E38,597 
Terraced f 35,816 f 80,014 E44,198 
(Source: City of Sunderland, 2001) 
Unemployment 
In 2000, the unemployment rate of the city totalled approximately 7.5 per cent. These 
figures should be treated with caution as they are based on the official claimant count 
regarding the number of individuals claiming benefit and actively seeking ernploynient. 
It should be recognised that the number of claimants underestimates tile real nuillber of 
people looking for work. In some instances in Sunderland there exist pockets where 
unemployment w as more realistically levelled at 40 to 50 per cent of the working 
population (City of Sunderland, 2000). 
A survey conducted by the local authority found that in one ward of the city 
(Thornley Close) only 25 per cent of people were actually employed in paid 
employment (City of Sunderland, 2000: 12). In 2001, 'the unemployment rate in the 
City is 5.9% compared with a national rate of 3.1 %. Whilst significantly higher than 
the national figure, the Sunderland figure also masks concentrations of deprivation and 
high unemployment in particular wards of the City, where tile unemployment rate 
reaches II W(City of Sunderland, 2001: 2 1). 
An interesting dilemma occurs here as to the use of data within the same local 
authority. The Economic and Develolmient Strategy (City of Sunderland, 2000) clainis 
that in some wards clusters of unemployed people total between 40 to 50 per cent, yet 
one year later, the City qf Sunderland Partnership Conirnunilj)Slralcýqy (City of' 
Sunderland, 2001) estimate the upper level total of unemployment witilill particular 
wards as II per cent. A 29 to 39 per cent reduction in one year appears too far-fetched 
to be achievable no matter what the econornic strategy. Over-esti mati oils, 
exaggerations, and miscalculations do of course occur, yet, it would be reasonable to 
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expect an economic and development strategy to get the sums right. No matter what 
the 'true' or 'realistic' picture of unemployment (in real terms) rates in the City of 
Sunderland, it is clear that the local authority and its partners have a difficult task at 
hand in dealing with a continual cycle of social exclusion in the town. 
Jarvis and Jenkins (1997) analysis of 'low income dynamics' comprised of 
5,500 British households. The research found that despite the large degree of low 
incomes within these households, a small and relatively consistent sub-sample 
remained persistently poor more strikingly was that there appeared to be a relatively 
large number of escapees and entrants into, and out of financial hardship from one year 
to the next. Of the sample, almost one-third had experienced levels of low income at 
least once during a four-year period (ibid: 136). 
The group with low-income at all four stages of the research interview schedule 
mainly comprised of, single pensioners, and families with children headed by a couple 
or lone parent who were not in work. The definition of 'low income' in this study over 
its four year period examined income measure levels, net income and uses the same 
definition of the DSS as 'before housing costs'. The net income of participants was the 
same for all household members and 'hard cash' from all sources, minus direct taxes, 
income tax and National Insurance contributions. It was found that a widespread 
persistent poverty problem existed for these households with 9.8 per cent having had at 
least three low income spells; 17.9 per cent having had two; and 31.3 per cent having 
had one period of low income during the four year period. 
This study found that from one year to the next, significant numbers of both 
low-level income escapees and entrants become trapped in a cyclical motion of poverty 
(ibid: 140). In time there is a significant 'churning over' of the low-level income 
population and of their 'poor work and social exclusion' (ibid). 
Atkinson's (1999) study explored the contribution of modem economics in 
order to understand the relationship between the 'meaning' and causes of social 
exclusion. Atkinson argues in a similar vein to Jarvis and Jenkins (1997), that 
unemployment does cause social exclusion but that a job does not necessarily equate to 
social inclusion. Employment, it is argued, must be acceptably paid and hold out 
prospects for the future and in short, dead-end jobs are not the answer. 
The local economy of Sunderland is of course considerably matched to that of 
the regional economy of the North east (although it is noted that differences within this 
economic barometer will exist). The economic long-term forecasting within Tyne & 
Wear demonstrates that the region, with Sunderland in particular, has a relatively weak 
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business link within the globalized economy. Tyne & Wear accounted 1101- four PCr Cent 
of all British participants on 'New Deal for Young People' and 3.3 per cent oftlic 
British total on 25+ 'New Deal' and the average earnings are significantly lower than 
the British average (Tyne & Wear Research and Information, 2000 : 2). All ofthese 
economic implications will have severe negative implications upon specific sectors of' 
the town's population. 
And, On a Sick Note 
Townsend, Phillimore and Beattie's (1986) study of early 1980s deprivation of the 
North-east region found that Sunderland possessed five of the regions twenty-five 
'worst' deprived wards (1986: 89). Employing indicators of unemployment, car- 
ownership, home ownership and overcrowding (in homes) this study found deep- 
pockets of long-standing deprivation in a number of Sunderland's wards. Tile study 
also found that those on 'permanent sick' were relatively high. As the following table 
demonstrates, 'sickness' and 'incapacity' rates of the local population have remained at 
a higher than average level. 
Table Fourteen 
(SOLirce: ibid: 105) 
The authors relate the levels of permanent sickness within the region (and the 
town) as a consequence of the industrial employment period relating to the levels of' 
poor health in the town. They also make the connection that equates 'sickness' to 
economic deprivation as being closely associated. 
The numbers of people in the town suffering from long-term 111ness or who are 
incapable of working throughout the North cast region are substantial. SLInderland tops 
the league of numbers of people receiving (100%) incapacity benefit inTync and Wcar 
with a staggering 22,094 (Tyne and Wear Research mid Informatioil, 2000: 48). The 
salient rise in sicicness/incapacity rates, 1986-2002, present a quite rernarkabic increase. 
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Table Fifteen 
Increasing Incapacity Benefit Recipients (1986 & 2002) 
1986 6,497 
2002 21,500 331% 
(Source: Townsend, Phillimore and Beattie's, 1986; National Statistics, 2002) 
It may expected that the levels of incapacity to be higher during the 1980s (the 
swan song of the town's industrial base), the heavy industrial work would have taken its 
toll upon many employees. The most recent figures (above) are impossible to analyse 
as to what ailments are the main incapacitations for this group from tile town's 
population. This of course may be a legacy of the former heavy industries found on 
Wearside, for example, shipbuilding and coal mining. 
Incapacity benefit claimants in the city are over represented in contrast to its 
population size. The following table highlights the scale of the incapacitated work aged 
population. 
Table Sixteen 57 
Working Aged Incapacity in the City of Sunderland: Number of Incapacity 
Benefits Claimants, August 2002 
MaIJS Female 59 Total 
12,900 8,600 21,500 
(Source: National Statistics, 2003) 
If a comparative analysis of the working population to that of the incapacitated 
claimants is applied the following data are assembled. 
57 The data for this chart was SUPlIlied as personal corrcspondcncc by a contact at the National SOHMICI ( )t*I'ILL', 
Newcastle upon Tync in. )an. 2003, The figures arc rounded to the nearest hundred and are I)ASCLI on A fiVC I)CI (CIIt 
sample and are therefore subject to a degree of sampling v-atiation. The original source for the thia mc 'hiconic 
Statistical I-aiquiry, Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) Information Centre. August 2002 
5H This figure includes 3,500 cases where the claimant receives National Insurance credits only. Working aged nialos In 
this, instance are aged between 16 and 64 due to differences in retirement age. 
ý')This figure includes 3,500 cases where the claimant receives National I nsurancc credits Ofllý'. l'umales are aged 16-59 
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Table Seventeen: Incapacity Rate 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
All Incapacitated Difference Ratio 
Employee Jobs (A-B) (B to A) 
104,300 21,500 107,500 4.85 
This calculation presents quite an outstanding figure of the number of incapacitated 
working aged population in the city. The number claiming Incapacity Benefit (Colunin 
B) is divided into the numbers of all employeejobs (Column A), and presents a 
remarkable ratio of approximately one in five of the working aged population in 
Sunderland are long-term incapacitated. The corresponding table (below) presents data 
that demonstrate the deep-rooted levels of the 'incapable' work force within the town. 
Table Eighteen 
Working Aged Population, Employment (EA), Incapacity in Sunderland 1999- 
2000 
Persons EA60 Adults Incapacity Ratio 
16-59 (working) (Benefit) 16-59 
16-59 16-59 (IncapablefWorking) 
171.400 124.100 22,094 1 in 5 
(72.4%) (17.8%) 
(Source: DETR and TWRI, 2000) 
These figures demonstrate the sheer scale of incapacity (perhaps as a legacy of 
the final stages of the town's overly romanticised ('industrial white finger', 'gamnly 
leg' and, 'a bad-back' included) industrial heritage. It is also suggested that the 
adaptation to the post-industrial milieu of the town has, and I suggest this without 
wanting to spoil a 'good thing' for those beneficiaries, adapted and deviated to the 
available options opened and facilitated by the State. The above table goes some way 
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in providing a snap-shot of the sheer scale of exclusion within the town. It does not 
however, demonstrate the full picture of the 'employment deprived' popukition of' 
Sunderland. The 1998-99 figures for unemployment claimant benefit iii the towii 
totalled 9,773 (DETR and TWRI, 2000). Coupled with the 22,094 incapacity benel-it 
claimants (ibid) in the town at this time the total number of 'employment deprived' 
totalled 30,302 of the employment aged population in Sunderland (ibid). 
Table Nineteen 
Employment Deprived Population of Sunderland 1998-1999 
(A) Employment Employment 
EA Adults 16-59 124,100 Deprived Deprived 
Ratio and 'Vo 
(B) Ratio 
Unemployment Benefit Claimants 9,773 9,773 Approx I in 4 
(A -B and C') 
(C) 22,094 22,094 'Y" 
Incapacity Benefit Claimants 17.80 
(13 wid C hito A) 
Total 155,967 31,867 
(Source: DETR and TWRI, 2000) 
The national average of Incapacity Benefit (113) claimants in the LJK in 2001 
stood at approximately 7 per cent. Regionally, this figure stood at 15 per cent. In 
Sunderland the corresponding figure in 2000 was approximately 18 per cent. 
Table Twenty 
National, Regional and Local IB Figures 
National Tyne & Wear Sunderland 
2,800,000 74,025 22,084 
TYO 151yo 18, yo 
(Source: Tyne & Wear Research and Inflorniation, 2001) 
61) TA', FImployinctit Aged 
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Nationally, one in three people between 50 and State Pension Age, 2.8 million 
in total, do not work and the proportion of men in this age group not working has 
doubled since 1979 (Cabinet Office, 2000: Sect. 4). Only a minority of those affected 
are affluent people who freely chose to retire early and almost half rely on benefits 
for most of their income, most commonly Incapacity Benefit. There has been no 
surge in volunteering, learning or caring among this age group (ibid). The 
Government argue that this situation causes poverty, exclusion and disillusionment 
for individuals. However, it was also exclusion from the employment market that 
drove many of them to this in the first place for of these incapacity benefit claimants, 
the majority generally sought out employment during their initial periods of enforced 
redundancy (ibid). 
This should be noted as a long-standing (and perhaps cyclical) trend within the 
town. The 1991 Census of Population recorded substantially more unemployment in 
the Tyne & Wear region than the official claimant count for most groups. For both 
men and women over the age of forty-five the Census recorded unemployment at about 
a third higher than the claimant count (TWRI, 2002: 6). The 1991 census also recorded 
that in Tyne & Wear there were large numbers of the population who described 
themselves as unable to work due to long-term sickness or disability. 'In Tyne & 
Wear, in 1991,25,000 men aged 45-64, one in five of men in this age group, described 
themselves in this way as 'permanently sick' (TWRI, 2002: 7). 
Yet, in 1986 a total of 6,497 individuals in Sunderland were claiming 
incapacity benefit. In 2002 this figure totalled 21,500 of an approximate available 
workforce of 114,000. This increase in employment incapacity represents a stinging 
331 per cent increase over a sixteen-year time scale. . 
It been acknowledged that, 'the population of Sunderland has significantly 
worse health problems than with national averages with great variations within the city 
itself (City of Sunderland, 2001: 3 1) it is also clear that the sheer size of the 'sick note' 
problem may go well beyond the frequency of industrial injuries incurred during the 
industrial era that the town was once a major player within. In January 2002, male 
unemployment benefit recipients in the town stood at 8.9 per cent while female 
unemployment totalled 2.5 per cent. This totalled an unemployment level of 6.1 per 
cent (Office for National Statistics, 2002). 
It is worth considering that the extraordinary levels of long-term incapacity in 
the town are very much an ailment of the post-industrial period. These are survival 
strategies that many of the claimants in the city have adapted to. The level of Income 
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Support Benefit claimants in the city also confirms the extent of some aspects of social 
exclusion encountered by large numbers of the population in the city. In August 2002, 
the total number of Income Support benefit claimants totalled 27,355. The number of 
people of working age in the city who are without, or cannot work, as a crude 
calculation due to the data being representative of different years, albeit, with a margin 
of five years, is approximately 48,855. 
Summary 
The consequences of the town's reliance upon two major industrial employment 
resources and its failure to diversify to the needs of the global economy were 
throughout its industrial progress, and continue to be in its post-industrial arena, a 
negative aspect of its progression. It was a working class town and is a working class 
town. Poverty, dispossession, and social exclusion (whatever terminology is in 
sociological vogue at any given point) have, and continue to impact upon large number 
of the town's past and present populace. It was, and is dominated primarily by the 
rough and respectable working classes in all most every aspect of consideration a post- 
industrial working class conurbation. 
The North east has the lowest level of household income in the UK and a 
greater dependence upon Social Security benefits and pensions than average UK 
households (Tyne and Wear Research and Information, 2000: 10). In January 1999,28 
per cent of all school children in the town were eligible for school meals. In 1998,21 
per cent of the population were under the age of 16 and 20 per cent were aged 60 or 
over. Sunderland is ranked 15th highest deprived area by the Indices of Population 2003 
(ýDý. neighbourhood. statisties. gov. uk). 
Sunderland has the unfortunate distinction of possessing nine of the most 
deprived 10 per cent of wards in England (Income Deprivation in Tyne and Wear, 
2001: 29). The town has twenty-five wards in total and nine of these are within the 10 
per-cent of the most deprived in England. It is therefore fair to argue that 
approximately one third (36 per cent) of the population of the city reside in some of the 
most deprived and socially excluded neighbourhoods in England. Four of the wards 
(Southwick, South Hylton, Grindon, and Thorney Close) have child poverty scores of 
over 65 per cent (TWRI, 2001: 29) and the majority of wards in Sunderland have child 
poverty scores ranging between 35 per cent and 55 per cent (ibid). Sunderland is a 
dispossessed City with large numbers of socially excluded individuals and groups 
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within its population. It is hardly surprising that due to the well established inter- 
connection between poverty and deviant behaviour that the town also has its fair share 
of young offenders. Pockets of deep unemployment have continued to exist. In many 
of those deep pockets of unemployment House referred to in 1969 a number of issues 
relating to the population's social exclusion remain unresolved. 
Those areas remain poor dispossessed and 'rough' neighbourhoods. Within 
them are located a number of young offenders who are now discussed. Much of the 
analyses of the underclass is utilised as a generic term for young, unemployed people 
who commit crimes. Crime and deviance are often presented as the principle activities 
of the underclass (Murray. 1990). However, the range of criminal possibilities open to 
these socially excluded youths is limited. Yet, in many ways the crimes they commit 
are directly linked to their exclusion and the urban hazards they encounter in this town 
which relate to issues such as education, housing and health. 
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